Talk:Maginot Line/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

English variety

This article does not conform to WP:ENGVAR, as it has a particularly notable mixture of British and American spellings, words and (if I looked hard enough), usages, eg defence / defense, armoured / armored, Gasoline-powered narrow-gauge locomotives (I precis).

I cannot easily work out which variety should be used, but I suggest that if someone cares to overhaul the article, they may as well flag it to their own variety of English, and make it consistent with that. Tim PF (talk) 06:44, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

Acroterion has recently suggested on his talk page that it should use British English (WP:BrE), since it is more European. He is American, but I am British, and would be happy to go along with that and make the necessary changes (and proof read future amendments), so long as there is concensus here. Tim PF (talk) 12:45, 15 February 2011 (UTC)

Okay, I've now put this into a single dialect of British English, seeing as there appeared to be no dissent (yes, I know that I only left it a few hours, but my original post to start this section was over a fortnight ago). Tim PF (talk) 01:33, 16 February 2011 (UTC)

I was invited to join the discussion on this article. Based on WP:ENGVAR, national ties to a topic are pretty narrowly defined, and this being a European topic doesn't meet that criteria. However, ENGVAR states that in the absence of strong national ties, the first major editor of an article essentially gets to decide. Looking at the earliest versions of this article, it looks as though British English is favored (see here, the first version of the article with a clear preference - the older revisions were stubs without words that vary between AE and BE), so that's what we should keep. Parsecboy (talk) 03:02, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

I agree with Parsecboy, though as long as a consistent spelling style is used I'm not really fussed either way. Nick-D (talk) 10:30, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

The first version actually included defenses twice, but the edit Parsecboy cited includes mobilise, which had not been corrected to mobilize after several further edits, so it is unclear if the first major contributor rule applies either way. An attempt was then made later on which changed three occurrences of "defense" to "defence", but missed one, and then used "Kilometer" twice. I haven't checked to see if any further attempt was made to use a single dialect, but it wasn't flagged until I did so yesterday.

Other than that, I agree both Parsecboy and Nick-D. There are no strong national ties (the British Expeditionary Force reinforced the Belgian sector, but then again the Americans were heavily involved in retaking those areas a few years later).

It shouldn't be too difficult to revert my Britishing edits, but some American speaker would still have to do a similar job to remove all the Britishisms. I don't really care either way, so long as the inconsistencies are ironed out in line with WP:ENGVAR (as originally stated). Tim PF (talk) 11:50, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

In dealing with French topics I find many cases of direct translation from French by French-speaking editors in enwiki articles, so spelling and usage can vary quite a bit depending on the proficiency of the translator in English. I'd also caution that I've seen a lot of copyright violations in the original and translated articles, and although sometimes it turns out that Wikipedia is the source of material turned up in search engine results, many times I've seen cut-and-paste into frwiki from external sources. We should be scrupulous in checking our sources, referencing them, and looking for close phrasing. Simple translation doesn't make something less of a copyright violation. Acroterion _(talk) 13:37, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

Just on ENGVAR, since I was invited to comment, I too see no strong argument against either version but since BritEng seems to be in use, let's stick with that and keep it consistent. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 01:45, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

...and since in my experience the French have as much contempt for the Yanks as the Poms, I doubt they'd care either way... ;-) Cheers, Ian Rose (¼ British,⅛ French, and American relatives!) (talk) 01:55, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

Artillery: Anti-tank guns Section

Tim PF,

I would like to go to the library to search for information on the "Artillery and Anti-tank guns" section. I've to do a couple of things before I go to the local library which is only a few minutes away from my place, then on the way home, go to the library to see if I can find any information. I'll be taking the laptop, but I won't be connected to the internet while I'm there. If you're still on Wikipedia, you may receive this message and I will check before I leave to see if you have replied. Your help is appreciated with this article as well as Acroterion's participation. Also, I am unaware if the other user's that I mention are aware of them being mentioned on the this talkpage. Adamdaley (talk) 00:15, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

Ah, the empty section. I presume that is pretty terminal on the article quality scale.

That's fine, you can go out to the library, but they're all shut around here at this time of night. The local town library in Scotland has WiFi access for members (use your library number +PIN). Anyway, I'm in Wales at the moment awaiting the movers on Friday, so I thought I'd just tackle the English and conversions before the move. I'll continue to keep an eye open for Americanisms (or Australianisms) and things to convert if and when I can. I also still need to check with Acroterion about the sub-pages, but that will have to wait.

