R v Lipman
| R v Lipman | |
|---|---|
| Court | Court of Appeal |
| Full case name | R v Lipman (Robert) |
| Decided | 29 July 1969 |
| Citation | [1970] 1 QB 152; [1969] 3 WLR 819; [1969] 3 All ER 410; (1969) 53 Cr App R 600; (1969) 133 JP 712; (1969) 113 SJ 670 |
| Keywords | |
| Intoxication; manslaughter; basic/specific intent | |
R v Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152 is an English criminal law case establishing that voluntary intoxication, however extreme, can not be a defence to manslaughter. The defendant in voluntarily taking dangerous drugs was found to have taken a dangerous risk which ordinary individuals would foresee, with his lack of intention to carry out dangerous acts not thereafter being relevant to a conviction of manslaughter.
Facts
The defendant and the victim, who were both alleged to be addicted to drugs, both took a quantity of LSD on the evening of September 16th 1967. On the morning of September 18th the defendant booked out of his hotel and left the country, before the victim was found on September 19th with haemorrhaging of the brain, and evidence of asphyxiation.[1] The defendant was returned under extradition, before giving evidence that he and the victim had experienced hallucinations in the course of taking LSD. By his account, he imagined he had been attacked by snakes, resulting in his assault on the victim. The jury accepted that he had no intention to murder or commit grievous bodily harm, but nevertheless convicted him of manslaughter, on the direction of the Judge that it would suffice for the prosecution to prove:
"He must have realised before he got himself into the condition he did by taking the drugs that acts such as those he subsequently performed and which resulted in the death were dangerous."[1]
The defendant appealed, alleging the Judge should have directed the jury to convict only if the prosecution could prove he had the requisite intention to carry out acts which were likely to result in harm.[1]
Judgment
It was submitted on behalf of the defendant that the decision of R v Church[2] placed a burden on the prosecution to show that the defendant had in fact intended the consequences of his actions. Widgery LJ held that this was not the case, stating that:
All that the judgment in Church's case says in terms is that whereas, formerly, a killing by any unlawful act amounted to manslaughter, this consequence does not now inexorably follow unless the unlawful act is one in which ordinary sober and responsible people would recognise the existence of risk.[3]
Accordingly, since the jury had concluded that the defendant's actions had created a dangerous risk that ordinary people would foresee, it was immaterial that the defendant did not have any specific intent to carry out the actions. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the sentence of six years upheld.[3]