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In 2002, there was a famine in Malawi with death estimates ranging from 300 to 3,000[1] Rising levels of poverty, food shortages, and political and economic issues all contributed to the resulting famine. The harvest in the latter half of 2002 alleviated the worst of the famine, but Malawi has since entered a food crisis that has persisted to this day.[2]

85 percent of Malawians’ primary source of income comes from agriculture, and maize is the primary crop grown and consumed.[3] Unusual rainfall and flooding in 2001 sparked a food crisis in 2001 that worsened until 2006.[4] The 2000/2001 maize harvest fell from 2.5 million to 1.7 million metric tons, creating a national deficit of 273,000 metric tons. In February 2002, the Malawi government announced that there was a food emergency and that the country was in a State of Disaster.[5] President Bingu wa Mutharika declared a national disaster on October 15, 2005[6] and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimated that there are 46,000 severely malnourished children.[7]

Background and factors involved

Scholars trace back Malawi’s food crisis to 1991 and 1992, when a drought in southern Africa severely reduced Malawi’s maize production. The price of maize shot up: the cost of maize, which is 54% of the average caloric intake for Malawians[8], almost doubled between 1992 and 1993.[9] Although there was a maize surplus in 1993 due to improved rainfall and government-subsidized hybrid maize seed and fertilizer, food consumption did not increase.[10]

Since then, periodic droughts and floods continued to affect Malawi.[11] Between 1990 and 2006, there were 33 weather-related disasters, a rise from the 7 that occurred between 1970 and 1989.[11] Malawi’s economy is heavily agricultural; most people survive on their own harvest and sell the excess to make a small income.[12] The high number and increasing severity of droughts and floods since 1990 has impacted much of the country’s population—farmers had little ability to adapt to or recover from disasters, making them more vulnerable to future events, and the cycle of poverty and hunger worsened.[11]

From the early 1970s to 1994, the government subsidized hybrid maize growth. When the government stopped this program because it was becoming too expensive support, maize production fell and price increased.[11]

Political factors

The National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) was created in 1999 to manage the strategic grain reserve in disaster relief. However, it quickly incurred a debt of 1 billion MK due to the high interest rate of 56% at which it bought 165,000 metric tons of maize. In 2001, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommended the government to sell the grain reserve because harvest had been ample in 2000 and there seemed to be little use for such a large reserve and because the grain itself was rotting. NFRA followed the IMF’s advice and sold a majority of its reserve to Kenya and Mozambique.<ref=Number15 /><ref=Number16 /> While some partially blame the IMF for the food crisis, others recognize that the grain was old and expensive to store and at the time, it made sense to advise NFRA to sell.<ref=Number16 />

By 2002, when the worst of the famine hit, this reserve was depleted, and the government did not have any additional resources. The situation was exacerbated by the government’s poor preparation in replenishing the reserve sources as they were used.<ref=Number12 /> Furthermore, private traders bought out much of the grain reserve, and resold it at excessive prices when food was scarce in 2001.<ref=Number15 /> The government began importing maize from neighboring countries and abroad, but the maize was slow to arrive.<ref=Number12 /> From congested roads to inefficiently rerouted trucks and overcrowded ports, there were a variety of transportation bottlenecks that delayed the arrival of food aid.<ref=Number16 /> Additionally, poor relationships with some donor countries made them slow to respond; many were suspicious of the IMF’s involvement in depleting the strategic grain reserve, and others were wary of government corruption.<ref=Number16 />

Furthermore, many farmers in Malawi were unequipped to handle the frequent weather disasters. The existing policies for disaster management, the National Adaptation Programme of Action, do not take into consideration gender and health, only agriculture and environment.<ref=Number5 /> Most disaster and climate change management occurs on a national level, and not all policies and practices trickle down to local communities; district leaders in Nsanje and Salima did not know that the NAPA existed when asked in 2006.<ref=Number5 />

Economic factors

Most of Malawi’s population is rural and agricultural; there are few industry- or service-related jobs.<ref=Number15 /> Some are able to work on large tobacco plantations, find jobs in cities, or migrate to neighboring countries for low-wage jobs, but there are few openings.<ref=Number 16 />

