Talk:Yom Kippur War/Archive 5

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Casualties

The claim that nearly all Israeli infantry manning the Bar Lev line were annihilated in the first day of war is ludicrous for the following reason. There were just under 1,000 IDF personnel manning the Bar Lev line at the commencement of hostilities. A total of 2,552 Israeli soldiers died during the 18 days of war. If your assessment is to be believed, then nearly 40% of IDF deaths occurred on the first or second day of the war on the Egyptian front (and I'm not even counting tank crewmen). This is preposterous and makes no sense whatsoever.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 08:23, 12 October 2009 (UTC)

Well I personally consider the total Israeli deaths to be understated, but this is unrelated. I've altered the statement to be more suitable. --Sherif9282 (talk) 02:55, 13 October 2009 (UTC)

This statement shows that you have a fundamental lack of understanding of Israeli society. Israel is an open society where there is a very critical and skeptical press. The Israeli government could never get away with understating casualties. Not to mention the fact that burials are very public matters. Israelis are meticulous in casualty counts and don't or actually, can't hide or understate them them given the open nature of Israeli society.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 04:23, 13 October 2009 (UTC)

If we take your estimate, then Israeli KIA range from 2,552 to over 2,800 according to various sources. The difference is nearly 250. --Sherif9282 (talk) 11:10, 13 October 2009 (UTC)

BTW Hebrew Wikipedia has a very nice table of all casualties, including personel and all types of equipment, by every army involved, including not only Israelis, Egyptians and Syrians, but also Iraqis, Jordanians and Moroccans.BorisG (talk) 17:13, 13 January 2010 (UTC)

I was disappointed that there is no reference to the sources of POW numbers. There is no reference to the claim that 500 Israelis were taken prisoners during the 1973 war, while Israel claims that the Egyptians captured 231 Israelis, the Syrian captured 62 Israelis, and 2 more Israelis were taken to Lebanon as prisoners. On the other hand Israel claims it had captured 8,372 Egyptians, 392 Syrians, 13 Iraqis and 6 Moroccans. The source of these figures is the Israeli ministry of foreign affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2004/1/Background%20on%20Israeli%20POWs%20and%20MIAs (Up to - 29/11/2009) It is also figured that the Egyptians lost no more than 5 aircraft on 06/10, according to Gamal Hamed. On the other hand the Israelis claim to shoot down, 18 Egyptian airplanes and no less than 10 Egyptian Helicopter on the first day of the war. Source: the Israeli air force web site http://www.iaf.org.il/Templates/FlightLog/FlightLog.aspx?lang=EN&lobbyID=40&folderID=48&subfolderID=322&docfolderID=939&docID=13279&docType=EVENT (Up to - 29/11/2009) It is mentioned that the western estimation of Israeli aircraft losses are over 200, and the source is Hassan El Badri book from 1978. If Hassan El Badri estimates that some westerns sources estimate that the Israelis lost over 200 planes, it doesn't mean that this is the current estimation of any western government. Only a figure that is referenced to more recent western source which in turn mentions those Israeli losses should be written under the title western estimation. Megaidler (talk) 20:57, 29 November 2009 (UTC)

Megaidler, your observations are correct and represent just a fraction of the inaccuracies contained in this article. The article needs a major overhaul, from start to finish.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 21:50, 15 December 2009 (UTC)

I do want theses edits to remain. thanks. Megaidler (talk) 14:45, 9 January 2010 (UTC)

BTW Hebrew Wikipeda has a nice table of all casualties including personell (killed and wounded) as well as all types of military hardware from all countries involved (not only Israelis, Egyptians and Syrians but also Iraqis, Jordanians and Moroccans. there was a lot of rapping and sexual activity happening to the captives.

It also has a great picture of Anvar Sadat. Can't see why in the English version we have Meir but not Sadat.BorisG (talk) 17:21, 13 January 2010 (UTC)

According to Haber & Schiff, page 11, 2,693 Israelis died in the Yom Kippur War. On January 1977 the army man-power department gave to the Knesset a report on casualties of the war.
The number of Israelis killed between 06/10/1973 and 24/10/1973 is:
1,488 in the south, 783 in the north and 26 in other theaters. That brings the number to 2,297.
The number of Israelis killed between 25/10/1973 and 31/05/1974 (the separation of forces agreement with Syria) is:
142 in the south, 89 in the north and 128 in other theaters.
That brings the number to 2,656.
Following the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt bodies of Israeli soldiers, regarded as missing until then, were returned to Israel, bringing the total number of dead to 2,693. I assume that these additional 37 men died before the cease fire. Megaidler (talk) 18:26, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

According to Haber & Schiff, some 10,000 Egyptian (p. 223) and 4,000 Syrian (p. 215) troops had been killed. Megaidler (talk) 16:56, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

According to Gawrych p.243, about 5000 Egyptians were killed and 12,000 were wounded, Syria suffered over 3000 dead and 6000 wounded, while Israel suffered over 2800 deaths (a number equivalent to 200,000 American deaths in Vietnam..)and at least 8,800 wounded. I am aware that these numbers are all disputed and the actual number is probably somewhere in the middle. The idea that 10,000 or more Egyptians were killed is ridiculous, and the only sources I have seen with this number are Israeli ones.ElUmmah (talk) 21:09, 25 March 2010 (UTC)

The number 2,693 is the current official number. All the names of these 2,693 fallen soldiers are listed on the final pages of Haber & Schiff. This is the number of all Israeli soldiers who died between 06/10/73 and 31/05/1974, as well as 37 soldiers, regarded missing, until their bodies were returned more than 4 years later. There is no doubt that this includes soldiers who died of their wounds in aid stations before they were evacuated to hospitals. If Israel, immediately when the war ended, published the number of its dead, Dupuy made an assessment that 10% more have died, and Gawrych made his own assessment that there over 2,800 dead, by relying on Dupuy assessment it doesn't mean that this is the number. They are both unaware of the final accurate number and their own conclusions are eventually based on Israeli given numbers. If Israel lost more than 2,800 men and it tries to hide the number of its dead, it wouldn't give the number 2,693. It would probably give a much smaller figure. The small gap between these numbers, some 200 men, isn't worth lying.

I am well aware that Sherif is citing from a book written by Gawrych and it is not the scanned document also written by Gawrych. If Gawrych claimed that somebody else claimed something, it doesn't mean that Gawrych himself believed this is true. He only cites some one else. It may be an honest person or some one like Muhammad al-Sahhaf. If Gawrych estimates that something is between 100 and 200, it means that he admits he simply doesn't know but he is sure that it's no more than 200 and no less than 100. It doesn't mean that according to Gawrych it is 150. If we can find a reliable source who gives the figure 105 or even 100 it is not in contrast to Gawrych, it is no less than 100 and no more than 200. In this case we don't need assistance from Gawrych. Considering I have lack of trust toward Sherif as a decent editor here, I expect him to quote Gawrych, word by word, in the talk page (from the book I don't have), as well from the sources Gawrych is relying on for stating that:

• Over 2,800 Israelis has been killed.
• Over 400 tanks had been destroyed during the first 3 days. Not "hit", not "lost" but "destroyed".
• Number of Israeli aircraft losses close to 200.

Megaidler (talk) 23:20, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

"Considering I have lack of trust toward Sherif as a decent editor here..." Why is such a statement necessary? This discussion is directed towards the improvement of the article, not attacks toward other editors. Please refrain from making such comments in the future, since I'm sure others feel the same about you.

Given that every loss is considered extremely serious, a difference of 200 would indeed make quite a large difference. I don't understand why we are playing this numbers game. Our job as editors isn't to do math, it's to take information from reliable sources and use it to improve the article as such. Furthermore, it doesn't matter what Gawrych based his assessment on. He's a secondary source, a knowledgeable scholar on the war. It is none of our concern whom he based his assessments on. The same applies to Dupuy. I'm sure he didn't pull the 10% out of his imagination. It's obvious that there's a dispute in the number of Israeli casualties, and in this case both figures should be mentioned. If some sources differ from Israeli sources, it does not mean that the Israeli sources are automatically correct. There is bound to be some bias. Regarding the tank and aircraft losses, it is also highly disputed how many of these were actually destroyed. Again both figures should be mentioned, rather than picking the Israeli source. The same applies to the Egyptian side,where Shazly's figures are often challenged by other sources. ElUmmah (talk) 00:09, 27 March 2010 (UTC)

As I previously asked Sherif, I am now asking ElUmmah to quote Gawrych, word by word, in the talk page, as well the sources Gawrych is relying on, regarding the 3 issues I have mentioned. For making this job easier and quicker, I recommend the scanning of the relevant pages and then using OCR software like SimpleOCR for extracting the text. Megaidler (talk) 17:24, 4 April 2010 (UTC)

According to Haber & Schiff page 294, the outbreak of the war caused the IDF to mobilize its troops hastily. There were problems in the combat registration of the troops. Soldiers were not assigned to their original units. Many switched units. Other arrived directly from abroad and immediately reached the battlefields. Many were declared as missing in action until it was found that they are in captivity or until it was declared that they are killed whose bodies' locations are unknown. To this day, there are still 17 soldiers considered missing in action and their names are listed on pages 294-295 together with details. Their names are also found in the list of 2,693 fallen Israeli soldiers.

According to Haber & Schiff page 345, 7,251 Israelis were wounded in the Yom Kippur war. About 750 of them needed prolonged recovery. 4,244 were injured in the south and 3,007 were injured in the north.

I'm sure the Israelis can count their own dead, wounded, and lost equipment much better than Gawrych. Megaidler (talk) 14:05, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

And I'm sure that they're capable of decreasing their own casualty numbers while exaggerating Arab losses. Notice that Israeli sources regarding Arab casualties tend to be larger than the actual number, and their casualty figures tend to be lower than other sources. I'm not saying this does not occur from the Arab side also, but we must acknowledge that this occurs on both sides. You continually disregard Arab sources on the basis that they are unreliable, while asserting Israeli sources as factually correct. It goes both ways. ElUmmah (talk) 02:25, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

I rely only on Israeli sources only when it comes to Israeli losses. Each side is the best one to count his own losses, When it comes to Arab losses I have no objection of mentioning many estimations, not only Israeli ones. There is a problem with the Arab casualties count. Until now the governments of, neither Egypt nor did Syria publish official details of their losses. These corrupt governments have something to hide. This is highly severe when it comes to fallen soldiers. Hiding the name and the death of some one who fought for his nation is a dishonor for the martyr and his family. If ElBaradei becomes president, there is a possibility that the truth will be revealed in the next 20 years. Megaidler (talk) 08:37, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

I usually try to keep good manners but 8,000 dead and 20,000 wounded Israelis is bullshit. Did O'balance mention only these figures, or did he give many estimations and the one of 8,000 Israelis dead and 20,000 wounded is only one of them?
If O'balance or Gawrych have heard or read somewhere these silly numbers and they did decide to write them on their books among other contrasting estimations, it doesn't mean that they actually believe in this.
They had lack of knowledge, so they have decided to write any assessment they have ever heard. The Israelis are the only ones who can count their own losses accurately. Megaidler (talk) 15:51, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

8000 dead? 20,000 wounded? What on earth are you talking about? Gawrych's figure is over 2800 killed, not 8000. Gawrych is a reliable secondary source and his figure WILL be included in the estimates of Israeli casualties. Out of courtesy for your sources, I left your 2693 killed figure there as well, and I expect you to do the same with Gawrych's. Do not remove sourced figures just because it does not suit your own POV.ElUmmah (talk) 16:11, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

The optimal sources for Arab casualties are the Arab governments. However no Arab government has yet published such details, so the best sources left for us are Israeli assessments, but there are many others assessments and they are also acceptable. The optimal source for Israeli casualties is the State of Israel and we have it and thus we don't need guesses and estimations. In this case, my source is better than yours. Regarding to Schiff's "October Earthquake", I do agree that it is much less reliable than modern researches. Megaidler (talk) 23:45, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

I disagree with your logic that the respective governments are best for counting casualties, since they are prone to skewing the figures to make themselves look better. A perfect example is the fact that Israeli estimates of Egyptian deaths alone are 10,000-15,000 an outrageous figure which is double that of most estimates, something even Rabinovich acknowledges. It is per wikipedia policy to use secondary sources over primary ones, thus my sources replace those of the State of Israel. Apologies, but your reasoning is not very convincing.ElUmmah (talk) 23:58, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

Our aim is not to make this article pluralistic unlike the talk page. This article must be accurate detailed and updated. When different sources give contradicting information, it is our responsibility to examine them and try to decide on which of them we should rely. Some times it's impossible, in case both sources are equal in their quality. But some times we can make selections. When one source gives assessments based on non-updated information, and the other one gives us a detailed count based on an accurate research we can afford disregarding the first one, even when both sources are decent and reliable.
The editor who brings the information from Gawrych's book is Sherif I am well aware that this book is not the scanned document also written by Gawrych. Let Sherif, defend and explain his own edits because he is the one who has this book, and knows exactly what is written there. We do not know how Gawrych made his conclusions and what are his own sources and this must be checked. Therefore I expect Sherif to quote in the in the talk page, word by word, Gawrych and the sources Gawrych is relying on for stating that:

• Over 2,800 Israelis has been killed.
• Over 400 tanks had been destroyed during the first 3 days.
• Number of Israeli aircraft losses close to 200.
  

For making this job quicker, I suggest him to scan the relevant pages and use OCR software like SimpleOCR for extracting the text. I don't think some one will sue him for copyright violations. When it comes to Israeli casualties count I give logical explanations for relying solely on Haber & Schiff.
Regarding the number of the dead, there is a problem with Gawrych claim that over 2,800 Israelis were killed. According to Sherif, Gawrych is relying on Dupuy's book for this figure. Dupuy wrote his book back in 1978. Dupuy's claimed that the Israeli death toll is actually 10% higher than the official number by the time he was writing. That is because he thought the official number by then did not include those wounded who died of their wounds and not evacuated from aid stations and field hospitals. In one thing we can be sure. Dupuy did not claim the Israeli official figure by then was not accurate because the Israelis were lying. Dupuy actually trusted the honesty of the Israeli authorities for this case, but he thought the official number by then was simply not up to date, because the Israelis didn't finish to count their dead that time. However, Haber & Schiff's book is from 2003. Their figure, 2,693, was concluded after a detailed count. This number does include both those who were killed during the war, as well as those who were killed until the separation of forces agreement with Syria 31/05/1974. There is no doubt that the number 2,693 includes those who died of their wounds in the battle field, in aid stations and in field hospitals. This number also includes 17 missing soldiers declared as dead, but their bodies have not been recovered yet. In this particular case, I support disregarding Gawrych, because his source, Dupuy, actually admitted he had lack of updated and detailed information. Not because I accuse him of lying, so this has nothing with my own POV. However, other editors refuse to rely solely on my source, although the only detailed and updated one, because they think my sources were lying. This is an unproved conspiracy theory, and it is influenced by their POV. The Israeli authorities don't always tell the true when it comes to national security and foreign relations, but after more than 30 years, revealing the number of killed can't cause any such damage. Unless you bring us a solid proof for such accusation against the Israeli authorities, the argument that the Israeli authorities are lying is void.
Regarding the argument for Gawrych stating that Israel lost up to 200 aircraft, I have few questions.

• Was this the only figure given by Gawrych or did he mentioned other possible figures?
• Is this figure based on a CIA report made on 11/10/1973, while the first US spy plane flight over the battle field took place only on 13/10?
• Did Gawrych give his support for this figure or did he just mention it.

In case Gawrych did not support it, Gawrych is not the source for this figure. Unless Gawrych support this figure, the source for this is the same source referenced by Gawrych, not Gawrych's book itself.
Regarding the argument for Gawrych stating that over 400 Israeli tanks have been destroyed during the first 3 days, some details are also unclear. What is exactly is written in Gawrych's book. Is it "hit", is it "lost", is it "destroyed" or is it "number of operational tanks dropping from X+400 to X"? What are the exact words? If this article should stay a WP:Featured articles, it can't be mentioned in one place that 400 Israeli tanks have been destroyed on the first 3 days and in another place that 400 Israeli tanks have been lost permanently in the entire war.
Until I receive answers from Sherif and not only from his supporters, I am changing the article again. Megaidler (talk) 20:32, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Regarding the 2,800 Israelis killed, Gawrych is relying on Dupuy's estimation from 1978. Dupuy has made his own assessment of the Israeli number of dead. He took a non-updated Israeli official figure, added 10% more, and thus he reached the number 2,800. That is because he taught the number given by the Israelis do not include those who died of their wound in field hospitals and aid stations, not because he believed the Israelis were lying. My figure from Haber & Schiff is an updated one and was reached after a detailed count. Therefore, we can disregard Dupuy's non-updated figure and rely solely on the updated one from Haber & Schiff.
However, many Egyptian nationalist editors refuse to rely solely on Haber & Schiff, but also on Dupuy in this particular issue. Their argument is that Haber and Schiff are Israelis, their own sources are Israeli official ones and the Israeli authorities are lying. This conspiracy theory is yet to be proved. There is some irony in the argument of the editors who do not trust the Israeli sources. They doubt the number 2,693 given by Haber & Schiff because they doubt the reliability of Israeli sources, but in the same time, they do accept Dupuy's figure which is also based on official Israeli given information. If you don't trust Israeli sources, you should reject both the number 2,693 by Haber & Schiff and the number 2,800 by Dupuy. If you do trust the Israeli sources, the number 2,693 should be enough.
Buckwalter is another source who claims that 2,800 Israelis died. He is relying on page 18 in a book written by Cordesman & Wagner and published back in 1990 for. We should examine this book and make our own conclusion for this figure. Therefore, I'm removing the referencing to Gawrych's book but not the one to Buckwalter's article. If we find that Cordesman & Wagner are also relying on Dupuy for this number, the referencing to Cordesman & Wagner will be removed as well. Megaidler (talk) 11:48, 25 April 2010 (UTC)

Tank Losses

When Gawrych stated that the Egyptian lost 240 tanks through 13/10 he actually cited Shazly, page 244. On the other hand, on the conversation that took place on 09/10, Mordechai Gur told Kissinger that the Egyptian had lost 400-500 tanks, and Israel had lost 400 to the Egyptians. Regarding the 400 Israeli tanks "destroyed" throughout October 6–8, Actually it’s the number of tanks damaged, not destroyed. Out of 1000 Israeli tanks disabled throughout the war, only 400 were lost permanently and the rest were repaired. Sources were already given to confirm this. Megaidler (talk) 14:02, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

What is this? Gawrych is a secondary source per WP. To whom he cites his information, is none of our business. You would rather take a primary source than a secondary source (contrary to WP policy), and show your biased nature by preferring an Israeli estimate given during the war than a secondary source because it is cited to an Egyptian source. Do not revert this edit again. --Sherif9282 (talk) 21:24, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Sherif, you’re being very disingenuous here because you were the one who cited this source or at least supported its inclusion in the article and had no objection to it when it was erroneously skewed this way. Now that it is more reflective of what was actually said and doesn’t comport with your view, it’s not good? You can’t have it both ways.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 21:53, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Wow! You really stupefy me!

