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Miglin v Miglin

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Miglin v Miglin
Supreme Court of Canada
Hearing: October 29, 2002
Judgment: April 17, 2003
Full case nameEric Juri Miglin v Linda Susan Miglin
Citations[2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, 2003 SCC 24
RulingAppeal allowed
Court membership
Chief Justice: Beverley McLachlin
Puisne Justices: Charles Gonthier, Frank Iacobucci, John C. Major, Michel Bastarache, Ian Binnie, Louise Arbour, Louis LeBel, Marie Deschamps
Reasons given
MajorityBastarache and Arbour JJ., joined by McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, and Binnie JJ.
DissentLeBel J., joined by Deschamps J.

Miglin v Miglin, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, 2003 SCC 24, is the leading case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on the use of separation agreements. The Court established a two-stage test to determine whether a separation agreement can be relied upon.

Prior to the Miglin decision, the leading cases on separation agreements was the Pelech Trilogy. In those cases, it was held that a separation agreement is binding and a party can only apply for spousal support where there has been a radical and unforeseeable change in circumstances which has a causal connection to the marriage. The Miglin decision rejected this strict test.

Opinion of the Court

Justices Bastarache and Arbour, writing for the majority, allowed the appeal.

In their analysis they set out the test for re-opening a separation agreement. Test has two phases. First, the court considers the circumstances in which the initial agreement was made: whether the agreement was negotiated fairly[1] and whether the agreement conformed with the objectives of the Divorce Act. Second, the court must consider the current circumstances: whether the agreement still reflects the intentions of the parties and whether there has been significant change in circumstances such that it was reasonably unforeseeable at the time of formation.[2]

Notes

  1. ^ para. 83
  2. ^ para. 88

See also