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Pope v. Illinois

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Pope v. Illinois
Argued February 24, 1987
Decided May 4, 1987
Full case nameRichard Pope and Charles G. Morrison, Petitioners, v. Illinois
Citations481 U.S. 497 (more)
107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439
ArgumentOral argument
Holding
In a prosecution for the sale of allegedly obscene materials, the jury should not be instructed to apply community standards in deciding the value question. Only the first and second prongs of the Miller test -- appeal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness -- should be decided with reference to "contemporary community standards."
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr. · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall · Harry Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell Jr. · John P. Stevens
Sandra Day O'Connor · Antonin Scalia
Case opinions
MajorityWhite, joined by Rehnquist, Powell, O'Connor, Scalia; Blackmun (Parts I and II)
ConcurrenceScalia
Concur/dissentBlackmun
DissentBrennan
DissentStevens, joined by Marshall; Brennan (except for note 11); Blackmun (Part I)

Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), was a United States Supreme Court case decided in 1987. In this case, the Court held that the "value" prong, which is the third prong of the Miller test established in Supreme Court's 1973 case Miller v. California, must be assessed based on a "reasonable person" standard. In contrast, the Court's decision in Pope reiterated its holding in the 1977 case Smith v. United States that the first and second prongs of the Miller test — "appeal to prurient interest" and "patent offensiveness" — must be decided based on "contemporary community standards".[1][2]

References

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  1. ^ Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987)
  2. ^ Smith v. United States (1977), 431 U.S. 291 (1977)
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