This is your excuse for directly, intentionally and purposely defying WP policy? Or do you now WP:Own this article? First, this is my edit when I first brought the source to the article. After that, Raul made some edits and it became this. I'm sure Raul was acting in the best of intentions, and possibly I didn't pay attention to what he altered; as the article moderator, he frequently copy-edited what I added to ensure it suited the FA nature of this article. I'm sure you believe he and myself were in some axis of evil alliance bent on twisting sources. Do not wrongly accuse me again; you've done it before. Second, do not make lame excuses to revert edits that perfectly comply with WP guidelines in a manner that is completely in disregard of these guidelines. We have a secondary source at hand that gives Israeli and Egyptian losses in the Sinai, and it will replace the primary source currently in use in compliance to WP policy. --Sherif9282 (talk) 00:24, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

Gawrych cites Shazly and you have, on a number of occasions, stated that Shazly is not reliable but as you've demonstrated before, you use him when it suits you. Moreover, according to most mainstream sources (aside from Hammad and Badri) the Israelis lost a total of 400 tanks (as noted by Rabinovich and Herzog, among others) during the entire war. So this figure cited by Gawrych (who borrows from Shazly) is not realistic.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 01:15, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

I caution you that you have removed sourced material for the third time. Moreover, your edit is opposed by other editors and you have no consensus for the change.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 01:44, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

This is simple, you cannot cite from a conversation between officials in the US and Israeli governments and use what they said to make statements of fact. If you want to cite the primary source, you need to attribute it. And for something like this, with countless secondary sources, there is not even a need for citing the primary source to begin with. There is certainly no reason to replace a secondary source with a primary one. Please see WP:SECONDARY. nableezy - 02:21, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

I didn't bother to look at whom Gawrych cites because WP does not require us to check what information is cited to whom in secondary sources. Also, when we have a secondary source, it replaces the primary source, especially when that source is only a convo between state officials that took place during the war and thus presents very raw estimates (as Nableezy already noted... acquaint yourself with WP guidelines before pointlessly arguing here). Finally, since I'm acting in line with the noted guidelines and you've repeatedly disregarded them, there is no need to establish consensus here. Consensus is not a tool to keep the article to your own liking. --Sherif9282 (talk) 08:16, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

There is no chance that 400 Israeli tanks had been destroyed on the Egyptian front on October 6-8. This is the total number of Israeli tanks destroyed throughout the entire war (Rabinovich, page 496). 400 is probably the number of Israeli tanks damaged during the first three days, but most of them were later repaired. I have found that Gawrych mentions that the Egyptians had lost 240 tanks through the 13th of October (while relying on Shazly) on page 57 of the PDF version. In which page in the PDF version did he mentions those 400 Israeli tanks destroyed between 6-8/10? Megaidler (talk) 19:54, 24 February 2010 (UTC)

Regarding the 400 Israeli tanks "destroyed" during the first 3 days. in this particular case, I expect Sherif to quote Gawrych word by word. In the PDF version of "The Albatross of Decisive Victory" I didn't find details on 400 Israeli tanks destroyed during the first 3 days. This figure is in contrast with other sources that mentioned that most of the Israeli tanks that were hit and disabled were repaired later. Megaidler (talk) 13:52, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

Migo and Jiutsu, please lessen the use of "you" in a discussion page of what is supposed to an encyclopedia, not a battleground, or a place for personal attacks -you are not in a forum-.

I am exetremely bussy in the college these days, and i do not know when i will ever have enough time to actively participate in this article, but just responding to Migo's question; The only source that have been known to state that the number of permanently lost Israeli tanks is 400 is Rabinovich, i found no other source to state that, so this is not some thing various sources agree' about. El-Shazley has put every thing in detailes about how much tanks of both sides were lost throughout different periods of the war. I had those info, but cannot find them right now, so here is another source for the 400 tanks lost in the Sinai alone: Citing to Kissinger, p. 492, Escalation and Intrawar Deterrence During Limited Wars in the Middle East p.29 states the following: "The massive Israeli defeat in Sinai on October 8, along with the continuing problem of the Golan Heights, led to what one source referred to as a “seemingly inexorable spiral to defeat.”72 In the first 48 hours of war, 400 Israeli tanks were lost in Sinai alone, a staggering and jolting setback.73"

72. Insight Team, p. 193.

73. Kissinger, p. 492.

Hope that would be enough. ( ΡHARAOH  The Muslim  06:15, 24 March 2010 (UTC)

I'm reverting the article to 400 destroyed. Megaidler, have you, by any chance, noticed that I was citing to a book and not a PDF? Pharoah, will you cite these sources in the article? --Sherif9282 (talk) 07:20, 24 March 2010 (UTC)

400 tanks destroyed on the first three days are in contrast to 400 tanks destroyed in the entire war, also mentioned in the article. For example, according to Haber & Schiff p. 28, on 08/10 division 162 lost 60 tanks, but only 25 were lost permanently. Megaidler (talk) 17:24, 4 April 2010 (UTC)

According to Haber & Schiff, page 28, division 162 was severely hit on 8/10. 60 tanks were hit and 25 of these were lost permanently. This information is not in contrast with Gawrych's scanned document. In this document, pages 50 and 52, it is written that in the 8/10 counter attack:
"In terms of combat power the 162nd Armored Division, with the number of its operational tanks dropping from 183 to approximately 100, now was tantamount to a single brigade."
Gawrych did not claim in this document that all, or even most of the Israeli tanks hit on 8/10 were lost permanently. If 400 Israeli tanks were lost on the first three days, the 25 tanks from division 162 lost on 8/10 were no more then 7% of these. But all sources describe the Israeli casualties of 08/10 as relatively severe. Therefore, 400 Israeli tanks lost on the first 3 days in somewhat unreasonable. I'm still curious for the exact words from the book. By the way, a lost tank may be a destroyed one, or one abandoned in the battle field and wasn't recovered. Megaidler (talk) 11:48, 25 April 2010 (UTC)

Oct 14 Tank Battle

• In his book Asad of Syria: the struggle for the Middle East, Patrick Seale claims that "more than 250" Egyptian tanks were destroyed in this battle

• A similar figure is cited here Arab-Israeli Wars: 60 Years of Conflict

• Schiff @ page 310-311 states that the Egyptians lost more than 250 tanks during the Oct 14 battles

• And Herzog @ page 206 cites 264 Egyptian tanks destroyed.

Sherif's claim that "most sources say 250 or less" is patently false--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 21:49, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

Martin van Creveld also cites the figure of 264 here @ page 17. I have now given five sources that state that more than 250 Egyptian tanks were destroyed during the October 13/14 battle. How Sherif can state with such authority "that most sources state 250 or less" when I've just named five that squarely contradict his position, is beyond me.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 07:41, 14 January 2010 (UTC)

Agree that the number of egyptian tanks destroyed was much greater than 250 —Preceding unsigned comment added by Joltinjoe56 (talk • contribs) 14:27, 20 January 2010 (UTC)

Thank you Joltinjoe56 for the supportive comment. I have since found another source that supports this position. In his book "Arabs at war: Military effectiveness 1948-1991 Kenneth Pollack states @ page 117 that 265 Egyptian tanks as well as 200 armored vehicles were destroyed during the Oct 14 engagement.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 03:21, 24 January 2010 (UTC)

According to Haber & Schiff, page 144, on 14/10 some 150 Egyptian tanks were hit by IDF forces while other sources put this figure in 250. 12 Israeli tanks were hit. Shazly gave the figure 250 and I see few possible reasons for that and the last 2 seems to be the most reasonable:

• Haber & Schiff counted only the number of tanks that the Egyptian left behind while Shazly counted the number of all Egyptian damaged tanks, including those that succeeded to return to the bridgeheads.
• In light of the hard atmosphere that was in the Egyptian command during and following the 14/10 battle and the reports of heavy casualties, many were panicked including Shazly and assumed that the Egyptian casualties were much higher that they actually were.
• Haber & Schiff counted only the number of tanks hit by ground fire while Shazly included those that were hit from the ground and the air. A lot of tanks were destroyed from the air that day. On pages 36-37 it is mentioned that Dozens of Egyptian tanks were destroyed in Wadi Mavook by air strikes.
• Shazly simply lied. He wanted to exaggerate the Egyptian casualties when they operated as Saadat ordered, and not as he suggested, "see what happened when people don't listen to me". may be it is the same reason for his claim that only 5 Egyptian aircraft were lost in the opening strike while on the first day the Egyptians lost 18 airplanes and 20 helicopters, according to Haber & Schiff pages 32, 281 and 282. In this case he wanted to minimize the Egyptian casualties when things were done according to his plans.

Megaidler (talk) 18:26, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

I don't think we need to decide Shazly's motivations or counting methods - Surely he's a primary source, and your secondary source overrules him per normal procedure? (Hohum ^@) 18:40, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

Aircraft Losses

I have doubt on Herzog's claim that the Arabs lost 514 airplanes. I don't know how did he get this figure but on October 2003, the 30th Yom Kippur War anniversary, an article was published on the Israeli air force magazine by former chief of the air force history department Lt. Colonel Joseph Abudi about the air campaigns of the war. Abudi stated that Israel lost 109 aircraft of all kinds, 102 of these were jets and the rest were propeller airplanes and helicopters. He also stated that the Arabs lost about 450 aircraft but he didn't mention whether that includes props and helicopters or not. I think this figure includes all kinds. However he did state that this figure includes aircraft destroyed on the ground. Egypt lost 279 aircraft confirmed and possibly 11 more. Syria lost 153 aircraft confirmed and possibly 6 more. Abudi article is on the Israeli AF website but only in Hebrew.

There is a gap between Herzog's 514 and the 450 mentioned by Abudi and the London Sunday Times. I see 5 possible reasons for this gap.
1) Only Herzog includes helicopters, props and Kelt cruise missiles that were shot down by the Israelis.
2) Herzog's figure may refers to the period between the outbreak of the war and the Israeli-Syrian disengagement on May 1974 while Abudi refers to the war itself.
3) There were many double reports on Arab aircraft losses by Israeli pilots. Two pilots saw the same aircraft destroyed and each of them thought he was the one responsible, especially when the Arab aircraft is being destroyed while on the ground.
4) Israeli pilots fired on the Arab aircraft during a dogfight, they thought the aircraft was hit but actually it succeeded to escape.
5) Some Israeli pilots lied in their reports.

I am not sure about any of these possible reasons, but if reasons number 3, 4 and 5 are true, Abudi's figure is more reliable than Herzog's one because it comes after a deep research that was made years after the end of the war while Herzog's book was published only in 1975. In my opinion, for now, the 514 figure is somewhat problematic and only the 450 figure should appear in the info box.

Megaidler (talk) 17:40, 9 January 2010 (UTC)

According to Herzog, the Arabs shot down 58 of their own planes and this accounts for the discrepancy you noted. (Herzog @ page 260)--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 07:41, 10 January 2010 (UTC)

Sorry to disappoint you but Abudi does include Arab aircraft losses caused by friendly fire, self interceptions, and technical problems on his stated figures. Megaidler (talk) 12:45, 10 January 2010 (UTC)

In his conversation with Henry Kissinger here Benny Peled, commander of the IAF stated that as of Oct 22, combined Arab aircraft losses were 504 and this figure included 33 choppers. Since the war ended two days later, it is likely that more aircraft were shot down, thus making Herzog's figure of 514 quite plausible--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 21:55, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

According to Haber & Schiff, page 32: On 06/10, 2 Israeli F-4 from the Ofir air base shot down 7 Egyptian air planes out of 24 that were sent to bomb that base. 20 Egyptian helicopters, that carried commandos and took off before evening, were shot down before they succeeded to land their troops. Megaidler (talk) 18:26, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

According to Haber and Schiff p. 41 Egypt lost 279 aircraft: 180 in air-to-air combat, 52 from ground fire and the rest were destroyed on the ground or crashed because of technical reasons or friendly fire. Syria lost 154 aircraft: 97 in air-to-air combat, 24 from ground fire, and the rest were destroyed on the ground or crashed because of technical reasons, or friendly fire. Israel lost 102 combat jets and 7 aircraft of other kinds. 53 aviators died, 44 were captured and 53 were recovered.

According to Haber and Schiff p. 241 Israel lost 102 airplanes. 39 of these were shot down by surface-to-air missiles and 10 were shot down by aircraft. The rest were lost to AA fire. Megaidler (talk) 23:20, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

The number of lost jets, 102, is the official number given today by the Israeli air force, as it was 30 years ago. It is confirmed in the 22/10/1973 conversation between Henry Kissinger and Benjamin Peled, then the chief of the Israeli air force. I don’t see any reason for Peled to tell Kissinger a smaller figure than the real one. Actually it was an Israeli interest to exaggerate the number of their material losses for convincing Uncle Sam to deliver more supplies. I don't think the Egyptians succeeded to shoot down another 100 planes during the last 3 days. I think the Israeli army knows well to count the number of its aircraft. Counting your own casualties is much easier than counting your enemy's casualties. 102 is the official number given today by the Israeli air force. I don't know according to which source the number is closer to 200. If Gawrych mentioned that some one else estimated this figure, while in the same time he also mentioned other estimations, it isn't mean that the real number is the average between the two sources. The conversation between Kissinger and Peled is a good proof that no more than 102 jets were lost by 22/10.

Regarding the Arab air casualties, Haber & Schiff included all kinds of aircraft, like helicopters and props, not only to jets. They also included aircraft lost because of friendly fire, accidents and destruction while the aircraft is on the ground. What did Gawrych include as lost Arab aircraft ? Megaidler (talk) 17:24, 4 April 2010 (UTC)

Gawrych does not break down Arab air losses among different MiG and Sukhoi aircraft. On Israeli losses, what he says is almost what is written in the article, that some sources mention figures closer to 200 aircraft lost. As for the tank losses. The 400 permanently destroyed is a figure provided by Rabinovich, so it's normal to find another source providing a different figure. I can't remember what Gawrych says, but I think the word was lost. Armor-wise, lost is synonymous to destroyed in that the armored vehicle has been permanently lost because it is irreparable, ie: destroyed. Gawrych also writes the Israelis lost over 2,800 killed, sourcing that figure to Dupuy. --Sherif9282 (talk) 09:49, 22 April 2010 (UTC)

According to No Victor No Vanquished by O'Ballance p.303, Herzog said that Israel lost 102 aircrafts during the war, other Israeli sources admit losing 115 aircrafts, while US defense department estimate was 200 aircrafts, and Soviet sources said that Israel lost 289 aircrafts.
US defense department put the overall Arab losses at 368 aircrafts. Egypt lost 120 aircrafts according to Egyptian sources, US estimates 182, and Israel claims 242 aircrafts brought down. US also estimated that Syria lost 165 aircrafts, Israel claims 117-179. and Iraq lost 21 aircrafts according to US figures. Vicimanno (talk) 23:12, 22 April 2010 (UTC)

According to Haber & Schiff p. 282, the Egyptian lost 279 aircraft while 42 of these were helicopters. That means that the Egyptians lost 237 airplanes and some of these were probably not jet powered. If Gawrych claimed that only 223 Egyptian aircraft were lost and it does not include helicopters and props, this number is not so far than 237 that includes all kinds of fixed-wing aircraft. Lt. Colonel (ret) Yossi Abudi, the former chief of the Israeli AF history branch, describes some of what happened on winter 1973. This article is in Hebrew so try Google translation. He claimed that Egypt and Syria lost together 450 aircraft but the destruction of 11 Egyptian and 6 Syrian aircraft is in doubt. So 279+11+154+6=450 and this is exactly the number given by the London Sunday Times. Another article, gives figures about aircraft losses. President Sadat: 120 Egyptian planes were lost, Israel: 223 Egyptian airplanes (the same as according to Gawrych) and 42 helicopters shot down. Probably 223 is only the number of Egyptian airplanes shot down by the Israelis while in the air and this number does not include airplanes destroyed on the ground and aircraft lost not to Israeli fire. Another possibility is that 237 is the number of all anti Israeli airplanes lost on the southern front and 223 is only the number of the Egyptian ones. The difference between Herzog's 102 aircraft and the 115 by other Israelis can be explained as follows: Herzog counted only the planes lost until the cease fire with Egypt, while the other sources counted all kinds of aircraft lost between 06/10/1973 and May 1974, the date of the disengagement of forces with Syria. The soviets claimed that up to 289 Israeli aircraft were lost, but the soviets are unreliable. I understand there was a DoD report with estimations of air losses. According to this report, Israel lost 200, Egypt lost 182, Syria lost 165 and Iraq lost 21. In their books, neither O'balance nor Gawrych give their support for this source, and they only mentioning it. We should seek for the time this report was done and the time it was published and examine its reliability. Above all, we should seek for the current American estimation of this war's air losses. Megaidler (talk) 11:48, 25 April 2010 (UTC)

Early Soviet warning?

