United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command

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U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command
ActiveFebruary 24, 2006-
CountryUnited States
AllegianceUSMC
TypeSpecial Forces
Size2,500 men
Part ofUnited States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
Garrison/HQStone Bay, Camp Lejeune, NC
Commanders
Current
commander		Major General Dennis Hejlik

United States Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is a component command of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) that comprises the Marine Corps' contribution to SOCOM. Its core capabilities are direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, information operations, and unconventional warfare.[1] Its creation was announced on 1 November 2005 by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, following a meeting between him, the USSOCOM commander General Bryan D. Brown, and the Marine Corps Commandant General Michael Hagee on 28 October 2005. MARSOC was officially activated on February 24, 2006 with ceremonies at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

Organization

MARSOC comprises roughly 2,500 Marines and supporting sailors, and is currently commanded by Major General Dennis Hejlik, formerly the deputy commander of I Marine Expeditionary Force. It is based at Camp Lejeune and will be split into five subordinate commands:

  • The Marine Special Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG), based at Camp Lejeune, contains about 400 infantry personnel and trains friendly foreign military forces in an effort to ease the workload for Army Special Forces to concentrate on more specialized missions. (Formerly the Foreign Military Training Unit)
  • Two Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOBs), one on each coast (one at Camp Lejeune, the other at Camp Pendleton, California).Their tasks are direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, counter-terrorism, unconventional warfare, and information operations. Each MSOB consists of four or five Marine Special Operations Companies (MSOCs), commanded by a Major (O-4). Three Marine Special Operations Teams (MSOTs) make up the MSOC, commanded by a a Captain (0-3) and Team Sergeant (E-7 / E-8), consisting of 14 operators in each team. The core personnel strength of the MSOTs was initially drafted from Force Reconnaissance Marines.
  • The Marine Special Operations Support Group (MSOSG) at Camp Lejeune, which also comprises 400 personnel, contains the Command's administrative, intelligence, and support assets.
  • The Marine Special Operations School (MSOS) at Camp Lejeune conducts screening, recruiting, training, selection, assessment, and development functions for MARSOC.

History

A MSOT operator glides towards his target in a parachute during HALO operations at Camp Lejeune

The potential participation of the Marine Corps in SOCOM has been controversial since SOCOM was first formed in 1986. At the time, Marine Corps leaders felt that their Force Reconnaissance units were best kept in the Marine Corps' MAGTF command structure, and that the detachment of an "elite" Marine Special Operations unit from the Marine Corps would be to the detriment of the Marine Corps as a whole. A re-evaluation following the September 11th attacks and the global war on terror, along with new policy established by Secretary Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, caused the Marine Corps to work towards integration with SOCOM. The establishment of MARSOC represents the most significant step towards this goal, and follows the establishment of MCSOCOM Detachment One (DET1), a small Marine Corps detachment formed as a pilot program to test Marine Corps integration into SOCOM and that served under Naval Special Warfare Squadron One. DET1 was disbanded in 2006.

Controversy Involving Afghan Civilian Casulties

On March 4th, 2007, along a Nangarhar highway in Afghanistan, Fox platoon of the US Marine Special Operations Company, 2nd Marine Special Operations Battalion (then operating with the 26th MEU) was hit by a roadside bomb and responded with gunfire, killing and injuring multiple civilians by mistake. In a report by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Afghan civilians allege that the American forces fired indiscriminately.[2][3][4][5]

The controversy stemmed from the Afghanistan and NGO authorities calling the US's attention to the killings before the US authorities acknowledged the incident. Afterwards, Maj. Gen. Kearney began an Article 15 investigation in order to come to a conclusion about the specifics of the incident (numbers of injured or killed, scope of the firefights, &c).[3]. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service is currently investigating the incident, although no criminal charges have been brought, against the service members[6]. According to the Marines' lawyers, there is evidence of a suicide bomber and bullet holes in the Marines' vehicles, sustaining their statements that they were hit by a suicide bomber and took fire from insurgents.[7]

After the incident in 2007, the Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Middle East and Central Asia, Maj. Gen. Francis H. Kearney III, sent the unit home early from their deployment, and the Commander of the Second Marine Special Operations Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Paul D. Montanus relieved the MSOC's senior officer (a major) and enlisted (usually a Gunnery or First Sergeant) Marine.[8][9].

Inquiry and testimony

In early January of 2008, a court inquiry at Camp Lejeune was looking into the incident.[10] At the inquiry, Col. John Nicholson Jr., then brigade commander of the Army's 10th Mountain Division and commander of the area in which the incident occurred, cited a tense relationship with the Marine special operations reconnaissance forces due to lack of communication and their disregard for civilian casualties after the incident (which he said disturbed the military's relationship with the local population towards gathering military intelligence). Col. Nicholson issued an apology to the Afghanistan civilians after the incident, but without the blessings of the Commandant of the Marine Corps James T. Conway, who said the apology was inappropriate due to the fact that the incident was under investigation.[11]

