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1974 South Side train collision

• The last serious accident on CTA lines occurred in September 1974 when 41 persons were taken to hospitals and six were admitted. There were four serious accidents in 1974, the worst on May 10 when 224 passengers were taken to a hospital alter a similar rear-end collision at a South Side station.

1976 Kennedy Expressway train collision

Background

Explain the creation of the Kennedy Expressway RT and the A/B system?

• This was one of many incidents with the opening of the Kennedy Expressway rapid transit.

Collision

On January 9, 1976, at 7:59 am local time,

• On January 9, 1976, at 8:06 a.m., Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) train No. 315 struck the rear end of train No. 104 while it was standing at the Addison Street Station platform in Chicago, Illinois.
• The train collision happened on January 9, 1976 at 8:15 am.
• An estimated 600 riders on the trains, Loop bound.
• The six-car train was stopped at the Addison Street station when it was slammed in the rear by a four-car train traveling south at 15 to 30 miles per hour.
• The moving train was not supposed to stop at Addison, but was on the correct track when the incident occurred.
• Zero degree weather.
• The rear car in the standing train was a hulk of mangled metal and splintered glass tipped upward at a 45-degree angle.
• The accident happened at 8:07 am.
• The standing train was a "A" schedule train; the approaching train was a "B" schedule train. The line was the Milwaukee line.
• The approaching "B" train had four cars.
• The standing "A" train. was making an "A" stop at an "A" station.
  • his cab signal system emitted a steady beeping that indicated it was not working properly. He requested for it to be shut off.
  • he was given the permission from his supervisor to bypass the cab-signal safety system and operate the train manually.
• One CTA train ran into the rear of another CTA train at the Addison Street station.
• A "crowded" CTA train plowed into the rear of another "loaded" CTA train, parked in an Expressway station.
• The rear car of the standing train was telescoped, trapping passengers in this car.
• It seems that the approaching train smashed into the standing train 4 seats deep and pushed the standing train 15 yards forward.
• Thomas Buck said there were approximately 500 people aboard both "six car" southbound trains.
• The crash occurred at 8:15 am.
• Happened at the Addison Street Station, which is situated in the median of the Kennedy Expressway.
• Quoted as happening on the "south side"?
• A six-car electric train stopped at a station on the city's northwest side.
• A second four-car train plowed into the rear end of the standing train.
• A crowded train slammed into the rear of another train that was stopped at a station in the morning of 9 January 1976.
• The aisle of the rear car buckled with the force of impact, and seats in five cars were torn loose and smashed.
• "Glass sprayed in all directions"
• Tom Buck estimated the number of people on the trains.
• The leading six-car "A" train was stopped when it was rammed by the 4 car "B" train that was not scheduled to stop at the addison "A" station.
  • During the morning rush hour on January 9, 1976, train #104 experienced a power interruption on 3 cars of it's six-car train.
  • The train coasted to a stop in the Addison Street Station platform.
  • It remained there for two minutes, then it was rammed from the rear by train #315.
    1. 315 was dispatched from the Jefferson Park terminal using manual bypass mode because the cab signal system was out of order. The train phone was also out of order at the time of it's departure.
  • Car availability was low, so #315 dispatched with four-cars instead of six.
    1. 315 was authorized to depart in bypass mode by the rail service supervisor (dispatcher).
  • Addison was not a scheduled stop for #315.
• Emergency Radiophones on both trains involved were malfunctioning, according to both motormen in hearing for the NTSB investigation.
• The motorman of the standing train testified he was delayed in leaving the Addison Street station.
• The motorman of the standing train was delayed two minutes because the circuit breakers on three of the six cars on the train malfunctioned.
• The motorman on the standing train, Walenty J. Sofer, tried to call the CTA line supervisor on his emergency radiophone to alert him about the malfunction and delay, but the phone didn't work.
• Ross, motorman of the approaching train, testified that his emergency phone malfunctioned before leaving the terminal at the beginning of his run.
• Ross testified he received permission from a CTA yard supervisor at Jefferson Park to proceed without the system in operation.
• Ross claimed he was blinded by the glare from the sun between the Irving Park and Addison stations. He didn't see the train stopped at the station until it was too late.
• Ross said he was temporarily blinded by the glare of sun and snow.
• Ross said his train was 300 feet away from the Addison train when he saw the standing train, according to Hubert H. Jewell.
• Jewell said the standing train was delayed 3 minutes because of a power failure in the rear car.
• Ross said he was traveling 30-35 mph when he saw the train. He applied his emergency brakes, but it was too late.

The impact of the collision damaged every car of both trains and telescoped the lead car of the approaching train into the standing train.