In Kissinger's Crisis, there is a statement by one of the parties (I forget who) that Soviet dependents were evacuated from Syria 48 hours prior to the start of the war. Is this relevant to the claim that worldwide intelligence agencies were caught by surprise? If we can confirm that, it's clear the Soviet intelligence apparatus was not completely unaware. Ray^Talk 23:29, 18 November 2009 (UTC)

Soviet advisors and their families were also evacuated from Egypt. Sadat and Assad had informed the Soviets of their intentions to go to war. The Soviet decision to evacuate served to tell the world their hands were clean and they had nothing to do with the Arab decision to wage war, and perhaps to voice their opposition to both Sadat and Assad about going to war. The claim that worldwide intelligence agencies were caught by surprise still holds true. Soviet intelligence did not uncover anything, rather the Soviets were directly informed of impending war by Sadat and Assad. --Sherif9282 (talk) 07:14, 19 November 2009 (UTC)

Thanks. I see how that worked out now. Ray^Talk 15:35, 19 November 2009 (UTC)

Actually, according to this article the Soviet advisers were not evacuated by the Soviets, they were expelled by Egypt: In July 1972, Sadat expelled almost all of the 20,000 Soviet military advisers in the country. Shlomke (talk) 16:32, 19 November 2009 (UTC)

To Shlomke. Look again at the first comment: Soviet dependents were evacuated... 48 hours prior to the start of the war. July 1972 was a completely different issue.

To Ray. You're most welcome. --Sherif9282 (talk) 00:23, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

Right, and the Soviet advisers were expelled, is this also different from what you are referring to when you say "evacuated? Shlomke (talk) 00:59, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

In July 1972, Soviet advisors were expelled. After Sadat reconciled with the Soviets, their advisors returned to Egypt. In October 1973, those advisors left again. this time however, they left on their own account. They were not expelled by Egypt. The Soviet Union took the decision to evacuate its personnel from Egypt. So as you can see, they are two very separate events. --Sherif9282 (talk) 23:19, 6 December 2009 (UTC)

Weasel words

The recent addition of words such as "profound", "dire", "soberly", "helpless", "claimed", "disaster", "catastrophic", "impressive", "poised" etc. is problematic. Note that the glowing term is invariably applied to the IDF, while the disparaging ones are slapped on the other forces. These seem to be coming from a single editor, who is also pushing "Israeli military victory" in the infobox with the summary that this will "reflect reality." Prefer not to get involved in an edit war with this user, what is to be done? Respectfully, RomaC (talk) 01:47, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

Absolutely, these words should either be deleted from the article or if possible converted into direct quotes from the researcher / authority on the subject having that opinion. --Marokwitz (talk) 07:11, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

I concur. I've been involved in edit war with this user and it's going nowhere. I've posted on his talk page and suggested he self-revert his edits as a condition for us to collaborate on this article. If he doesn't however it seems he will be reverted anyway. Whatever happens I hope it doesn't turn into edit-war again. Let's wait and see shall we? --Sherif9282 (talk) 10:58, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

I have rephrased some of the obvious peacock/weaseling. However, catastrophic seems appropriate when used. I can't find helpless used anywhere; impressive is used in a direct quote; and poised is used informatively, as is claimed. Hohum (talk) 20:07, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

The editor in question, Jiujitsuguy, and I, have agreed to collaborate and discuss before making additions to the article. Accordingly I've returned the article to its original state. However I would very much appreciate input and opinion from you three users. Thanks. --Sherif9282 (talk) 20:46, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

I will be posting in length sometime soon to discuss two issues. --Sherif9282 (talk) 20:49, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

Non-English sources & other issues (cut & pasted from jiujitsuguy's & Sherif's Talk pages)

Why?

Even though we've discussed this countless times... you still insist on re-inserting that material. Last time we discussed anything, you proposed that we work through things bit by bit. I agreed, but you didn't discuss anything. Instead, you re-inserted everything back into the text... and more. This is one of the most biased edits you have ever made to the article, and you even removed sourced material. The bias and POVness you showcase in your additions is truly incredible. Will we, please, discuss the issues in dispute before changing the original article? I would much rather do this, though it would take up a considerable amount of time, then engage in senseless edit-war with you. How about it? --Sherif9282 (talk) 16:11, 15 November 2009 (UTC)

I agree to collaborate with you. I propose we go through it para by para and make changes we both can live with. I think if we work together, we can reach middleground and really put together something solid that both of us can stomach. Gotta sign off now but will discuss later and will self-revert if necessary.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:19, 15 November 2009 (UTC)

Excellent. I'm glad you've agreed to discuss this. Bear with me though, for as a law student I'm really time-stripped; discussions will tend to progress slowly. I hope that won't be a big problem with you. Cheers. --Sherif9282 (talk) 16:26, 15 November 2009 (UTC)

Law student? Impressive. Looks like you and I have more in common than just an interest in the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War, though I already passed the Bar. In any event, I don't have much time this week to engage in any kind of substantive editing. However, I will say that as a general rule, I object to usage of non-English sources (Arabic, Hebrew or Russian) for an English speaking encyclopedia users. All sources should be in English as this is a Wiki English article. Second, I'm not crazy about Major Michael C. Jordan Major Steven J. Piccirilli as an RS. He's a relative unknown, has done no original research of his own and his work has not been cited or republished in any reliable source. I do believe that Zeev Schiff is an RS and his credentials speak for themselves, see Hundreds pay their final respects to Haaretz reporter Ze'ev Schiff I look forward collaborating with you on this project as you are obviously well-versed on the subject, though it is obvious that we don't share precisely the same viewpoint. (which is not necessarily a bad thing)--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 01:40, 16 November 2009 (UTC)

Even though I believe I stated my objection to the use of Schiff clearly, you gave a reply entirely unrelated to my objection, stating his credentials are excellent. I did not doubt Schiff's honesty or his reliability. Nevertheless, the link you provided me further supports my argument. My objection resides on two facts. First, Schiff is a journalist first and foremost, a fact which the article confirms. The second fact is that Schiff's book was written barely months after the war.

In light of this you will better comprehend my main objection for using Schiff. With concern to the first, Schiff wrote the book as a journalist, and the book is indeed a work of journalism more than history. I have a similar book in Arabic. Publications like these simply compiled as many facts as were available at the time concerning events surrounding the war. In some aspects, Schiff's book and the Arabic one I have were surprisingly accurate, keeping in mind they were made so soon after the war. In other aspects, they were plainly mistaken and pro-Israeli/pro-Arab. I'm not blaming the authors; it was only natural and inescapable that their books would be riddled with errors throughout. For their time period, they were as reliable as they could have been.

Take Schiff's book. The Agranat fact-finding Commission had not yet published its findings when Schiff's book was already on sale. To go even further, Israeli generals had yet to publish their memoirs and their experiences and views on the war. To say the least, a lot of facts were in the dark, even for a fine journalist like Schiff. Most of all, the other viewpoint was completely ignored, as Schiff acknowledged in his book. To be fair the same goes for the Arabic book I have. Arab generals had yet to share their experiences, and the other viewpoint was mostly ignored (mostly because the Israeli viewpoint was all over Western press at the time). Which explains alot of the errors in that book as well. For their time, they excellent resources and gave people as much information as was possible concerning the war, and also provided references to researchers and historians.

Look closely at the article. Schiff won an award in journalism for his book. This very clearly shows how his book was primarily a work of journalism than of history. Not once does the article call Schiff a historian, but always a journalist.

That's all I can say for now. Sorry for the long read. Gotta run. --Sherif9282 (talk) 15:41, 16 November 2009 (UTC)

I disagree with you on a number of levels. First, Schiff is a historian and studied Middle Eastern affairs and military history at Tel-Aviv University. Second, he is an accomplished author having written five books, all dealing with various aspects of the Arab/Israeli wars, including the Yom Kippur War. His book on the Yom Kippur War was critically acclaimed by book reviewers and historians alike. Third, He was a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, chairman of the Military Writers Association, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and an Isaac and Mildred Brochstein Fellow in Peace and Security at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University; all this, on top of being a respected journalist and military correspondent. Simply put, you can not say that he is not a reliable source. It’s obvious to anyone who takes one glance at his impeccable credentials that he is a distinguished author, writer, defense analyst and military historian. He is heads and shoulders over any source that you cite, including Rabinowitz. I am including him as a source.

What I find astounding is that you would include Major Michael C. Jordan Major Steven J. Piccirilli, a virtual no name, as a reliable source over Ze’ev Schiff. And that brings me to my next point. I have serious problems with your sources. I've already specified my issues concerning Michael Jordan Piccirilli and reiterate that I reject all non-English sources. This is Wiki English for English readers. How do you expect English readers to read Russian or Arabic sources. These are not acceptable sources and must be rejected.

Bearing this in mind, I suggest that we start making a collaborative effort to make the substantive edits we discussed previously and move along in a methodical fashion, paragraph by paragraph.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 14:59, 18 November 2009 (UTC)

I also intend to cite Luttwak, Edward and Horowitz, Daniel. The Israeli Army. Cambridge, MA, Abt Books, 1983. Incidentally, Luttwak stated that, “both Egypt's Anwar Sadat and Syria's Hafez Assad soberly recognized that their countries had come closer to catastrophic defeat than in 1967, and that it was absolutely imperative to avoid another war. That led to Mr. Sadat's peace with Israel and Mr. Assad's 1974 ceasefire on the Golan Heights, never violated since then.” I now have four credible sources that reflect an Israeli battlefield success and that should be reflected in the FactBox.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 15:32, 18 November 2009 (UTC)

Oh my goodness... Is it really so difficult to restrain yourself from making an edit before we've agreed on middleground? Furthermore, I find it hopeless to make you see my point concerning Schiff, despite voicing it several times in different ways. I never doubted his reliability or his credentials, yet for some odd reason I would kill to know you keep telling me of his CV. You know what, I find this an incredible waste of my time that I wouldn't bother changing the incredibly biased edits you keep introducing. You evidently are not seeking a compromise, but only wish to see your narrow viewpoint in the article. So go ahead and do whatever you want. I'm too tired for this nonsense. --Sherif9282 (talk) 22:04, 18 November 2009 (UTC)

Oh, and before you go on a rampage removing material sourced to Hammad, have a read of this will you? Using Hammad as a source in this article or in any other is perfectly justified. --Sherif9282 (talk) 13:12, 19 November 2009 (UTC)

I'm sorry you feel that way. I think you can offer much to the project because you possess a unique expertise. However, even the Wiki policy that you cite states that English sources are preferred. Non-English sources are acceptable where an English equivalent is unavailable. But there is a wealth of information in English. Why resort to Russian and Arabic? As an English speaker, I found it frustrating that I could not read the sources. Here I was trying to use this article as a referenece and I was unable to read the sources upon which the edits were based. Respectfully,--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:47, 19 November 2009 (UTC)

I'm the one who's sorry for going a bit over the top with my last posts, but if you want to continue any kind of collaboration, then please self-revert yourself and refrain from making any further edits unless we've agreed over them. For my part I will be extremely reasonable and will ensure no time is ever wasted in endless discussions. If you refuse to do this, then go ahead with whatever you'd like and I won't say a word; it's your loss. Respectfully, Sherif9282 (talk) 00:32, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

No need to apologize. This Wiki thing is heroin. I almost wish I never started editing. I'll self revert the infobox/factbox back to ceasefire status and we can discuss the rest. Is that Okay?--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 02:21, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

Indeed it is addictive. Your proposal though is not enough I'm afraid. Go to the article talk page and look at the last section, where you'll find two users have voiced concerns concerning what you've written in the introduction and the factbox. Their argument is quite legitimate as well per WP guidelines I should say. Well? --Sherif9282 (talk) 11:03, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

I was about to revert all of my edits per your request and then I saw your comments on the discussion page. Edit war? I thought we were collaborating as partners in a subject that we share mutual interest. In any event, revert to your heart's desire and cite whatever sources you want. I won't stop you.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 19:32, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

We are indeed. I think you've misunderstood. I simply said I hope our cooperation continues and we never witness any kind of edit-war. Don't get me wrong here. If we were edit-warring I wouldn't have posted anything here and would have simply reverted without any kind of discussion, which is definitely not what I've done. I certainly hope we continue working together. Apologies for the misunderstanding.

I've returned the article to its original shape. Let's discuss before changing anything again alright? I guess from here onwards discussions should take place in the article's talk page so anyone can get involved and help. I will be posting there in considerable length soon. --Sherif9282 (talk) 20:47, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

Lead

Since I've received no reply, I'll go ahead and state my views regarding Jiujitsuguy's version of the lead.

Cutting off Third Army and exposing Cairo to counterattack.

I had inserted elements into the lead because the Israelis had in fact cut off two divisions of Third Army, the 7th and the 19th. Jiujitsuguy's (JG for short) version implied that an entire army had been surrounded, which is plainly false by all standards. Also, claiming that Cairo was exposed to attack is a highly dubious claim to say the least. There were, to my knowledge, one to two divisions (from Third Army) blocking any advance westwards to Cairo, not to mention the strategic reserves which included around 250 tanks, and an oversized Algerian armored brigade which had arrived in Cairo on October 24 (the day of the ceasefire; hence the brigade was too late to partake in any fighting). So to claim Cairo was open to attack is greatly far from reality.

The Soviets threatened direct military intervention if Israel did not cease its counterattack. A ceasefire was accepted by the warring parties on October 24 with Israeli forces just 20 miles from Damascus and 60 miles from Cairo.

These couple of lines are also quite biased. To start with, the belligerents had accepted a ceasefire on October 22, but that ceasefire failed. The article details that sufficiently, and it would be safe to say the Israelis broke that ceasefire. Who broke the ceasefire however is not the focal point here. The Soviets threatened intervention because they believed, and they had cause to do so, that Israel had violated the ceasefire it had officially accepted. The Soviets felt betrayed by the Americans. Evidently they didn't plan to carry out their threats, but only hoped to push the Americans to pressure the Israelis to cease their offensive actions, which the Soviets succeeded in doing. Hence the Soviets did not threat intervention because the tide was turning in favor of Israel, as JG's version of the lead claims, but they did so because they believed Israel had violated the ceasefire.

Also, JG's version implies that the Israelis ceased advancing only because they were restricted by the ceasefire, which doesn't comply with what's in the article. At any rate, details like the distances are best left to the article body.

The final paragraph I have serious issues with. By failing to mention Israel entirely, it gives the supremely incorrect impression that Israel came out of the war unscathed, that post-war for Israel didn't differ much from pre-war. Also, the claims made regarding Sadat and Assad cannot be accepted from anyone. The source for such claims must be either Sadat or Assad or an extremely close confidant of theirs. Luttwak is simply not a legitimate source for such claims.

Let's be realistic here shall we. JG's version implies somehow that Sadat entered war planning to defeat the Israelis completely or regain the entire Sinai militarily. The reality is the complete opposite. Sadat wasn't planning on entering any further wars with Israel after this one. His primary aim for going to war was to jump-start diplomatic efforts to ultimately regain the Sinai. Hence Sadat turned to diplomacy because that was the second stage of his strategy, not because he was forced to due to an Israeli "victory" or because the war didn't turn out like he had hoped it would. It is a widely, repeat, a widely accepted fact that the war was a political victory for Sadat.

Bottom line, the older version is far more accurate, comprehensive, and an accurate summary of the article. Apologies for the long read. --Sherif9282 (talk) 02:31, 28 November 2009 (UTC)

The entire Third Army was trapped and cut off from re-supply. A look at the October 24 ceasefire map of opposing forces is demonstrative of this. Israel’s West Bank salient completely encircles Egypt’s narrow strip on the East Bank of the canal. Moreover, the ceasefire agreement compelled Israel to allow deliveries of water and medicine to Egypt’s beleaguered Third Army precisely because Israel controlled all the routes and passageways. Sherif's view is contrary to the facts.

Sherif claims the Egyptians had at least 250 tanks to oppose any advance on Cairo. The claim is simply false and inaccurate even by his own calculations. He claims that Egypt started the war with 1,700 tanks, 1020 of which crossed. The consensus is that combined Arab tank losses were between 2,000 and 2,250 and at least 1,000 of those were Egyptian tanks. When you couple that with Sherif's ridiculous assertion that the Soviets didn’t resupply Egypt with tanks, the math simply doesn’t add up. The road to Cairo was clear for the IDF with very little in their way. The only ones who feel differently are a small core of revisionist Egyptians who have created for themselves a bubble of delusional fantasy, dedicating museums and parades to their so-called “victory” thereby perpetuating their ridiculous charade. The consensus according to Luttwak, Herzog, London Sunday Times and Schiff among others is that Cairo was extremely vulnerable to attack, Egypt’s entire Third Army was trapped and the Soviets, fearing the complete collapse of Egypt’s and Syria’s armed forces, threatened direct military intervention.

Incidentally, regarding Schiff, the book that I have includes the Agranat’s commission findings. This leads me to conclude that Sherif hasn’t even read the book yet dismissed it outright.

This current version of the Yom Kippur war article is so inaccurate that it is almost painful to read. Moreover, it’s laced with clear POV bias. There is no mention of the fact that over 8,000 Egyptians were taken prisoner. Moreover, Egyptian assertions are taken as fact while Israeli claims are always prefaced by “Israel claims.” For example, describing the initial Egyptian air attack, the article states, “The airstrike was highly successful with the loss of five aircraft.” This is purely an Egyptian POV attributed to a purely Egyptian source, with no mention of the fact that Israel had in fact downed least 18 Egyptian aircraft during that aerial assault (and there are plenty of sources to back up that claim).