The Article 15 investigation centers around the actions of two officers: Maj. Fred C. Galvin, the special operations unit's commander, and Capt. Vincent J. Noble, a platoon leader. During this inquiry the military has used videoconferencing to hear Afghan witness statements concerning the incident. Two of the witnesses were Haji Liwani Qumandan, a tribal elder in Nangarhar province, and Nangyli, a taxi driver. Both said they were injured and had injured or killed relatives from the attack.[12] In addition, two Afghan doctor, Dr. Fazel Rahim Shagiwal of Jalalabad's main public hospital, reported on the patients he had seen from the local hospital, Ghani Khail, who had reportedly been shot in 'the firing'. Dr. Shagiwal said that some of the wounds looked like gunshots, but that he was not an expert on that matter.[13]

The director of the local hospital in Nangahar, Dr. Aman Gul Amani, also testified. He reported on receiving 23 injured people on March 4, and having to send 11 of them to Jalalabad due to their severe injuries. He also stated that he had no records that day of receiving Haji Liwani Qumandan at the hospital, who had previously testified that he had been shot twice by the Marines. In addition, the commander of the 26th MEU, Col. Greg Sturdevant, testified as to Maj. Galvin's actions as MCSOC-F commander. He reported Maj Galvin's pressures as the commander of the first MCSOC to deploy, compounded by things such as the MCSOC unit's lack of personnel support (such as radio and vehicle technicians). Col. Sturdevant also testified as to Maj. Galvin's temperament as straight forward, honest, and up front.[13]

Reorganization

MARSOC has started a reorganization. The primary purpose is to better balance the capabilities of MARSOF and better balance the operator/support ratio within MARSOC to execute direct and indirect missions. The reorganization enables a long term relevant special operations force with greater self sufficiency.

Based on requirements from USSOCOM and Theater Special Operations Commands, MARSOC identified the need to have greater capacity in FID. The reorganization provides more capacity by reducing capacity in other areas.

After action reports from deployments identified a significant shortfall in the ability of an MSOC to be user-friendly and plug into a JSOTF with minimal impact. The reorganization addresses that shortfall by increasing the Combat Service Support in an MSOC. In the reorganization, MARSOC will adopt a uniform naming convention. The base unit of MARSOC will be the 14-man Marine Special Operations Team (MSOT), commanded by a Captain. All MSOTs will have the same organization.

MSOTs will be part of a Marine Special Operations Company, commanded by a Major. Each MSOC headquarters will have the same structure. All MSOCs will be elements of an MSOB, commanded by a LtCol. The uniform naming convention gives MARSOC consistent, clearly understood force modules which enable effective resourcing and joint employment.

The restructured MARSOC will be more agile, user-friendly, and relevant for the long term. It will provide operational commanders with well trained Marine Special Operations Forces that are prepared to execute the assigned missions.

See also

External links

References

Public Domain This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Marine Corps.
Notes
  1. ^ .Hejlik, MajGen Dennis J. (August 2006). "Special Operations Marines and the Road Ahead". Marine Corps Gazette. August 2006. Marine Corps Association. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  2. ^ AIHRC human rights report.
  3. ^ a b Ann Scott Tyson (2007). "Marine Unit Is Told To Leave Afghanistan". The Washington Post. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |accessmonthday= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  4. ^ "U.S. officials, Afghan elders discuss civilian deaths". Stars and Stripes Mideast edition. 2007. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |accessmonthday= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  5. ^ Lisa Burgess (2007). "Army colonel offers formal apology to families of innocent Afghans fatally shot by Marines". Stars and Stripes Mideast edition. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |accessmonthday= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  6. ^ [1]"Lawyers: Evidence backs MARSOC’s claims." By C. Mark Brinkley and Trista Talton - Staff writers at Marine Corps Times (not associated with the US Marines Corps). Posted : Tuesday May 8, 2007 14:29:35 EDT.
  7. ^ [2] "Marines who killed civilians were attacked." May 23, 2007. By Rowan Scarborough, The Examiner.
  8. ^ "Spec ops commander relieved." By Trista Talton - Staff writer. Posted : Wednesday Apr 11, 2007 13:48:04 EDT.
  9. ^ "Army colonel offers formal apology to families of innocent Afghans fatally shot by Marines." By Lisa Burgess, Stars and Stripes, Mideast edition, Wednesday, May 9, 2007.
  10. ^ Hlad, Jennifer (January 7, 2008.). "Court of Inquiry starts a day early". Jacksonville Daily News. Retrieved 2008-01-27. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
  11. ^ Army Officer: Marines Didn't Coordinate. ESTES THOMPSON, The Associated Press, Wednesday, January 23, 2008.
  12. ^ Afghans: Marines Fired Without Cause. ESTES THOMPSON, The Associated Press, Tuesday, January 22, 2008.
  13. ^ a b Hlad, Jennifer (January 25th, 2008). "Afghan doctors testify about casualties" (online). Jacksonville Daily News. Retrieved January 26, 2008. About 30 people with various types of injuries - including some that looked like bullet wounds - checked into nearby hospitals after a suicide bomb explosion and subsequent gunfire on a busy Afghanistan highway in March, two Afghan doctors testified Thursday. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
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