Talk:Vyborg–Petrozavodsk offensive/Archive 1

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Soviet Losses

Where do those numbers come from? According to Krivosheev, the two fronts involved (Leningrad and Karelian) lost a combined 94,000 to all causes (KIA, MIA, medical). Check here. Andreas 12:35, 2 June 2006 (UTC)

I used Ohto Manninen, Molotovin coctail, Hitlerin sateenvarjo, 1994 book, where he had collected his research articles. In this case, he has used Soviet Ministry of Defence archives and counted the numbers from day to day casualty reports and 10 day Army level casualty reports. I tried to use Krivosheev's numbers but those parts and strong elements not in... makes those unreliable in Finnish fronts. In addition as most of the troops on both sides were concentrated in Karelian Isthmus, it is unlikely that total losses there were only 30,000 when in Karelia they were almost 64,000, especially when in Ministry of Defence 10-day casualty reports indicate, that only 21.Army lost in a month 51,200 men during the main offensive.--Whiskey 13:33, 2 June 2006 (UTC)
I don't know what you read, and maybe you misunderstood, but here is a website made by Krivosheev, and there are his numbers there, and they are 23674 KIA/MIA, 72,701 Medical (http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_10_1.html#5_10_35). What is your problem with the losses again? As for: "In addition as most of the troops on both sides were concentrated in Karelian Isthmus, it is unlikely that total losses there were only 30,000 when in Karelia they were almost 64,000, especially when in Ministry of Defence 10-day casualty reports indicate, that only 21.Army lost in a month 51,200 men during the main offensive." I am sorry, but we do not care here about your opinion. We also do not really care about what Manninen used to do his estimates. The rule on wikipedia is to use Krivosheev for soviet casualties in WW2 and Overmans for gemran casualties. As for other countries, I do not know, but it starts to be really annoying when people use a finnish historian when they want to cite russian casualties.--99.231.50.255 (talk) 01:53, 1 August 2009 (UTC)Pavel Golikov.
The problem is the second line in the Krivosheev's table: 1) First column: Where is Soviet 59th Army which tried to cross Bay of Vyborg during the operation? 2) First column: Ending date. Why it is June 20, while Govorov received orders to continue offensive with next directions and timetables at June 21 and Govorov ordered troops to defensive posture only at July 15? According to Platonov (Bitva za Leningrad) the offensive continued at Karelian Isthmus after the capture of Vyborg several weeks. 3)Second column: As initial numbers this is ok, but during the operation 22 rifle divisions and 4 tank brigades participated in the combat. 4)Sixth column: Total casualties are mentioned as 30029, while only 21st Army, which is only one of the three armies which operated only at Karelian Isthmus during that time, reported 51200 casualties between June 5 and July 15 in it's 10-day casualty reports to STAVKA.
What is the problem if Finnish historian, instead of using Finnish estimates, uses Krivosheev and archived STAVKA reports (Soviet archives, Soviet army internal reports) to bring corrected numbers to the situation where Krivosheev is by his own admission (wrong end date) leaving a large number of casualties out from his calculations? --Whiskey (talk) 01:36, 3 August 2009 (UTC)

Liberating Red Army?

In the article it says "The result was a stalemate, even though Soviets liberated East Karelia". I hardly think they liberated anything... They just brought back the oppression and the killings...

Let's not make a political point of view here. The East Karelia was possessed by Soviet Union before the war, and it was occupied by Finnish troops. To drive occupying force away is generally called liberation. If one starts making judgements which liberations are really liberations and which are not, then we are in a bottomless swamp without any hope of neutral articles. --Whiskey 08:13, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
According to some Wikipedia policies such words as "Liberation" should be avoided and instead use neutral terms such as "battle of", "conquered" etc. --Pudeo (Talk) 12:01, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
I agree with Whiskey, East Karelia was Soviet territory before the war. Article doesn't mention Vyborg beeing "liberated", since it was conquered by the Red Army.Woden 18:08, 31 October 2006 (UTC)
Sorry to bring up this old matter again but if east karelia was "liberated", shouldnt the term for Vyborgs faith rather be occupied than conquered? Or conquered and occupied? So Finns occupy and Soviets just "liberate and conquer, eh?"
Yes, soviets occupied Vyborg, for me it sounds much better. But they also conquered it, since they never left the city which is now a part of Russian territory. Woden 14:45, 22 September 2007 (UTC)

After reading article again, it says that Soviets liberated East Karelia and captured Vyborg. Now this seems for me the best wording over this matter. Woden 14:49, 22 September 2007 (UTC)

No it was not liberation, lets not use political term. Capturing is a better term, it's neutral. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.181.87.13 (talk) 23:22, 5 March 2008 (UTC)

Like Whiskey said before, and which i agreed, liberation means driving occupying force out from the territory previosly owned by the liberator. Finnish army occupated East Karelia, it never was part of Finland, and Soviet army liberated territory which belonged to soviets in the first place. I don't think its overtly political to say, that someone liberated something that had belonged to them at the beginning. For me, soviet army liberating seems NPOV, word capture is OK, but liberation gives the image that this territory was soviet territory before finnish occupation. Woden (talk) 00:09, 8 June 2008 (UTC)
Would be nice to use words that are appropriate. Because this is a discussion on military forces, it would be useful to qualify what's what. Temporary capture of objectives or areas is not like long term occupation, permanent liberation or an even more permanent incorporation of the territory into a state. Liberation is not a politically charged word, but as Woody suggested, just a word that denotes reoccupation of territory that was an integral part of a state. The usage of "take" and retake" is not any more appropriate then "capture" because in English the first is more properly applied to possession of objects, and the later to possession of people (captives). In any case, armed forces always occupy positions, and surrender them by vacating. It seems to me "conquests" went out of fashion in the colonial era--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♣ 03:16, 8 June 2008 (UTC)

From the Soviet losses, again...

There seems to be contradicting information about the losses Soviet army suffered during the operation. Ilya Moshansky gives in Sturm Karelskogo Vala. Vyborgsko-Petrozavodskaja strategicheskaja nastupatelnaja operazija 10 ijuna - 9 avgusta 1944 goda. ("Vojennaja Letopis", BTV-MN, Moscow, 2005) the casualty numbers of 23,674 KIA and 72,701 WIA. The exactly same numbers exist in G.F. Krivoshejev's Grif sekretnosti snjat (Soviet Casualties and combat losses in the Twentieth century). I look right now in front of me a photocopy of the table from Krivoshejev's book (English translation), and there reads: "Leningrad Front, right wing (21st and 23rd Armies, 13th Air Army; 10.06-20.06.44)" in the next column, there is a number of formations, and it also is incomplete: "rifle divisions-15, fortified areas-2, ind.tank brigades-1" as in reality even in the given timeframe at least 22 rifle divisions (45, 63, 64 Guards RD, 178, 358, 372, 46, 90, 314, 72, 109, 286, 168, 265, 268, 13, 177, 92, 281, 381, 10, 142 RD), up to 4 tank brigades (30 Gurds, 1, 152, 220), at least 2 artillery divisions (5 Guards and 15), 32 AD artillery division, at least 3 pioneer brigades (17 Sturm, 20, 52) and other units participated in fighting at Karelian Isthmus.

So, the data in Krivoshejev's book and all other books which derive their numbers from Krivoshejev are incomplete. --Whiskey 07:44, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

STAVKA gave order to continue attack to Lake Saimaa and Priozesk at June 21, and finally at July 15 commander of the 21st Army general D.N. Gusev ordered troops to defensive. In is hardly believable that not a single soldier was killed or wounded during those three and half weeks when Red Army tried to fulfill it's order. Krivoshejev is truthful in his statistics that he doesn't even claim that his casualty numbers consist all casualties for the whole duration of the offensive, but I haven't read Moshansky's book so I don't know if he has the same caveat in his numbers.

The final conclusion is that Krivoshejev's numbers had to be modified by the casualties of the 21st, 23rd and 59th Armies from the time period of June 21-July 15. --Whiskey 14:48, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

So if the casualties are deflated in Krivosheev's book, than how come the total number (450 thousand) is used in the article? And if the 450 thousand number is indeed correct, than perhaps the mistake could be somewhere else (ie. not in the casualties)? With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 13:56, 10 March 2008 (UTC)
The total number is the best available according the sources we have. The main discrepancy in casualties rise from the fact that Krivosheev cuts the operation already June 20, while the offensive continued up to July 15, when the last Soviet forces at the Isthmus were ordered to defensive. 25 days of offensive and not a single casualty counted to the numbers. And the given divisions were only those which were recognized at Karelian Isthmus, thus those at East Karelia are not counted here. --Whiskey (talk) 21:09, 10 March 2008 (UTC)
My guess would be that he cuts it where it "stopped" being a strategic (ie conducted by forces of several fronts) operation. So, like with Kursk and Zitadelle, we might be comparing different things. With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 21:13, 10 March 2008 (UTC)
Well, in fact it "started" being multi-front at June 20, when the Karelian front joined the offensive. Until then it had been solely Leningrad front thing. And it was only after June 20, maybe as late as July 1, when 59.Army joined 21. and 23. Army the offensive at the Isthmus.--Whiskey (talk) 23:05, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

No. Krivocheev includes all Soviet losses suffered in the Karelian front from June 10th - August 9th as well. We are talking about the same operation (Vyborg-Petrozavosk operation), right? --85.164.189.184 (talk) 11:34, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

The Karelian front is not the problem, Leningrad front is. It is Leningrad front forces which attacked at the Karelian Isthmus, and Krivosheev artificially cuts their offensive to the capture of Vyborg, while all the forces and further reinforcements were under the order to continue their offensive. Also, the corps level casualty reports do not indicate any lessening in the intensity of the fighting, on the contrary, corps level casualty reports indicate increase of casualty levels after the June 20. Also, he still doesn't include in his numbers all units which were fighting there at that timeframe. These failures were recognized and corrected by Manninen in his research, so why don't we use his numbers? --Whiskey (talk) 20:54, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

Soviet forces karelia isthumus 1944

The forces of the soviet in this artical are way to low and miss some key elements from the russian army. Just dubble check with this artical in russian wiki(babelfish) and you can see they nummberd 29 divisions. The number of armred brigade is 4 not to with the 1 152 and 220 tank brigade and 30th Gd tank Ill also have other figures from Ohto Manninen in Finnish military journal nummber 17.--Posse72 11:02, 12 June 2007 (UTC)

I agree, I changed ridicilous and obviously wrong number 5:6 to the more general "multiple times more men". There are many estimates, but the official figures given by Soviet army seem to lower than the estimates from other parties. We should compare the different estimates, but we need better sources. There is no point stating some arbitrary number as a fact when the fact is disputed! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.181.87.13 (talk) 23:26, 5 March 2008 (UTC)

To survive is a direct quotation from Saaresalo's book. Also how Finns managed to deplete Soviet forces when retreating from East Karelia is established both in Platonov's book and in Jatkosodan historia. The numbers, most likely, are not correct because of the habit of different armies and historians to count different things to the total numbers, but they are all we have currently, and they are sourced in their respective places, but your "multiple times" is not sourced at all. If you like, you can put fact-tag to the places you don't think are sourced properly, but unless you have sources, please don't remove or change them altogether right away.--Whiskey (talk) 06:05, 6 March 2008 (UTC)
Krivosheev states that the number of Soviet soldiers at the beginning of the operation was 451 500 (including 60 400 in the Baltic Fleet, Ladoga and Onega Flotillas), that were organized in 31 rifle divisions, 3 rifle brigades, 3 tank brigades and 4 UR's (~division sized garrisons of fortifications) http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_10_1.html#5_10_35. With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 13:47, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

