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Conflict continuum

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A conflict continuum is a model or concept used by various social science researchers when modelling conflict, say from low intensity conflict, to high intensity conflict (or from "irritation", to "explosiveness", respectively).[1] These conceptual models facilitate discussion as in "anywhere on the conflict continuum".[2][3]

The mathematical model of game theory originally posited only a winner and a loser (a zero-sum game) in a conflict. This model was extended to cooperation (a non-zero sum game; competitors are able to gain something from a contest), thus setting forth an exploration of the continuum between cooperation,[4] contest,[5] and conflict.[6]

Glasl's model of conflict escalation

Overview

By the decade of the 2010s, military planners realized that additional capabilities in communications, sensors and weapons countermeasures made it possible for competitors to react to a contestant's moves in the 'gray zone' just short of conflict.[7] Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside (2020) caution that for strategists, the 'gray zone' must not blur peace and war; they offer an analysis of the need for strategists to clearly distinguish peace, competition, contest, conflict, and war.[8][9] In 2018 Kelly McCoy identified a continuum within competition itself,[10] as explored in the Joint Staff's Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC), up to the point just short of armed conflict, while noting Perkins' connection to deterrence in the continuum.[11]

Standoff is the condition of deadlock between antagonists,[12][a] sometimes measured by the distance between them (standoff distance). For n antagonists in a non-zero sum game, von Neumann and Morgenstern (2005) show that this condition is equivalent to a zero-sum game with n+1 antagonists, where the 'n+1st player' ("the fictitious player") is not an entity.[13]: 505  Rather the fictitious player represents the global profit (or loss) of the n players in the non-zero sum game.[13][b][15] In Tibor Scitovsky's terminology (more commonly known as the Kaldor–Hicks criterion), this global profit (or loss) of the 'n+1st player' represents the amount that the gainers would have been prepared to pay to the losers (or, in a global loss, the global amount that the n players have lost in total), in order to attain a desired global policy.[16]

Overmatch is the condition where protagonist A is able to present multiple dilemmas[17] to an antagonist E —General David G. Perkins. In other confrontations between A and the Es, deterrence can be the mutual recognition that power need not be used to destroy one another (mutually assured destruction). Instead A might display or project its power to the Es as a substitute for battle with them.[18] If A's power can remain leashed (potential rather than kinetic) then soft power and hard power are also optional possibilities on a continuum of possible conflict between A and the Es.[19]

Various continuum models

Elise Boulding's conflict continuum

Elise M. Boulding was a Quaker sociologist influenced by the events of World War II. Examining how war becomes peace, she posited a continuum between Wars of Extermination [20] and Transformation.[21]

This is Boulding's conflict continuum:[20]

War of extermination
Limited war
Threat systems (deterrence)
Arbitration
Mediation
Negotiation (exchange)
Mutual adaptation
Alliance
Co-operation
Integration[20]
Transformation[21]

Andra Medea's types of conflict

Theorist Andra Medea seeks to explain how individuals, small groups, organizations, families, ethnicities, and even whole nations function when disputes arise between them. She posits that there are four types or levels of conflict, each operating under distinct rules:[22]

(1) Problem Solving     (2) Domination     (3) Blind Behavior     (4) Rogue Messiah

Each level moving from first to fourth is characterized by increasing degrees of separation from reality, and decreasing degrees of maturity, in this context, defined as the ability to control anger and settle differences without violence or destruction. Problem-solving behavior is based in reality and maturity, and is therefore more rational and mature than domination. Domination is more rational and mature than blind behavior, which is more rational and mature than the Rogue Messiah.[23]

However, each level moving from fourth to first is more capable than the one below it at forcing victory in a conflict. The rogue messiah overpowers blind behavior, blind behavior thwarts domination, and domination deadlocks problem-solving.[23]

Perkins' continuum of conflict

See also: Reorganization plan of United States Army § Multi-domain operations (MDO), and Hybrid warfare

Before 2017, winning a conflict was seen as the objective of the US Army (Win in a Complex World[24] —Gen. David G. Perkins). By 2018, the US Air Force showed it was important to reformulate this strategy, as part of a larger process Multi-domain operations (MDO), which involve more than an army in a theater of war (World War II and Cold War model). Specifically, MDO can offer options short of war which can defuse armed conflict from total war into deterrence, compromise, or cooperation between competitors.[25]

Multi-domain operations occur as overlapped, integrated operation of cyberspace, space (including satellite operations), land, maritime, and air.[26] A multi-domain task force was stood up in 2018 in I Corps for the Pacific.[17][27] Multi-domain battalions, first stood up in 2019, comprise a single unit for air, land, space, and cyber domains.[28] New cyber authorities have been granted under National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) 13;[29] persistent cyber engagements at Cyber command are the new norm for cyber operations.[30][31]