Moreover, I reiterate my objections to non-English Russian and Arabic sources when there is an abundance of English sources readily available.

In short, this article needs a major overhaul from start to finish to address its many inaccuracies, patent falsehoods and blatant POV pushing.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 03:00, 29 November 2009 (UTC)

I invite both (all) editors to WP:PROVEIT. Hohum (talk) 19:17, 29 November 2009 (UTC)

It seems JG is trying to twist my words into what they're not. I didn't deny there was an encirclement of Egyptian forces. I rejected saying the entire Third Army was encircled. Only two divisions, the 7th and the 19th, were encircled. The other two divisions of Third Army, the 4th and te 6th, were on the west bank and were not encircled. These divisions, or at least the 4th Armored Division, was in place to defend any advances towards Cairo. In addition to these were the strategic reserves and the Algerian armored brigade that arrived on October 24.

The five aircraft lost figure is not pure Egyptian POV by a purely Egyptian source. Other sources mention that figure, and Hammad, using Israeli and Western sources as references to his book, is not purely Egyptian. On the contrary, Schiff's October War is a purely Israeli source, but that's not the argument here.

I haven't seen what you claim to exist in the article, but maybe I've got sore eyes. Where exactly is the phrase Israel claims in the article, or likewise?

Also, which of Schiff's books are you talking about? October Earthquake or A History of the Israeli Army? I did not dismiss Schiff outright. I had previewed the book on Google books, and I found nothing of the Agranat Commission.

Another reply is forthcoming, and I will be backing up with sources. --Sherif9282 (talk) 04:41, 30 November 2009 (UTC)

I am very busy these days, which is why I haven't followed up my post. Hammad (pages 469-471) states that Kalman Magen's Division, which possessed around 50 tanks on October 23, attempted to advance east towards Cairo from Kilometer 101. They kept moving east for around eight kilometers, at which point they encountered an Egyptian armored force of the 3rd Armored Brigade, 4th Armored Division. After heavy fighting throughout the night, the Egyptians repelled the Israelis, who broke off the attack and returned to their original starting point (Kilometer 101).

What this does is prove Cairo was not wide open to attack. Evidently, an Israeli advance in the direction of Cairo was stopped by Egyptian armored forces, belonging to the 4th Armored Division. As I stated before, this proves there where forces in place to defend Cairo, in addition to other forces, the Algerian armored brigade and the general reserve placed in Cairo.

To whom it may concern, I shall list non-Arabic sources used in Hammad's book. Some of these sources were translated from their original language into Arabic, and they are listed in their Arabic titles. The rest are in English. I shall attempt to translate the Arabic titles into English but I'm liable to make an error somewhere. Here goes.

Arabic-translated sources:

• Strategic Survey 1973. Published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 1973.
• Return to the Sinai, by Brigadier D. K. Palit. Translated in 1977
• The Gun and the Olive Branch, by David Hirst (journalist). Translated in 1974
• War without End, Peace without Hope, by David Downing. Translated in 1974
• The Great Crossing: The New Spirit of Egypt, by Erich Helmensdorfer. Published and translated 1975
• The Mossad: Israel's Secret Intelligence Service, by Dennis Eisenberg. Published 1978, translated 1988
• Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations. Published 1981, translated 1988
• October Earthquake, Ze'ev Schiff.
• The Agranat Commission Report.
• Israeli Military Industries, by Uram Piri.
• The Making of Israel's Army, by Yigal Allon. Published 1970, translated 1971
• From the Six Day War to the Six Hour War, by Cooper Jack, published and translated 1974.
• The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, by Harold Saunders. Published and translated 1974.
• Quantity and Quality in Israeli Strategy, published and translated 1986. It seems the author is Israeli. His name is written in Arabic, and it's near impossible to translate.

English Language Sources:

• The Making of War: The Middle East From 1967 to 1973, by John Bulloch, 1974
• Insight on the Middle East War, London Sunday Times, 1974
• The War of Atonement, Chaim Herzog, 1975
• My Life, Golda Meir, 1975
• The Yom Kippur War, London Sunday Times, 1975
• The International Year Book of Foreign Analysis, 1975
• The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, New York Syracuse University, 1975.
• On the Banks of the Suez, Abraham Adan, 1979
• Elusive Victory, Trevor Dupuy, 1976
• Two Minutes Over Baghdad, Amos Perlmutter, 1981
• Modern Military Powers: Israel, 1983

These amount to 24 non-Arabic sources used in making Hammad's book, which certainly does not make his book a purely Egyptian source. In addition ther are over 50 Arabic sources which include declassified Egyptian documents. Hammad also spent five years researching the topic, and even conducted a field visit to the various battlefields, before releasing his two-volume encyclopedia on the Yom Kippur War. Unfortunately I only posses one of the two volumes. Hammad is a unique source and he cannot be disregarded for simply being in Arabic language. JG's labeling of Hammad as a delusional revisionist is a hollow claim and patently false. Hammad will remain in use as a source.

To back up that the war was a military stalemate is Trevor Dupuy's Elusive Victory, Edgar O'Ballance's No Victor, No Vanquished, George Gawrych, Hammad, Michael C. Jordan and Steven Piccirilli. --Sherif9282 (talk) 00:26, 8 December 2009 (UTC)

Sherif, you've done a great job in ignoring the facts and you've proven yourself to be a very proficient cherry picker.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 01:24, 24 December 2009 (UTC)

You've done a marvelous job not replying to what I present or countering with your own, instead choosing to throw in a few propagandist words as you just did. --Sherif9282 (talk) 16:52, 24 December 2009 (UTC)

Sherif, you rely principally on Hammad and again I reiterate that I object to sources that are written in any language but English. Wikipedia discourages the use of non-English sources and permits it only in extreme cases where English sources are not available. That is not the case here where there is a wealth of English sources available. The use of sources written in Arabic and Russian is therefore inappropriate and contrary to Wiki policy. In addition, Michael C. Jordan and Steven Piccirilli are virtual “no names” whose works have not been cited or republished in any RS. I am certain that you would not have cited them had they posited a viewpoint that was contrary to yours. And using the same convoluted logic that you posited for your rejection of Schiff, they are not “historians.” Finally, the sources that you cite are in the minority. The following eight sources all define the Yom Kippur War as an Israeli military triumph. There is no reference to “stalemate.” Some have argued that the defeat suffered by the Arabs during the war was “catastrophic” and on a scale greater than the Six Day War. There are many more sources that I can cite without too much digging. However, I will be relying primarily on these sources when I overhaul this article.

• The war of Atonement, Chaim Herzog

• The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East, Abraham Rabinovich

• The Yom Kippur War, Insight Team of the London Sunday Times

• The Israeli Army, Edward Luttwak and Horowitz

• A History of the Israeli Army 1874-1974, Zeev Schiff (This version includes the Agranat report)

• The Egyptian strategy for the Yom Kippur War: An Analysis, Dani Asher

• Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Studies in War, Society, and the Military), Kenneth M Pollack

• Revisiting the Yom Kippur War, P.R. Kumaraswamy

• Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives, Martin van Creveld

Respectfully,--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 19:46, 24 December 2009 (UTC)

I see there are a number of I-P articles where recent pushes have occurred to declare Israel as "Victor" in infoboxes, can I remind editors that these articles fall under the scope of Wiki general sanctions and editors must bring an objective approach if they want to edit here. The use of non-English sources is clearly allowed by WP:NONENG. (I would venture especially in an article on a war where none of the belligerents have English as an official language.) It is disingenuous to claim that Wikipedia "permits it only in extreme cases" or that it is "contrary to Wiki policy" as an editor has done above. Further, there are a clear lack of Arab sources published in English. For example, Rabinovich, whose writings currently account for about one-quarter of the 160 sources used in the article, wrote his book almost entirely from Israeli sources. Is this appropriate? If so, then we must allow Hammad if we want to have some balance. Respectfully, RomaC (talk) 08:43, 25 December 2009 (UTC)

First off, I don’t recall any of the belligerents speaking Russian, which is used as a source. I don’t think that many English readers are familiar with the Cyrillic alphabet. Second, just because the belligerents speak languages other than English is not an excuse for using non-English sources. This article is for English readers. Not Arabic. Not Hebrew. Not Russian. I looked at Shreif’s Russian and Arabic sources and I have no way to verify their veracity or whether Sherif is paraphrasing or quoting them correctly. I note that I have already caught him paraphrasing English sources incorrectly. That is precisely the reason why the sources must be in English, to establish accountability, accuracy and verifiability. Now I would agree that if no other sources are available, then perhaps we can resort to non-English sources. But this is not the case here where there is a wealth of English sources readily available.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:19, 25 December 2009 (UTC)

I concur. What applies to Rabinovich in addition applies to Herzog, Schiff, Pollack to a degree, and van Creveld as well. Hammad is an essential source to the article, and his use complies with WP guidelines. Additionally, what applies to Schiff does not to Jordan and Piccirilli. By the time the latter two had published their papers, there was a wealth of sources available on the war from both viewpoints. Also, their near complete reliance on existing primary and secondary sources means their work does not present new facts or unprecedented opinions and analysis for that matter. In addition, not being cited by other sources in by no means an indication of their unreliability.

On a side note, it seems JG is in the habit of making false claims against me, as is evident when he/she claimed I had dismissed Schiff's book without even opening it. It is now clear that he/she was in fact referring to an entirely different book, and not simply a different version of October Earthquake, which was under discussion at the time.

As for the claim that this is a minority group, that's just non-credible. On the other hand, as has been pointed out before, most of the books presented by JG are Israeli-based in their sources, with a some exceptions. --Sherif9282 (talk) 11:14, 25 December 2009 (UTC)

Excuse me, incorrectly paraphrasing an English source? When and where exactly did you "catch me" doing so? Also, maybe you haven't been concentrating enough, but the use of Arabic sources is within WP guidelines. In other words, removing them from the article in order to comply with your objections would be in contradiction to WP guidelines and would be detrimental to this article.

Also, I may add that I did not add the Russian source to the article. However, it is only used to provide figures, and using Google Translation it is easy to verify the information cited to the source since it is available online. --Sherif9282 (talk) 00:35, 26 December 2009 (UTC)

WP:NONENG says the following (my emphasis):

"English-language sources are preferable to sources in other languages so that readers can easily verify the content of the article. However, sources in other languages are acceptable where an English equivalent is not available. Where editors translate a direct quotation, they should quote the relevant portion of the original text in a footnote or in the article. Translations published by reliable sources are preferred over translations made by Wikipedia editors."

There are plenty of english sources available for this conflict, so it would be preferable to use them. Hohum (talk) 14:01, 26 December 2009 (UTC)

The important issue is not the availability of English sources, but the nature of the sources available. Right now, Hammad represents the only scholarly, secondary Egyptian source that relies on a variety of Arab, Israeli and Western sources, in addition to a massive amount of primary research conducted by the author on the Arab side of the war, facilitated by the fact that Hammad was in the army and has numerous connections. In view of this, an English equivalent that includes all these characteristics is indeed unavailable. Western sources rely mainly or entirely on Israeli sources, and disregard Arab ones. The same is applicable to Israeli sources.

No one questions that there are a wealth of English sources available, but there is no real equivalent to Hammad. --Sherif9282 (talk) 14:44, 26 December 2009 (UTC)

In that case, I suggest Hammad's book is vetted as a reliable source at Wikipedia:Reliable sources/Noticeboard, and the original+translation of the supporting phrases are provided with each citation. Where Hammad conflicts with other reliable sources, both should be included, per normal wikipedia practice. Hohum (talk) 16:12, 26 December 2009 (UTC)

I don't see the reasoning behind examining Hammad's book at WP:RS. No dispute has been raised over his reliability. --Sherif9282 (talk) 16:38, 26 December 2009 (UTC)

There is a reason why Western sources rely mainly or entirely on Israeli sources. This reason is that the people in Israel enjoy the freedom of speech. It means that Israeli war veterans of the Yom Kippur War, who fought in the battlefield and manned the high headquarters, are allowed to speak almost freely about that war and tell what did really happen, without fearing that their government will persecute them for this.

For example: in 2003 two Israeli journalists, Ronen Bergman and Gil Meltzer published a collection of transcripts from the 1973 war in their book. A lot of embarrassing information was uncovered. The transcripts were taken from both official archives and from unofficial sources. In other words some of these transcripts were made from audio tapes that were recorded in the war, copied with no authorization and kept by retired soldiers in their homes for 30 years. Do you know what was done to those retired soldiers? Nothing. No steps were taken against them. Such steps are irrelevant after 30 years.

It is hard to imagine that uncovering information about a war that took place more than 30 years ago could be a threat for Israel's national security but that excluding information about espionage and Israel's nuclear weaponry. In a country where war veterans are allowed to speak almost without limits, it's almost impossible for the government to spread false information about events that took place 30 years ago because hundreds of veterans will tell the press their version.

In Egypt the situation is quite different. Documents and transcripts from the "glorious" October war are still classified as secret because of "national security" concerns. Actually, revealing this embarrassing information may cause a serious treat to the "reputation security" of the current Egyptian leadership and institutions. Egyptian Veterans are not allowed to speak about that war. If someone dares to open his mouth and to tell even partial true that may cause embarrassments (as Shazly did), he pays the price (as Shazly did). Another example can be found in you tube. Search for: 20th Century Battlefields - 1973 Yom Kippur War part 1/6. When a BBC team asked for a permit to film a TV program about that war in Egypt they were not allowed by the government. It has something to hide.

Many Egyptian sources are unreliable simply because a gun is pointed on their heads. Preferring Israeli sources over Egyptian and Syrian sources is equal to preferring liberty over tyranny. Megaidler (talk) 02:10, 27 December 2009 (UTC)

Unobjective personal opinion. The assessment is quite similar to that of Rabinovich and quite wrong as well. I don't deny that their are numerous fantasy accounts of the war from both Egypt and Syria, but there are accounts which are factual and objective as well, other than Shazly's. The reason Egyptian sources are not used is because they are unavailable in English. Some authors also have a stereotypical belief that all Arab sources are fairy tales, other authors are simply biased and some perhaps just don't bother. Egyptian veterans do speak about the war. Pollack and Gawrych interviewed some Egyptians (some in Egypt), and Hammad interviewed even more. To my knowledge, some documents surrounding the war were released, and in his position Hammad would have had access to documents classified or not. What you're describing used to happen during Sadat's reign, but nowadays it there is no longer such tight control. Hammad in his book for instance severely criticized Sadat and even charged him with forging history and twisting facts for his own agenda. Where is he now? Six feet under? In some dark prison dungeon? Actually, alive and healthy, and still speaking too. A while ago he came on Al-Jazeera and gave a series of interviews about the 1952 coup d'etat and about Nasser. He revealed some embarrassing information underlining the extent of corruption and power games between Nasser and his friends, even time pointing out that the massive demonstrations that took place in the aftermath of the Six Day War to stop Nasser from resigning were in fact staged so Nasser could pretend he reversed his resignation because he had "popular" support.

Blatantly discarding all Arab sources into the same group as unreliable fantasy accounts is plainly incorrect. --Sherif9282 (talk) 07:41, 27 December 2009 (UTC)

Sherif is correct. This is not a place for personal opinion rants on "freedom of speech". Editors arguing this article should be written with predominantly Israeli sources and attempting to discredit Arab sources are in violation of Wiki NPOV policies and more particularly the general sanctions that currently exist on I-P articles. Please review these. Respectfully, RomaC (talk) 09:03, 27 December 2009 (UTC)

Roma, you're the first "editor" in this discussion who is implying the threat of I-P sanctions. Please don't threaten me or for that matter any other editor from expressing his or her viewpoint on the subject. Megaidler and Hohum have made valid points and I have my own concerns. And remember Roma, I-P sanctions are a two-way street.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 20:14, 27 December 2009 (UTC)

When I claim that the average Egyptian source is much less reliable than the Israeli one it is not because of any prejudice toward Arabs and Muslims. It is because of the controversial reliability of information that comes from Egypt. Even since the death of Sadat until now, the Egyptian government limits the freedom of speech where it comes to revealing facts about the October war. Shazly was being imprisoned for his book in 1992. More than 10 years after Mubarack became president. This was a deterrent action, a message to any veteran of the October war who thinks to speak openly. If a famous war hero like the former chief of staff can be put in jail, what would be done to platoon leaders? I believe that even the men that were interviewed by Hammad, Pollack and Gawrych, chose their words very carefully after they saw what was done to Shazly.

The persecution didn't end in 1992. The BBC team that was not allowed to film in Egypt, made the program about the war for "Twentieth Century Battlefields" in 2006, 4 years after Hammad published his book. Hammad can allow himself to criticize former Egyptian leaders that have already left this world, but real courage is to reveal scandals that may embarrass the current institution. When Hammad "discovered" that Nasser had no real intention to leave his office after the six day war, this was already known for years to many people outside Egypt. Hammad may be only the first Egyptian to write it in Egypt, his public reputation can give him some protection for a while.

The gaps between the Israeli and the Egyptian version over some issues of the 1973 war are much larger than the gap between the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd armies in Deversoir. One claims that that only five Egyptian aircraft were lost in the opening strike. The other claims that Egypt lost 18 planes and more than 10 helicopter in the first day. One claims that on the afternoon of 14/10/1973, during 53 minutes above El Mansoura, Egyptian pilots shot down 17 Israeli planes, while Israeli pilots shot down 3 Egyptian planes. The other claims that only two Israeli planes were lost in the entire theater that day. One claims that the Patton tank once used by battalion commander Asaf Yaguri was captured intact by the Egyptians, and is still publicly displayed as a monument of victory. The other claims that it's impossible. Yaguri's tanks exploded after sustaining hits, and his entire tank battalion was made of Centurions.