Name

I can't find any sources which refer to this action as the "Fourth Strategic Offensive". The closest thing to a name I can find is that the Finn's referred to it as "The Great Attack". If we can't get a source for FSO, I'd like to rename this article to either "The Great Attack" or "Soviet offensive against Finland (1944)". Oberiko (talk) 13:29, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

In Soviet historiography this operation is known as Vyborg-Petrozavodsk strategic offensive operation, dated from June 10th to August 9th, 1944. With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 13:42, 10 March 2008 (UTC)
Several historians also refer to it as "The Karelian Offensive". Google book hits gives the following:
  • Fourth Strategic Offensive - 0
  • Karelian Offensive - 12
  • Vyborg-Petrozavodsk - 8
  • The Great Attack - ~8
Nothing overwhelming for any of them. I'm fine with renaming to "Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive". Oberiko (talk) 20:30, 10 March 2008 (UTC)
I think the "Fourth" in the title referred to the offensive being the fourth of the so-called "Ten Stalin's strikes". Here's an English discussion on some of those. --Illythr (talk) 10:12, 4 May 2008 (UTC)
Sure, but this is something that became known only in the late 50s, so can't have been the contemporary name for the operation. In any case, I do not suggest we rename all the ten operations as 1,2, 3, or 4 etc. ;O)
I hope to eventually do an article on these
If the Karelian Offensive can be sourced, we can include this as the Finnish name for it, but I would not want the "great" in there as it will seem over the top even if it was the largest combat operation in Scandinavia--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♣ 11:08, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

Update: Moved to Vyborg–Petrozavodsk Offensive per multi-move discussion at Talk:Baltic Offensive (1944)#Requested move. --ROGER DAVIES talk 05:36, 11 October 2008 (UTC)

New changes

Kurt, you are known to have tried to push your point of view in the past. Please bring in new sources and gather consensus before you try to do so again. Most certainly don't alter existing sourced information without changing the source supporting it, or perform any kind of other such sneaky changes, as they only damage your own point. --Illythr (talk) 23:49, 29 December 2008 (UTC)

...and again and again...

Why don't we use Russian sources for Finnish casualties also?
I am not sure Krivosheev cuts off the casualties. The dates in the table seem to indicate when the armies were involved in the offensive (so Vyborg offensive ended on the 20th of June). It does not mean the casualties are not for the whole operation.
So you are suggesting that he cut off over 40% of the casualties?? -YMB29 (talk) 17:02, 30 October 2009 (UTC)
There seems to be some kind of language barrier between us, because I don't understand what you are trying to say.:-(
I am using a Finnish publication, where Finnish historian has researched Soviet casualties by using only Soviet sources. If you have similar Russian publication where Russian historian has researched Finnish casualties using only Finnish sources, feel free to add it here.
I'm confused. After June 20th three armies participated in the offensive at the Isthmus: 21st, 23rd and 59th. What is your point?
I believe he reports correctly the casualties between 9th and 20th June. But yes, he cuts off over 40% of the total casulties by limiting his study to that arbitrary date. --Whiskey (talk) 21:28, 30 October 2009 (UTC)
You assume that he cuts them off. The date is the end of the Vyborg offensive, and it is not clear whether the casualties are only up to that date or if it is just the end of the armies' participation in that offensive (but not their involvement in further fighting). That is not a reason to claim that he cuts off 40% of the casualties. Again, I don't see why we can't have both figures. Please don't delete sourced alternative data.
And also don't delete Soviet victory. The offensives were successful in pushing the Finns way back. -YMB29 (talk) 18:54, 31 October 2009 (UTC)
I have to say that you are the first person in any Eastern Front battles to suggest that Krivosheev gives casualties outside the timeframe he gives in his book. I haven't heard any other editor in Wikipedia suggest such a thing, and neither have I read any historian in any WWII related book I've read to present such a claim. So the consensus among historians is that the numbers given by Krivosheev present the casualties suffered during the given time period. If you want to challenge that, please give some sources.
In the battlebox is the summary of the whole battle, not some part of it. You cannot have such a situation that one side includes casualties from a longer time period than the other. It simply falsifies the table. On the other hand, in the text it is possible to give such information to alleviate different sections of the battle, and it has been commonly used in many articles.
The Soviet offensive was able to reach the first given target, Vyborg. It was also able to open Murmansk railroad and liberate Petrozavodsk. But from the pre-offensive targets given for that offensive, it failed to reach second and main target, the border of 1940. It also failed to reach third target, River Kymijoki. And it failed to reach it's main military objective, destruction of the Finnish army. That means it was a stalemate.--Whiskey (talk) 20:42, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

I don't know if I should even take you seriously after this. It is clear that you are just pushing Finnish POV. The Soviet objective was to push the Finns back and force them out of the war, which they achieved. Saying that the Soviets failed to reach some secondary planned military targets or that the main objective was the destruction of the Finnish army is diverting attention. Finland was forced to sign an unfavorable peace treaty and even fight the Germans. How could you not call the offensive a victory.

Here is a non-Russian source:
The Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive Operation of 1944, although small in scope and conducted by a portion of the forces of the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts as well as the Baltic Fleet, ended with a major defeat for the enemy troops on the Karelian Isthmus and in Southern Karelia. The enemy was thrown back to the Soviet-Finnish frontier virtually along its entire extent and this accelerated the pulling out of Finland from the war.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA359713

As for casualties, again, it is unclear if they are incomplete or not. But you are suggesting that the Leningrad Front from the 20th of June suffered casualties that were 2.5 times more than what they lost until June 20th?? What falsifies the table is giving inflated casualties...

You want a source?
В ходе наступления против финских войск на Карельском перешейке с 10 июня по 9 августа 1944 года 21-я и 23-я армии, 7-я воздушная армия Ленинградского фронта потеряли 6 тысяч убитыми и 24 тысячи ранеными
http://www.gov.karelia.ru/Karelia/774/32.html
In the course of the offensive against the Finnish forces on the Karelian Isthmus from 10 June to 9 August 1944, the 21st and 23rd armies, the 7th airborne army of the Leningrad Front lost 6 thousand killed and 23 thousand wounded.

I don't see any reason to not use those figures in addition to what you have, so stop reverting me. -YMB29 (talk) 22:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

Well, the first source you give is not non-Russian, as it is a direct translation of Soviet Journal.
And if you read closer your second source, it gives much higher permanent loss figures for Karelian front than you suggest in your figures.
Anyway, Platonov et.al. in Bitva za Leningrad gives different objectives for the offensive as you do. Also the archived orders Govorov received for this offensive and it's targets differ with your views.
I'll add also this to the Third opinion resolution process. --Whiskey (talk) 00:56, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

3rd opinion: Casualties

Following views disagree:

Whiskey:As has been noted in the tables Krivosheev has published, he has stopped counting casualties when the Vyborg was captured, although the offensive continued as witnessed by Platonov in Bitva za Leningrad and from the orders Marshall Govorov received from STAVKA. The Corps and Army level 10-day casualty reports indicate very heavy losses to 21st and 23rd army between 20 June and 15 July, when the order to move on defensive was finally given to the forces. Omitting these losses from the battlebox gives falsified view to the battle. --Whiskey (talk) 00:56, 2 November 2009 (UTC)


YMB29: It is unclear if the casualties of the Leningrad Front after 20 June 1944 are omitted or not. The dates (in the Soviet casualties table) might refer to when the major objective of taking Vyborg was complete, and not necessarily to the Soviet armies' participation in the fighting. Anyway, this is not a reason to use only Finnish estimates for which the casualties are 3.5 times higher for the Leningrad Front. Presenting both Russian and Finnish figures is more objective. We can add a + or a note to indicate that the Russian casualty figures might be incomplete.

Also I don't see why this offensive is not a victory for the USSR, since as a result of it Finland was forced out of the war and accepted Soviet peace terms. Saying that it was not a victory is a clear example of pro-Finnish POV pushing. -YMB29 (talk) 15:08, 2 November 2009 (UTC)


For consistency, then the Petrozavodsk part of the operation should have been dated ending when the town was captured. Also none other Red Army operations were dated in the Krivosheev's book ending when the location used in the name was captured. And these Finnish "estimates" you are referring are counted from Soviet sources find in Soviet archives, Red Army internal casualty reports Corps have sent to Army HQ or Army has sent to STAVKA.
It was not a victory, as Platonov et.al. in Bitva za Leningrad states: "...The Red Army failed to reach given objectives." Also in other cases even when an attacker captures a lot of land but fails to reach it's objective, the total result is considered failure (f.ex. Operation Barbarossa). Finns asked for peace at June 20, but as Soviet response demanded unconditional surrender, Finns didn't accept that. After the offensive was fought to the standstill, Soviet's dropped that demand in future negotiations.--Whiskey (talk) 23:51, 2 November 2009 (UTC)
You twist and turn to try to present this as a non-defeat or victory for Finland... It is ridiculous to compare this to Barbarossa. One can look at the final outcome and see that the major Soviet goals were accomplished. They wanted unconditional surrender? What was the change in demands since the last negotiations before the offensive? The $600 million reparations were lowered to $300... Or am I missing something?
As for the table, for consistency also it should list the casualties for the entire offensive. It might be just dividing it into two part, since one starts right after the other. But again, there are other ways to deal with this besides just deleting it and having "one truth".
Can you quote your source where it gives the archival data for the Leningrad Front casualties? -YMB29 (talk) 03:41, 3 November 2009 (UTC)
The difference is like in the case you have 500$ and you are forced to make a payment of 300$ or 600$: The First you can make, the second you cannot. Also, in the final deal the timelimit from the internment of German forces was removed, which was also unrealistic, as Germans couldn't withdraw their forces and material as fast. Failing to fulfill either of these demands would make Finland to breach the peace treaty thus opening the road for Soviet countermeasures, f.ex. occupation of the country. Both of these issues were explained to Molotov at March, but he refused to alter the demands. Why on earth should Finland agree to the treaty it knows it cannot fulfill?
In fact, they continue simultaneously three weeks, as Vyborg part continues until July 15, when the order to move on defence was issued to the forces. (The decision was made already July 11 at STAVKA, but it took time to go all the way to the front, as Govorov tried to the end to reach breakthrough at Vuosalmi.)
I'll work on the quote...--Whiskey (talk) 08:16, 3 November 2009 (UTC)
I am not saying that the fighting did not stalemate back near the border. Perhaps Finland improved its position as a result. However you can't deny that the Soviets got most of what they planned to achieve as a result of the offensive.
I know this war for Finland is something like the Great Patriotic is for the USSR, but you have to be objective here. And I am not trying to insult Finland. -YMB29 (talk) 15:19, 3 November 2009 (UTC)

Guys, as I understand the casualty figures issue, I'd give both numbers and note that there's a discrepancy. There's always a discrepancy with stuff involving the USSR, because both the USSR and it's opponents tried to control the “spin” on things. As for the outcome of this operation, try finding RS that discuss the outcome. ---Irbisgreif-(talk | e-mail)-(contribs) 22:05, 3 November 2009 (UTC)

Quotes

Some relevant quotes from Manninen's book:

"Kesän 1944 Kannaksen suurhyökkäyksen osalta julkaistu venäläisselvitys antaa luvut vain Viipurin valtauspäivään (20.6.) asti: 6 018 menetettyä ja 24 011 lääkintätappiota. Sen sijaan teoksessa ei ole eriteltynä Viipurin valtauksen jälkeen yli kolmen viikon ajan kiivaina riehuneiden taisteluiden tappioita. Ne on etsittävä arkistotutkimuksen avulla."

