Michael Pettis

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Michael Pettis (born June 16, 1958) is a Beijing-based economic theorist and financial strategist. He is a professor of finance at Guanghua School of Management at Peking University in Beijing. He was founder and co-owner of punk-rock nightclub D22 in Beijing, which closed in January 2012.[1]

Pettis is a highly influential speaker and writer on global economic growth, having published two books on the subject. In 2013, Princeton University Press published his most recent book, The Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conflict, and the Perilous Road Ahead for the World Economy.[2][3]Pettis has been called a “brilliant economic thinker” by the Wall Street Journal.[4]

Biography[edit]

Early life and education[edit]

Pettis was born in Zaragoza, Spain to a French mother and an American father. His father was a geologist and civil engineer. He spent his childhood in Peru, Pakistan, Morocco and Haiti, before returning to Spain for High School. Pettis entered Columbia University in 1976.[5] Pettis received a Masters of International Affairs in 1981 and a Masters of Business Administration in 1984, both from Columbia University.[6]

Career[edit]

Michael began his career in 1987, joining Manufacturers Hanover (now JP Morgan) as a trader in the Sovereign Debt group. From 1996 to 2001, he was at Bear Stearns as a managing director-principal in Latin American capital markets. Pettis also served as an advisor to sovereign governments on topics regarding financial management, including Mexico, Macedonia and South Korea.[7]

Pettis is a frequent guest as an economic expert, with media appearances on news stations including CNBC, NPR, Bloomberg Radio and BBC.[8]

Writings[edit]

Chinese economic investment[edit]

Pettis has long warned that heavy investment by China into infrastructure projects, at the expense of consumption, is cause for serious concern.[9] The banking sector in particular, the source of cheap loans for large infrastructure projects, has accumulated large debts both on and off balance sheet. There are only two methods by which investment, which is estimated at almost 50% of China’s GDP, would decline to a level more consistent with other Asian economies. China can either deliberately de-incentivize investment spending, at the near-term cost of slowing economic growth, or investment can continue to rise as a share of GDP until the financial system cannot absorb further increases to debt, and a financial contraction will ensue.[10]

References[edit]

External links[edit]