I gave you logical reasons why the Israeli sources should be preferred over Egyptian ones when there are contradictions. An Egyptian primary source about that war, that contradicts so many independent Israeli sources, can be considered reliable only if the source and his family live outside Egypt.

Megaidler (talk) 15:42, 27 December 2009 (UTC)

"I don't see the reasoning behind examining Hammad's book at WP:RS. No dispute has been raised over his reliability." - Sherif.

Well, there clearly is concern about its use by a number of editors. If you feel it's a good source, I don't see why you wouldn't want it rubber stamped by WP:RS, to end this tiresome, unending squabble. Hohum (talk) 16:05, 27 December 2009 (UTC)

More forum-style posting by Megaidler. On a side-note though, Hammad states that Yaguri's tank was destroyed, and that the Egyptians lost around 10 helicopters too. It's also worth noting his book was first published in 1989, before Shazly's imprisonment in 1992, which rules out that the men he interviewed were twisting facts and events. Two more editions came out, and I have the most recent (2002). Additionally Hammad was well-aware of Nasser's thinking from day one, and wrote about it long before he reiterated it publicly on Al-Jazeera. Also, you clearly are not aware of the situation here in Egypt, which is also not the point of discussion now, so I suggest you give up this argument. --Sherif9282 (talk) 19:00, 27 December 2009 (UTC)

Let me make myself crystal clear. I don't object to the use of Hammad or other Arab sources per se. I object to the use of sources that are not written in English for the reasons that I explained above. Wiki readers are entitled to verifiablity, accountability and accuracey. This is made impossible when the sources are written in languages other than English.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 20:04, 27 December 2009 (UTC)

Jiujitsuguy, surely your issues should be resolved by having Hammad's book vetted at WP:RSN, and if it passes, quotations from it plus their translations being included in the article? i.e. there is a way to verify it. Hohum (talk) 21:42, 27 December 2009 (UTC)

I guess that's inevitable. I'll do that very soon. --Sherif9282 (talk) 21:53, 27 December 2009 (UTC)

I have commented on the relevant thread at WP:RSN to point out my opinion that while WP:NONENG obviously allows non English sources, it's this specific Hammad source that we want to verify as reliable, irrespective of the language it's written in. Hohum (talk) 20:17, 29 December 2009 (UTC)

Sherif’s version of the lead is un-sourced and factually inaccurate.

• He states: “the Egyptians were successful during the first four days of the war.” In fact the Egyptians did not register a single advance past the second day of fighting. (Herzog @ page 199)
• He states: “By the second week of the war, the Syrians had been pushed out of the Heights.” In fact the Syrians were ejected from the Golan on the fourth day of the war. (Herzog @page 127)

The last paragraph of Sherif’s lead is completely un-sourced and is purely Sherif’s POV. The bottom line is my version of the lead is factually accurate and well sourced with reliable, verifiable sources. While his is filled with factual inaccuracies and unsourced conjecture--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 01:44, 30 December 2009 (UTC)

I disagree with that assessment of the lead; it seems to me to make fewer disputable major statements- e. g. saying nothing about the complicated matter of "whose victory?" rather than plainly "Israeli military victory." From Dupuy's Elusive Victory, p. 602-603:

• " Achievement of Sadat's Strategic Objectives

Probably the most important single strategic result of the war was the accomplishment of President Sadat's basic war objective; the condition of "no peace, no war" was dramatically ended. ... Thus, if war is the employment of military force in support of political objectives, there can be no doubt that in strategic and political terms the Arab states - and particularly Egypt - won the war, even though the military outcome was a stalemate permitting both sides to claim military victory.

• The Shocks to Israel

On the other hand, event though the military outcome was on balance an Israeli military success, the war was a severe psychological shock to the people of Israel. ..." It is hard to say all this in an infobox, so saying nothing there is better.John Z (talk) 07:01, 30 December 2009 (UTC)

"The war had profound and long-reaching implications for the leaders of Egypt and Syria. Both Egypt's president Sadat and Syrian president Assad recognized that their countries had come closer to catastrophic defeat than in 1967, and that it was absolutely imperative to avoid another war. That led to Sadat's peace and Assad's 1974 cease-fire on the Golan Heights, never violated since..." I think this probably true but rather subjective and one-sided. Fallout in Israel after the complacency after six-day war was no less profound. It is better to remove it from the Lead. What do people think?BorisG (talk) 05:01, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

Thank you for acknowledging the veracity of the statement. As far as it being "subjective," the other version of the lead was equally, if not more subjective and one-sided but the editor who made that previous one-sided edit refused to compromise on the language.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 06:02, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

Sorry, in my view, this is a weird logic. The fact that one editor is biased justifies your bias? In general, it is always better to avoid discussing politicians's thinking. No matter how reliable the source, no one can say for sure what Sadat of Asad thought. In contrast, the fallout in Israel was a public affair. BorisG (talk) 06:44, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

Sounds logical. Your reasoning is a basis for excluding the previous version as well.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 06:55, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

Just to comment here. I have to agree with Boris. After all, as Hohum clearly stated, the lead is supposed to summarise the rest of the article. That was what the previous version did, and in no way does the current version do this. Additionally, the current version is factually inaccurate. How did the war have a profound effect on Arab leaders when Sadat clearly did not want to resort again on the military, but rather relied entirely on diplomacy after the war; something he had intended to do long before the war began, not something he was forced to do due to the war's outcome. --Sherif9282 (talk) 17:15, 10 January 2010 (UTC)

Sorry, Sherif, to clarify, I criticized the version of January 8 (cited above). Then with the help of other editors I modified the lead (especially the last par) to make it more balanced. As JG said elsewhere, we will never have a version that satisfies everyone, but the current version is a reasonable compromise. See Intro section below. BorisG (talk) 15:41, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

Infobox

My most recent edit concerning the lead is supported by seven Reliable Sources. I substituted Sherif's unsourced conjecture with reliably sourced fact. Sherif's speaks of consensus so let's talk consensus. My edit has the support of at least three editors including Megaidler, Mikrobølgeovn and Hohum. There you have it. Reliable sources and consensus. Sherif, you do not WP:own this article. It is open to all editors. Yet you have stubbornly and persistently refused to cooperate or collaborate in any way shape or form, relentlessly reverting well-sourced edits from anybody who dares to add them. The article in its current form is inaccurate and poorly sourced, relying on non-English sources (that can't be verified) and English sources cherry-picked to present your POV. For example Steven J. Piccirilli whom you cite is a virtual "no name" whose work has not been cited or republished in any reliable source. His work has not undergone any form of peer review and he is neither a journalist, historian or researcher. In sum, he is not an RS but was chosen by you as a source simply because his view comports with yours. The article is factually inaccurate, misleading and poorly sourced and I intend to make it on par with Wiki standards with collaborative editing and not relentless reverting.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 19:18, 29 December 2009 (UTC)

Here are just a few examples of inaccuracies and errors of omission that plague this article:

• The article fails to reflect the fact that over 8,000 Egyptian soldiers were captured by the IDF during the course of the war.

• The article states that only 5 Egyptian aircraft were shot down during an Egyptian aeriel attack on the first day of war when in fact, I provided Sherif with a sourced edit verifying that at least 18 Egyptian aircraft were shot down. Sherif reverted the edit.

• The article cites a figure that only 5,000 Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian soldiers were killed in combat but no source is provided for this ridiculous figure

• I provided Sherif with credible sources that stated that an Egyptian heliborne assault during the fist day of war was an abismal failure with the loss of several helicopters. Instead of including my sources along with his, he reverted my edit in its entirety.

These are but a few examples of the lengths to which Sherif will go to protect his article that reflects sheer fantasy with just a shred of truth.

It appears that the only sources acceptable to Sherif are those cherry-picked exclusively by him. This is unaccptable and must change.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 19:52, 29 December 2009 (UTC)

Regarding the recent infobox addition/reversion. I think it is perfectly reasonable to include "Israeli military victory" with verifiable, reliable references. When reliable references disagree, both (all) should be included with relevant weight. Hohum (talk) 20:07, 29 December 2009 (UTC)

There are reliable sources which disagree. In that case, a section should be devoted to this dispute, with the infobox containing result=Disputed. --Sherif9282 (talk) 20:20, 29 December 2009 (UTC)

That seems reasonable in theory. Hopefully it will be in practice. Hohum (talk) 20:43, 29 December 2009 (UTC)

Sherif relies heavily on a minority viewpoint that is contravened by at least a dozen reliable sources. As indicated below, the war resulted in a clear battlefield victory in Israel's favor.

• "The brute statistics of war indicated an Israeli victory," London Sunday Times, Yom Kippur War @ page 450.
• "As a military feat, the IDF’s performance in the Yom Kippur War dwarfed that in the Six Day War. Victory emerged from motivation that came from the deepest layers of the nation’s being and from basic military skills that compensated for the grave errors of leadership," Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War, @ page 498.
• "[The Yom Kippur War] is the story of an astounding Israeli victory," Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, @ Foreword.
• "The war had profound and long-reaching implications for the leaders of Egypt and Syria. Both Egypt's president Sadat and Syrian president Assad recognized that their countries had come closer to catastrophic defeat than in 1967, and that it was absolutely imperative to avoid another war. That led to Sadat's peace and Assad's 1974 cease-fire on the Golan Heights, never violated since then." Edward Luttwak, Misreading the Lebanon war
• "On October 24, 1973 when Israel finally implemented the cease-fire agreement, nothing stood between its advancing troops and the Egyptian capital. Israel had gained complete control over the entire front. Facing an imminent threat to Cairo and hence to the regime itself, President Anwar al-Sadat was desperately seeking heightened Soviet intervention and even direct military involvement to secure an early cease-fire. But for intense American pressure, Israel would have annihilated the stranded and encircled Egyptian Third Army. The story was more or less the same in the north where the Syrian advances in the Golan Heights were stopped and reversed and the outskirts of Damascus were brought within range of Israeli artillery. After initial surprises and setbacks, Israel had bounced back, stopped the Arab offensive and reversed the course of battle. If the Arab military offensive was motivated by a desire to change the status quo in Sinai or the Golan Heights, Israel had throttled them. The October 1973 cease-fire lines significantly improved Israel’s position." P.R. Kumaraswamy, Revisiting the Yom Kippur War
• "Although the Egyptians continue to tout the Yom Kippur war as a great victory, in truth, their successes were modest and their failures equal or greater than their achievements," Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991
• "In material terms, the Israelis won a clear victory in the Yom Kippur war. Israel never held more territory than it did at the end of the Yom Kippur War – a war it had supposedly lost. At the cease fire, the Israelis were only fifty miles from Cairo and thirty miles from Damascus. The Soviet ambassador to Egypt Aleksei Kosygin saw the situation in Cairo at the end of the war as a 'catastrophe.' He declared: 'We must have a cease-fire because otherwise, everything will collapse,'" Johnson and Tierney, Failing To Win, Perception of Victory and Defeat in International Politics, @ page 177. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jiujitsuguy (talk • contribs) 21:12, 5 January 2010 (UTC)
• "There is no question that the Israeli army emerged from the Yom Kippur War victorious," Charles Liebman, The Myth of Defeat: The Memory of the Yom Kippur war in Israeli Society Middle Eastern Studies, Vol 29, No. 3, July 1993 @ page 411 Published by Frank Cass, London--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 15:13, 15 January 2010 (UTC)
• "What Sadat did not discuss with Asad, because it was too humiliating, was that Israel had him by the throat. The Egyptian Third Army was on the brink of collapse and the besieged town of Suez was desperately short of food, water and medicines. In the circumstances, Israel was able to extort from him a whole string of concessions: the return of Israeli prisoners of war, the lifting of the blockade of the Bab al Mandab Straits and above all, direct talks in which a defeated Egypt would be the supplicant." Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: the struggle for the Middle East @ 227--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:21, 15 January 2010 (UTC)
• “The Arab world will soon realize that there will be no automatic Israeli withdrawal, and that Sadat’s and Asad’s glorious reassertion of Arab dignity has suddenly turned into another defeat,” Memo from Asst Secretary of State Ray Cline to Kissinger, Oct 24--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 09:06, 17 January 2010 (UTC)

More importantly, Sherif’s version of the lead is patently inaccurate. As I pointed out He states the following: “the Egyptians were successful during the first four days of the war.” This statement is false. In fact, the Egyptians did not register a single advance past the second day of fighting. (Herzog @ page 199). He further states: “By the second week of the war, the Syrians had been pushed out of the Heights.” This statement is equally false. In fact, All Syrian forces were ejected from the Golan by the fourth day of the war. (Herzog @page 127). The last paragraph contains the following sentence: “This vindication paved the way for the peace process that followed, as well as liberalizations such as Egypt's infitah policy.” This statement as well as the entire paragraph is un-sourced and as an aside, it is common knowledge that Egypt is still one of the most repressive dictatorships in the world with a dismal human rights record. My version of the lead is factually accurate and well-sourced with reliable and verifiable sources. Sherif’s lead is completely un-sourced and as I proved, inaccurate.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 07:54, 3 January 2010 (UTC)

The lead typically doesn't have inline sources as it should reflect what is in the rest of the article. Rather than fight over the lead, which is a symptom of the rest of the article, perhaps you could concentrate on the article body itself. Include the variously sourced victory/outcomes there, and then rewrite the lead to reflect the article. Hohum (talk) 15:03, 3 January 2010 (UTC)

You are doing a good job, Jiujitsuguy. The fact that the egyptians were advancing the first days of the war, does on no account tell anything about the results of the conflict. The initial egyptian "success" was limited, and it did not take too long before IDF took the advantage. The beginning phase of the war has nothing to do in the infobox. --Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 22:56, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

Just a quick note for Hohum. I agree that the main body is the bread and butter. However, many readers only look at the lead and infobox (everyone reads an article differently) and there is a problem if the lead does not summarize or represent the article correctly.Cptnono (talk) 09:19, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

My point is that it "summarizes" something that isn't currently reflected in the article body - current content would be summarized as "disputed". Say it in the main text first, with references, and counterpoints, if relevant, and then you can have a relevant summary phrase in an infobox. I encourage Jiujitsuguy to do this. Hohum (talk) 17:08, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

Hi there Hohum. I've taken you up on your suggestion and have been making edits throughout the article that reflect the lead, including the fact that the IDF captured some 8,400 Egyptian POWs and 400 Syrian POWs during the course of the war. I've also added edited other war statistics that were either omitted, poorly reflected or inaccurately noted. The editing process is continuing and I appreciate your feedback and encouragement.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:49, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

I also encourage other editors to provide counterpoints, where reliable. Regarding the numbers, be wary of replacing one set with another - if both(all) are reliably sourced, then both(a representative range) should be given. This goes for prose as well. Hohum (talk) 19:03, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

(outdent)I reverted to the old version of the infobox. Jiujitsuguy said he would accept the old infobox at my talk page; I don't know why he changed his mind. I agree with Hohum that the lead should reflect the body and with his suggestion for improving the article. As stated before, saying this was an Israeli military victory and nothing else is extremely misleading. It is not the mainstream point of view, which is that it was a stalemate or a draw, with Arab battlefield success followed by Israeli battlefield success, but strategically an Arab, Egyptian victory. The sources cited in the infobox do not give page numbers, and some of Jiujitsuguy's sources quoted above, which tend to be Israeli / pro-Israel (e.g. Herzog became the president of Israel) do not really support the claim of simply "Israeli victory."

From Shmuel Gordon's contribution to the Kumaraswamy collection, Revisiting the Yom Kippur war: "Israel, which relied heavily on the support of the US during the war, and achieved the verge [n.b. not the reality] of decisive victory thanks to that support, was compelled to obey the American recommendations..." "Pyrrhic victory alone is useless in the modern world." If this was an Israeli victory, it was a pyrrhic one, as Gordon suggests, and there is no question that the government and people of Israel had no desire to see another such victory. The other papers in the collection I checked seem to similarly have a more balanced view in line with what I call the mainstream above. After the war, Israel accepted the Sinai Disengagement Agreements and eventually a Sinai-for-peace treaty - the Camp David Accords (1978), both on terms which it had rejected before the war. It is a very strange kind of victory that leads to losing territory by accepting rejected offers.John Z (talk) 01:19, 9 January 2010 (UTC)

Sherif, this is just plain stupid. The results is not "disputed" only because some egyptians believe they won the Yom Kippur war. You can probably find a bunch of americans believing that the "won" the Vietnam war, or pakistanis arguing that they won the Kargil war. The examples are almost unlimited. Wikipedia is an encyclopaedia, not a discussion-page. Several times, you have blindly removed Jiujitsuguy's edits, and refused to co-operate. This is a collaborative project, not another edit war. Please, show some respect to this. The history can not be denied, no matter how many people who misunderstands it. Please, bring this stupidity to an end. It annoys me appreciable. And you, John Z, have misunderstood the term "pyrrhic victory". A pyrrhic victory is when the victor's casualties is higher than the defeated party's casualties. In the Yom Kippur war, this was clearly not the case. The Camp David Accords was not a result of an israeli defeat, but rather Israel wanting to settle peace with Egypt and "give land for peace".--Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 17:46, 9 January 2010 (UTC)

? - Sherif hasn't been around for a few days. The majority view of reliable sources, including some of the ones cited without page numbers, not just "some egyptians", is as I have outlined - that all in all, taking the long view, the Egyptians "won" - not as much as they would have liked, but enough to put Sadat's strategy in effect. On Pyrrhic victory - "a victory with devastating cost to the victor" - note that in the original example "In both of Pyrrhus's victories, the Romans had more casualties than Pyrrhus did. However, the Romans had a much larger supply of men from which to draw soldiers, so their casualties did less damage to their war effort than Pyrrhus's casualties did to his." Exactly the same as in Egypt vs Israel. My point on Camp David is: Why was Israel willing to "pay" the whole Sinai for a peace treaty, after, but not before, the war?John Z (talk) 21:06, 9 January 2010 (UTC)

I support the Israeli Military Victory version. It is clearly the most historically accurate interpretation Joltinjoe56 (talk) 21:34, 8 January 2010 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jiujitsuguy (talk • contribs)

John Z - Israel was willing to give land for peace. That doesn't have anything to do with the battlefield. Israel defeated Egypt on the battlefield, and that's what this article is all about. --Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 00:11, 10 January 2010 (UTC)

Regarding the recent reversions which I hope do not escalate into an edit war; Again, the outcome isn't as simple as can be properly summarized in an infobox, so I suggest you sort the main text out first.