Since you mentioned those other users, I think that you ought to poke them, as I don't know them from Adam (sorry, bad pun). Tim PF (talk) 00:52, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

Haven't been able to go to the library yet. Had an incident Thursday where rain got inside the house. Therefore no library. Last night I tried to look on the library website for any books or information they would have, but I have looked on their website for any information about the Maginot Line not much came up. So I've decided to leave that section to see if it would be appropriate to leave it blank or get rid of it totally. Maybe someone can find information about it and would be willing to do a couple of paragraphs. Adamdaley (talk) 03:01, 21 February 2011 (UTC)

Comments on the 26 August edit

I'm not very happy with the two paragraphs that were added to the Introduction on 26 August - in my opinion, while they are factually OK, they are not written in an appropriately professional style.

Language like "The French have always been big on concrete" is both too opinionated and too colloquial for an encyclopedia entry, and "But the Germans simply outflanked it with fast-moving armoured formations the Maginot Line, in the which the French had put so much faith was largely irrelevant to the battle" is simply ungrammatical.

I'd like to see if others agree with me before I go in and edit these paragraphs.

Don Radlauer (talk) 10:36, 30 August 2011 (UTC)

I've boldly removed both paragraphs, the first as excessively informal and the second as ungrammatical. The whole lead could be tightened up and rewritten. Acroterion (talk) 11:38, 30 August 2011 (UTC)

Well all you had to do was message me instead of complaining on here, anyway ive removed the second paragraph and rewritten the first. Goldblooded (talk) 12:38, 30 August 2011 (UTC)

strategically ineffective?

"The fortification system successfully dissuaded a direct attack. It was strategically ineffective, as the Germans indeed invaded Belgium, defeated the French army, flanked the Maginot Line, through the Ardennes forest and via the Low countries, completely sweeping by the line and conquering France in days.[2]"

My understanding is that the line did exactly what it was intended to do. It put the Germans off from a direct assault, leaving them the only alternative of attacking through Belgium. Hence why the best French troops were positioned to face the German onslaught through Belgium, because that is what they had trained and planned for. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.4.86.206 (talk) 20:02, 26 June 2012 (UTC)

Unfortunately, the best portions of the French army were in Flanders, not in the Ardennes. The Flanders armies did pretty well for a while, but they couldn't stop the main attack, which wasn't against the French army's strength. The Germans chose to make the main attack in the Ardennes against reserves, and broke through there. The Maginot Line influenced the German thinking to that extent. French strategy was flawed: one can argue that the Maginot and Flanders part of the strategy was sound and the French Ardennes strategy flawed, but that seems to me to be hair-splitting. The net effect was still a strategic defeat of the French Army by simply going around the end of the fortifications. Secondarily, the gap in the line at the Sarre was penetrated and the line, which had no means of defense from behind without a field army in support, could be and was ignored or attacked in detail from the rear. Acroterion (talk) 22:33, 26 June 2012 (UTC)

Yet the line did its job, the Germans went around it. I am also under the impression that the initial German invasion plan was little more than a modified version of the Great War battleplan: a massive surge through Belgium towards Paris. However, at some point it was changed to an attack through the Ardennes towards the Channel. Both plans still included going through Belgium around the main portion of the Maginot Line.

This begs the question, if the Germans did not attempt a frontal assault and went through Belgium (albeit with a different plan than the one the French envisioned) how was the main line strategically ineffective if it did its job? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.4.86.206 (talk) 01:03, 27 June 2012 (UTC)

Tactically, it was quite effective. Viewed in isolation from the main campaign, it was effective. As part of the overall French strategy, it did not do France much good. I'm not opposed to your argument, I think we have a different notion of what "strategic" means, and the notion of a fortification where one can simply go around the end is somewhat whimsical. It tied up some German forces and made them make a detour through difficult ground, where they did what they wanted anyway. I don't call that quite strategically effective in the sense of the campaign. Published authorities agree that it did what it was advertised to do, which was to prevent a frontal assault on Alsace and Lorraine, but they also agree that that wasn't sufficient to defend France as a whole. If the French forces at Sedan had been up to scratch, and if the line had been backed up by effective mobile army units, the strategy would have worked, but part of the reason for the Maginot Line was to economize on manpower to allow the first-line troops to go elsewhere. The fortifications didn't free up enough manpower to allow the mobile army to deal with the remainder of the frontier. Is that the Maginot Line's fault, and does that make it less than successful? That's the issue.