• There were 600 passengers on the two trains.
• The "fail-safe" on the train wasn't working and was off when the accident happened, according to CTA officials.
• The impact forces extensively damaged the lead car of the moving train and the rear car of the standing train, and slightly damaged the other cars in both trains.

Rescue/Recovery

• At least 340 people injured.
• It was "initially" reported that no one died.
• Rescue workers had to use torches to free at least two of the trapped passengers. Others scrambled out through shattered windows.
• Some passengers reported screams and panicked efforts to escape; Police sgt. Lawrence Schreiber stated it was strangely quiet.
• Blood and broken bones.
• The list of injured passengers wasn't available that Friday.
• 379 passengers were injured.
• The accident caused a traffic jam that lasted for hours; rescue equipment, cleanup operations, and rubbernecking were listed as contributing factors. Police cars were placed at entrances to the Kennedy Expressway to reroute traffic, some being placed near Lawrence Avenue. Edens Expressway suffered similar conditions.
• The most severe injuries occurred to passengers in the sixth/last car of the standing train at the Addison Street station and the first car of the approaching four-car train that collided with it.
• Firemen and the police removed all injured passengers from the trains within 45 minutes of the collision.
• Damaged cars were moved to the Jefferson Park station, which was the line's terminal at the time, and service to inbound trains resumed at 9:45 pm CST.
• The fire department was alerted at 8:08 am CST.
• The rescue mission involved 10 ambulances, a helicopter, two "flying squad" units with cutting tools, jacks, torches, and two snorkels.
• Injured passengers were taken to nine area hospitals.
• 100 additional passengers told CTA via phone that they would consult their own personal health professionals for examination and treatment.
• Ross left the incident without major injuries.
• One person died in this incident.
• more than 400 people went to the hospital
• no deaths were (initially) reported, but the Chicago Hospotal Council and nine hospotals said 404 people reported for treatment.
• Northwest Memorial said it had 103 of the injured and six required major surgery.
• Rescue efforts were conducted in 1 degree weather.
• There weren't any screams.
• A 61 year-old man, Kenneth Biere, who was injured in the crash died the following Saturday.
• He was one of "61" people hospitalized after the collision.
• More than 200 of the 600 passengers aboard were treated at local hospitals.
• It was apparent to Police Supt. James Rochford that people were critically hurt.
• Four of the injured had to be cut free from the wreckage.
• Two that were trapped in the wreckage were in the motorman's cab of the "A" train. This cab wasn't occupied by CTA staff at the time, and passengers used the empty seats.
• People coming out of the cars with bloody noses and cuts on their faces.
• They were rushing to get out of the cars as quickly as possible.
  • As 315 approached the station, the glare of the sun temporarily blinded the motorman; he did not see train 104 stalled at the station. Then the accident happened.
• The crash killed one passenger and injured 310.
• The fire department's snorkel squad no. 1 showed up first.
• According to the Lt. Robert Sutherland, they found six passengers in one far on the first train lying under a big clump of twisted steel frames. The metal floor had buckled, and their arms and legs were under the floor.
• They must've been in a lot of pain, but they were great about it. No one complained; one woman fainted after she was rescued.
• "I could see teeth on the floor"
• Of the 381 passengers who were injured in the collision, 1 passenger died.