From the 1944 Isthmus offensive published Russian book (e.g. Krivosheev) gives numbers only to the capture of Vyborg (June 20): 6 018 lost and 24 011 medical casualties. The book doesn't have included the casualties of over three weeks of intense fighting after the capture of Vyborg. Those has to be searched from the archives.

"Kannaksen osalta puna-armeijan tappioista on käytettävissä Leningradin rintaman päiväilmoitusten tietoja. Alaisten ilmoitukset eivät voineet olla päivänkohtaisesti tarkkoja. Tästä antaa hyvän kuvan 98. AK:n tappiolaskelma kesäkuun 16. päivältä: aluksi on kaatuneiden määräksi merkitty 165 ja haavoittuneiden 578. Nämä on kuitenkin pyyhitty yli ja merkitty kaatuneiden määräksi 798, haavoittuneiden 2 232, yhteensä 3 002 miestä. Kun laskelma on tehty Siiranmäen taistelun päättyessä, tuntuu uskottavalta, että muutoksella on korjattu edellisten päivien tappiotietoja. Kuuterselän päivänä, 13.6., Leningradin rintaman kokonaistappiot Kannaksella olivat ilmoituksen mukaan 438 kaatunutta, 10 kadonnutta ja 2 156 haavoittunutta, yht. 2 604 miestä."

From the Red Army Isthmus casualties one can use daily casualty reports of the Leningrad Front. The reports from underlings couldn't have been exact daily. A good example from that is 98. Corps casualty report from June 16: At First the number of killed is marked as 165 and wounded as 578. These have been stroke over and marked number of killed as 798, wounded 2 232, together 3 002 men. As the count is done when the battle of Siiranmäki has ended, it is plausible, that in the change has been fixed casualty reports from the previous days. At the day of battle of Kuuterselkä, June 13, Leningrad Front casualties were according to the announcement438 KIA, 10MIA and 2 156 WIA, together 2 604 men.

"21. A:n tappiot Vuoksen ja Viipurin välisellä alueella 29.6.-10.7. olivat 3 198 kaatunutta, 363 kadonnutta ja 13 125 haavoittunutta, yht. 16 686 miesta. Jakson raskain päivä oli 29.6. (tappiot 3 500 miestä) ja 2.7. (tappiot 2 825 miestä). Talin— Ihantalan taistelun neljä ensimmäistä päivää puuttuvat tilastosta. Näiden taisteluiden neuvostotappiot 25.6.—10.7. lienevät olleet noin 22 000 miestä, mikä merkitsee neljän divisioonan jäljellä olleita voimia. Taakse vedettiin tältä kaistalta taistelujakson aikana 4.-5.7. kuusi divisioonaa. Joukkojen irrottamisen vaikeutta kuvastanee se, että rintamareserviin tilastollisesti, muttei käytannössä, kuuluvilla joukoilla oli 4.-6.7. tappioita, yli 300 miestä."

21. Army casualties in the area between Vuoksi River and Vyborg June 29 - July 10 were 3 198 KIA, 363 MIA and 13 125 WIA, together 16 686 men. The heaviest day was June 29 (casualties 3 500 men) and July 2 (casualties 2 825 men). The First four days of the battle of Tali-Ihantala are missing from the statistic. The casualties from these battles between June 25 - July 10 could be around 22 000 men, which means the remaining strength of four divisions. From this section of the front, six divisions were withdrawn July 4-5 to the Leningrad Front reserve. The difficulty of withdrawal is represented the fact, that the forces belonging to the reserve in theory although not in praxis, suffered over 300 casualties July 4-6.

"Moskovan puolustusministeriön arkistossa on nyt nähtävissä myös kymmenen päivän jaksoin laadittuja yhteenvetoja Kannaksella toimineiden armeijoiden tappioista. Niistä käy ilmi, että pääiskun suorittanut 21. Armeija menetti kuukauden aikana 51 200 miestä ja Äyräpäähän edennyt 23. Armeija 22 700 miestä."

In the archive of Ministry of Defence in Moscow there is also ten day summaries from the losses of the armies at the Isthmus. From those one can see that 21. Army, which conducted the breakthrough, lost 51 200

in a month, and 23. Army, which advanced to Äyräpää (at Vuosalmi), lost 22 700 men.

"Jo nimellään kunnioitusta herättänyt 30. Kaartin armeijakunta menetti läpimurrossa Valkeasaaressa ja sen jälkeisinä päivinä (10.—15.6.) kaatuneina 736 miestä ja haa-voittuneina 3 199 miestä. Kun se oli välillä vedetty huollettavaksi selustaan, se osallistui 24-6.-4-7. Talin-Ihantalan taisteluun ja menetti vielä kaatuneina ja kadonneina 1 840 ja haavoittuneina 7 204 miestä (ilmeisesti noin puolet vahvuudestaan)."

30. Guards Corps, which name induced respect, lost in its breakthrough at Valkeasaari (Beloostrov) and in the following days (June 10-15) 736 KIA and 3 199 WIA. After it was temporarily in reserve, it participated June 24 - July 4 in the battle of Tali-Ihantala and lost then 1840 KIA and MIA and 7 204 WIA (apparently half of it's strength).

"Puna-armeijan tappiot Kannaksella heinäkuussa 1944 (Leningradin rintaman päiväilmoitukset)

23. A kaat./haav. 21. A kaat./haav. 59. A kaat./haav res. YHT. kaat./haav.
29.6.-3.7 239 / 682 2577 / 10527 72 / 150 2888 / 11359
4.-10.7 1804 / 6856 984 / 2598 1498 / 764 84 / 218 4370 / 10436
11.-17.7. 1506 / 4905 256 / 1124 144 / 274 1906 / 6303
18.-24.7. 135 / 958 273 / 1020 46 / 120 454 / 2098
25.-31.7. 84 / 286 126 / 462 19 / 80 229 / 828
yhteensä 3768 / 13687 4216 / 15731 1779 / 1388 84 / 218 9847 / 31024
17236 19548 3002 302 40871

Kaatuneiden sarakkeeseen on laskettu kadonneet."

Red Army casualties at the Isthmus July 1944 (Leningrad Front daily casualty reports)... kaat.= KIA+MIA, haav.=WIA, yht.=yhteensä=together.

Translations are coming tomorrow...--Whiskey (talk) 21:29, 3 November 2009 (UTC)

Sorry, it took a little bit longer... --Whiskey (talk) 16:55, 8 November 2009 (UTC)
Ok, thank you. So this means that there were an additional 9,847 killed and 31,024 wounded for the Leningrad Front? -YMB29 (talk) 14:58, 5 November 2009 (UTC)
During July, yes.

"Neuvostojoukkojen kesä-heinäkuun 1944 tappioluvut olivat arkistotietojen mukaan Kannaksella yhteensä 105 000 miestä, joista kaatuneina ja kadonneina 22 000 ja haavoittuneina ja sairauksien takia sairaalaan vietyinä 82 000 miestä. Kaatuneiden kohdalla luku on huomattavasti suomalaisten arvioimia 28 000 pienempi. Karjalan rintaman tappiot 21.6.-9.8. olivat 17 000 menetettyä ja 47 000 lääkintätappiota ja Suomea vastaan tuossa vaiheessa hyökänneen laivaston osuus 700 menetettyä ja 2 000 lääkintätappiota. Näin ollen kesähyökkäyksen kokonaistappiot olivat jopa 170 000 miestä."

The casualties of the Soviet troops at June-July 1944 were according to the archives at the Isthmus together 105 000 men, where KIA and MIA 22 000 and WIA and taken to hospitals due to sickness 82 000 men. The number of KIA were noticeably smaller than the Finnish estimates of 28 000 men. The losses of the Karelian Front June 21 - August 9 were 17 000 lost and 47 000 medicals, and Navy losses were 700 lost and 2 000 medicals. So the total losses of the summer offensive were even 170 000 men. --Whiskey (talk) 16:55, 8 November 2009 (UTC)


Ok thanks for the translation, but it is still not all clear. So 22,000 killed and 82,000 wounded are the total casualties for the Leningrad Front?? The losses for the Karelian Front look to be the same as listed in Krivosheev's book. -YMB29 (talk) 23:59, 8 November 2009 (UTC)

Yes, they were the total casualties at June-July for Leningrad Front. And yes, the losses of the Karelian Front are the same as in the Krivosheev's book. As I have written earlier, the only problematic place was Leningrad Front between June 21 and July 15, which were missing from the Krivosheev's tables. --Whiskey (talk) 16:50, 27 April 2010 (UTC)
So the Leningrad Front's casualties are almost 2.5 times higher in the second phase? Don't know how reliable this is... Getting accurate casualties figures from archives is not as simple as just adding up the numbers in the various casualties reports. -YMB29 (talk) 16:22, 4 May 2010 (UTC)
Yes. June 10-June 20 (11 days): 6000KIA+MIA, 24000WIA+Med., June 21-July 15 (25 days): 16000KIA+MIA, 58000WIA+Med. So the duration was 2.27 times, killed 2.67 times and wounded 2.42 times. So there seems to be 17% increase in KIA rate and 7% increase in WIA rate. In fact, that is not surprising, as during the latter time period Soviet forces conducted several amphibious operations where KIA/WIA-ratio tends to rise, and due to the fact that number of Finnish foces increased drastically when fighting moved to VKT-line while simultaneously STAVKA refused to release additional troops to Govorov thus making the attacker/defender-ratio more unfavorable to Soviet Union.
By no means is it accurate, as those reports only handle the casualties as long as they are within the responsibily of the army/corps. As soon as wounded are moved to the hospitals, they are out from the count. I read one Soviet study about military medicine during the WWII, and there was said that 6% of all patients in military hospitals died in their wounds. The way how Krivosheev produced his numbers did take those into account, but Manninen's method of using only army/corps reports underestimates KIA and overestimates WIA numbers. But as long as Krivosheev and his group doesn't do the counting of the casualties between June 21 and July 15, Manninen's numbers are the best estimate we have on Soviet losses. --Whiskey (talk) 20:43, 4 May 2010 (UTC)
SU was successful with its attacks pretty much until the June 20. That is it could be assumed that casualties on successful attacks would be smaller than on a repulsed one. The heaviest fighting (Tienhaara, Tali-Ihantala, Äyräpää-Vuosalmi, Bay of Viipuri) in Karelia happened exactly on the period omitted from Krivosheev's data. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:18, 6 May 2010 (UTC)
So Manninen only counted the casualties for the Leningrad Front after June 20th? He did not count them up to the 20th and for the Karelian Front to see if his calculated figures matched those in Krivosheev's book? -YMB29 (talk) 21:14, 11 May 2010 (UTC)

Result of the offensives

Since the cites of Petrozavodsk and Vyborg were liberated from the Finns the result of the operations is a clear Soviet victory. All other claims are absurd. Koskenkorva (talk) 20:38, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

Not at all. One should take into account what was the initial Soviet goal from the offensive as given by Platonov and copies of orders given by STAVKA before and during the offensive as published in the Soviet archives. If those are taken into account, then the offensive was only partially successful as it failed in some goals. That's why it was a stalemate. --Whiskey (talk) 21:34, 24 January 2010 (UTC)
Well again just because the fighting stalemated at the end after the Finns were pushed back, does not make the offensive a stalemate draw. The major Soviet goals were achieved: Vyborg and Petrozavodsk were taken, Finland exited the war on Soviet terms. How about strategic Soviet victory and tactical stalemate? -YMB29 (talk) 15:30, 2 February 2010 (UTC)