By the way, the sources make a point of contrasting the northeastern fortifications against the Alpine Line, which were built under the same program, and are universally considered successful, strategically, tactically and all. The Italians never gained any traction at all. Acroterion (talk) 01:31, 27 June 2012 (UTC)

But, as you - and the article - point out it was designed to allow the Germans to go around the flank so that the desisive battle would occur off French soil as much as possible. The idea being the French could dictate where the battle took place. The fact that the rest of the French strategy walked into the hands of a German trap - devised only before the attack took place, otherwise the Germans would have played into the French strategy - i think should not be the sole factor on which the Maginot Line is judged. The overall French strategy was flawed, but the line did its job.

In regards to fortification lines that could be outflanked: the west wall did not stretch to the sea, (not quite in the same cateogry due to the nature of the war and other trench system) the hindenburg line, the British defenses at Mersa Matruh, Gazala and el Alamein all had open flanks with the idea mobile forces would cover them (the later also had impassable ground covering the flank, but see the battle of Alam Halfa). It is not exactly a novel idea. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.4.86.206 (talk) 14:33, 27 June 2012 (UTC)

In addition the reference does not support the statement, quoted up top. The article does not call the line strategically ineffective or claim the Germans took France in days.

"There were gaps, big ones, and the Germans knew it. For all intents and purposes, the Maginot Line ended just east of the city of Sedan, directly under the great forest of the Belgian Ardennes, a natural barrier that the French general staff calmly asserted to be as secure as the Rhine. “With special modifications, the Ardennes Forest is impenetrable,”"(p.3)

"Beyond the Ardennes and along the Belgian border to the English Channel, there was no serious effort at fortification. After all, the French reasoned, their ally Belgium was itself a fine barrier to the Germans, a buffer state whose resistance would offer the French an eightday delay for organizing their defenses. That reasoning was calculated on the walking speed of foot soldiers. But by then the Germans were motorized and mechanized."(p.3)

The article highlights what the line was suppose to do, what the French assumed the Belgians would do, and what the main French army would do. A fight in Belgium was expected, the French went to war with outdated equipment (the article claims) and met its match was mauled inopen combat. The article highlights that the overall French strategy was flawed, that "It is an incontrovertible fact that the Maginot Line failed to foil a German invasion" (p. 5), but that the line was never taken and handed over in tact. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.4.86.206 (talk) 15:04, 27 June 2012 (UTC)

I'll review the article a bit more: I've written many of the supporting articles, but the overall state of the main article has bothered me. I disagree that we should alter the article to plainly state that the line was strategically effective: there were flaws in concept, funding and execution, and the sources I've worked with are equivocal on the overall effectiveness, making a point, as I've noted above, of contrasting the northeastern line against the Germans versus the success of the southeastern fortifications against the Italians. I agree that the line did much of what it was supposed to do, but not in the way intended. Most fortifications have an end somewhere, but the line was compromised by a loss of funding before the western end could be completed as intended, and by problems with the fortification of industrial areas right against the border. Had there been a strong anchor and rallying point at a logical terminus, rather than the place funding ran out, things might have been different. The other issue that's mentioned in the sources I've worked with is that the line was quite thin, and was designed for mutual support along the length of the line, but was quite weak when considered in depth, with no backup in case it was broken at a given point, as happened. Acroterion (talk) 13:44, 28 June 2012 (UTC)

I think all we need is a bit of expansion to make it clear that the Maginot Line itself wasn't the ineffective part. Something like this: ---- Alassius (talk) 20:41, 2 July 2012 (UTC)

The fortification system successfully dissuaded a direct attack, as the Germans indeed invaded Belgium. But the strategy was rendered ineffective by the Allies' misjudgement of the precise route they took. Britain and France deployed their troops deep into Belgium after the invasion began, anticipating a replay of Schlieffen plan, where the Wehrmacht would invade through the Netherlands into Belgium. The Germans instead managed to advance through the Ardennes forest, cutting off a major part of Allied armies from the rest of France (and the Maginot line) - over three hundred thousand of which later escaped from Dunkirk. Although the French army did not merely sit in the Maginot Line, reference to the line is used to recall a strategy or object that people hope will prove effective but instead fails miserably. It is also the best known symbol of the adage that "generals always fight the last war, especially if they have won it".