Malawi’s current economic policy toes the line between liberalization, a laissez-faire market, and regulation, a state-determined market. a government-owned corporation and one of the primary suppliers of maize, controls some of the market and makes food available in poorer and more vulnerable areas. The liberal part of the economy allowed maize prices to rocket from 4MK/kg in June 2001 to 40+MK/kg in January 2002. The daily wage for workers, however, remained the same at 20MK/day.<ref=Number15 />

Malawi’s agricultural policies are also problematic: the country’s economy is heavily reliant on maize, and efforts to diversify crops have been unsuccessful.<ref=Number12 /> Therefore, a majority of its population suffered when the crop production, especially maize production, failed in 2001, because people could no longer grow food for themselves and did not have an income to purchase food.

Tobacco, the main export product in Malawi, has declined in sales. Since the 1980s, its revenue has decreased by 50%, and thus the income and purchasing power of small farmers has decreased.<ref=Number15 /> In 2000/2001, many small farmers failed to repay their loans. Therefore, in 2001/2002, many were unable to receive credit with which to buy seeds and fertilizer for their crops.<ref=Number22 />FAO 2002</ref>

Social factors

Poverty is widespread in Malawi, with 50% of its population living under the poverty line of $2/day according to the World Bank.<ref=Number17>World Bank 2013</ref> Most of its impoverished population is rural and depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, which generates little income.<ref=Number17 /><ref=Number16 /> Thus, the rural poor were especially vulnerable to the food crisis because they could not afford to buy food when their harvests failed.<ref=Number16 />

Some have speculated that since 1994, when democracy was established in Malawi, there has been a social shift away from community solidarity. During the 1991/1992 drought, communities banded together and supported one another, giving food and employment to those that needed it. During the 2001/2002 food crisis, however, peoples’ philosophies changed to an “anarchic mob justice,” an “everyone for himself” attitude.<ref=Number16 />

HIV/AIDS affects about 15% of Malawians.<ref=Number16 /> Households with adults affected by HIV/AIDS and households without adults due to HIV/AIDS have significantly lower agricultural productivity. Not only are those with HIV/AIDS prevented from working the fields, but other people must take care of them and a portion of the household income must go to medication and funerals. Thus, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS has made many Malawians vulnerable during the food crisis.<ref=Number18>Meera, et al. 2002</ref>

Ecological factors

The soil in Malawi is in poor condition, due to many farmers’ historical inability to afford fertilizer.<ref=Number4>Hardy 1998</ref> There are few easy solutions to maintaining soil fertility; Malawi is too poor to import organic materials to restore soil nutrients, and land is too scarce to allocate large plots of land to soil restoration4. Individual farmers cannot afford fertilizer for their land.<ref=Number16 /> Therefore, food production levels are also largely affected by the declining soil fertility and land shortages.

Poor land use and deforestation has also been suggested to play a role in the increasing droughts and floods.<ref=Number5 /> Large tobacco farms have replaced forests, and commercial farmers have cut down reeds along rivers that control flooding.<ref=Number5 />


Government response

In October 2005 Malawi President Bingu wa Mutharika called all of the nation a "disaster area" and said the government would spend $50 million to import 330,000 tons of corn from South Africa, but that the country still needs an additional 158,000 tons to sustain the country until next harvest season.[13]

Relief efforts and effects

In 2002 United Nations Children's Fund stated the foreign community was ignoring the crisis. Thereza Banda, Malawi co-ordinator for nutrition, stated that 6,000 children were on the verge of death while 65,000 were malnourished.[14] School attendance also dropped with 500,000 children absent. During the peak of the food crisis in 2002, the government reports 500 people died from starvation.[15]

The World Food Program warned that the number of most vulnerable people was more than five million, and the United Nations is called for a major increase in aid to the region. In August the United Nations appealed for US $88 million of donations to Malawi, with only $28 million pledged.

International aid is also needed to help build irrigation systems. Currently only 2% of cultivated land is irrigated,[16] and the government is trying to increase irrigation to reduce reliance on rainfall.