Having the outcome of this offensive as a stalemate is dubious because the main political goal of USSR (pushing Finland out of the war) was achieved. The actual (not declared) desire of Soviet leadership to sovetize Finland is arguable. The fact that Finnish army wasn't fully destroyed (despite that being one of the declared goals) doesn't alter the fact that the Soviet Union managed to get Finland out of the war. Since the outcome overall is not clear-cut, I suggest a descriptive outcome - along the lines of - Operational - Soviet offensive stopped after certain Soviet gains, Strategic - Soviet victory; Finland exits war of the Axis side; ie, the separation of the military and political (which are most important) sides. With respect Ko Soi IX (talk) 23:56, 8 April 2010 (UTC)

If you consider pushing Finland out of the war as the main goal you should note that the offensive had relatively little to do with that. That is Finns had actively tried to get away from the war since 1943 (i.e. over a year at that point). The offensive did not alter their intent at all. Finns wanted both before and after the offensive to quit from the war. Also the Soviet demand for surrender (main arguing point with me and YMB29) which was made at the height of the Soviet offensive was rejected - it remained rejected even when SU explained that they hadn't intended for unconditional surrender (indicating that the offensive alone was not 'enough'). - Wanderer602 (talk) 14:48, 9 April 2010 (UTC)
Again you can't guess that Finland would have exited the war on similar terms if there was no offensive. The offensive clearly made major gains and stressed Finland to the point where its military/government understood that it would be better to agree to Soviet demands. The result has to be changed. -YMB29 (talk) 16:55, 15 April 2010 (UTC)
Well.. Mannerheim made it clear to the Germans that should SU take Estonia Finns would be forced to agree to heavy (or severe, not sure how it should be translated in this case) peace terms with SU. So i actually can guess that they could have agreed to fairly similar terms even without the offensive. The offensive gained some land and even managed to break the lines Finns had intended as 'main defensive positions'. But in the end it was stopped by the Finns short of reaching any of its original goals to pretty much to the same positions where the lines were when Winter War ended without reaching the border of 1940. In that sense the offensive failed (it never managed to reach its listed goals). - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:48, 15 April 2010 (UTC)
Again you claim that an offensive is a failure if it does not reach all of its tactical goals... Most of the tactical goals were achieved and the strategic objective was fulfilled to the fullest. Saying that the same result could have been achieved without fighting is speculation. -YMB29 (talk) 15:01, 26 April 2010 (UTC)
Offensive had listed goals of reaching Kymijoki line and crushing Finnish army. Only few Soviet troops reached the 1940 border and even these were thrown back by Finns (Ilomantsi) and none of the troops reached Kymijoki at any point. Crushing of the Finnish army failed as well (Soviet troops failed to breach the VKT line) as Finns made sure they wouldnt be surrounded. And yes, its speculation but it is speculation supported by the comments in his memoairs of the commander-in-chief of one of the parties engaged in the the conflict. Wanderer602 (talk) 22:21, 1 May 2010 (UTC)
We went through this on the other talk page... You say that the Soviet offensive failed while I think that this claim is laughable. We are not going to change what we think so let others comment on this. -YMB29 (talk) 16:22, 4 May 2010 (UTC)
Fine with me - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:18, 6 May 2010 (UTC)

finnish misinterpretation of the Russian response was denied by the Soviet Union in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944?

On June 22 the Finnish government asked for peace from the Soviet Union, but when the Soviet response arrived on the next day, it was interpreted by Linkomies as a demand for unconditional surrender, which it really wasn't. The finnish misinterpretation of the Russian response was denied by the Soviet Union in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944. [7] [8] —Preceding unsigned comment added by Petu1965 (talkcontribs) 22:21, 12 February 2010 (UTC)

Could someone please clarify real facts (?) upon this "misinterpretation" ?????????
Mannerheim, C. G. E., Muistelmat, osa II ("Memoirs, Part II"), page 450. 1952. - Rough translation:
  • Evening on the 23rd of June when Ribbentrop was still in Helsinki the government received a following communication from soviet regime via Stockholm:
  • Because the Finns have several times betrayed us, we want Finnish cabinet/state to make an announcement signed by the president and the foreign minister where they tell that Finland is ready to surrender and turn to soviet government in asking for a peace. If we receive this kind of announcement then Moscow is ready to accept Finnish delegation.
  • Finnish: Koska suomalaiset ovat useaan kertaan pettäneet meidät, haluamme Suomen hallituksen antavan presidentin ja ulkoministerin allekirjoittaman ilmoituksen, että Suomi on valmis antautumaan ja kääntymään neuvostohallituksen puoleen pyytäen rauhaa. Jos saamme Suomen hallitukselta tämänlaatuisen tiedotuksen, Moskova on valmis ottamaan vastaan suomalaisen valtuuskunnan.
The SU demands Finns first to declare their surrender and then they would have been willing to accept a delegation. No guarantees, promises, or even suggestions were given that any actual talks would be held. SU certainly claimed - 10 full days later - that it was misinterpreted but the above is rather difficult to interpret as anything else than unconditional surrender - it clearly demands Finns to surrender without any guarantees of actual talks. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:38, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
The word that was used is capitulate, not surrender.
capitulate - to surrender under specified conditions, come to terms, to accept military defeat, to accept something or agree to do something unwillingly.
So this is far from unconditional surrender; the Soviets wanted the Finns to accept their terms. -YMB29 (talk) 22:29, 13 March 2010 (UTC)
Version that reached Finnish government used term 'surrender'. Not that it matters, SU still demanded Finns to declare their surrender/capitulation without a single guarantee that any kind of talks would be held and without any knowledge of the demanded treaty terms. Which in both cases either is or is extremely close to an unconditional surrender. And so it was unacceptable for the Finns. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:30, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
Again this is your interpretation of it. Something may have been lost in translation, but unconditional surrender is not what the Soviets wanted. The disputed statement you inserted does not make sense, since it is about what the Soviets wanted and not how it was interpreted by the Finns. -YMB29 (talk) 20:18, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
Read the quote i posted above. If SU made a demand for an unconditional surrender (or even surrender) how can it be understood as being something else? It doesn't matter what SU intended or what they wanted behind the scenes. Publicly they made a demand for surrender and it was refused (unconditional or conditional, doesn't matter as it was still refused). - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:13, 20 March 2010 (UTC)
If they did NOT want unconditional surrender as sourced in the article, how can you claim that they did? It is mentioned that the Finns thought that they did demand it, so what else do you want?
To reach a conclusion to the conflict with Finland instead of demanding a surrender as they had done in July 1944 the Soviets offered in September 1944 roughly the same peace treaty as in February 1944 though with some demands reduced, like the war reparations being halved and the time in which the reparations needed to be completed being extended.
What does surrender mean? Again, if it is sourced in the article that the Soviets did not want unconditional surrender (as you are implying with "demanding a surrender") then your statement does not make sense. -YMB29 (talk) 02:39, 21 March 2010 (UTC)
It doesn't even matter what SU was demanding in summer 1944 as Finns rejected SU demands for their surrender. Finns didn't agree to conditional or unconditional surrender. Especially in this case - as there weren't any kind of military surrender, occupation, or anything like them - the use of word 'surrender' as result of the war is extremely misleading. War ended in armistice followed by peace treaty without military surrender. Unlike what SU was demanding in summer 1944. So the SU demands for surrender in summer 1944 were rejected. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:53, 21 March 2010 (UTC)
And where exactly do you see there a mention that the demand that was rejected would have been a demand for an unconditional surrender. I wasn't implying anything with the statement just listing the fact that SU made a demand for surrender and that it was rejected. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:57, 21 March 2010 (UTC)
You are implying unconditional surrender with that statement. Otherwise what would surrender mean in that statement? Conditional surrender? What would that mean exactly? How is it different from what actually happened (Finland ceased fighting and submitted to Soviet demands after both agreed on conditions)? The war did not end just in an armistice; it was a conditional surrender by Finland, since the Soviets dictated the terms. Again, by surrender you are thinking of unconditional surrender.
Willing to surrender, or rather capitulate, and ask for peace in the Soviet response does not mean that Finland is to lay down its arms and give in to the Soviets, which is basically unconditional surrender.
So either you are implying a demand for unconditional surrender which is contradicted by sources in the article, or saying that instead of conditional surrender/capitulation terms were offered to Finland, but those terms were themselves part of a conditional surrender/capitulation. Both interpretations are contradicting and illogical. -YMB29 (talk) 21:12, 27 March 2010 (UTC)
I wasn't implying anything of the sorts just to avoid this kind of argument on this talk page. Therefore i left the word 'unconditional' out from the statement. SU demanded a surrender in June 1944 and Finns rejected it. That is a fact. What SU demanded is obscure as the message they used demands for surrender without negotiations (i.e. unconditional surrender) and yet they claim to have demanded something else.
So you interpret an armistice treaty into a conditional surrender. Why is it so hard to use term armistice (which is the event which actually took place)? With using term 'surrender' you are already implying a whole set of different things. If you open any dictionary or thesaurus you can easily see that the words have very different meanings.
Finns were willing to make an armistice and then peace. They never agreed to sign anything with word surrender and much less anything with word capitulate on it. You could twist the armistice treaty and following peace treaty into something else but then you would be deliberately misleading the people.
Demand for unconditional surrender was made. If SU intended to say something else (in which case either SU officials responsible for the wording on the demand or the leadership were just plain incompetent) or if they wanted to save face by later claiming to have meant something else is debatable. Given that SU kept bidding lower and lower with their demands for peace treaty and armistice it is difficult to view the final agreement as a surrender (even in its liberal interpretation) - besides nothing even remotely resembling a military surrender (or capitulation) took place at all and the word surrender when used in this context seems to imply that there was - which in turn is misleading. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:24, 28 March 2010 (UTC)

Again you are thinking of unconditional surrender... You still need to explain what surrender means in the statement you keep inserting. Armistice only means that both sides stop fighting. Surrender (conditional) is accurate in describing Finland's situation:

Finland fought alongside Germany in the war against the Soviet Union and provided Germany with vital raw materials, particularly nickel, but in September 1944 Finland surrendered to the Russians. [1]
-Hitler, Dönitz, and the Baltic Sea: the Third Reich's last hope, 1944-1945 by Howard D. Grier
In the meantime they had, however, lost most of the sympathy of Great Britain and the United States, and they found it ever more difficult to maintain the fiction of a separate war, or to live with the fact that Finland had sided with a Nazi power with which it was not in ideological, moral or political agreement. Surrender to the Soviet Union came in late September 1944, but was preceded by a British declaration of war against Finland and almost three years of hostilities between these two countries. [2]
-Churchill and Finland: a study in anticommunism and geopolitics by Markku Ruotsila
Marshall Zhukov's army sat on the banks of the Vistula outside Warsaw, other armies drove into Romania and Hungary. Finland surrendered to the Soviet Union on September 19. If Moscow were primarily interested in the rapid defeat of Germany, military logic dictated a drive on Berlin. [3]
-Caught between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's ambassadors to Moscow by Dennis J. Dunn

-YMB29 (talk) 17:17, 5 April 2010 (UTC)