rewriting needed

While it is clear what this sentence is supposed to mean:

"Flanked the Maginot Line, through the Ardennes forest and via the Low countries, completely sweeping by the line and conquering France in about 6 weeks"

it seems to me ungrammatical, and could do with rewriting. --Brian Josephson (talk) 15:29, 26 November 2012 (UTC)

I really hate when historians debate the necessity of the line

From my prespective the line was not a waste in any sense. The French had limited amount of troops and as such had to decide where to place them. A fortified line like the Maginot reduces the number of troops needed to defend an area. By sealing off your direct border with germany it reduces their options for planned attacks. As such the french did what any country did mass their mobile forces together in 2 massive armies with a 3rd one organized during the phony war. The 1st and 2nd Armies were to advance through belguim as fast as possible in preset defensive lines. The 7th Army was to advance to cover southern Netherlands with the BEF providing imediate support to the belgiums. As such a gap existed in the ardennese area. Since that area was deemed to be difficult to traverse with mobile forces it was given the 3rd Army which was a predomintaly cavalary army. That happened to be in the center of the line. The germans knew what was going to happen when they invaded when the french and bef setup to meet the germans in the fall of 39. It ended up getting post ponned and both forces settled down and as such gave the germans perfect intellangence. The key thing about the whole invasion was both sides knew what each side was going to do so it came down to who could exploit each other the best. Thats what the Maginot line did. It made sure France knew exactly where the Germans were going to attack. --Mihsfbstadium 17:46, 1 June 2007 (UTC)

Um, except that it didn't, and thus the french did not know, and their plan played into German hands. Your entire line of reasoning is invalid. DMorpheus 21:07, 2 June 2007 (UTC)

Actually you didnt understand what I said. The French knew they would be forced to go through Belguim. Hence they put their best troops to meet them. They did not put any armor of any major size behind the Magiot and hence they were able to mass a nice force. I think the only problem was trying to save the Dutch with the 7th Army but alas they probally did not think paratroopers would have played a part. --Mihsfbstadium 19:20, 5 June 2007 (UTC)

First of all I want to apologize about my English, I'm French. I completly agree with Mihsfbstadium. I work in a French association called AALMA. We restore ouvrages (works) of the Maginot Line and we organize visits to the people. I wrote a great part of this article and I've never said that the line was useless or ineffective, I just didn't want to erase other edits about this subject.

If you are able to read French, I invite you to read our website over this question: www.lignemaginot.com you will see historical proofs.

Cordialy Martial BACQUET 14:17, 13 June 2007 (UTC)

"Both sides knew what each side was going to do" ???? I'm sorry, I see little evidence that the French Army knew the Germans would attempt to pass through the Ardennes and fight on the other side. I will look at the French site, I can read a little, but looking at the French dispositions I don't see how they match any foreknowledge of German intentions.

I agree that the line made a lot of sense as an economy-of-force measure; that is, it allowed the French Army to place mininal forces in secondary or well-fortified sectors so that the best assets could be concentrated where they were most needed. But they did not in fact concentrate them where they were most needed. DMorpheus 15:14, 13 June 2007 (UTC)

Okay this is a little project you can do. Take a map of the present border of Germany, France, and the Low Countries. Now rotate it 90 degrees so the North Sea and Switzerland is on the left and right sides of the map. Now the fortified line pretty much ran from Luxembourg to Switzerland. That means you are limited to just the Belgium Border to go through. As such if you were to base any force where would you place it at. There is one more thing you should also remember is that the ardennese forest area is really hilly and military commanders felt that with a poor road network and the such it would be pointless to cover it with tons of tanks and felt that time would be on their side if anybody would invade that region. So the French did what any intellegant commander would do put thier force in a position to stop the most likely invasion route. Its was not the Strategic operations of the french that doomed them but rather the fact that the germans were operating on a very fast response time versus the french. Thats because the commanders were using encrypted radios to broadcast notes back and forth along with just using radios in the majority of the tanks. The french were still using older technology like the telegraph and the like that is slow and as a result could not adapt fast enough for the changing enviroment. --Mihsfbstadium 00:12, 14 June 2007 (UTC)

It's what I wrote on this article:

The Maginot Line was built to fulfill several purposes:

-To avoid a surprise attack and to give alarm.