The new model recognizes that near-peer competitors might not actually seek conflict with the US, but perhaps merely near-term advantage in order to buy time for themselves[32] in the face of overmatch. For example, the X-37B space plane can change its orbit; this capability has military applications.[33] On 15 July 2020, Cosmos 2543 emitted a kinetic vehicle, which emitted a tertiary object. This maneuver is interpreted as a test of anti-satellite capability.[34][35] Cosmos 2542 has been tailing USA 245, a KH-11.[36] Other multi-domain operations short of war,[37] but still escalating the conflict, might include the shooting-down of military drones as in June 2019.[38][39]

Other operations short of war in 2018 include undeclared conflicts, involving proxy military units funded by oligarchs,[40] but specifically disclaimed by near-peer competitors.[41] This is in direct response to the strategy which the US has promulgated since 1949.[42][c] Destruction of infrastructure such as the energy grid,[44][45] or the GPS network, or the financial markets, or confidence in national law and order may be goals for partners, competitors, or adversaries[46][47] depending on where they might be in the continuum of conflict.[48][49][50] Thus disinformation could be a tactic in the spectrum of conflict.[51] [52][48][53]

Footnotes

  1. ^ In game theory, a Nash equilibrium is an array of strategies, one for each player, such that no player can obtain a higher payoff by switching to a different strategy while the strategies of all other players are held fixed.[4]: 526–528 
  2. ^ Simplest 2-player Nonzero Sum Game: 503–504 : If we reduce this game to a zero-sum 3-player game by the introduction of a fictitious player 3, then the characteristic function becomes the one given: 501 [14]
  3. ^ Erdogan bluntly informed Putin in a phone conversation that Turkey would react “in the harshest way” to any future attacks on its forces." The proxies are across Turkey's border from Idlib (Syria), which is largely held by Syrian fighters allied to al-Qaeda and rebels backed by Ankara (Turkey).[43]