Using the same source as you did (Google Books) and searching for 'Finland armistice' and 'Finland surrender' yields considerably more results with 'armistice' than with 'surrender'. Just few opposing examples:
Stalin on his part no longer insisted on surrender: thus Moscow, too, implicitly recognized the separate character of the Finnish war. On September 19, 1944, an armistice agreement was finally signed in Moscow. -[4]
-Finland in the new Europe by Max Jakobson
[5] - Finland in the twentieth century by D. G. Kirby
[6] - The history of Finland by Jason Edward Lavery
In short using that reference it would seem to imply that armistice is more acceptable than surrender. Same result happens with 'Google Scholar' search. And even then it seemed like most of the found 'surrender' references were of something else than Finnish surrender (i.e. the rejected SU's surrender demand, or the surrender of Nazi Germany which were mentioned in the same articles).
I still can't understand why it is so hard for you to use word armistice. Also this whole discussion - even though it supports the use of armistice instead of surrender - is besides the point. SU did demand a surrender (conditional or not) in the summer 1944 and it was rejected. That is a fact which you have agreed to. And the statement which you keep removing ( ...instead of demanding a surrender as they had done in July 1944... ) only tells that SU made a surrender demand with either unconditional or undisclosed terms and that this was rejected (and later 'replaced' with armistice). - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:06, 5 April 2010 (UTC)
So now you are using google search results to prove your point...
Like I said before, an armistice could be part of a surrender.
The source you gave talks of surrender as unconditional surrender.
Again, Finland surrendered conditionally, so it does not make sense to say that instead of offering a surrender (conditional since it is sourced that the Soviets did not want unconditional) they offered terms of surrender... -YMB29 (talk) 17:01, 8 April 2010 (UTC)
I merely followed your example and slightly expanded the method of proving the point you started in the preceding post.
It could be said. However the fact is that war ended in armistice. Not in any kind of surrender.
It was just one of the many sources.However if you start going through the sources you'll see that armistice is the generally accepted result for the war.
They didn't offer a surrender. They demanded a surrender (for example the demand explicitly mentioned severing ties with Germans before any contact could be made). And they were rejected. - Wanderer602 (talk) 14:29, 9 April 2010 (UTC)
They rejected it because they thought it was a demand for unconditional surrender.
The Soviets demanded that the Finns announce that they are willing to surrender and send a delegation that will be offered terms of surrender.
Again armistice does not mean that there was no surrender.
However that part in the article is fine now. -YMB29 (talk) 16:41, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

Losses yet again

Read the thread title. I believe that Finnish historians though, should not be trusted. I have a few Russian/Soviet sources for Finnish casualties - maybe we should add them to as an alternative POW on the Finnish losses? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Nikitn (talkcontribs) 11:27, 14 May 2010 (UTC)

Finnish losses are listed in detail in the archives. However there appears to be some problems with the reported Russian losses. This has been discussed several times in this talk page already. In short the data Krivocheev gives of the losses suffered by the Leningrad Front during the operation start from the June 9th and end to June 20th. However the attack continued in full strength all the way until July 15th. Of this period Krivocheev's data lists no casualties what so ever even though it is known that the hardest fighting that happened on the Isthmus by the units of the Leningrad Front took place precisely during that time (Battle of Tali-Ihantala, Battle of Vyborg Bay (1944), Battle of Vuosalmi, Battle of Tienhaara). To be totally honest Krivocheev does not claim that there were no casualties during that period. The tables just tell that casualties of the Leningrad Front from June 21st to July 15th are not listed in Krivocheev's data. So his data is in that regard incomplete.
Manninen noticed this and he used the unit, corps and army level casualty reports (from STAVKA/SU/Russian archives) to fill the blanks. And as discussed on this page the casualties calculated by Manninen have small bias towards elevated number of WIAs at the cost of the number of KIAs.
Feel free to attempt to prove that the Russian/Soviet reports of the Finnish casualties are correct. In Manninen's case he used actual Soviet casualty reports, not some hearsay or intelligence reports or estimates of Soviet casualties by the Finnish troops. - Wanderer602 (talk) 17:59, 14 May 2010 (UTC)
Reproduction (without permission) of the table from the http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_10_1.html#5_10_35
Наименование объединений и сроки их участия в операции Боевой состав и численность войск к началу операции Людские потери в операции (чел.)
Количество соединений Численность Безвозвратные Санитарные Всего Среднесуточные
Карельский фронт левое крыло:

7-я и 32-я армии, 7-я воздушная армия (21.6 - 9.8.44 г.)

сд - 16, сбр - 3, отбр - 2, УР - 2 202300 16924 46679 63603 1272
Ленинградский фронт правое крыло:

21-я и 23-я армии, 13-я воздушная армия (10.6. - 20.6.44 г.)

сд - 15, отбр - 1, УР-2 188800 6018 24011 30029 2730
Балтийский флот, Ладожская и Онежская военные флотилии (весь период) '-' 60400 732 2011 2743 45
Итого Дивизий - 31, бригад - 6, УР- 4 451500 23674 (5,2%) 72701 96375 4047
Please notice the section i marked in bold. Either Krivosheev is not much of an historian as his list is missing a whole army (59th) and marks the attack has having been finished at June 20th. Or then the data is marking the fact that it is not complete. Granted that my Russian is almost non-existing so can some one else give his comments of the highlighted entry? - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:40, 14 May 2010 (UTC)
Наименование объединений и сроки их участия в операции means "the name of the formations and the time frame of their participation in the operation." The section header also gives the correct time scope of the whole operation - 10 June-9 August 1944. So, according to Krivosheev, the right wing of Leningrad Front participated only in the first 10 days of the offensive, and whatever losses it suffered after its participation was over (that is, after 20 June) are not part of the losses of this particular offensive operation. --Illythr (talk) 21:40, 14 May 2010 (UTC)
Yes, you are correct. And this is peculiar, as according the Platonov's book the original target of the offensive was to throw Finns outside Soviet 1941 borders deep into Finland, not just out from Vyborg. Also, Platonov makes no distinction of "offensive" before or after the capture of Vyborg. It would be enlightening to hear his and his group's reasoning for that time limit. --Whiskey (talk) 23:57, 14 May 2010 (UTC)
The question boils down to this: why does Krivosheev's work mark the 20th of June as the end of participation of the Leningrad Front in the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk offensive? Does Manninen or Platonov offer any insight here? Were these units redirected, ordered to hold captured ground, advance in another direction? What happened on 20.06.2944? --Illythr (talk) 01:14, 15 May 2010 (UTC)
Okay, this (and this) pretty much settles it - the official time frame of the Vyborg offensive operation was 10-20 June 1944. Which source extends it to 15 July? --Illythr (talk) 01:46, 15 May 2010 (UTC)
If you insist that the offensive ended in 20 June then all the Finnish casualty reports need to be taken out and revised as well as they contain all the losses until the mid July and all references to German forces need to be removed as well (as those arrived to front only after the 20 June) etc. It seems quite convenient to arbitrarily decide when the attack ends according to the achieved results and not according to the actual actions on the front. Also if the Vyborg operation ended in 20 June to the capture of Vyborg then why did Leningrad Front kept attacking until mid July? As for which source.. From Battle of Tali-Ihantala page:
According to Bitva za Leningrad 1941-1944 ("The Battle of Leningrad") edited by Lieutenant General S.P. Platonov:
"The repeated offensive attempts by the Soviet Forces failed ... to gain results. The enemy succeeded in significantly tightening its ranks in this area and repulse all attacks of our troops ... During the offensive operations lasting over three weeks, from June 21 to mid-July, the forces of the right flank of the Leningrad front failed to carry out the tasks assigned to them on the orders of the Supreme Command issued on June 21." —Preceding unsigned comment added by Wanderer602 (talkcontribs) 05:06, 15 May 2010 (UTC)
Something i noticed while looking at this issue from the books.. In book Kun hyökkääjän tie suljettiin (U.E. Moisala, Pertti Alanen, Otava 1988) the writers are not using explicit references but they are listing the SU operations as Leningradin rintaman Viipurin operaatio (Leningrad Front's Vyborg operation), Karjalan rintaman Syvärin-Sortavalan operaatio (Karelian Front's Svir-Serdobol operation i.e. the Petrozavodsk operation), and Leningradin rintaman Lappeenrannan-Kymijoen operaatio (Leningrad Front's Lappeenranta-Kymi River operation). Of these the last one is a direct continuation for the Vyborg operation (it started on 21 June while the preceding one ended in 20 June). So in that respect the data by Krivosheev (btw is correct spelling Krivocheev or Krivosheev?) is accurate though it omits one of the operations. Also the lack of 59th army from the list is in this respect understandable as it joined in operations with 21st and 23rd armies in Karelian Isthmus only after 20 June. However it does it not change the fact that Krivosheev's data is incomplete. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:00, 15 May 2010 (UTC)
Once a battle group completes its strategic objective (in this case, the capture of Vyborg), it is immediately given new orders on how to expand the achieved success. The excerpt you provide further demonstrates that these were different offensive operations: "...offensive operations lasting over three weeks, from June 21 to mid-July... tasks assigned to them on June 21". And yes, the Finnish casualties must be adjusted as well. A solution here might be to create a separate section, "Lappeenranta-Kymi River operation" for the lack of a definite term and describe the events of 21 June-9 July separately, with a separate casualty count. The solution for the infobox is to cite both numbers with a footnote explaining that, although Leningrad Front's participation in the V-P operation was officially over on 20 June, the fighting continued until the 9th of July, incurring further casualties. The correct spelling is Krivosheyev, but "Krivosheev" is also often used.
On a side note, ruwiki has two more operations listed as part of the V-P that are apparently not mentioned here: the Tuloksa landing operation (part of S-P; 23-27 June, by the Ladoga Flotilla) and the Björkö landing operation (part of V-P; 20-25 June, by the Baltic fleet). --Illythr (talk) 15:25, 15 May 2010 (UTC)
I don't know how to resolve the problem with the data at the moment. Either we use Manninen's data with current Finnish casualties, or then the casulties could be cut into three separate sections according to the respective operations, or something else..
Soviet landings at Tuulos are generally in finnish sources included to the rest of the operations in Ladoga Karelia (Svir-Sortavala op.) and the landings at Koivisto as part of the operations in Karelian Isthmus (Vyborg op). Ru-wiki pages give rather different picture of the events in Koivisto (total strength of the Finnish & German units that took part in combat was smaller than the losses the Soviets reported - even then the units successfully carried out the evacuation of Koivisto) though while Tuulos report seems to be fairly consistent with Finnish reports (IIRC Mannerheim in his memoirs give separate praises for the Red Army landings in Tuulos) on the other hand the actual landing was not very significant as Finns had already build a detour in fear of amphibious operations and as the main thrust of the Karelian front was delayed for some reasons. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:10, 15 May 2010 (UTC)
There's no need to split the casualty data into more than two parts - one for the Soviet operation scope and one - for Finnish/extended Leningrad Front participation. Is it possible to make this split in Finnish casualty reports (that is, separate the casualties suffered in 21.6-9.7 battles with LF units)?
ruwiki articles about WW2 often make use of old Soviet sources and thus tend to exhibit Soviet systemic bias (notice the constant references to German/Finnish forces as "the enemy," for example). However, since each operation (one more: Vyborg islands landing, 1-10 July) marks a significant diversion of forces, they all deserve some mention in the main article. By the way, neither ruwiki article provides any data on Finnish/German personnel losses - where's this discrepancy you speak of? --Illythr (talk) 01:53, 16 May 2010 (UTC)
Losses section unless translator is playing some funk again. In the Koivisto area during the attack and evacuation of the islands Finns lost 1 MTB (Taisto 1 or Tarmo), and 1 patrol boat (VMV 17) and possibly a small coastal transport (Matti - not sure when it was sunk) and gained (captured) 1 SU MTB. German forces assisting the Finns lost torpedo boat (light destroyer) T31, MFB (armed barge) AF 32, and mine transport vessel (Otter - which was damaged and 'sunk' after it had reached the pier). Quite different from Soviet story of losses (via translator - sunk - 2 destroyers, 4 transport, 3 patrol boats, two patrol boats, six landing craft - and damaged - 3 minesweepers, five patrol ships, 2 transport, 4 landing craft, 2 torpedo boats, 2 patrol boats). Finnish naval losses are fairly easy to track as there were only quite few ships in the navy, for German losses i have used Chronik des Seekrieges 1939-1945 page.
Vyborg islands landing is essentially the same as the Battle of Vyborg Bay (1944) - however Soviets units did try to land on the other side of the bay as well but they were quickly repulsed and thrown back to the sea by actions of German 122nd division and Finnish units. Finnish navy did not lose any ships during the operation as sunk. Several were badly damaged but could still be repaired. And i couldn't see any German ships being sunk either. Still need to check the Finns & German personnel losses (navy history book didn't bother to list ground troop losses). - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:19, 16 May 2010 (UTC)
Ah, I thought you meant personnel losses. Yes, some of the ships that the bombers reported destroyed weren't (no destroyers, though, миноносец is a torpedo boat, although the classification is kinda confusing there). This forum discussion (ru) goes into quite some detail the losses and the operation in general in the losses and the operation in general about the losses and the operation in general, without citing their sources, alas. --Illythr (talk) 22:10, 18 May 2010 (UTC)
Yeah.. Its kinda confusing name due the origins of it as original 19th century torpedoboats evolved into destroyers and to motor torpedoboats and as some countries insisted using types which were neither (namely Germans). However given the size, shape, and firepower of the German Elbing class torpedo boat it would not be surprising to see it classified as a destroyer (after all it was such in all but the name). - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:43, 20 May 2010 (UTC)