-To cover the mobilization of the French Army (which took between 2 and 3 weeks).

-To save the forces (France counted 39,000,000 inhabitants, Germany 70,000,000).

-To protect Alsace and Lorraine (returned to France in 1918) and their industrial basin.

-To be used as a basis for a counter-offensive.

-To push the enemy to circumvent it while passing by Switzerland or Belgium.

Martial BACQUET 22:02, 20 June 2007 (UTC)

France did what any unimaginative commander would do. They chose the obvious position which was forseen by the germans (by one very imaginative general). It's not an intelligent decision, as it is so obvious a kid can see through it. And then the Germans can as well. Regarding the speed of communications etc. it's difficult to find a defence for the French actions. However they did make strategical errors besides the disasterous dicision to ignore the Ardennes. For instance their operations of armor. IIRC, France had very good armored capabilities but squandered it away piecemeal (as did any army except the German - but that's not a defence).--Nwinther (talk) 14:09, 6 October 2008 (UTC)

The Maginot Line doesn't seem like like it was a waste at all. It allowed the French to concentrate resources where they were most needed: on the border of the Low Countries. The Germans never managed to break the Maginot Line in force; indeed, it seems they really didn't even try. It forced them, as Mr. Bacquet said, to go through Belgium. Unfortunately, Belgium remained neutral until they were invaded, they were unprepared but put up a valiant fight, but the Belgian army was stabbed in the back by their king who surrendered them to the Germans, without their government's approval. Then the French were alone--only a few UK divisions to help them--and those UK divisions were quickly encircled by Rommel's armor at Dunkirk and had to be evacuated or face annihilation. The Low Country border was teeming with German armor--and, on top of that, some Germans managed to sneak through the Ardennes, which was thought to impassable. The French were outnumbered and outflanked by a massive concentration of overwhelming force...they were a country of 40 million to the German 80 million...and compared to Germany, they weren't bent on building an army of world conquest. Their military did all they could, they gave a good account of themselves...and then the French got stabbed in the back by Petain and Darlan. The Maginot Line was successful because if it wasn't there, the Germans would have gone through Belgium AND through Alsace-Lorraine and the Ardennes...the French would have been attacked all along their entire northeastern border. They would have had to spread their resources, thin as they were, even thinner, which would have certainly doomed them. In retrospect, perhaps, if the Maginot Line was longer, if the Belgians hadn't capitulated, and the UK had a few more divisions to spare, they might have had something of a chance. As it was, they were doomed by a combination of bad luck, the Belgian king, Rommel's drive to the sea, and lack of manpower on a scale compared to Germany.Katana0182 05:17, 1 July 2007 (UTC)

The belgians didn't surrender until 28 May. By that time the BEF was already back in England. I can't see how the Belgians could keep fighting and expecting to win. The French was outnumbered, that's an undisputable fact. But they had more armor and more guns than the Germans. And while they were a country of only 40 million, they had a huge empire of colonies to draw upon (and also to maintain of course). To say that the French did "all they could" or even "gave a good account of themselves" seems like wishful thinking. Rommel simply scared away french forces. I respect the french fighting man, though morale seems a bit low. But looking at the general staff and supreme command, more inept men is hard to come across. IMO, the French lost fair and square. The Maginot Line served a purpose - funnelling the germans into what the french thought would be a trap. The funnel was leaky though and the French themselves got caught. Had the Magiont Line never been built, I actually think the French would've come across better. By building it, they forced the Germans to be innovative, while remaining ignorant themselves. NOT building it would force the French themselves to be innovative - so much so that they could better stand up against the Germans. (There would be no reason for the Germans to go through Belgium so the french could meet them head on). I doubt that the French would've been victorious anyway, because german Blitzkrieg-tactics were simply too awestriking. It just goes to show that you shouldn't start a war you can't win (as is the case with the British DoW on Germany over the Danzig-matter). And what do you expect from Petain and Darlan? Would France have been able to fight on? No. They were destroyed and demoralized and did, at the time, the only reasonable thing. Vichy France was a certainty - if not by the hand of Petain, then in some other form by someone else, just as Norway, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands came to terms with the nazis.--Nwinther (talk) 14:33, 6 October 2008 (UTC)

