This article is within the scope of WikiProject Philosophy, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of content related to philosophy on Wikipedia. If you would like to support the project, please visit the project page, where you can get more details on how you can help, and where you can join the general discussion about philosophy content on Wikipedia.
Added references to 4 of Karl Popper's works on propensity probability. These were all gleaned from "Self and It's Brain", and are not something I have read personally. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 220.127.116.11 (talk) 04:41, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
Why is the section Principal Principle of David Lewis in this article? Is it really a propensitists position? RJFJR (talk) 19:13, 8 April 2012 (UTC)
From what I can tell it is currently irrelevent. But it could be made relevent by making explicit that Pronpensity theories, or at least most of their formulations, cannot meet one of david Lewis's desiderata, which is that probabilities should be able to constrain, or relate to, credences - this is the principal principle. This is begging the justificationist question; Propensity Theories, esp the one developed by Popper, were develoepd to dispense with probability and its link with justification (epistemic probability), because it lead to very many difficulties. To say that this is a desiderata, and that we should dispdence with Pronenity theory on this basis, is to jump over the fact that epistemic probability was criticised by Karl Popper, that is why he developed firstly a frequency-type theory and then the propensity theory.