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Richard Haking

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Richard Cyril Byrne Haking
General Sir Richard Haking
Born(1862-01-24)24 January 1862
Halifax, West Yorkshire
Died9 June 1945(1945-06-09) (aged 83)
Allegiance United Kingdom
Service / branchBritish Army
Years of service1881-1927
RankGeneral
Commands1st Division
XI Corps
Battles / warsThird Anglo-Burmese War
Second Boer War
World War I
AwardsGBE, KCMG and Order of the Bath
Other workGeneral and Armistice Commissioner

General Sir Richard Cyril Byrne Haking, GBE, KCB, KCMG (24 January 1862 – 9 June 1945) was a British general in the First World War. He is remembered chiefly for the high casualties suffered by his forces (including many Australian troops) at the second Battle of Fromelles, although at least one British historian has sought to defend his reputation, regarding him as an "intelligent and capable man" unfairly maligned in the popular mythology of the war.[1]

Biography

He was probably born in Halifax, the son of a clergyman, and was commissioned into the Hampshire Regiment in 1881. He saw active service in Burma and in the Boer War, and was both a graduate and then a lecturer at the Staff College. Haking espoused the pre-war belief that the most important factor in winning a battle was the character and attitude of the troops engaged. He published a book "Company Training" that espoused this principle and argued that the attacker would have the advantage over the defender. The book was reprinted during the first part of the war, at least.[2] The book was considered "first class" and "even today ... has a freshness about it and an insight into human characteristics that would not be out of place in a modern military work".[3]

Haking was given command of the 5th Brigade on the outbreak of war in August 1914, and travelled to the Western Front. On 14 September his was one of the few units to fight its way onto the Chemin des Dames after the crossing of the River Aisne, but on that day he received a head wound that required three months' recuperation.

On his return to duty he commanded the 1st Division from December 1914 - taking part in the Battle of Aubers Ridge (also known as the first Battle of Fromelles) where a total of 11,600 casualties were suffered, and where he argued for further attacks despite the clear failure of the first assault - to September 1915.

He then moved to command XI Corps, where he remained until the end of the war. His corps took part in the Battle of Loos in September 1915, where he oversaw another 8,000 casualties on the second day, although his divisions were in reserve under the direct control of GHQ on that occasion. The XI Corps' organisation of the attack failed to provide covering artillery fire. His promotions may have resulted from Haig's patronage, but later attempts by Haig to obtain an Army command for him were unsuccessful.

Haking acquired the nickname "Butcher Haking" while the fighting was still taking place. Some claim that this was because he took excessive casualties, felt to be pointless and resented by those who served under his command - although other First World War generals have also gained this label, this has principally occurred after the war ended. However, it has also been claimed that he acquired the nickname amongst Australian troops from his propensity for ordering trench raids, and that "it is not even known how pejorative the appellation really was" given that amongst Australians " "bastard" is almost a term of affection" [4]

At the second Battle of Fromelles, launched while the Battle of the Somme was underway 80 km to the south, he launched an attack by two divisions (61st British and 5th Australian Divisions) that cost 7,000 casualties.[5] This earned the undying disgust of the commander of the Australian 15th Brigade, Brigadier-General Harold 'Pompey' Elliott, who had seen 80% of his two assaulting battalions killed, wounded or captured by night-fall. It has been claimed that the battle "did prevent the Germans from shifting reserves south to the Somme battlefield, and cannot be said to have been without point".[6]

Haking criticised the 61st division for being "not sufficiently imbued with the offensive spirit to go in like one man at the appointed time" and summed up the outcome in these terms: "I think that the attack, though it failed, has done both divisions a great deal of good...".[7] His reports claimed "The artillery preparation was adequate. There were sufficient guns and sufficient ammunition. The wire was properly cut and the assaulting battalions had a clear run to the enemies’ trench... With two trained divisions the position would have been a gift after the artillery bombardment...". Yet the majority of casualties resulted from machine guns fired from positions that the bombardment had failed to suppress.

The nature of the fighting in the First World War was difficult for the commanders of all sides to comprehend. It took time for Britain to assemble the weight of artillery and munitions needed, and even with experience of fighting, it was not easy to deduce the correct mix of artillery and infantry tactics which were needed to make even modest progress (for example a breakthrough had almost been attained at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915; at Loos in September 1915 it was believed at the time that quicker commitment of reserves might have achieved results; at the opening of the Somme the Germans were given the heaviest and longest bombardment yet - but it was still not enough to suppress German machine guns etc etc). Up until the middle of 1916 at least, Haking experienced difficulties, as did most other generals.

Generals Tamagnini and Gomes da Costa, together with General Haking.

After being sent to reinforce the Italian Front following the disastrous Battle of Caporetto from November 1917 to March 1918, XI Corps was returned to the Western Front and was stationed at Béthune. It was almost immediately engaged by the assault in the German Spring Offensive of that year. Overall, the Corps protected the Channel ports, although some sections of the Corps were all but destroyed by the German "Georgette" Offensive. In particular the 2nd Portuguese Division suffered 7,000 casualties and 300 officers (out of a divisional strength of 20,000) in the Battle of Estaires. Haking and his Corps "did well" in the halting of this offensive and that autumn "earned a high reputation in the British Offensive which ended the war".[8]

After the war "his ... career was distinguished" [9]: he served as chief of the British section of the Armistice Commission, 1918–1919, commander of the British military mission to Russia and the Baltic Provinces, 1919, commander of Allied troops in the plebiscite area of East Prussia and Danzig, 1920, High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig, 1921–1923, and General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt, 1923–1927. He retired as a full General in 1927 and died of secondary colon cancer in 1945.

Haking was appointed Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire (GBE) in the 1921 New Year Honours.[10]

Footnotes

  1. ^ Corrigan, Gordon (2003). Mud, Blood and Poppycock. London: Cassell. pp. 201–2. ISBN 0-304-36659-5.
  2. ^ The Great War - Les Carlyon - Pan McMillan Australia, 2006 p45.
  3. ^ Corrigan, Gordon (2003). Mud, Blood and Poppycock. London: Cassell. p. 201. ISBN 0-304-36659-5.
  4. ^ Corrigan, Gordon (2003). Mud, Blood and Poppycock. London: Cassell. p. 202. ISBN 0-304-36659-5.
  5. ^ C. E. W. Bean - The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 - Volume III - The AIF in France:1916 - p 442.
  6. ^ Corrigan, Gordon (2003). Mud, Blood and Poppycock. London: Cassell. p. 202. ISBN 0-304-36659-5.
  7. ^ C. E. W. Bean - The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 - Volume III - The AIF in France:1916 - p 444.
  8. ^ Corrigan, Gordon (2003). Mud, Blood and Poppycock. London: Cassell. p. 202. ISBN 0-304-36659-5.
  9. ^ Corrigan, Gordon (2003). Mud, Blood and Poppycock. London: Cassell. p. 202. ISBN 0-304-36659-5.
  10. ^ "No. 32178". The London Gazette (invalid |supp= (help)). 1 January 1921.

References

Military offices
Preceded by General Officer Commanding the 1st Infantry Division
19 December 1914 – 10 September 1915
Succeeded by
Preceded by
New Post
GOC, XI Corps
1915–1918
Succeeded by
Post Disbanded

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