Also of little to no use is proposing your own pet theories on this talk page. Wikipedia requires sources, so please WP:PROVEIT within the article. Hohum (talk) 00:45, 10 January 2010 (UTC)

I haven't been around lately due to real-world obligations, and I don't expect to return anytime soon, so the recent changes to the article will unfortunately remain. I see JG has taken the liberty of removing sourced information too. Let's see how much more will be added. Because there are going to be a lot of changes. --Sherif9282 (talk) 09:52, 10 January 2010 (UTC)

Can the result be changed soon? It annoys me that somepeople seems to think that the Camp David Accords indicates that Israel were defeated on the battlefield 5 years earlier. You guys completely misunderstand the history. Israel was willing to give away Sinai in exchange for peace and recognization by Egypt. --Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 22:55, 11 January 2010 (UTC)

Before reverting Mikrobølgeovn’s recent edit, I hope that I can prevail upon the naysayers to listen to reason. As the Insight Team London Sunday Times accurately pointed out in their exhaustive book on the Yom Kippur War, “The brute statistics of war indicated an Israeli victory.” In every battlefield category, losses in tanks, aircraft, naval vessels, soldiers and POWs, Arab losses dwarfed Israeli losses, and by large margins. In the north, Israel occupied 500 sq. km of Syrian territory and in the south, Israel’s west bank salient more than made up for territory lost in Sinai. Moreover, the strategic positions favored Israel with the 3rd Army surrounded and IDF troops poised some 50 miles from Cairo. The situation in the north was equally favorable to the Israelis who were within artillery range of Damascus and whose forces now occupied both sides of the Hermon. So when one looks at the picture on a tactical level, one can only come to but one conclusion concerning who the winner is.

Now I understand that on a political level, the situation is a bit murkier with some arguing that Arab military successes of the first 2-3 days allowed Sadat to claim that Arab pride had been restored. However, one can equally argue, as Luttwak and Kumaraswamy do, that it was Israel that emerged with a political victory. This is precisely why the result section is phrased “Israeli military victory” as opposed to just “Israeli victory.” While one can argue "political victory" for either side, one cannot in good faith argue that the war resulted in stalemate. Gawrych, who subscribes to this view, himself acknowledges that most Western analysts considered the war to be an IDF military victory. Perhaps, we can further narrow the scope of the result section by stating “Tactical Israeli victory.” Respectfully,--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:49, 14 January 2010 (UTC)

As explained above, the simple view "Israeli military victory" is not a consensus view of RS's or contributors here. Without saying "Arab, particularly Egyptian, strategic and political victory" even "tactical Israeli victory" is extremely misleading. RS's like those adduced by me and Sherif and even you - Gawrych above - do in good faith say "stalemate"; therefore "Israeli military victory" is quite unacceptable, particularly in an infobox, which should be only for the simplest and most indisputable information. Concerning casualties, measured by percentage of population, Israel's casualties were five times higher than Egypt's, a sobering fact not lost on the Israelis.

I - and the sources - strongly disagree that on a political level, it is murkier. It is much clearer that it was a political victory for Egypt. It is a fringe view or near to it to argue it was a political victory for Israel. Where does anyone in the Kumaraswamy collection say this? Not in anything which has been quoted, not in what I see in the intro etc, which is consistent with the standard Egyptian political victory view, which is supported by the author from this volume I quoted above. Again, it is a weird sort of political victory that leads to losing territory, accepting offers rejected earlier, and the fall of the politicians who led Israel to this "victory". The sources adduced in the current version do not generally support the simpleminded "Israeli military victory" view. So the earlier, longtime consensus version of the infobox is clearly superior, and I reverted.John Z (talk) 01:25, 15 January 2010 (UTC)

Your analysis is flawed on several levels. Your “percentage of population” argument is illogical. Using this logic, one would have to say the Finland “lost” its initial 1939 encounter with the USSR because, based on "percentage of population," its casualty rate was higher than Russia’s. Of course, it’s a silly argument and all acknowledge Russia’s humiliating defeat but that’s in essence what you’re saying. Moreover, when you factor the 9,000 POWs that Israel captured into the equation, your “percentage of population” argument becomes factually incorrect as well as being illogical and silly.

As for Camp David and Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai, this was a great achievement for Israel. Prior to the war, the most Sadat was willing to offer Israel was a non-belligerency pact in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal of all territories captured in 1967, including the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan. He would not offer a full peace and would not disconnect the Sinai issue from the other captured territories. The war compelled him to change strategies and attitude. Kumaraswamy noted that the war drove a wedge in the Arab world that was to Israel’s strategic benefit. Luttwak summed in up best when he noted that, “both Egypt's president Sadat and Syrian president Assad recognized that their countries had come closer to catastrophic defeat than in 1967, and that it was absolutely imperative to avoid another war. That led to Sadat's peace and Assad's 1974 cease-fire on the Golan Heights, never violated since then.”

I have now compiled nine credible sources that unambiguously and clearly state that the Israeli army emerged victorious in the Yom Kippur War. It is an unshakable fact, just as the earth is round and Lindsay Lohan is a lousy actress.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:34, 15 January 2010 (UTC)

The analyses presented above just show that there is no way to reach a consensus on this issue. It is possible to argue that Sadat chose negotiations after unsuccessful war demonstrated futility of attempts to defeat Israel by force. But it is equally possible to argue that Egypt's relative successes marked a redemption of sorts after the disaster of 1967, and hence allowed him to move on the diplomatic front (otherwise it would be regarded as humiliation). This just shows the futility of attempts to characterise it as victory or defeat, especially in infobox. On this I totally agree with John Z. Regardless of the sources, this is a controversial statement and should be left out of the lead and the infobox. I would even leave it out of the aricle. Rather I would spell out all the facts and let the readers make their own conclusions.BorisG (talk) 19:12, 15 January 2010 (UTC)

(Editconflict) (Thanks for the agreement, BorisG) Sadat offered a peace treaty to Israel in 1971 for returning the Sinai and the Gaza strip. Israel refused and stated it would not return to the 1967 lines, even in return for a peace treaty. This is in the article and cited to the government of Israel. Does whatever dishonest and unreliable propagandist being cited who rewrites history to call a proposed peace treaty only "a non-belligerency pact" know better than the government of Israel? (N.B. there were more than one February 1971 Egyptian initiatives - the last one, in response to Jarring, as cited, was a peace treaty offer) In the words of Moshe Dayan, Israel then would rather have "Sharm-al-Sheikh without peace than peace without Sharm-al-Sheikh."

Saying the "Israeli army emerged victorious" is not the same as Israeli victory simpliciter; Dupuy says about as much, quoted above by me, and is not an unreasonable statement, in light of the great Israeli military achievements (and in contrast to the extremely inept Israeli top leadership actions before the war). The problem is that it also reasonable to say that the Egyptian army emerged victorious. It was not destroyed, it crossed the canal, and even the 3rd army was not clearly doomed; some late Israeli actions were met with fierce resistance. Gawrych is misquoted above, he only says "many Western analysts" not "most Western analysts" say Israeli victory. It is not our job to detail counterfactual alternative history - what is speculated would have happened if not for the superpower intervention (that Sadat had been counting on all along), but what actually did happen. Again, not all of these sources clearly and unambiguously state "Israeli military victory", which again is extremely misleading without the more widespread, practically universal Egyptian political victory assessment. The only counterview cited is in an aside in the Luttwak newspaper article about another war. Again, where does anyone in Kumaraswamy say that it was not an Egyptian political victory?

I am taking the population percentage comparison from Dupuy, p 603. The fact that Israel faces adversaries that are greatly superior in population is one of the most basic facts about the Arab Israeli conflict. This makes any war of attrition by numbers an Arab victory and dictates much of Israeli strategy. To quote Herzog, Israel accepted the ceasefire because it did not want to spend any more of its sons' lives. How can one say that Israel won when Egypt essentially met its prewar aims, while the result was wildly different from the prewar Israeli aim of cheap, immediate and complete domination?John Z (talk) 21:43, 15 January 2010 (UTC)

I disagree with the analysis of John Z. Remember, in 1967 Israel agreed to UN Resolution 242 while Arab states rejected it... I think it is futile to draw conclusions about the outcome of the war based on what different leaders of Egypt and Israel agreed to at different times, if only because these decisions have as much to do with domestic and global situations as with the bi-lateral and regional conflict itself. In case of Sadat's peace initiative, the Israeli postion was also largely determined by the style in which it was presented. But, again, I agree with you completely that one-word interpretations have no place in the infobox or lead, and arguably, in the article. Instead, arguments from different sources and on different aspects need to be all presented and contrasted. No conclusion is warranted.BorisG (talk) 04:59, 16 January 2010 (UTC)

That simply isn't true about SC 242, though it is a common misapprehension. See our article (or more comprehensible, less battleground-like old versions). Egypt and Jordan immediately accepted SC 242, while Israel neither accepted nor rejected it. During 1968 it at first privately to the UN Secretary General, and later publicly, gradually accepted SC242. A clear Israeli public acceptance including the word "withdrawal" was not made until August 1970 as part of the Israeli-Egyptian-Jordanian acceptance of the Rogers B plan; it was controversial enough to induce Begin to resign from the cabinet. See Shlaim's Iron Wall, p. 260 & p. 296.John Z (talk) 06:51, 16 January 2010 (UTC)

Yet again; this complex issue needs to be properly explored within the article body. I think that certain strategic benefits were seen by Israel (along with some drawbacks, as noted - mostly prompting renewed negotiation). Israel successfully defended itself, and held off joint armies again - this has probably prevented additional military adventures against Israel.

Constantly "grandstanding" in the infobox is a futile exercise, editors should use their energies more effectively by creating a comprehensive explanation. Hohum (talk) 01:48, 15 January 2010 (UTC)

This User Talk Page message concerns me. First, it accuses me of POV-pushing when I was reverting POV-pushing by an editor who has been changing a number of conflict infoboxes to "Israeli Victory". More importantly, it could be regarded as Canvassing, and also suggests a strategic calculation to identify and sway "sidelines" editors to a particular side. Might I remind editors that Wikipedia is not a battleground. Respectfully, RomaC (talk) 02:42, 15 January 2010 (UTC)

=In battlefield terms the war ended with a clear Israeli victory. After the 3rd army became trapped, Egypt's situation was desperate. Among all warring parties, Egypt was the only one that asked desperately for a truce. Not Israel. Not even Syria whose capital was shelled. This was confirmed not only by Israeli and American sources but also by the Soviet ambassador in Cairo that time.

=In regarding to political achievements gained by Egypt as a direct result of the war, I am quite not sure there is a consensus about this. Not any one in Egypt saw the Camp David accord positively. Shazly claim that this was a humiliating deal that caused the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab league. If it was up to him, or up to the assassins of Sadat, this accord was never to be signed.

=Some may claim that only as a result of the war Israel accepted an Egyptian offer that it refused to accept earlier. This statement is also problematic. The peace accord was signed 5 years after war ended. There were many other events that took place during those 5 years which made Israel agree giving back the entire Sinai Peninsula. For example: Before the war Israel offered Egypt a partition of the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt will get the western Sinai in condition for peace with Israel and Israel will have the eastern part, from the 1967 border to Sharm El Sheich. More than a year after the war ended the U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger threatened Israel that the US will not deliver F-15 airplanes to Israel unless it would agree to withdraw unilaterally from the western Sinai Peninsula. Thus the Sinai Interim Agreement of 1975 made Israel losing a fundamental play card in the negotiation with Egypt, but receiving the F-15 and more arms in the future. The US also started to deliver arms to Egypt in 1976 and Israel had to accept counter balancing guaranties from the US.

=Moreover the Camp David accord of 1978 was not what Sadat offered Israel before the war. I am not sure that Sadat was ready to make separate peace with Israel while the Syria and the Palestinians gain nothing. After 1978 Egypt actually abandoned the Palestinians. Jewish settlement in the 67 occupied territories expanded massively under Begin and Sharon. I don't think Sadat was ready to accept this in 1972.

=Considering there is a consensus among almost all reliable sources over a tactical Israeli victory and no consensus at all over a political Egyptian victory, this war stays a tactical Israeli victory. Megaidler (talk) 17:25, 16 January 2010 (UTC)

JohnZ: The post war protests in Israel that you refer to were not a product of the results on the battlefield. They were a product of an Israeli constituency that demands perfection from its leaders. Israelis were more than satisfied by the achievements of their army. They were angry over their government’s failure to read the writings on the wall. But this had nothing whatsoever to do with the favorable results achieved by the IDF on the battlefield. And to be sure, there was also fallout in Egypt where Shazli was dismissed from the army and later placed under house arrest. The commanders of the 2nd and 3rd armies were also dismissed from the army. In Syria, a general was executed even before the war ended. Just imagine however, if Syria and Egypt were open democracies where freedom of expression was permitted. Could you imagine protests in Syria over how its soldiers were defeated despite the element of surprise and numerically superior forces? Can you imagine Egyptian protests over how the Second and Third armies failed to recognize the gap between their forces? Or why they didn’t recognize the Israeli incursion for what it was? Or why Sadat didn’t heed Shazli’s request to pull forces back to the west bank to meet the Israeli encirclement action? Or how on October 14, Ismail allowed his tank forces to emerge from the SAM umbrella only to be massacred? or why the Egyptian and Syrian airforces performed so miserably against the IAF in air-to-air combat? I can go on and on. My point is that discourse, protests and demonstrations in these dictatorships would be met with an iron fist, arrest, killings, torture etc... Does Hama come to mind? The only line fed to these people was government propaganda which the people of Egypt and Syria swallowed if they knew it was good for them. Egypt claimed victory in 1956 as well. Does that make it so? Egyptian propagandists were claiming that they were well on their way to Tel-Aviv in the Six Day War. Does that make it so? Arab claims of Arab "victory" have become threadbare, even in the Arab world. Incidentally, I have yet to see one commission of inquiry formed by any arab government to investigate a government shortcoming. --Jiujitsuguy (talk) 04:19, 17 January 2010 (UTC)

Belligerents

The recent addition of Cuba to the infobox is too much. Aside that this statement of fact appears highly susceptible (Shazly, who detailed each and every bit of support sent to Egypt and Syria, doesn't mention Cuba), it is at any rate a very minor contributor. So is Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Jordan. I've instead included a link directly to the appropriate section. --Sherif9282 (talk) 16:51, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

All participants must be included on the infobox for accuracy. The list in the Korean War infobox is much longer and it includes powers that sent a negligible part of their armed forces. Megaidler (talk) 18:30, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

Just because it's set up like that in the Korean War doesn't mean it's correct. If you have a problem with it, feel free to edit as such, as I have no interest in the Korean War. A problem with this article is it's length, it's far too long. Sherif's link allows readers to read about aid to Egypt and Syria during the war, without cluttering the infobox. If I'm not mistaken, it appears you're trying to maximize the list of countries that aided Egypt and Syria so that it appears to readers that the "big and bad Arab countries" are all picking on the "poor, tiny Israel". ElUmmah (talk) 02:39, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

I'm aware that the article is to long but this problem can be solved if we make cuts in other places.
There is a lot of irrelevant information like the comparison of Israeli casualties to the American casualties in Vietnam. There are countless possible comparisons of casualties per period and per capita. Why shouldn't we make similar comparisons to WWII or the Zulu war?
We can also split the article, but this will be done after we will solve all disputes (some thing that will probably never happen).
The infobox must be accurate and detailed. This is relevant to any kind of data that should appear in the infobox. It shouldn't redirect to the article. I'm suspecting that other editors actually try to minimize the combat support that Egypt and Syria received. The force of all belligerents removed from the infobox by Sherif and ElUmmah was significant. Together, it consisted over 500 tanks, more than 1/5 of Israel tank force on 06/10. Not all of the expeditionary forces have seen combat, but many Egyptian and Syrian units didn't see combat as well.
Megaidler (talk) 09:35, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

Actually, the Vietnam comparison is crucial to this article. One of the main results of the war was the high Israeli casualties, in comparison to Israel's previous wars, where victory was achieved with low casualties (except for the '48 war of course). By removing the comparison, you are leading readers to believe that since the Arabs had higher casualties, then the Israelis were victorious. The Vietnam comparison shows that this is not the case. While the Israelis DID suffer much lower casualties than the Arabs, proportionally (with respect to the populations of these countries), the Israeli losses were much more severe. Israel's population at this point was only about 3 million, while the Arabs had tens of millions (I don't know the exact figures). If you wish to include an Arab comparison as well, feel free to do so, provided you can find a source. No one is trying to minimize support to Egypt and Syria, if you look at the section "Aid to Egypt and Syria", you'll find all details there. It's unnecessary to include them in the infobox, since many of these either arrived with logistical problems, and so were unable to participate in the fighting, while many arrived following the ceasefire, again, too late to participate. However, these details cannot be mentioned in the infobox, and the list may simply end up giving readers the wrong idea. Also, support from many of these countries were minimal. Sherif's link allows the infobox to remain concise, while allowing readers a link to read all about the support to the Arab nations while mentioning the fore-mention problems regarding logistics, support that arrived after the ceasefire, etc. ElUmmah (talk) 16:27, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

Mentioning all combat belligerents in the infobox won't make readers to think that the entire Arab nation sent its entire armed forces against Israel in 1973. If the reader scrolls down the page, he can watch the numbers of troops and equipment used by both sides. The infobox of the Korean War is much longer. If the article is too long, the infobox is not the place for making cuts. Megaidler (talk) 20:23, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

new article Syrian Front (Yom Kippur War)

I am not sure about the legitimacy of this split. --Shuki (talk) 19:30, 14 December 2009 (UTC)

I believe it should be redirected to this article. --Sherif9282 (talk) 17:44, 15 December 2009 (UTC)

Archive

The discussion at WP:RSN appear to have reached a close. Here is a summary of the discussions, which one editor has concurred with.