References

  1. ^ "Conflict Management". The University of Iowa. 26 July 2007. Archived from the original on 2 October 2010. Retrieved 30 November 2010.
  2. ^ Ruoti, Tony (18 June 1993). C412 Interoperability: Operational Art in a New Paradigm. Naval War College. Newport, RI: United States Department of the Navy. p. ii.
  3. ^ Hart, Louis B. (1991). "4. Getting Started". Learning from Conflict: A Handbook for Trainers and Group Leaders. Amherst, MA: Human Resources Development Press. ISBN 9780874251593. Retrieved 2 December 2010 – via Google Books.
  4. ^ a b Sethi, Rajiv; Weibull, Jörgen (May 2016). "What is ... Nash Equilibrium?" (PDF). Notices of the American Mathematical Society. Vol. 63, no. 5.
  5. ^ Hitchens, Theresa (19 June 2019). "OPIR missile warning sats plow ahead amid $$ turmoil". breakingdefense.com.
  6. ^ "Levels of War: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical" (PDF). doctrine.af.mil. Curtis LeMay Center. 2015.
  7. ^ South, Todd (24 January 2020). "From long-range fires to countering drones, the Army looks to link weapons systems across the force". Army Times.
  8. ^ Stoker, Donald; Whiteside, Craig (2020). "Blurred Lines: Gray-zone conflict and hybrid war — Two failures of American strategic thinking". Naval War College Review. Vol. 73, no. 1. Article 4.
  9. ^ Junge, Michael (10 March 2020). "What should I wear to the war? Formal vs. informal war". Modern War Institute. mwi.usma.edu. West Point, NY: United States Department of the Army.
  10. ^ McCoy, Kelly (11 April 2018). "In the beginning, there was competition: The old idea behind the new American way of war". Modern War Institute. mwi.usma.edu. West Point, NY: United States Department of the Army.
  11. ^ "Competition Continuum". Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) (PDF). Joint Doctrine. 3 June 2019. Note 1-19.
  12. ^ Standoff, Noun: A deadlocked confrontation between antagonists."Standoff". wiktionary.
  13. ^ a b von Neumann, John; Morgenstern, Oskar (25 June 2005) [1944]. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (60th anniversary commemorative ed.). Princeton University Press. Retrieved 25 February 2018.
  14. ^ Copeland, Arthur H. (July 1945). "Book review of von Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944)" (PDF). Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (Book review). pp. 498–504.
  15. ^ von Neumann, John; Morgenstern, Oskar (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior [archived copy] (1st ed.).
  16. ^ Scitovsky, Tibor; Shaw, E.S. Tarshis (1951). Mobilizing Resources for War: The economic alternatives.
  17. ^ a b Gen. David G. Perkins, U.S. Army (November-December 2017) Military Review III "Multi-Domain Battle The Advent of Twenty-First Century War"
  18. ^ Yasuhito Tanaka (9 Sep 2018) On zero-sum game formulation of non zero-sum game
  19. ^ Matthew Rothenberg (6/19/2019) For the industrial Internet of Things, defense in depth is a requirement
  20. ^ a b c Hocker, Joyce; Wilmot, William W. (1995). Interpersonal Conflict (4th ed.). Madison, WI: Brown & Benchmark.
  21. ^ a b "History". The Institute for Global Leadership. 2001. Archived from the original on 14 December 2010.
  22. ^ Andra Medea interviewed by Jerome McDonnell (audio). WorldView. Chicago, IL: WBEZ. 16 May 1999.
  23. ^ a b Medea, Andra (1996). The Conflict Continuum. Chicago, IL. p. 1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  24. ^ Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World —Gen. David G. Perkins
  25. ^ Douglas A. Ollivant (June 17, 2019) On Will and War
  26. ^ (Sep 16, 2015) Perkins discusses operationalizing the Army Operating Concept
  27. ^ Maj. Richard W. Gibson (October 1, 2018) Applying Multi-Domain Concepts Against Counter-Space Threats
  28. ^ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. (24 Jan 2019) Hack, Jam, Sense, & Shoot: Army Creates 1st Multi-Domain Unit an MDO BN for Targeting, I Corps
  29. ^ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. (17 September 2018) Trump eases Cyber Ops, but safeguards remain: Joint staff
  30. ^ Mark Pomerleau (8 May 2019) New authorities mean lots of new missions at Cyber Command
  31. ^ Gary Sheftick, Army News Service (September 17, 2019) Cyber teams deploying to safeguard national security Gen. Nakasone's report on cyber to AUSA
  32. ^ Morganteen, Jeff; Miller, Andrea (26 September 2019). "Hypersonic weapons are the center of a new arms race between China, the US and Russia". CNBC.
  33. ^ The X-37B space plane can change its orbit:
  34. ^ Theresa Hitchens (23 July 2020) Russian Sat Spits Out High-Speed Object In Likely ASAT Test
  35. ^ (Aug 9th 2020) A Russian satellite weapon shows the danger of hazy rules in space
  36. ^ Joseph Trevithick (30 January 2020) A Russian "Inspector" spacecraft now appears to be shadowing an American spy satellite USA 245 is a KH-11 series satellite; Cosmos 2542 is now tailing the USA 245's movements with a precision of 150 to 300 kilometers. See Hall thruster
  37. ^ Catherine Kim (21 June 2019) Vox Sentences: The strike that never happened
  38. ^ Paul McCleary (14 June 2019) Centcom confirms Reaper shoot-down, says Iran and Houthis fired at drones
  39. ^ Paul McLeary (September 23, 2019) NATO’s not ready for Saudi-Style drone attacks; 'It’s a serious problem'
  40. ^ polygraph.info (June 22, 2019) Putin calls Russian mercenaries private contractors, claims they are not ‘engaged in combat’
  41. ^ Battle of Khasham in Syria, January 2018
  42. ^ James Kitfield (16 October 2018) Russia's strategy, ISIS’ future & countering China: CJCS Dunford speaks
  43. ^ Meyer, Henry; Kozok, Firat (6 February 2020). "Putin swallows irritation at Erdogan as Syria clash strains ties". bloomberg.com.
  44. ^ Eaglen, Mackenzie (27 November 2019). "Winning the U.S. military's 'away game'". Protecting electricity supply. Compromised infrastructure by rival providers.
  45. ^ A probe of the grid was detected by Department of Energy, as reported in April 2019:
  46. ^ Koebler, Jason; Cox, Joseph; Maiberg, Emanuel (5 February 2020). "An 'off-the-shelf, skeleton project': Experts analyze the app that broke Iowa". vice.com. Iowa Reporter App: 'the app was clearly done by someone following a tutorial.'
  47. ^ Cimpanu, Catalin (5 February 2020). "Microsoft says it detects 77,000 active web shells on a daily basis". Windows defender ATP detects '77,000 active web shells, spread across 46,000 infected servers'.
  48. ^ a b Freedberg, Sydney J., Jr. (24 September 2019). "Fog of information war: Army asks civilians, allies for aid". breakingdefense.com.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  49. ^ Kyle Rempfer (20 September 2019) Army’s new chief looks to prep the force for large-scale combat 40th CSA mulls deployments for Large-Scale Combat Operations — LSCO
  50. ^ "Saudi Arabia oil facilities ablaze after drone strikes". BBC News. 14 September 2019.
    "10 Drones attack Saudi Arabia's oil and gas facilities". BBC News. 15 September 2019.
  51. ^ Mackintosh, Eliza (May 2019). "Finland is winning the war on fake news. What it's learned may be crucial to Western democracy" (Report).
  52. ^ Davey Alba and Adam Satariano (26 September 2019) At Least 70 Countries Have Had Disinformation Campaigns, Study Finds"the number of countries with political disinformation campaigns more than doubled to 70 in the last two years"—The New York Times
  53. ^ Sun Tzu. The Art of War.
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