After the Meiji Restoration and the overthrow of the Shogunate in 1868, the newly formed Meiji government embarked on reforms to centralize and modernize Japan. In foreign affairs, the government had taken steps to establish a foreign affairs bureau to take over Japan's external relations which was previously conducted by the bakufu.
Meiji Politics and tensions with the Samurai
Serious divisions had emerged in the restoration coalition that had overthrown the Shogunate. Reforms enacted by the meiji government such as the abolition of the domains had led to resentment.
Japanese attempts to establish relations with Korea
During the Edo period Japan's relationship and trade with Korea were conducted through intermediaries with the Sō family in Tsushima, A Japanese outpost, called the waegwan, was allowed to be maintained in Tongnae near Pusan. However the traders were confined to the outpost and no Japanese were allowed to travel to the Korean capital at Seoul. The bureau of foreign affairs wanted to change these arrangements to one based on modern state to state relations. In late 1868, a member of the Sō daimyo informed the Korean authorities that a new government had been established and an envoy would be sent from Japan.
In 1869 the envoy from the Meiji government arrived in Korea carrying a letter requesting to arrange for a goodwill mission be established between the two countries, the letter contained the seal of the Meiji government rather than the seals authorized by the Korean Court for the So family to use. It also used the character ko (皇) rather than taikun (大君) to refer to the Japanese emperor. The Koreans only used this character to refer to the Chinese emperor and to the Koreans it implied ceremonial superiority to the Korean monarch which would make the Korean monarch as a vassal or subject of the Japanese ruler. However the Japanese were just reacting to their domestic political situation where the Shogun had been replaced by the emperor. The Koreans remained in the sinocentric world where China was at the centre of interstate relations and as a result refused to receive the envoy.
Saigō Takamori and his supporters insisted that Japan confront Korea due to the latter's refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Emperor Meiji as head of state of the Empire of Japan, and insulting treatment meted out to Japanese envoys attempting to establish trade and diplomatic relations. The war-party also saw the issue in Korea to be an ideal opportunity to find meaningful employment for the thousands of out-of-work samurai, who had lost most of their income and social standing in the new Meiji social and economic order. These samurai posed a threat to the government, and (as a samurai himself) Saigō sympathized with their situation.
According to orthodoxy, "Saigo himself volunteered to go to Korea as a special envoy, inviting an assassination attempt that would provide justification, if any were needed, for a punitive expedition." However Saigo's statement was an attempt to win over the support of Itagaki Taisuke. Additionally, while the expedition to Korea was aimed at providing income for unemployed samurai, Saigo did not object to the Inoue-Yoshida plan, which abolished samurai stipends. Thus Saigo's condemnation of Meiji's provocation against Korea in 1876 suggests that Saigo's intention may have merely been to "establish a firm relationship" with Korea. In any case the other Japanese leaders strongly opposed these plans, partly from budgetary considerations, and partly from realization of the weakness of Japan compared with the Western countries from what they had witnessed during the Iwakura Mission.
While orthodox historians view the dispute as a matter of whether or not to invade Korea, the provocation against Korea in 1876 supports the claim that the Iwakura party never disagreed on the validity on an attack. Revisionists see the Seikanron as not a dispute of whether to invade, but instead when and who to do it. The former because those returning from the Iwakura Mission believed that Japan was too weak to attract international attention and needed to focus on internal reforms, the latter because the separation of the government between the caretaker government and the Iwakura groups allowed power-struggle between them. (Okubo, for example, had no real position of power at that time, seeing as his position was taken up after his departure). The arguments against invading Korea were outlined in Okubo Toshimichi's "7 Points Document", dated October 1873, in which he argued that action against Korea was premature because Japan was in the stages of modernizing and an invasion would be far too costly for Japan to sustain. Okubo's views were supported by the anti-war faction which mostly consisted of those returning from the Iwakura Mission. Iwakura had the emperor reverse the decision to send Saigo as an envoy to Korea, thus putting an end to the debate.
As it was decided that no action was to be taken against Korea, many of the War Party, including Saigō and Itagaki, resigned from their government positions in protest. Saigō returned to his hometown of Kagoshima, although he was never officially resigned from his role in the palace guard. Some historians (mainly orthodox) suggests that this political split paved the way for the 1874 Saga rebellion and the 1877 Satsuma Rebellion. Itagaki, on the other hand, became involved with the Aikoku Kōtō, a liberal political party, and rebelled against the Iwakura clique through legal means.
Legacy and Analysis
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- Norman, E. Herbert; Woods, Lawrence Timothy (2000). Japan's emergence as a modern state: political and economic problems of the Meiji period. UBC Press. p. 85. ISBN 0-7748-0822-5.
Inflamed by such incidents, and coming out in support of the Seikan Ron (advocacy of a punitive expedition to Korea) various cliques agitated immediate invasion of Korea.
- Jansen 2002, p. 343.
- Jansen 1995, p. 275.
- Beasley 1972, p. 377.
- Duus 1998, p. 30.
- Jansen 2002, p. 362.
- Duus 1998, p. 31.
- Hunter, P.43.
- Yates 1995, p. 145.
- Kyu Hyun Kim, The Age of Visions and Arguments: Parliamentarianism and the National Public Sphere in Early Meiji Japan, p. 81
- Inoue: Saigo Takamori zenshu III: 414-16.
- Beasley, William G. (1972). The Meiji Restoration. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-0815-0.
- Duus, Peter (1998). The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea. University of California Press. ISBN 0-52092-090-2.
- Jansen, Marius B. (2002). The Making of Modern Japan. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-6740-0334-9.
- Jansen, Marius B. (1995). "Japan's drive to great-power status". The Emergence of Meiji Japan. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-5214-8405-7.
- Keene, Donald (2002). Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852–1912. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-12341-8.
- Palais, James B. (1975). Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea. Harvard University Asia Center. ISBN 0-67468-770-1.
- Ravina, Mark (2004). The Last Samurai : The Life and Battles of Saigō Takamori. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 0-471-08970-2.
- Yates, Charles L. (1995). Saigo Takamori: The Man Behind the Myth. Routledge. ISBN 0-7103-0484-6.
- Inoue Kiyoshi, Saigo Takamori zenshu (Japanese)
- Janet E. Hunter, The Emergence of Modern Japan (1989) ISBN 0-582-49407-9
- Kenneth B. Pyle, The Making of Modern Japan. Second Edition (1978). ISBN 0-669-20020-4
- Jansen, Marius B. (2000). The Making of Modern Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 10-ISBN 0674003349/13-ISBN 9780674003347; OCLC 44090600