"A non-English source may be used regardless of the situation, except perhaps when it is related to a basic, undeniable fact, in which case a single English source may be used per normal practice. The non-English source may be used to support an English source and vice versa, particularly if there is dispute over the matter among various sources. The non-English source may also be used on its own. Per consensus reached here, the non-English source in question, Military Battles on the Egyptian Front by Gamal Hammad, is usable in the article per WP:NONENG and WP:NPOV and is WP:RS."

With this tiresome dispute out of the way (I hope), I propose that we next begin discussing issues with the article one at a time, ultimately reaching the "end result" issue, where per normal practice a section (for instance) would be dedicated to describing the disputes surrounding the end result of the war. Before we go ahead with this, this talk page should be archived, as it's far too long. --Sherif9282 (talk) 16:39, 30 December 2009 (UTC)

I suggest you archive "Disputed aerial figures" and earlier. The rest is recent enough to be of interest to editors coming to the page.

Regarding "end results", the "Long-term effects of the war" section already discusses tactical and strategic military outcomes, as well as political ones. Hohum (talk) 16:52, 30 December 2009 (UTC)

Precisely, end results would be discussed in that section. --Sherif9282 (talk) 17:01, 30 December 2009 (UTC)

There, I've archived some 200 kB of posts, as Hohum suggested. --Sherif9282 (talk) 05:55, 3 January 2010 (UTC)

Intro

The intro to this article is almost cartoonishly one-sided. This is a war that is generally regarded as a major political victory for Sadat, as it resulted in the withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai. The war also had very serious repercussions in Israel, leading to the fall of the Meir government. To ignore all this and summarize the conflict as some sort of salutory lesson handed out by the IDF to the Arab states is a gross misinterpretation. Gatoclass (talk) 10:55, 30 January 2010 (UTC)

Can you propose some changes? You have been around long enough that I assume you can. Throw some thoughts out there without referring to others' work as cartooonish.Cptnono (talk) 11:41, 30 January 2010 (UTC)

That comment was only intended as a description of the intro as I see it, it's not intended as some sort of statement of blame. I don't know how the intro got into its current state and I really don't care, I'm simply saying it's far from adequate.

Probably I should just have a go at fixing it. And perhaps I will. But in the meantime, I thought it would be just as well to leave a comment here first. Gatoclass (talk) 12:47, 30 January 2010 (UTC)

It is a collaborative project and you should most certainly have a go. Don't call it cartoonish unless you are going to step up. Any thoughts on particulars (outline style)? Cptnono (talk) 12:58, 30 January 2010 (UTC)

Not at the moment, beyond my initial comment. I have a large amount of new content I am currently working on, so it may be a while before I can come back to this. I just thought I would drop a word here in the meantime. Gatoclass (talk) 13:09, 30 January 2010 (UTC)

Funny how you neglect to mention fallout in Egypt and Syria. General Shazly was dismissed from the army and placed under house arrest for openly criticizing various aspects of Egyptian military performance during the war. The commanders of the Second and Third armies were also dismissed from the army. The First commander of the Third Army Corps suffered a nervous breakdown that required hospitalization. A Syrian general was executed even before the war ended and another purportedly suffered a heart attack and died. General Shazly advocated the formation of a committee modeled after Israel's "Agranat Commission" but his requests "fell on deaf ears." This is so because Egypt and Syria are closed societies where dissent is not tolerated and criticism is met with arrest and killings. Israelis were angered with pre-war intelligence failures and as in any democracy, anger is channeled toward the government. No such mechanism exits in Syria or Egypt.

As for military performance, in the words of P.R. Kumaraswamy "On October 24, 1973 when Israel finally implemented the cease-fire agreement, nothing stood between its advancing troops and the Egyptian capital. Israel had gained complete control over the entire front. Facing an imminent threat to Cairo and hence to the regime itself, President Anwar al-Sadat was desperately seeking heightened Soviet intervention and even direct military involvement to secure an early cease-fire. But for intense American pressure, Israel would have annihilated the stranded and encircled Egyptian Third Army. The story was more or less the same in the north where the Syrian advances in the Golan Heights were stopped and reversed and the outskirts of Damascus were brought within range of Israeli artillery. After initial surprises and setbacks, Israel had bounced back, stopped the Arab offensive and reversed the course of battle. If the Arab military offensive was motivated by a desire to change the status quo in Sinai or the Golan Heights, Israel had throttled them. The October 1973 cease-fire lines significantly improved Israel’s position."

Kumaraswamy view is shared by many well regarded others including Edward Luttwak, Kenneth Pollack, Chaim Herzog, Dominic Johnson, and dozens more.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 01:39, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

Funny enough, the fallout in Israel is not mentioned in the Intro at all. Sorry, it does look one-sided. BorisG (talk) 04:36, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

Fallout among all belligerent parties is discussed in greater detail the prose. Incidentally, the previous version of this article completely neglected fallout in Egypt and Syria even though sources discussing this issue were readily available.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 05:36, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

That's no excuse to omit mention of the fallout in Israel in the intro. Also, the Arab "fallout" you mention is inconsequential by comparison with the great positives that came out of the war for the Arabs, especially the Egyptians. This is a war that completely changed the dynamic of the conflict, with the Arabs restored a sense of pride, and Sadat and his proposals taken seriously for the first time, while on the other hand it led to a great deal of hand-wringing in Israel and finally a judgement that it would be better to have peace with Egypt than risk another war. The intro as it stands almost completely reverses the outcome of the war. It was Israel that felt compelled to make concessions in the aftermath, not Egypt. Gatoclass (talk) 07:49, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

There are plenty of sources that stand for the opposite position including the one mentioned in the lead. they argue that it was in fact Egypt that conceded by engaging Israel in a separate peace treaty. In fact, most sources agree that prior to the war, Egypt was only willing to offer Israel a non-belligerency pact in exchange for all territories Israel captured during the Six Day War. Sadat and his allies waged a two-front war against Israel and had the element of surprise and Israel still emerged victorious. This made him come to the conclusion that he could never re-claim Sinai by military means, thus forcing him to resort to diplomacy. The Arab world was livid over Sadat's peace overtures and considered it an act of betrayal. On the Syrian front, the Golan is the quietest place in Israel and has been since the cease-fire. Despite fiery rhetoric from Syria's dictators (father and son), not so much as a stone has been thrown in Israel's direction.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 08:34, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

Well, yes, I've had a look at the sources in the article for this interpretation, and they consist of an article from the Jerusalem Post and a paragraph from the Guardian. I don't know of any quality sources that come to the same conclusions about the war as you. But I know plenty of good sources that do not.

I don't think there is much point in continuing with this debate right now however, as arguments in the abstract are rarely of any use on this project. I will try to make some corrections to the intro and some of the other content when I can find the time, I'm a bit tied up with other things at the moment. We can then discuss those if you have any objection to them. Gatoclass (talk) 10:17, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

I have gone ahead and included a statement about fallout in Israel, copying verbatim from Gatoclass above. And Jiujitsuguy improved it. I hope this is more balanced now.BorisG (talk) 01:08, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

(outdent) I don't think that's an adequate fix Boris as it leaves in place the poorly sourced and misleading claim that the war persuaded the Egyptians to make peace. In fact the opposite is the case - it persuaded the Israelis to accept a land-for-peace deal, which they had previously rejected. So I've tweaked the paragraph to reflect that. Gatoclass (talk) 12:27, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

Well, Gatoclass, you have replaced one speculation with another. Not good at all. There are differing views on this. In my view, all this is not mutually exclusive. On one hand, Egypt had restored some pride and therefore it was easier for it to make peace. OTOH, the outcome of the war showed to Sadat that Egypt would never regain Sinai by force, so the peace initiative seemed not only feasible (due to restoration of pride) but also the most reasonable course of action. I can't see how the outcomes of the war could induce Israel to make peace. More the way Sadat presented it... And also Israeli internal politics played its role... I think we need to try to avoid speculations and present facts or perhaps point to a range of views. I will not revert your changes as the last things we need is edit war, but you would be well advised to try to find a compromise solution rather than push your own POV. BTW it is not for you to decide which sources are reliable and which not. BorisG (talk) 13:52, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

It's not "speculation", Boris! It's what every book says that I've read about this conflict. The material I replaced was sourced to a defunct link from J Post and a paragraph from the Guardian. They are far from scholarly sources on a topic like this. My addition is sourced to two unquestionably reliable sources, and I'm sure I could add many more if necessary. Gatoclass (talk) 14:55, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

Given the fact that this area seems to be a lightening rod for divergent views, perhaps it would be best to keep the lead as factual as possible and leave speculative aspects for the prose.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 15:52, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

Lightning rod is maybe too strong, but I agree that analysis is best left for the body of the article.BorisG (talk) 16:00, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

Having said that, we may be able to reach a mutually agreed position if we only leave statements of more general and uncotroversial nature. Please check my attempt there.BorisG (talk) 16:07, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

I've tweaked the intro a bit to make it a little more even-handed, per Boris' concerns. Gatoclass (talk) 16:20, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

I am fine with the Gatoclass's latest version. Maybe it requires some stylistic improvements, but overall looks balanced to me.BorisG (talk) 16:33, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

I concur with BorisG. No one will ever be completely satisfied as I-P issues evoke strong emotions. But Gatoclass' edit represents a good attempt at compromise and I commend his, as well as BorisG's efforts--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:43, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

Thanks guys :) Gatoclass (talk) 09:01, 2 February 2010 (UTC)

Fallout in Israel

This section is quite poor, in my view, as is the article on Agranat Commission. It does not say what the fallout was about, and what was the aim of the commission. I am not an expert on this, but people who know the subject should add a bit of meat to this. Otherwise we know what was commission's recommendations regarding various senior persons, but what was actually investigated remains unclear.BorisG (talk) 17:43, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

There's a separate wikipedia section dealing with the Agranat Commission. If the reader wishes more info on this subject, they can click an internal link where more detailed information is available. This article is about the war itself; Battles, tactics, strategies, weapons, commanders. Agranat as well as other matters like the oil embargo, while related to the Yom Kippur War article, should not overshadow it. That is why internal wiki links are available where the reader can get an expanded picture of a particular subject that interests him or her.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 19:12, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

An article on the war certainly cannot be confined to its military aspects. War as Clausewitz said, is diplomacy by other means, and the political dimensions of a war are much more important than the military, because they are the reason wars are fought in the first place. War is only a means to an end, it's obviously the end that matters most.

I do agree with Boris that the political aspects of the war need some filling out. I've considered having a go at it myself, but as I said earlier I have lots of other priorities ATM. But certainly I would encourage someone else to have a go. Gatoclass (talk) 09:00, 2 February 2010 (UTC)

I don't think the section needs major expansion, but rather some improvement. Fewer names and more substance.BorisG (talk) 15:30, 2 February 2010 (UTC)

Comparison with Vietnam

The article says that Israel suffered three times more casualties in three weeks than the United States did in one decade of fighting during the Vietnam war. This statement is apparently sourced, but really how can ~11,000 Israeli casualties compare to some 360,000 American casualties during the vietnam war? I really doubt this statement even if it's sourced it's just not logical. I didn't want to edit because i can't verify the source which is not available online, but it's just not logical. I hope somebody will verify this and thank you --86.76.51.56 (talk) 16:16, 2 February 2010 (UTC)

You quote the aricle incorrectly. It says "Per capita, Israel suffered three times as many casualties in 3 weeks of fighting as the United States did during almost a decade of fighting in Vietnam". PER CAPITA means if you divide the casualty number by the total population of the country. In Israel case it is 11,000/5,000,000=2.2 per 1000. For the US it was 360,000/200,000,000=1.8 per 1000. 2.2 > 1.8. Any questions?BorisG (talk) 16:50, 2 February 2010 (UTC)

OK, sorry i was not paying attention when reading. Thanks for the reply --86.76.51.56 (talk) 17:06, 2 February 2010 (UTC)

Even though the statement above is sourced, I find it odd that no similar analysis is done in connection with Arab casualties, particularly in light of the fact that their casualties rates were significantly higher than Israel's. I don't think that the Vietnam analogy belongs here and if it is included, the analysis should apply to all belligerents, not just Israel.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 22:08, 2 February 2010 (UTC)

It jumps out as "nuh uh... Israel lost the fight" Cptnono (talk) 01:01, 3 February 2010 (UTC)

Precisely Cptnono. As usual, you're on the mark. The same holds true for the next sentence/pragraph dealing with psychiatric disorders. Makes it appear as though the Israelis were the only ones who suffered battle shock and the Egyptians and Syrians were somehow immune to it. I tried adding this for balance but it doesn’t do the trick. I’m strongly in favor of doing away with unnecessary Vietnam analogies and psycho babble. This is especially so in light of the undue focus on the Israeli side while negating any mention of the other side.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 03:16, 3 February 2010 (UTC)

I say go for it. I think it borders on useless trivia (although it is a interesting enough) but mainly because it leads the reader.Cptnono (talk) 03:56, 3 February 2010 (UTC)

done--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 04:07, 3 February 2010 (UTC)

No ghost edits, please. The fore-mentioned edit actually deletes more than what the editor assumed have been agreed on in this section; That's one thing, the other is that the deleted info are cited to sources that are considered reliable by Wikipedia, and as so are not original research. If some one would want a similar estimate regarding Egypt's case, the can go search for a reliable source that cites it. I do not think that the statement misleads the reader making them think that Israel lost the war (which would be no problem at all as the statements are cites by reliable sources), because it is not about how much men or equipment you lose as much as whether or not you have achieved your goals of the war with acceptable loses. As Egypt originally assumed it would lose 10,000 men in the crossing alone, which is part of the first day of fighting, and as the direct result of the war was that Egyptian forces gained foot hold on the Sinai, and by political actions, Sadat could return the rest of it, I think that Egypt did achieve it's goals with far less loses than what i was ready to pay.( ΡHARAOH  The Muslim  20:48, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

USA ??????????????

I think u have to put USA in israel side as u put the whole arab countries in in Egypt even though they did not largly contribute to the war.

--76.68.19.254 (talk) 18:59, 7 February 2010 (UTC)

What a pointless suggestion. I do however oppose including such countries as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait in the infobox.--Sherif9282 (talk) 22:15, 7 February 2010 (UTC)

A Kuwaiti regiment, composed mainly of Palestinian exiles, participated in the fighting against the Israelis on the west bank of the Suez Canal.I'll try to get the source.

A Saudi combat expedition arrived too late, but there were also many Egyptian units that didn't confront the Israelis. Megaidler (talk) 14:34, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

Ok Then u should not include those arab countries. they have to be removed. --76.68.19.254 (talk) 03:14, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

Attitudes pre- and post-war

It's unfortunate I wasn't around the past several weeks. The article now needs serious balancing.

The lead claimed that the war led to a realistic attitude on the part of the Arabs. I'm assuming Egypt is specifically intended here, since it goes on to say that that realistic post-war attitude lead to the Camp David Agreement.

This is silly. Egypt had the ultimate objective of regaining the Sinai through diplomacy because Sadat knew militarily he would never accomplish that. Before the war Egypt had the intention of initiating military action to jump-start negotiations and revitalize US mediation in the Middle East. After the war, with military action coming to an end, Egypt pursued diplomacy as the second phase of its strategy. What change did the war bring about to that? --Sherif9282 (talk) 05:56, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

I agree with your analysis. However, one cannot add one's own opinion to an article, one can only go on what the sources say. Gatoclass (talk) 07:38, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

I have sources that assert this analysis. I'm sure Rabinovich agrees with this analysis as well, can anyone confirm this?--Sherif9282 (talk) 08:13, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

There's not the slightest doubt that this is true, can't check Rabinovich at the moment. A good supporting source could be a Ha'aretz column by the late Ze'ev Schiff a few years ago, where he commented on the then novel revelation that Sadat had been in constant communication with Nixon from day one of the war, assuring Nixon that Egypt's objective was just to gain a little territory to break the stasis and envigorate negotiations. Glad to see you and Gatoclass here, as I have been preoccupied too.John Z (talk) 10:08, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

So we work hard to reach some consensus here (Gatoclass was part of it; some stuff was copied directly from his statements above) and then you guys come back and want to rewrite the whole thing again? Let me remind you that the lead is supposed to summarise the artcile, not to cite any sources. As for the change of attitudes etc., I am sure we can find a variety of RS that can all say different things. There have been a lot of different interpretations proposed by different sources in 37 years. If we open this pandora box, we can fill a whole new article with just this topic.BorisG (talk) 10:19, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

Sherif, I could give you a dozen sources that stand for the opposite position. I did not cite them in the lead because there was was some reluctance on the part of some editors. After discussion and debate an agreement was hammered out and the version that you see is the product of that compromise but I would be more than happy to reinsert Edward Luttwak's viewpoint--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 15:27, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

Stick to the facts here people. Before the war, Israel govt informed the US its desire to return the Sinai and the Golan in return for peace. Apparently they regretted that, and soon withdrew their offer before it reached the Arabs. Up to 1973 the Israeli position remained the same: it was unwilling to give up Arab land, preferring to rely on its military superiority. As it was, for the Israelis no war was a plus, and no peace could be lived with. In 1971, Sadat proposed Israel return the Sinai in return for a peace treaty. The Israelis insisted on retaining parts of the Sinai for "security", forcing Sadat to withdraw his proposal. In 1973 Sadat repeated his proposal of peace for the Sinai to Kissinger. Kissinger replied that the US could exert pressure on Israel, but could not force it to take action. He also replied Egypt had to make more concessions (besides a peace treaty!). Just after these talks the US supplied nearly 50 F-4s to Israel, showing just how much "pressure" it could apply on Israel. Sadat again withdrew his offer, and decided he had to wage war to force a change in thinking. These are not my opinions, my analysis. These are facts. They're stated in [Jordan http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Jordan.htm#_ftnref54]'s paper, and in A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, as well as The Yom Kippur War: A Case Study in Crisis Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy, both mentioned in the paper by Jordan. (Sorry I can't add more details on these sources). This is also the stance taken by Gawrych.