Investigation

• CTA issued a statement late friday. It said that its preliminary investigation showed that the moving train was being operated manually because of an apparent malfunction of the automatic signal equipment of the lead car of the train.
• CTA, FRA, and NTSB began an investigation immediately.
• A special investigation by industry experts was lead by William J Ronan, head of PATH.
• This incident was investigated by the NTSB and the FRA.
• Ross passed his drug tests.
• Ross was immediately suspended, pending the outcome of an investigation.
• According to Jewell, Ross "followed the guidelines the CTA has to allow him to operate this train in bypass (manually)."
  • he was going the CTA speed limit of 30-35 mph while (attempting) to go through Addison station.
  • he immediately applied the emergency break. It was confirmed that all three breaking mechanisms were activated when the collision occurred.
  • he was approximately 300 feet away when he saw the standing train.
  • he was "blinded by the sun and glare from snow".
• McKinly Ross, the motorman who was driving the approaching train, told Hubert Jewell the lead investigator for NTSB and FRA's investigation:
• Motorman McKinly Ross was blamed for the incident.
• Ross said the signal system malfunctioned and a blinding glare from the sun prevented him from seeing the other train.
• CTA acknowledged that the motorman of the second train, McKinley Ross, 35 at the time, was allowed to turn off the fail safe.
• The device was out of order, and he was told to turn it off, according to the CTA.
• The Urban Mass Transit Administration Safety Program Manager investigated this collision.
  • The motorman on train #104 hadn't yet received a reponse from central control when he reported the "blue condition" by the train phone.
  • Trains dispatched from Jefferson Park were running late.
    1. 315 motorman was left with no other tools but his own sight, due to the cab signal system not working and the train phone not working.
• A NTSB hearing with the motormen occurred on February 3, 1976.
• The motorman of the standing train testified he failed to order his conductor to flag down trains behind him.
• Federal investigators questioned the CTA flagging process, considering rush-hour trains are only operated at three-minute intervals.
• The CTA controller in charge of the line that morning testified that he received no calls and learned about the crash from a bus supervisor who was contacted by the police.
• Carl Myer, the rail controller, said he heard a noise on the radiophone system, but heard inaudible noise when attempting to answer.
• Ross said the crash could've been avoided if the automatic train control worked.
• The control system is designed to warn motormen with lights and warning buzzers when they are approaching another train. If they fail to apply brakes, the system is supposed to stop the train automatically.
• Sofer said he did not order his conductor to flag down following trains because he thought he would be able to fix the circuit breaker quickly. He was trying to "save time".
• John Gorman, the CTA dispacher who sent ross' train on it's way with the malfunctioning equipment said he did so because "[Ross was] a good motorman." and they didn't have replacement equipment, and it was rush hour.
• He didn't give Ross any special instructions, and communicated to him through a third party, the Jefferson Park yard foreman.
• The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the motorman of train No. 315 to perceive standing train No. 104 at a sufficient distance to permit him to stop his train before striking No. 104.
• Contributing to the collision was the rule that permitted the operation of the train with the automatic train control and the cab signals inoperative.
• Contributing to the collision was the lack of consistent enforcement of operating rules.
• Contributing to the collision was the absence of flag protection against following trains.
• Contributing to the collision was the failure of the train phone system to provide reliable communications.
• Contributing to the collision was the violation of the 25-mph speed limit required by Rule 178B.
• Damage to the equipment and track was estimated to be $267,000.

Aftermath

• David Young and Clarence Page of the Chicago Tribune labeled the event "the worst accident in the six-year history of the Kennedy Expressway rapid transit line" at the time.
• After this incident and the 1977 Chicago Loop derailment, CTA voted to allow an outside consulting firm to study the safety of their network. It costed them $286940.
  • The concentration of the study was to find ways to improve alertness among it's motormen and evaluate the human factors of the two crashes.
• The US Urban Mass Transportation Administration offered federal aid for a safety study following this incident, but it took CTA more than a year to process this request and find a consultant, according to CTA general manager George Krambles.
• The CTA was ridiculed by citizen groups for failing to execute the study before the 1977 derailment.
• Under CTA rules, a motorman could proceed without the automatic system in operation only after receiving permission from the controller. This rule was changed the day after the crash. Now, trains with malfunctioning control systems must be taken out of service immediately.

Initial Summary

A southbound 'B' train of 2200-series cars, Run 315, struck the rear of an 'A' train of 6000-series cars, Run 104, standing in the Addison station -- at the time, the Addison station was an 'A' station, and so Run 315 would have normally passed through without stopping. The cab signal (automatic train control, or ATC) system was having issues (which had been common on the Kennedy Extension at the time), and Run 315 had bypassed the cab signal system to allow the train to proceed down the line. In addition, some visibility factors existed: while the Addison station is reasonably visible approaching from the previous station (Irving Park) due to the presence of a down-slope between the two stations, just before a train gets to Addison station from Irving Park there is a significant curve. It was also a bright, sunny morning, and glare may have been a factor.

Car 2308, the lead car of the striking train, was seriously damaged and retired, its mate renumbered a paired with another car.

1977 Chicago Loop derailment

"UPI briefs: CTA safety study voted", The Vidette, Fact Sheet

• The motorman was blamed in the incident.
• The crash killed 11 and injured nearly 200.
• Stephen A Martin said he did not see the train in front of him until it was too late.

1984 Milwaukee line collision

https://chicagotribune.newspapers.com/image/202459672

https://chicagotribune.newspapers.com/image/202459688

References

Notes

Footnotes

Sources linked as PDF files use PDF page numbers.

Bibliography

• Railroad Accident Report: Chicago Transit Authority Collision of Trains No. 104 and No. 315 at Addison Street Station, Chicago, Illinois, January 9, 1976 (Report). Via University of Minesota and Google Books. Report No. NTSB-RAR-76-9. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. 8 July 1976. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 December 2021. Retrieved 24 December 2021.{{cite report}}: CS1 maint: others (link)