Cultural references

There is a personal account of the famine by William Kamkwamba in his book The Boy Who Harnessed the Wind. The government estimate of famine deaths appears to be severely understated.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Devereux 2002
  2. ^ Phillips, E 2007
  3. ^ Lilliston, B and Ranallo, A 2012
  4. ^ Devereux 2002
  5. ^ IMF 2002
  6. ^ "Malawi issues food crisis appeal". BBC. 2005-10-15. Retrieved 2007-12-13.
  7. ^ "High stakes for Malawi's children as malnutrition rises". UNICEF. 2005-10-14. Retrieved 2007-12-13.
  8. ^ Minot 2010
  9. ^ United Nations 1994
  10. ^ Hayes 1997
  11. ^ a b c d ActionAid 2006
  12. ^ Dorward and Kydd 2004
  13. ^ Associated Press With food crisis worsening, Malawi pleads for aid (October 17, 2005) St. Petersburg Times. Last accessed on 2006-12-31.
  14. ^ World 'ignoring' African food crisis(20 August 2002) BBC News. Retrieved on 2006-01-04.
  15. ^ Malawi officials blamed for food crisis (6 August 2002)BBC News. Retrieved on 2006-01-04.
  16. ^ "Malawi faces food crisis". ABC Radio National. 2005. Retrieved 2008-02-21.

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References

  • Devereux, Stephen. “The Malawi Famine of 2002.” IDS Bulletin 33 (2002): 70-78.
  • Phillips, Erica. “The 2002 Malawi Famine.” In Food Policy for Developing Countries: Case Studies, ed. Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Fuzhi Cheng.
  • Lilliston, Ben and Ranallo, Andrew. “Grain Reserves and the Food Price Crisis: Selected Writings from 2008-2012.” June 2012. Institution for Agriculture and Trade Policy.
  • Devereux, Stephen. “State of Disaster: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Lessons from Malawi.” June 2002. ActionAid. Lilongwe, Malawi: ActionAid.
  • “Malawi—The Food Crises, the Strategic Grain Reserve, and the IMF.” July 2002. International Monetary Fund. Washington, DC: IMF.
  • Minot, Nicholas. “Staple food prices in Malawi.” January 2010. Prepared for the Comesa policy seminar on “Variation in staple food prices: Causes, consequence, and policy options.” Maputo, Mozambique:African Agricultural Marketing Project (AAMP). http://fsg.afre.msu.edu/aamp/seminar_3/AAMP_Maputo_22_Malawi_ppr.pdf
  • “Update on the Nutrition Situation, 1994: Chapter 2, Recent Nutrition Trends in 14 Countries, Malawi.” November 1994. Prepared in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute. Washington, D.C.: United Nations. http://www.unsystem.org/scn/archives/rwns94update/ch14.htm
  • Hayes, L.M., Minae, S., Bunderson, W.T., Bodnar, F. & Ngugi, D. "The potential of improved fallows on small holder maize productivity on food security in Malawi." 1997. Paper presented at the International Symposium on The Science and Practice of Short-term Fallows. Lilongwe, Malawi.
  • “Climate change and smallholder farmers in Malawi.” ActionAid. October 2006. https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc_lib/malawi_climate_change_report.pdf
  • Dorward, Andrew and Kydd, Jonathan. “The Malawi 2002 food crisis: the rural development challenge.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 42 (2004): 343-361.
  • Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States (FAO). 2002. “Special Report FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Malawi.” Rome, Italy: FAO.
  • World Bank. “Malawi Overview.” Last modified October 2013. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malawi/overview
  • Meera Kaul Shah, Nick Osborne, Thoko Mbilizi and George Vilili, Impact of HIV/AIDS on Agricultural Productivity and Rural Livelihoods in the Central Region of Malawi, CARE International in Malawi, Lilongwe, January 2002.
  • Hardy, P. “Malawi soil fertility issues and options.” 1998. Discussion Paper. http://www.reading.ac.uk/ssc/n/TIP%20Archive%20CD/related%20materials/SoilfertOpt/Malawistarterpack.pdf
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