Talk:Nomological determinism

Wholesale rewrite made without any discussion on Talk page

The edit provided here removed comp0letely the original article and replaced that material with entirely new material here that provides a one-sided and largely incorrect view of the topic, and which was not at all discussed on this Talk page. I have accordingly reverted this material in anticipation of some discussion here. Brews ohare (talk) 04:27, 11 February 2013 (UTC)

Why are you engaging a separate debate? The definition of nomological determinism is currently being disputed at Physical determinism Talk as per your request. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 00:38, 12 February 2013 (UTC)

The debate here is separate because you insist upon rewriting this page without responding to the discussion presented on this page about this page, but do insist upon changing it to suit your own ideas without justification. Brews ohare (talk) 01:40, 12 February 2013 (UTC)

What is wrong with Richardbrucebaxter's formulation

Twice now Richardbrucebaxter has changed the entire content of this article without using the Talk page. This is contrary to etiquette of course, but also the content replaced is superior to Richardbrucebaxter's replacement of it.

Richardbrucebaxter's text says:

"It is a common form of causal determinism, and is generally implied by physical determinism."

This claim of implication is unsupported.

There are sources that express the view that in fact physical and nomological determinism are the same thing, that they are synonyms. Synonyms probably can be held to imply each other, because either term can be used interchangeably. However, the claim of one-way implication suggests that physical determinism is a wider concept that contains the narrower view of nomological determinism as a special case. Is that view supported?

One very common view of nomological determinism is that stated by the cited reference Horst:

"nomological determinism is a contingent and empirical claim about the laws of nature that they are deterministic rather than probabilistic, and that they are all-encompassing rather than limited in scope."

— Steven W. Horst, Laws, Mind, and Free Will, p. 98

Now, the description of "laws of nature" in this definition is not true of laws of nature as we understand them today. The modern view, as expressed by Hawking (see model-dependent realism) is that no "law of nature" is all-encompassing and instead we depend upon a mosaic of overlapping theories each with its own limited domain of applicability. And, additionally, today the "laws of nature" are not universally deterministic.

On this basis, physical determinism supposing that it refers to actual laws of nature as we know them does not imply nomological determinism, nor is it a synonym. On the other hand, if one wants to include in the laws of nature both real and imaginary laws, then nomological determinsm is included. I think that is a confusing way to look at things.

Another view of nomological determinsm is that it applies to everything, which includes not only inanimate nature but psychological and other mental events. In other words, nomological determinism refuses the notion that psychological events may be separate from physical events. Now that division is a matter of active debate today and falls under the topics of mental causation, materialism, reductionism, multiple realizability, and so on. On the other hand, physical determinism makes no claims in this matter and sets the issue to one side for other argumentation. This is he position of Ginet, for example, who excludes psychological events from physical determinism.

So from every perspective, the claim that "Nomological determinism is a common form of causal determinism, and is generally implied by physical determinism." is incorrect as well as unsupported. The statement of the original text is a more accurate (and supported) view of nomological determinism:

"Nomological determinism (sometimes called 'scientific' determinism, although that is a misnomer) is the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid, all-encompassing natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events.[1][2] It is a common form of causal determinism, and is a much broader claim than physical determinism, a term sometimes used as a synonym."

This formulation should be reinstated. Brews ohare (talk) 17:27, 11 February 2013 (UTC)

I've rewritten this introductory section in what seems to me to be a compromise approach. Brews ohare (talk) 20:13, 11 February 2013 (UTC)

Richardbrucebaxter's removal of 'History' section

Without explanation, Richardbrucebaxter has removed the text below; I think it should be reinstated as providing some perspective upon the origins of nomological determinism and why it is no longer a term in favor:

History Not true The notion of nomological determinism takes its classical form in the ideas of Laplace, who posited (in agreement with the physics of his time) that an omniscient observer (called sometimes Laplace's demon) knowing with infinite precision all the positions and velocities of every particle in the universe could predict the future entirely. Needless to say, omniscient observers are imaginary creations, and infinite precision exceeds the capacities of human measurement. However, nomological determinism refers to these notions as a statement in principle, and their reduction to practice is not at issue.

Today nomological determinism is found to be at variance with modern science, and reformulations of determinism such as physical determinism are more compatible.

"the ideal of a science of physics with strictly deterministic theories must be relinquished as inherently unrealizable."

— Thomas Nagel, Causality and Indeterminism in Physical Theory, p. 277

In place of the rigid and all-encompassing theory envisioned by nomological determinism, a different idea of a deterministic theory is proposed:

"a theory is deterministic if and only if, given the values of its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."

— Thomas Nagel, Causality and Indeterminism in Physical Theory p. 292

Sources

Physical determinism doesn't imply nomological determinism

The article Nomological determinism states (emphasis added):

" It [referring to nomological determinism] is a common form of causal determinism, and is generally implied by physical determinism."

This statement is wrong, and should be changed.

To elaborate upon the error involved, the article Nomological determinism uses a definition based upon the sources cited there:

"Nomological determinism is the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid, all-encompassing natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events."

On the other hand, the definition of Physical determinism used in that article is that of Ginet^[1]

"Physical determinism holds that a complete description of the physical state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the physical laws of nature together entail every truth as to what physical events happen after that time." (Italics in the original text)

The italics in this definition were introduced by Ginet to distinguish physical determinism from a broader form of determinism defined with the same wording, but without the word physical appearing. Ginet's explicitly stated purpose in introducing physical into the above definition was to separate physical determinism from psychological determinism. That is, he feared that the definition with no italics, namely:

"Determinism holds that a complete description of the state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the laws of nature together entail every truth as to what events happen after that time."

could be construed to include psychological determinism. Inasmuch as this definition without the italicized, limiting adjective physical is equivalent to that of nomological determinism, it appears clear, at least from Ginet's viewpoint, that 'physical determinism' does not imply nomological determinism.

Sources

[1] This definition is from Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press. p. 92. ISBN 052138818X.

A comparison of the terms physical and nomological determinism was made at length on Talk:Physical determinism. Despite the cogency of those arguments, the article Physical determinism as of today also insists, in the words placed there by Richardbrucebaxter, that physical determinism "implies nomological determinism, which holds that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws."

This contention of implication in the introductions to both the articles Nomological determinism and Physical determinism therefore is wrong on two counts (i) it contradicts Ginet (and several other sources as well), and (ii) it is a non sequitur that does not follow from the underlying definitions.

So far, Richardbrucebaxter has reverted every attempt to fix this matter, and done so without justification of his actions on this, or any other, Talk page. Nonetheless, the introduction should be changed. Brews ohare (talk) 09:52, 14 February 2013 (UTC)