The Maginot line was not a bad idea, as has already been said. It limited the opportunties in where germany could attack. There is one point that no one mentioned: it actually turned out to be too good. The French thinking was that "Oh, the Maginot line is impenetrable," which it was, "so we can deploy our best units in the north. The problem with that thinking, coupled with the thinking that the Ardennes was too difficult for tank divisions to transverse, and it is indeed difficult, but not impossible, was that to the French there seemed no need for strategic reserve in the south. Had there been a substantial strategic reserve in the south a large counter attack against German armoured could have been carried out. Additionally, the strength in the Maginot line gave the French a false confidence in their abiltiy to set defensive positions deep into Belgium. Even in the Dyle plan had been carried out perfectly (one could argue that would play into Germany's hand), there was to be a large salient in the Ardennes. Had the French not had the Maginot line they would not have been as agressive and then would have been forced to have a larger strategic reserve becasue no one knew where the attack was going to come from. In summary, the maginot line gave the French the wrong idea that a large strategic reserve was unecessary. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.151.59.42 (talk) 06:41, 8 January 2009 (UTC)

I think there's a couple of things missing here. Firstly the BEF wasn't "safe in England" when Belgium surrendered, most of the evacuation took place in the 4 days after that, although it is true that it started before the surrender. The French command wasn't as inept as is sometimes seen. Gamelin deduced the correct counter strategy when the blow came. The problem was that he couldn’t react fast enough. The Germans moved faster than he believed they could. Weygand devised his “hedgehog” strategy to counter the blitzkrieg. That, again, was a good strategy, but he lacked the time, and by that period, the numbers to make it work. The French weren’t inept. Von Manstein was brilliant, and the Germans performed brilliantly and had luck go their way. Another factor on the selection of the Maginot line is French politics. France was deeply divided between the wars, and there was a very strong pacifist sentiment as well. Tanks and aircraft can be used for offensive purposes. The Maginot line, by contrast, is purely defensive, as the fortifications cannot advance across the frontier. So, politically, it was the safest option for military spending as it was, for a pacifist, the least objectionable project. I think the article needs to include some more of inter-war French political realities, which must have played a significant part in swinging the decision in favour of the Maginot line. The failure wasn't the Maginot line itself, but broader French Strategy, including the use of armoured formations (and to an extent Britain not adopting conscription until 1938). The plan was not to rely upon the Maginot line forever, but to go on the offensive once the Allies had superiority in numbers, which was supposed to be in 1941 when Britain was finally fully mobilised. The Maginot Line was only part of French Strategy, and hence the fact that it was largely successful in its intended role doesn’t alter the fact that the strategy as a whole was a disastrous failure. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.254.146.84 (talk) 17:37, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

It's often stated that the Maginot Line was created to 'save forces'; However, if you look up the strength of the French defenders (third, fourth, fifth and eighth army) and compare it to its opposing force (army group C with first and seventh army) or calculate the numbers down to individual men, you will find that there were many more men deployed in the maginot line then necessary, tying down more than half a million soldiers. In respect of 'saving forces', the maginot line was a failure. Xiaozhouzhou (talk) 08:21, 24 March 2010 (UTC)

The most convincing criticism of the Maginot line was strategic and diplomatic: the Maginot Line lulled France into complacency during Hitler's first four years of power (1933-1936), before he had a chance to re-arm. A French reoccupation of the Rhineland during this time would have overthrown Hitler at little or no cost in French lives. Partly because of the expense of building the Maginot line, but even more because of the pacifist mentality you mention, France starved her offensive capabilities, even for an easy mission like this. By 1940, rearmed Germany was so superior in air power, manpower, training, communications, and military leadership that no French strategy would have made a difference.(Hcunn (talk) 21:18, 30 July 2014 (UTC))