It seems we need the original order from STAVKA for the offensive to make a final decision. As has been demonstrated, even some Soviet sources include Koivisto landings and the battle of Vyborg bay islands to the offensive, although they are outside the Leningrad front time frame. Anyway, what we know from Platonov, the initial STAVKA order was to advance further than Vyborg. Some historians have explained this as Soviet advance was divided into three phases, from Beloostrov to Vyborg, from Vyborg to state border/Lappeenranta and from state border to Kymijoki, which is supported by STAVKA order of June 21, where the preparation order was given to the third phase.

Some kind of analogy could be found in the second Belorussian front and the East Prussian operation at the winter of 1945, where the front forces immediately continued with Pomeranian operation while Baltic front forces continued the East Prussian operation. --Whiskey (talk) 12:15, 16 May 2010 (UTC)

In the book i mentioned it is implied that true goal of the SU operation was the Lappeenranta-Kymi River line but that operations were cut into three separate pieces which were to be started in sequence. (1) Vyborg operation was intended to force Finns to pull out troops from Eastern Karelia and Ladoga Karelia to bolster defenses on the Isthmus. (2) This would have then triggered Karelian Front's operation which would have had easy advance and cause more disruption in Finnish defenses and cause yet another troop redeployment to defend against advances north of Ladoga. (3) And then Leningrad Front would have made the attack towards Lappeenranta-Kymi River as well as Sortavala and smashed the divided Finnish troops. So it would still have been a single large scale operation (4th strategic offensive) with its goals set on Lappeenranta and Kymi River line as well as in crushing the bulk of the Finnish army. But as said they do not provide explicit references for their data in the book. - Wanderer602 (talk) 13:17, 16 May 2010 (UTC)
Whiskey: Note that these landing operations were conducted by the Ladoga Flotilla and the Baltic Sea Fleet, not the Leningrad Front (and Krivosheev's table gives them proper mention). I think Wanderer602 is correct above - (3) was supposed to be the next major move of the VP Op (and thus the next operation), but it failed/was canceled and so wasn't included. --Illythr (talk) 14:48, 16 May 2010 (UTC)
I think that it did both. It was commenced but it failed to create any kind of breakthrough regardless of several attempts (well documented on the Finnish side - again Tali-Ihantala, Vuosalmi & amphibious/naval ops in Vyborg Bay area) with the troops available to the 'right flank of Leningrad Front'. After no breakthroughs had been achieved the further attacks were canceled on 8/9 July apart from one last attempt at Vuosalmi where SU forces were bolstered and active offensive operations continued until 11 July when STAVKA told Leningrad Front to call off any further assaults and redirected assault troops elsewhere 'to avoid unnecessary losses' (started at mid July). That is had SU kept concentrating more troops against Finns they would have ground down the defenses and broken through sooner or later. So it failed to provide breakthrough with the forces available for the operation and was canceled instead of being sufficiently reinforced.
However lack of success is not really a valid goal for excluding a part of an operation or its casualties from any lists. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:06, 16 May 2010 (UTC)
Yes and no - the casualties should be included, but since they were incurred outside of the Vyborg offensive, and, officially, outside of the V-P offensive, they should be described separately - either in a separate article about these attempts or a separate section here (probably better), with two separate figures in the infobox. This should finally close the casualties topic, stem the endless revert wars and claims about "Finnish propaganda." --Illythr (talk) 20:13, 16 May 2010 (UTC)
Well.. V-P offensive seems to be used quite often as synonymous to 4th strategic offensive so it probably better to use single article for all the three as in this respect the last phase is still a part of the V-P offensive - which i take is a name assigned to the operation after the war. Assuming Finnish casualties reports for the time period can be found and if a single infobox entry is not preferred then how about listing all three phases separately (Krivosheyev's data allows for this already - assuming information from Manninen is used for the last phase of the attack). - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:00, 17 May 2010 (UTC)
That could be acceptable solution. In fact, if we take the orders of STAVKA as a base, then the Leningrad front operation was divided to three, and we should use the name Lappeenranta-Virojoki operation for the second one, as it was the STAVKA ordered target for the offensive (e.g. the state border). And do we still use the current name to the article, or do we revert it back to the fourth strategic offensive? --Whiskey (talk) 08:04, 17 May 2010 (UTC)
Er, three? --Illythr (talk) 12:47, 17 May 2010 (UTC)
Yes. The First ordered LF to attack from Beloostrov to Vyborg in 8-10 days and prepare the advance to the state border and Elisenvaara/Käkisalmi area. The second was issued after the First was reached by the capture of Vyborg and asked LF to advance Virojoki-Lappeenranta-line (the state border) and to Elisenvaara/Käkisalmi area, and prepare advance to Kymijoki. If the second order would have reached, then the Third order would have come out which would have ordered advancement to the Kymijoki. Very standard practice in military, so you don't end up having your forces in a wrong place at the end. --Whiskey (talk) 13:08, 17 May 2010 (UTC)
Well.. I guess it could be mentioned. However as the second oder could not be accomplished the third order is largely irrelevant in respect of casualties and the lot it however is useful in determining the actual goals of the 4th strategic offensive. - Wanderer602 (talk) 13:17, 17 May 2010 (UTC)
Just what I wanted to say - since the third LF op is only hypothetical, there's no point in giving it more than a passing mention. Thus the two casualty numbers should be the ones for the official V-P op as provided by Krivosheev and the full number as provided by Manninen, with an explanation that both are correct and target different time frames. --Illythr (talk) 15:38, 17 May 2010 (UTC)
Are the names of the landing operations really 'Bjorkö' and 'Tuloksa' in Soviet/Russian literature? Just wondering as in Finnish the first one that is in Swedish is known as 'Koivisto' in Finnish (AFAIK in Russian 'Primorsk') and the second one is generally known as 'Tuulos' in Finnish. - Wanderer602 (talk) 11:59, 18 May 2010 (UTC)
Yes, 1) see e. g. the Treaty of Björkö - the name of the operation is based on its operational area. 2) Likewise, the river's name in Russian is Tuloksa, hence the operation name GSE. --Illythr (talk) 22:10, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

Section break 1

This entire "discussion" is ridiculous. Wanderer and Whiskey are basing their entire claims on a text they can't read nor understand. It stands the following: the RIGHT WING of the Leningrad front, ie 21. , 23. and the 13. armies STOPPED their offensives. BUT the Karelian front started with full force with the help of elements from the Baltic front.

You ask what happened at the 20th of June? Soviet fronts and even armies operated with a strict system where each formation has their assigned areas of operation. It would be realistic if the Right wing of the Leningrad front already completed their objectives, opened up for a strike by the Karelian front further north.

Soviet casualties from June 21-August 8: 17.000 killed. Out of 24.000

I have proven my point without any doubt. I will revert 2 the proper numbers now. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 62.92.31.1 (talk) 06:25, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

Right wing of the Leningrad front did reach its initial objective by 20 June. After which they continued their attack and were reinforced with 59th army (which apparently consisted - or then the part of the 59th army which was in Isthmus consisted - only of single three division strength army corps). Leningrad front however pressed on with the attacks which were stopped by stiffened Finnish resistance (and on Vyborg bay also by German 122nd division). This phase started on the 21 June and continued in strength until mid July when STAVKA called off the failed offensive. There are plenty of Finnish & German & Russian documents verifying that heavy combat operations continued on the Isthmus during that period even if Krivosheyev omits the data from that period.
In one respect you are correct. The first phase of the attack of the Leningrad front did force Finns to pull forces from the front of the Karelian front. This set the stage for the offensive by Karelian front which despite of the successful landing at Tuulos and its initial success of breaking Finnish 'PSS' line ended up advancing at relatively slow pace which allowed Finns even with smaller strength to make an orderly withdrawal while delaying the Karelian front and prepare defenses at 'U' line. But as said at the same time (21 June) when Karelian front was advancing the Leningrad front started the second phase of its attack. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:06, 18 May 2010 (UTC)
You are obviously confused. The attack came from the North (attacking from the east would be a bad desicion due 2 the terrain). The attack at Vyborg was carried out by the Karelian front. Leningrad units were sent south, to assist in the attack on the Nazi lines in Poland.
Besides, if what you say is true (which it isn't) then there is no logical reason that krivocheev wouldn't take into account casualtiesfrom the entire operation. You seem 2 fail at understanding that Krivocheev takes into account the whole Operation, as seen by him writing that the operation lasted until 8th of August (or was it ninth? cant remember).
Nope, not confused. Leningrad Front with 21st, 23rd and elements of 59th army (and their respective air support) in addition with Baltic Fleet attacked again starting from 21 June with their goals being set to both 1940 border/Kymi joki and the rear of the finnish troops operating north of Ladoga. Leningrad front units (not all of them mind you) - or what was left of them as assault troops tend to receive more than their fair share of casualties - were indeed sent south. However this happened only after STAVKA ordered the further assaults to be canceled in mid July after three weeks of fighting (21 June - 13 July). And even then Leningrad front (most likely in agreement with STAVKA command) made one last concentrated attempt to breakthrough in Vuosalmi but it was unsuccessful and ended in 17 July.
Similar event happened in the Karelian front (KF) as well though it just didnt happen to coincide with phase of operation. On 10 July first SU troops reached Finnish U line. KF (Meretskov) pressed the attack until 25 July but did not manage to make a successful breakthrough and finally set the troops to defensive posture on 4 August and started moving offensive/assault elements of KF to south. Even there SU made one last attempt, namely the push with 176th and 289th divisions to 1940 border at Ilomantsi which ended up being surrounded in the frontier and were eventually allowed (by STAVKA) to save themselves by retreating without equipment on 9 August ending the offensive operations on KF area as well.
Krivosheyev lists casualties per phase of the offensive and per front and then sums to get the result for the whole operation. While this is good and valid practice it yields wrong result if you omit one of the operations from the offensive. Which is exactly the reason why Manninen went through the trouble to collect the SU casualties reports to get the number of SU losses during the last phase of the operation. In short we know that Leningrad front continued operations from 21 June to mid July. However Krivosheyev's data does not include that front within that time-frame into its casualties listing. You could ask 'why' but i'm more interested in getting an answer to 'how many' instead. - Wanderer602 (talk) 11:44, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

THERE IS OBVIOUS CONFUSION HERE... Wanderer, as I said you are confused. It were elements of the Karelian front which carried out the main push into Vyborg. Just look at a map and historical archives. I don't know what Finnish "historians" claim, but since Krivocheev: 1. Lists the total Soviet strength as 450,000 men (matches Finnish sources) and 2. Says the operation lasted from 9 june - 8 august he is entirely correct in all his assesments. I believe there is some confusion on the Finnish side of what actually constituted the Leningrad Front and what constitute the Karelian front. I believe the discussion here isn't about casualties, but out of which units the fronts are made up from. As I said b4, using Finnish historians is completely unacceptable as a source, since they are simply not unbiased concerning Soviet casualties.

