September 11 intelligence before the attacks

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In December 1998, the CIA's Counterterrorist Center reported to President Bill Clinton that al-Qaeda was preparing for attacks in the U.S. that might include hijacking aircraft.[1][2] Another warning came from Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, in April 2001, in a speech before the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium where he asked for humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan. Massoud told the parliament that his intelligence agents had gained limited knowledge about a large-scale terrorist attack on U.S. soil being imminent. Massoud was assassinated by al Qaeda two days before the 9/11 attacks on September 9, 2001.[3]

In July 2001, J. Cofer Black, CIA's couterterrorism chief and George Tenet, CIA's director, met with Condolezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, to inform her about communications intercepts and other top-secret intelligence showing the increasing likelihood that al-Qaeda would soon attack the United States. Rice listened but was unconvinced, having other priorities on which to focus. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld questioned the information suggesting it was a deception meant to gauge the U.S. response.[4][5]

On August 6, 2001, the President's Daily Briefing, entitled Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US warned that bin Laden was planning to exploit his operatives' access to the U.S. to mount a terrorist strike: FBI information... indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country, consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attack.[6] Rice responded to the claims about the briefing in a statement before the 9/11 Commission stating the brief was "not prompted by any specific threat information" and "did not raise the possibility that terrorists might use airplanes as missiles."[7]

  1. ^ Schmidt, Susan (July 18, 2004). "1998 Memo Cited Suspected Hijack Plot by Bin Laden". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2011-09-03.
  2. ^ "Bin Ladin Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks". Director of Central Intelligence. December 4, 1998. Retrieved 2011-09-03.
  3. ^ Boettcher, Mike (November 6, 2003). "How much did Afghan leader know?". CNN.com. Retrieved June 11, 2011.
  4. ^ Washington Post, Two Months Before 9/11, an Urgent Warning to Rice http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/30/AR2006093000282.html
  5. ^ Blanton, Thomas S. (2004-04-12). "The President's Daily Brief". National Security Archive. {{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
  6. ^ Blanton, Thomas S. (2004-04-12). "The President's Daily Brief". National Security Archive. {{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
  7. ^ "Transcript of Rice's 9/11 commission statement". CNN. 19 May 2004. Retrieved 14 March 2012.