Diplomatic origins of the Maginot line

At present, this article makes no mention of the diplomatic origins of the Maginot line. The decision to begin the line was taken in 1929, and construction stated in 1930. Those dates are very interesting because in 1929 Germany was still more or less disarmed by the Treaty of Versailles, and thus could pose no danger to France. I forgotten how much the Maginot line cost the French tax-payer, but I believe that the French spent million and millions of francs building the line. Does anybody spends millions and millions of francs (or any other currency for that matter) against a non-existent danger? This article says the Maginot line cost the French tax-payer 3 billion francs, through there is no source for that. If the French expected the Germans to abide by Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, which had disarmed Germany and to accept that the Rhineland was to be demilitarized forever, then presumably there would had been no need for the 3-billion franc Maginot Line. You don't spend 3 billion francs for nothing. My point is that the French expected in 1929 that Germany was going to rearm in violation of Versailles on a truly massive scale sometime in the 1930s, hence the Maginot line. The reason for this is up until June 1930 the French occupied the Rhineland, which played the role as a sort of "collateral". If Germany violated Versailles by attempting overt rearmament, the French would just annex the Rhineland, which is what they had wanted at the Paris peace conference in 1919, but had prevented from so doing by Anglo-American pressure (perhaps a sign of the allegedly "Carthaginian Peace" that was Versailles?) Along the same lines, the occupation of the Rhineland actually protected the region from being annexed by France. The Treaty of Versailles stated the Rhineland was to demilitarized forever and to be occupied by the French for 15 years, but the Rhineland was to remain German. If the French were to violate Versailles by annexing the Rhineland (which was something that was seriously considered in Paris between 1919-24), then the French would be violating Versailles, which would of course be the perfect excuse for the Germans to start violating Versailles. Clearly, if the French were to violate Versailles, then the treaty would no longer be sacred, and Germany would have the perfect pretext to start violating the treaty, like for an example going over the 100, 000-strong men limit on the military or having all of the weapons like tanks and airplanes that Versailles had forbidden the Reich from possessing. It is precisely for that reason the French never did annex the Rhineland, and instead contented themselves with half-hearted support for Rhineland separatists. Once the French left the Rhineland in June 1930, it was no longer French "collateral", which thus meant Germany was going to rearm in violation of Versailles sooner or later sometime in the 1930s. In turn this is why the French decided to start building the Maginot line in 1929. This article could use something about the diplomatic origins of the Maginot line and how it related to the French pull-out from the Rhineland in June 1930. At present, we learn that the French decided in 1929 to build the Maginot line and that construction started in 1930. All true, but we never learn why? Why 1929 instead of let's say 1924 or 1920? Along the same lines, this article should talk about how the Maginot line affected French diplomacy and that of Poland. The construction of the Maginot line, with the implication that the French would remain behind the line in the event of a war with Germany played a major role behind the Polish-German nonaggression pact of 1934.--A.S. Brown (talk) 20:25, 18 November 2014 (UTC)

"hindsight is 20/20 vision"

I don't like the "I told you so" tone of the article.

If the Americans were so clever, then why didn't they actually do something useful BEFORE the event, rather than sit back and say "I told you so" after the event?

Or am I missing something? Pdfpdf (talk) 10:29, 18 January 2015 (UTC)

Given that Germany had engaged in covert rearmament with the co-operation of the Soviet Union starting in 1921 (a fact that public knowledge in 1926) ...

The parenthetical comment "a fact that public knowledge in 1926" needs a citation. I looked and found one that may be of use. It's from the book Inspection For Disarmament, Edited by Seymour Melman, Columbia University Press, 1958.

"In October, 1926, three Russian ships landed in Stettin with about 350,000 illegal grenades. But the workers became suspicious and wanted to know the content of the cases. Thus, it became known that grenades had been introduced for illegal uses by the Reichswehr from Russia. (The Communist Party denounced this news as false, since it could not admit that Russia had collaborated with the illegal Reichswehr.)"

How much this event contributed to "public knowledge", or if it went beyond the dock workers, is not discussed. In any event, the phrase "a fact that public knowledge in 1926" needs clarity. I'd do it but I'm not sure it's an accurate statement. My feeling is unless it can be supported it should be deleted, but I don't want to take it upon myself either because I just don't know. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 155.178.180.5 (talk) 13:36, 5 October 2015 (UTC)

The secret Soviet-German collaboration in violating Versailles was exposed in a series of articles in The Manchester Guardian in 1926 and the matter was brought up in the Reichstag, when the Defense Minister Otto Gessler rather halfheartedly sought to deny what was going on. True, the full extent of the Soviet-German work in violating Versailles was not known until after 1945, but at least in a general sense, anybody who was following the news in 1926 would had known what was going on. --A.S. Brown (talk) 00:43, 23 May 2016 (UTC)