Did you read the excerpt User:Illythr provided? It clearly lists the operational boundary between Leningrad Front and the Karelian Front. And that line goes through Ladoga to Tervu, Elisenvaara, Tainionkoski, Lappeenranta, Lahti (and even notes that all listed points are included to the Leningrad Front area). Vyborg lies south of this line in region 'reserved' for Leningrad Front. So it is outside of the Karelian Front's operational area. Also armies which took part into the fighting in Karelian Isthmus in late June to mid July 1944 were 21st, 23rd and 59th army. All which were under command of Leonid Govorov. And list time i checked all those were part of the Leningrad Front.
Karelian fronts (7th army with ~ 150 000 men and some operational reserves) advance stalemated when it failed to penetrate Finnish 'U' line. As the 'U' line starts from northern edge of lake Ladoga (at Pitkäranta) the Karelian Front was very far from Vyborg and even unable to reach Sortavala (which was AFAIK its main goal before continuing deeper into Finland). The much weaker 32nd army (of the Karelian Front) was the only Soviet formation which managed to reach 1940 border however even it had to retreat further back to east. All these facts including the fact that Leningrad Front kept attacking after 20th June contradicts your position and instead indicates that Leningrad Front indeed actively sought breakthrough after 20 June. All which in turn indicates that Krivosheyev's casualties list is missing one of the offensives (especially if we look at the fronts and dates he provided). See for example (totally without permission once again) this map which seems fairly adequate for this purpose.
There is also the question if Krivosheyev's list includes the 59th army which Leningrad front shifted from Narva region to Isthmus so the actual troop count of the 4th Strategic Offensive could be closer to 500 000 (as AFAIK, cant find source atm, only few (3) divisions of the 59th army participated - assuming apx. 15 000 men per div - so 3 divs + 450 000 ~ 500 000). On the other hand on Finnish side there is the problem of setting the troop strengths as some of the Finnish units managed to participate in fighting on different sectors (like Cavalry Bge). That is strength of Finnish troops if counted per operation or even operation area might end up higher than the total Finnish strength. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:38, 19 May 2010 (UTC)
OK, listen there is clear confusion here on the Finnish side. First of all, a Soviet division was not 15k men, but more lioke 9k. Also they were likely understrength. So Krivocheev says that roughly 450k men fought from 8th June until 9th August. Finnish sources say the same. That is why there is othing2 discuss here. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 62.92.31.1 (talk) 08:15, 20 May 2010 (UTC)
Very well, i stand corrected. According to this [7] the strength in 1944 is around 9 to 10 thousand men. Problem in the units i mentioned (of the 59th army) is that the whole army is missing from Krivosheyev's list (probably cause it moved to the Karelian Isthmus after 20 June). Fi-wiki page doesn't seem to be using any references or citations so its kinda difficult to check from where those values are from (could be using Krivosheyev/en-wiki data for all i know).
Also a question about the troop strengths of the area - well sort of. Soviet Marine brigades (at least 3rd, 69th, 70th, 260th) which operated in Tuloksa, Björkö as well as in Ilomantsi (of all the places...). Were those part of conventional army structure or were those part of Baltic Fleet/Ladoga Flotilla. - Wanderer602 (talk) 10:40, 20 May 2010 (UTC)

Section break 2

Well the problem here, as in all Soviet-Finnish war articles, is Finnish users pushing their "patriotic" POV. Part of that is trying to make the losses look lopsided and making victories or stalemates out of obvious defeats... So don't blame me or others for not trusting the Finnish sources for Soviet losses that are presented in these articles. -YMB29 (talk) 19:48, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

And here i thought we had something of an agreement on how to approach the issue...
Krivosheyev's data is lacking rather important part of the offensive (by his own admission if you look at the dates and front sections he has given) so it can not be used as it is or then we need to clear the Finnish losses section instead (as those are for the whole length of the operation on all areas). Are there some other verifiable Russian/Soviet sources for the losses in Karelian Isthmus from 21 June to mid July (or even to September)? - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:20, 18 May 2010 (UTC)
Manninen used Soviet data to count the losses and the existence of further operations/tasks for the Leningrad Front is confirmed by Soviet sources as well, so I don't see "Finnish patriotic POV" here. It would be interesting to find out why LF's engagements between 21.6-12.7 are not included into the V-P operation, even though its activities fall into the operation's scope and are a direct continuation of the Vyborg operation. --Illythr (talk) 22:10, 18 May 2010 (UTC)
Well I know the issue with the dates and the missing losses (I have been discussing this since November)...
You don't see a "Finnish patriotic POV" in calling this offensive a stalemate?
The fact that Manninen counted the losses from Soviet data does not mean his numbers are accurate. Don't know how competent he is when dealing with Soviet data for losses and if his numbers (6/21-) are compatible with Krivosheev's (6/10-6/20).
Also where are the Finnish losses from? -YMB29 (talk) 20:03, 20 May 2010 (UTC)
Any chance of actually resolving the issue? Manninen's data (AFAIK - Whiskey can probably confirm) relies on Krivosheyev's data as far as it can and unless there are some new data from the Soviet archives those values are the best (if only archive based) available - that is if there are new results the values can then be fixed. Also as YMB29 asked the source for the Finnish losses that would be good to know. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:17, 26 July 2010 (UTC)
If the results are separated according to Soviet offensives then it might be tad difficult to get accurate values for LF after 21 June (until 29th). However...
  • The casualties of the Soviet troops at June-July 1944 were according to the archives at the Isthmus together 105 000 men, where KIA and MIA 22 000 and WIA and taken to hospitals due to sickness 82 000 men. The number of KIA were noticeably smaller than the Finnish estimates of 28 000 men. The losses of the Karelian Front June 21 - August 9 were 17 000 lost and 47 000 medicals, and Navy losses were 700 lost and 2 000 medicals. So the total losses of the summer offensive were even 170 000 men. --Whiskey (talk) 16:55, 8 November 2009 (UTC)
As we know Soviet losses on the Isthmus until June 20 it should be possible to get the losses for the rest of the period by subtracting Krivosheyev's (6018 + 24011) numbers (casualties until June 20) from Manninen's (casualties for June & July) for the Isthmus (22 000 + 82 000) which yields ( ~16 000 KIA & ~58 000 WIA ).
Opinions? Or too much OR (assuming doing math counts as such)? - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:17, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

Again the numbers

Sorry to keep talking about this one but the i took a look at Jatkosodan Torjuntataisteluja 1942 - 44 (Raunio, Ari; Juri, Kilin) and progressed through the 'Soviet side' data provided from the Soviet War Archive by Kilin as well as by looking the data provided here indicated that the strength of the Leningrad Front's offensive on the Isthmus would have been considerably higher than on the data credited to Krivosheyev here. That is if we count the formations (not sure of the actual troops). And assuming i got the abbreviations translated into English correctly...
  • Krivosheyev (10.6.1944 - 20.6.1944): 15 rifle divisions, 1 armored brigade, 2 fortified regions (ie. defense divisions).
  • Victory.mil.ru page (1.7.1944):
    • 21st army: 5 army corps HQs, 15 rifle divisions, 1 armored brigade, 10 armored regiments, 1 armored battalion, 2 armored train battalions (?), 2 artillery divisions, 2 artillery brigades, 3 artillery regiments, 2 AA-regiments (?), 1 AT-regiment, 4 'special power' (??) artillery battalions, and then some which couldn't translate...
    • 23rd army: 3 army corps HQs, 8 rifle divisions, 5 armored regiments, 1 armored train battalion, 1 fortified region, 1 artillery brigade, 3 artillery regiments, 4 AT-regiments, and again bunch of units i couldn't translate...
    • 59th army: 1 rifle division, 1 artillery brigade, 1 AT-brigade, and again some which i couldn't translate...
      • Total: 8 army corps HQs, 24 rifle divisions, 1 armored brigade, 15 armored regiments, 2 artillery divisions, 4 artillery brigades (+1 anti-tank), 10+ different artillery regiments etc.
  • Jatkosodan Torjuntataisteluja 1942 - 44, Soviet/Russian sections:
    • 9 army corps HQ, 26 rifle divisions, 1 fortified region, 3 armored brigades, 14 armored regiments, 6 artillery brigades, 22 artillery regiments.
Given that the Jatkosodan Torjuntataisteluja 1942 - 44 included the 43th Army Corps and its two constituent divisions (124th and 80th) into the count and that 'victory.mil.ru' separates the numbers between line and reserve units those two sources represent fairly equal numbers while Krivosheyev's numbers are considerably smaller (again, only counting the formations).
So... Is Krivosheyev accurate in any aspect regarding offensive on the Karelian Isthmus? - Wanderer602 (talk) 10:51, 5 August 2010 (UTC)
Listen, Krivocheev is correct in all aspects. Just many Finnish nationalists (quite disturbing, especially their apologism for massive warcrimes carried out by for example Mannerheim and the Finnish army) retard the objective presentation of truth.
Now, to your main point: Average strength of a Soviet rifle division at that time was at max 6k. Reserve divisions were what their name says, reserve divisions. I bet they got heavy cannibalized, just like any other reserve division.
Also, Finnish strenght was WAY more than two Corps. Effective Finnish strength and masses of infantry were very formidable.
--88.89.199.238 (talk) 18:31, 3 September 2010 (UTC)
There are several problems with Krivosheyev's data with regards to Vyborg-Petrozevodsk Operation. First his numbers of units for the Soviet forces are grossly below the actual number of units that actually took part into the offensive. Second his data for the Leningrad Front stops three weeks (or more) before the Leningrad Front really were forced to stop its offensive. As the data for the offensive - and for its continuation after June 20 - can be verified from example STAVKA orders it is a rather curious error in his data.
What does the average division strength matter if Krivosheyev's list lacks nearly 10 infantry divisions and most of the of support (armor and artillery) units.
And what warcrimes did exactly Mannerheim and Finnish Army commit?
As for the Finnish strength.. Initially (on the Isthmus) it was barely 90 000 men. Later it was reinforced. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:06, 3 September 2010 (UTC)
Wrong. krivocheev provides all data, and the Leningrad front DID not participate in that offensive after 3 weeks. All he provides is correct, and there exist no "support divisions".
In conclusion: trusting Finnish historiography is possibly more dangerous than even Estonian or Soviet.
As for Finnish warcrimes; you should read some books. I remember a prominent Swedish historian recently published a book about the massive war crimes and collaboration with Nazis that the Finns performed. Mannerheim was for example happy to provide concentration camps to the (small) Russian population in Karelia, just like he did during the civil war. Death rate in concentration camps were very high. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.89.199.238 (talk) 08:45, 4 September 2010 (UTC)
Please read the following section of the talk page titled 'Stavka orders'. Leningrad Front was ordered to advance further after June 20 but it failed to do so even after more than three weeks of combat. In addition there are some doubts that Krivosheyev's data for the Leningrad Front from June 9 to June 20 would be incomplete as well. Also the values i used were actually from the Soviet/Russian archives. Not from Finnish historiography.
See for example this webpage.
In other words Leningrad Front kept attacking after the June 20. But failed to gain much anything. All which are documented in Soviet era archives.
Mannerheim was actually against the concentration camps after the Finnish Civil War. Like he was strongly against accepting any help from Germany. But as he was only a general and not leader of the country there wasn't much he could do - apart from resigning which he did. As for the high number of casualties in both camps.. They are pretty much for the same reason - diseases and starvation both from bad harvests and from lack of trade. Before 1918 Finland had been non self sufficient being autonomous part of Tsarist Empire. With the Russian Civil War and Finnish Civil War the food trade came to halt. In 1941 Finland which had oriented itself after the WWI towards export and import of material instead of ensuring self sufficiency was in severe trouble once the trade routes were cut by war. In both occasions Finland had still mostly rural economy which allowed for the large portion of the non interned population to supplement their diet with local food sources. People interned in camps could not do so and they suffered heavily from it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 10:10, 4 September 2010 (UTC)
1. You do not know Russian. I don't see what your point is.
2. There is more than the Stavka orders. Krivocheev has done serious archival research to confirm this.
3. Mannerheim fully cooperated with the Nazis. He used concentration camps & massacres against reds, both real, and perceived. Read the Swedish book.
4. The people who were interned starved. If we use your logic, then pretty much all of the 600k Axis troops who died in Soviet POW camps died due 2 "malnourishment" —Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.89.199.238 (talk) 15:51, 8 September 2010 (UTC)
Indeed there are more than Stavka orders (including the interesting order which only considerably after June 20 orders Leningrad Front in Karelian Isthmus to static defense). There are even several - literature - works in Russian which handle (at least in some measure) the Soviet attempts to push forward in Karelian Isthmus after June 20. Why Krivosheyev chose to omit that data is rather odd as the data concerning the Leningrad Front's attack after June 20 was readily found by Russian historian Juri Kilin and by others who have actually bothered to search for it.
Interesting... Care to provide any proof for the 'fully cooperated with the Nazis'?
Of civil war camps most people died due starvation and due diseases (namely the Spanish flu). Only ~500 were sentenced to death (of which ~150 were executed) of the 70 000 interned of which in total ~13 500 died in the camps.
Of the ~18 000 Soviet POWs that died during the war 'only' ~1 000 were shot - and all of these were remarked as 'shot while trying to escape' or 'executed for inciting prisoners to rebel'. Rest died from starvation or from conditions related to starvation. As said after war in the Eastern Front began in 1941 Finns were near completely dependent on German aid as Soviet ally Britain included Finland into the blockade. Whole country was at starvation level but - again as said above - the Finns were in general in better initial condition than the Soviet civilians and POWs in the camps and had chance to supplement the diet from the forest and countryside, or from black market. All of which considerably increase the chance of survival in those conditions. After supplies were received from Germany in late - due bad ice conditions ships couldn't reach Finland earlier - spring 1942, and by setting real administration to the camps instead of ad hoc Civil Guard setup used in autumn and winter of 1941 and in early spring 1942 the situation in the camps improved.
How, why, and due what causes did the Axis prisoners die in Soviet camps is not really scope of this discussion. Given that of the total of 3 500 Finns Soviet have been estimated of being captured only ~2 400 reached the POW camps and after that the mortality was relatively low (~2 000 returned) it seems that most died during initial capture - Äyräpää, Tiurinsaari - or during the transportation to the camps. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:58, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

Stavka orders

Okay, this book (Ставка ВГК. 1944-1945 гг. Том 16 (5-4); swf doc) contains all the Stavka directives in 1944-1945. Relevant here are the following documents:

  • № 117
    • Date: 11.06.1944
    • Goal: capture Vyborg by 18-20 June
  • № 120
    • Date: 21.06.1994
    • Goals:
      • Leningrad Front forces active on the Karelian Isthmus are to continue their attack; use the main force to take the Imatra-Lappeenranta-Virojoki line by 26—28.06 Part of the forces are to advance towards Kexholm, Elisenvaara in order to eliminate the enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus northeast of the river and lake Vuoksa.
      • After that, develop the offensive in order to capture the Kouvola, Kotka line and fortify the eastern bank of the Kymijoki river. Supply the main battle group from the north.
      • From 24.00 21.06.1944 establish the following demarcation line between the Karelian and Leningrad Fronts: up to Korovkino — same as before; beyond that - the southern and western banks of the Ladoga lake, Tervu, Elisenvaara, Tainionkoski, Lappeenranta, Lahti (all points are inclusive for the Leningrad Front).
  • № 121
    • Date: 21.06.1944
    • Contents: Confirms Govorov's decision to continue the advance, denies the Front the two requested infantry corps, promises to provide the request of matériel.
  • № 171
    • Date: 10.08.1944
    • Contents: Transfer two infantry corps to the Baltic Front, go on the defensive on the Narva direction.
  • № 190
    • Date 30.08.1944
    • Contents: Total defense along the whole front line.
Please fix the names if you know the right ones, I just blindly transliterated them all.
Thanks, Colchicum.--Illythr (talk) 23:01, 18 May 2010 (UTC)


About the demand of surrender...

I read this article and found it relatively good. Still, one thing surprised me. Article says that "demand of surrender" late june 1944, was just finnish misinterpretation of Soviet response. For this claim the article gives two sources. Both sources are issues from some swedish newspapers dated 3rd July 1944 (there is no link, no certain page, nothing clarifying about these newspaper issues). I dont know about you, but for me these kind of sources (which probably doesn't exist anywhere anymore) doesn't feel best possible ones in any wikipedia article.

But anyway, to my main point.. I had heard several times before that SU really demanded unconditional surrender from finns at summer 1944. So, when I read this article, I decided to find out how the things really were. After pretty long search I finally found something pretty intresting about this thing. What I find was (as it's claimed) the contract about the terms of surrender given to Finland. Terms include in overall 56 articles which Finland should have to fulfill after signing the contract. Contract was planned and made by so called "Voroshilovs committee", workshop under the control of K.I.Voroshilov, and it's dated on June 28th 1944. From beginning of red army summer offensive until the reveal of this surrender demand Finnish army had done nothing but delayd and withdrawn, and the attack of red army had advanced without any greater resistance or battles (exept easily won Battle of Kuuterselkä. Later on summer (July-August) 1944, Voroshilov was also asked to plan the new peace contract, which then really was the basis of contract that came to efford in september 1944. June 28th 1944 contract contained 56 articles, but I could't find all of them from Internet. Next is first chapter of terms from partially shortened version of peace terms (by military historian Sampo Ahto from his speech on july 2004 (http://www.panssarikilta.fi/Lehti/Panssari200403_sivu_23.html). First in finnish, then translated in english:


"Suomen hallitus ja puolustusvoimain ylipäällystö tunnustavat Suomen asevoimien täydellisen häviön sodassa SNTL:ää vastaan ja ilmoittavat Suomen ehdottomasta antautumisesta pyytäen lopettamaan sotatoimet... Täten Suomen maa-, meri- ja ilmavoimat, sijainnistaan riippumatta antautuvat ehdoitta... Suomen puolustusvoimain ylipäällystö suorittaa kaikkien Suomen maa-, meri- ja ilmavoimien aseistariisumisen NL:n sotavoimien ylipäällystön määräysten, aikataulun ja järjestyksen mukaisesti sen valvonnan alaisena... Tämän asiakirjan allekirjoittamishetkestä lähtien siihen saakka kunnes NL:n sotavoimien ylipäällystö on ottanut valvontaansa kaikki Suomen tietoliikenneyhteydet, kaikki radiolähetykset Suomen alueella on kielletty ja Suomen lennätin-, puhelin- ja radioyhteydet muihin maihin katkaistaan... Antautumisehtojen täyttämiseksi ja SNTL:n etujen turvaamiseksi NL:n sotavoimien ylipäällystö miehittää omin asevoimin ja oman harkintansa mukaan osittain tai kokonaan Suomen alueen, sen satamat, Ahvenanmaan saariston ja Suomenlahden saaret. SNTL:n hallitus toteuttaa kaikkia miehitysvaltiolle kuuluvia oikeuksia Suomen miehitetyillä alueilla. NL:n sotavoimien ylipäällystö julkaisee omat käskyt ja määräykset. Suomen hallitus ja Suomen kansa pyrkivät kaikin tavoin myötävaikuttamaan näiden käskyjen ja määräysten täytäntöönpanoon. Suomen hallitus antaa viipymättä määräykset kaikille viranomaisille totella ehdoitta määräyksiä."


And in english:


"Government of Finland and supreme command of Finnish military recognise the complete defeat of finnish armed forces in the war against USSR and report the unconditional surrender of Finland by asking to stop all the military actions... Hereby ground- naval- and airforces of Finland, apart of their location, surrender without conditions... Supreme command of Finnish military forces executes the unarming of all ground- naval- and airforces of Finland under the commands, schedules, orders and supervision of supreme command of armed forces of Soviet Union. Since signing of this document, until the moment when supreme command of armed forces of SU have taken all telecommunications of Finland under it's control, all telegraph- telephone- and radio connections to foreign countries shall be cut off... To fulfill the terms of surrender and to secure interests of USSR, supreme command of armed forces of SU will occupy with it's own armed forces and with its own consideration partially or completely land areas of Finland, it's harbours, archipelago of Åland and islands of Gulf of Finland. Government of USSR will execute all rights of occupying nation to the areas occupied in Finland. Supreme command of armed forces of SU will reveal its own commands and orders. Government of Finland and people of Finland will, by all possible ways contribute implementation of these commands and orders. Government of Finland will, without delay, give orders to all authorities to obey these commands without conditions"


Okay, that was shortened version of first chapter. There is much much more in complete text (next chapter is for example about seizure of finnish state property). As far as I have found out from Internet sources, the complete version of document can be probably found from two researchs by historian Tapio Tiihonen (Yllätys Kannaksella 1944 -. Felix Kustannus Oy. 2002. ISBN ISBN 978-951862153-2. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help) and Karjalan kannaksen suurtaistelut kesällä 1944 -. Felix Kustannus Oy. 1999. ISBN ISBN 951-862-128-4. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)).

Well, the question goes now, do we keep this article as it is now (and keep those strange old citations from swedish newspapers) or do we take in consideration the changing of this article?Esgorde (talk) 21:56, 3 July 2010 (UTC)

The full Finnish and English translations of the document can be found in [8]. It was prepared supposedly late 1943, but it was found in a dossier with date June 28, 1944, containing papers concerning Soviet-Finnish relations. It was found in Soviet Archives 1999 by historian Martti Turtola.--Whiskey (talk) 10:06, 4 July 2010 (UTC)
So, we probably change this article, unless someone can represent those swedish newspaper citations (AND if they really show something that can be important about this case). WW2 era newspapers (no matter where they are published) aren't usually the best sources to find scientific evidences about events of war (everyone knows the reason why).. Esgorde (talk) 12:41, 4 July 2010 (UTC)