Now will someone convince me, how did this war change Sadat's position? Or, show me that pre-war Sadat was unwilling to make peace with Israel, and that this changed post-war.--Sherif9282 (talk) 12:23, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

There are disputes about the impact of the conflict. Sherif claims that Sadat achieved all his combat objectives and as a result, all his political ones.

Most of us agree that Sadat was ready to make peace in return for the entire Sinai Peninsula and Israel rejected the. However there is no mention for his demands in regarding to the Palestinian issue and the Golan Heights. After the peace treaty of 1978, Israel under Prime Minister Begin, invaded Lebanon, and begun a massive Jewish colonization campaign in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Golan Height which was claimed by Israel in 1981. I don't sure that Sadat was ready to accept this back in 1973. If we find a source that confirms Sadat's demands in referring to the Palestinian issue and the Golan Heights in the pre war negotiation, this all theory of pure Egyptian political achievement collapses.

In referring to the tactical situation at the end of the war, Sadat must have been joking if he claimed that the Egyptian army fulfilled its war objectives. When he said that he have expected the army only to occupy a narrow strip in the east bank and stay under the cover of SAMs, does it also include that hundred of Israeli tanks would cross to the west, cut the supply lines of 3rd army, and destroy each one of the SAMs that provided it protection. After the 14/10 assault, it became clear how much important was it for the Egyptians to stay under the SAM umbrella, but on the 24/10, it ceased to exist on the 3rd army sector.

Sherif himself confirms that the U.S didn't put a lot of pressure on Israel before the war, like the selling of F-4 airplanes. However, during the siege on the 3rd army Kissinger did threat to take heavy steps toward Israel if it is still unwilling to accept the truce. Therefore, American political pressure was much more imported than Egyptian military threats, for convincing Israel to return into the negotiating table. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Megaidler (talk • contribs) 03:38, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Exactly where did that sudden surge of US pressure on Israel come from? I don't suppose it was a shot of adrenaline?

Look, Sadat waged this war with Syria to change the superpowers' position towards the Middle East. Pre-war: Americans and Soviets were working on achieving detente. This in turn meant they were unwilling to get involved much in the Middle East, ie: they preferred to keep the situation "status quo". Pre-war: the Americans applied little or no pressure on Israel. Pre-war: whenever Sadat came out to deliver a threat of war, you would just turn the TV channel because it was just another one in a long line of hollow rhetorical threats. Post-war: the Americans began applying pressure on Israel to turn to negotiations. Post-war: Israel itself saw it had to turn to negotiations, because Arab lands obviously won't be occupied without a price in Jewish lives, and the next time a war erupts, it might be the case the Arabs won't be so inferior in weaponry and training. Post-war: Sadat's proposals were no longer tossed aside but now taken seriously, and this enabled peace negotiations to go ahead.

American political pressure was born out of Egyptian military action.

As for the rest, I guess Sadat left the West Bank and Gaza to the PLA, and the Golan Heights to the Syrians to handle. BTW, do you really think Israel would have done any of that if it hadn't signed a peace treaty? Without a peace treaty to rely on, Sadat would have been compelled by domestic pressure to go to war with Israel and support Syria and Lebanon. Israel knowing this, might not have gone to war in Lebanon. At any rate, Sadat died in October 1981, the annexation of the Golan Heights took place in December 1981, and the following year Lebanon was invaded. Since these events happened following Sadat's death, your argument is fundamentally unfounded and irrelative. --Sherif9282 (talk) 06:41, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Even though Sadat died in October 1981, the annexation of the Golan Height was two months later and the invasion of Lebanon was in 1982, The 1978 peace provided Israel guarantees that Egypt won't make a lot of noise in referring to Israel relations with the rest of the Arab world.

I believe that if Sadat was still alive in 1982, he would probably act the same as Moubarack. If you claim that Sadat achieved in the 1978 peace treaty exactly what he wanted back in February 1973, you must find a source that confirms that back in February 1973 he was ready to give up solidarity with the rest of the Arab world in return for Sinai. Megaidler (talk) 17:11, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

All these arguments are irrelevant. We just need to present all significant points of view discussed by reliable sources and let readers decide.BorisG (talk) 12:27, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Quite the contrary Megaidler, it's you who has to prove his belief that Sadat was unwilling to give up solidarity with the Arab World, but that after the war he was ready to give up solidarity. Since Sadat died too early, you cannot prove that. --Sherif9282 (talk) 17:22, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Other before and after points of view

While in agreement with the initial discussion that started the section, I find that the war also had other before and after differences of consequence. According to William B. Quandt, US policy was fundamentally affected by the war, and I believe that most other RSs indicate US actions and policy were important aspects of the war. While I do not know how these might influence the initial discussion on the lede, I do note that while some are mentioned, their notability seems downplayed. Rather than influence any particular POV, I suggest that his views be considered; his conclusions seem well stated here. Regards, CasualObserver'48 (talk) 02:01, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Quandt's words fully support the view that the war was a political victory for Egypt. As he noted, prior to the war, American mediation was far from determined (and had actually ceased in the summer of 1973). Sadat and his peace proposals were not being taken seriously either. Kissinger even admitted that pre-October 1973, the Americans "knew astonishingly little of Egypt's real thinking". Sadat was aware of all this, and wanted to push the US out of its languorous attitude towards the Middle East problem by renewed military action. As evidenced by Quandt, Sadat did just that.--Sherif9282 (talk) 23:22, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Dominic Johnsom and Dominic Tierney note that the clearest loser in the war was Syria. As for Egypt, though they acknowledge that Israel made some post-war concessions, "Egypt shifted its position to an equal or greater extent by accepting a peace agreement that did not address wider Arab grievances." Johnson and Tierney p.182.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 18:45, 12 February 2010 (UTC)

Soviet threats of intervention

According to what is clear, the Soviets felt they had been betrayed by the Americans, who were apparently collaborating with Israel by buying them time through negotiations for the latter to accomplish the encirclement of the Third Army. In view of this, and Israel's violation of the first ceasefire (UNSCR 338), the Soviet Union threatened to send in troops if the Israelis did not halt their ceasefire violations. They threatened to send forces as "peace-keepers", and to act unilaterally if the Americans did not cooperate. Evidently their threats were not real and only had the intention of forcing the US to pressure Israel into ceasing hostilities, which worked.

In short one fact needs to be made clear: Soviet threats of intervention were not born out of Israeli advances but Israeli violations of the first ceasefire.--Sherif9282 (talk) 07:16, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

It's neither fact nor clear. The USSR was hardly some neutral observer to this conflict, whose sole purpose was to end the fighting. The Soviet Union opposed Israeli ceasefire violations not because of some good will it felt towards all men but precisely because of Israeli advances and the fact that the party it was supporting was on the losing side. It would not have been so adamant for fighting to stop were the Egyptians on the advance. One need only look at the ceasefire that ended the War of Attrition in 1970. The Soviets said nothing when Egypt advanced its air defence array to the canal zone despite the specific prohibition to do so in the ceasefire agreements. Not only were they not saying much, they were in fact helping Egypt carry out the task. The Soviets, Americans, Israelis and Arabs were all acting according to their own self-serving interests, let's not lose sight of that. Poliocretes (talk) 07:43, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

Well then, where were Soviet threats of intervention before the first ceasefire? No mention was made of sending Soviet troops to the area prior to the ceasefire violation, even though Israeli advances were being made by the day. --Sherif9282 (talk) 08:08, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

Precisely because the ceasefire was not an end unto itself but rather the way by which the Soviets hoped to stem Israeli advances. When that failed, they pursued another method, by threatening to send forces. It's the nature of diplomacy, no one pulls out the big guns at the very beginning, especially when it's doubtful the Soviets ever had a real intention of intervening. Seriously Sherif, do you think the Soviets loved peace more that the Americans? Come on, the Israelis were on the advance and the Arabs were on the retreat, there's really nothing more to it than that. Poliocretes (talk) 09:29, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

Now you're assigning a "peace-loving score" to the Soviets and the Americans? This argument is pointless here, though as far as I'm concerned here they were both trigger-happy (Vietnam, Afghanistan...).

The fact is, the Soviets were pressing for a ceasefire from the very start, maybe October 8. Sadat and Assad thought otherwise. So you can see, the Soviets were arguing for a ceasefire almost from day one (though there were no Israeli advances then), right up to the end of the war, for whatever intentions. The Americans were eager to delay a ceasefire until the Israelis were able to change military situation to their favor. When the ceasefire was implemented, then violated, the Soviets stated to the Americans that if the ceasefire cannot be enforced, they would intervene on Egypt's part. Of course the threat was hollow; the Soviets would never intervene, but they would force the Americans to pressure the Israelis to halt their violations.

If no ceasefire had been implemented in the first place, the Soviets still would not have intervened. They admitted they would not go to war with the US over Egypt and Syria. --Sherif9282 (talk) 10:47, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

"Peace loving score"? Hardly! The exact opposite in fact. As you described the Americans as "buying" the Israelis time, so were the Soviets attempting to deprive them of this time. I was objecting to your characterization of the Soviets as disinterested parties, something you were not affording the Americans - obviously because it's not true, my point being that neither were the Soviets.

Furthremore, Soviets attempts to reach a ceasefire from day one make perfect sense from their point of view. As an ally of Egypt and Syria it was the Soviet goal to maximize Arab gains and minimize Israeli gains. Arab gains were at their peak at the very start of the war - a succesful crossing of the Canal and the Golan overrun. A ceasefire at this point would have been great for the Arabs, especially when the Soviets could not have known the tide would not be turning in Israel's favour (as many observers were speculating could happen). In light of later developements, Sadat and Assad were wrong not to accept a ceasire at that point (though Israel would have undoubtedly rejected one). Indeed, after October 8 Syrian fortunes on the Golan were reversed and Egyptian advances in the Sinai were relatively meaningless compared to the inititial crossing and the blow given to Israeli aerial power. My point remains - A ceasefire was not a Soviet end unto itself. It's purpose was to end the war with the Arabs at their best possible positions, just as the Americans were buying the Israelis time to improve their own positions. Poliocretes (talk) 17:37, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

I agree to a point, but it very much depended on which way the war was going, that day or week, according to Quandt. For the immediate reaction, see p120, here. CasualObserver'48 (talk) 03:55, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

I didn't say that the Soviets were neutral observers, and if I implied that, it was entirely unintended. This argument is subjective. However you cannot presume what you presume unless you have the equivalent of credible Soviet source stating that, something like Victor Israelyan for instance. What is obvious from events, from Brezhnev's letter and from other statements, is that Israeli violations of the ceasefire were the immediate result of Soviet threats, and that there was never any real intention of actually intervening. Soviet threats were so hollow they were amazed by the American response of switching to DEFCON III. Apparently the Soviets ceased their threatening moves before the second ceasefire was announced on October 24.

As a side note, one of Sadat's objectives in going to war was to prolong the war as long and inflict as many casualties as possible. Israel, relying mainly on a reserve force that while mobilized is harmful to the economy, cannot stand increased casualties or a long war because it destabilizes its economy. Prolonging the war achieved that to Sadat, in terms of the casualties suffered at the Chinese Farm, Sharon's drive towards Ismailia, Adan's drive to Suez and his attempt to capture that city. That is why he refused a ceasefire. It is a mistake to assess achievements merely in the seizure of territory.--Sherif9282 (talk) 00:28, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Don't you mean Soviet threats were the immediate result of Israeli violations of the ceasefire?

Anyway, and this is to answer both Sherif and CasualObserver48, I am not disputing the fact that Israeli violations were followed by Soviet threats, and I'm well aware that the Soviets painted these as nothing more than concern over Israeli violations. What else would they be saying, "our clients are losing"? I simply object to a portrayal that divorces these threats from the overall Soviet policy at the time. If the Soviets' sole concern was for a ceasefire, beginning at the very start of the war, then why did they begin supplying the Arabs with arms on October 9? Let's not loose sight of the bigger picture: "The Soviets adapted their behavior to the unfolding events on the battlefield, alternately emphasizing diplomatic efforts to end the fighting on terms favorable for their clients and sending arms to prevent a military debacle" and "Once it became clear that the war would be prolonged and that the Israelis were capable of mounting an effective counteroffensive, the Soviets adopted a policy designed to prevent an Arab military debacle" (source pages iii and vi). Specifically regarding the events sorrounding the ceasefire see page vii: "When the ceasefire of October 22 failed to take hold, the Soviets showed great concern that the Israelis might move to destroy the nearly encircled third army" and "...it is clear the Soviets were worried about the consequences for their regional position of the defeat of Egypt's Third Army" (page 33).

It light of all of these, I do believe that Sherif's statement of "fact" that "Soviet threats of intervention were not born out of Israeli advances but Israeli violations of the first ceasefire" is disingenuous. Whether they actually intended to intervene is immaterial, the question is why they made those threats to begin with. Poliocretes (talk) 22:00, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Here's what I suggest in place of the current lead: "When a ceasefire was imposed, than violated by Israeli forces, a crisis erupted between the Soviet Union and the United States when the former warned it would take action if the Israelis did not stop their violations. The Soviets wished to avert possible destruction of two encircled Egyptian divisions by the Israelis and threatened to intervene."

This points out that Soviet threats followed Israeli violations (thanks for correcting my mistake). It also shows that the Soviets were aiming to stop the deterioration of Egypt's military situation. Lastly it mentions the superpower crisis, which despite its significance found no spot in current or previous versions of the lead. I did not mention Syria because, since October 14, no major change occurred on the Northern Front. The Syrians had been partially replenished and had Arab reinforcements by their side. In fact, they were to launch a counteroffensive on October 23, which means their military situation was more stable, and not, as the current lead suggests, on the "verge of collapse" (aside that that claim, with respect to Syria, is unsourced). The "verge of collapse" claim is also debatable concerning the Egyptian military, since Second Army was not threatened with encirclement, and others state that Third Army was not as vulnerable as to fall under a new attack or surrender.--Sherif9282 (talk) 23:08, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

I think Sherif's latest proposal above is kind of reasonable. But I am not at all sure it belongs in the lead.BorisG (talk) 13:46, 12 February 2010 (UTC)

I oppose Sherif’s proposal.

• Patrick Seale notes that the Third Army “was on the brink of collapse.”

• P.R. Kumaraswamy notes that but for American pressure, the Israelis would have “annihilated the stranded and encircled Egyptian Third Army.”

• Shazly states that the Third Army’s encirclement was a “catastrophe.”

• Premier Aleksei Kosygin saw the situation in Cairo at the end of the war as a 'catastrophe.' He declared: 'We must have a cease-fire because otherwise, everything will collapse."

• Edward Luttwak classifies the Arab defeat in the 73 war as “catastrophic” on a scale greater than the Six Day War.

• Dominic Johnson notes that “by this stage, thousands of Egyptian troops were surrendering and had the fighting lasted a few more days, the Third Army would have been battered into submission.”

• Kenneth Pollack notes that at the later stages the Third Army as well as other elements on the west bank of the Canal began “falling apart.”

Now I’m sure that Sherif will counter with Hammad (who thinks that the war ended on the euphoric note of the first two days) as well as other selected cherry-picked sources, but these represent a fringe view. In any event, as BorisG states, it not something that belongs in the Lead.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:33, 12 February 2010 (UTC)

I dont have a crystal ball, so will just take a crack at improving Sherif’s suggested prose for the short lede snippet, with the references hinted at in 'Nuclear alert', and other comments that followed it.

When the first UN ceasefire line was declared, and Israeli forces advanced beyond them, Egypt requested additional support. A crisis erupted between the Soviet Union and the United States as a result; the former warned it would take unilateral action if the two could not act jointly to stop Israeli violations and attendant Egyptian losses. While both wished to avert the impending destruction of the Egyptian Third Army, the US raised its defence condition, the request was withdrawn, a super-power confrontation was avoided, and increased US diplomatic pressure was exerted on Israel.

You might note that it follows the refs much closer, doesn’t appear to push the largely one-sided refs that abound, and generally follows Quandt. The (second) near-nuclear event of the war is definitely WP:N and rightly should be in the lead. Regards, CasualObserver'48 (talk) 07:04, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

I completely agree, this issue perfectly belongs to the lead. CasualObserver'48, I think your attempt addressed issues I had left out, for which I commend you, but I have some comments I will pertain to later.

To reply to Jiujitsuguy. I suppose you read Hammad's book, yes? No? Then you're just throwing around baseless claims and accusations. Save your breath.

To present my "cherry-picked fringe" sources, I'll start with Dupuy. He writes that Third Army was not as vulnerable as believed, and that it was uncertain a new offensive would defeat it. Then there is Gawrych, who states Third Army surprised everyone, including Egyptian commanders, by maintaining its combat integrity on the east bank. Indeed, an Israeli battalion attacked the Lituf fortification on October 22 but failed and lost nine tanks. Who repelled them? Third Army troops. The Botzer fortification, known as Kibrit East to the Egyptians, also repelled numerous attacks and, despite being under siege from the start of the ceasefire until the disengagement agreement was signed. That is attributed to both Gawrych and Hammad. The latter also supports this view.

Kenneth Pollack is inconsequential here since, by Third Army, I believe we are specifically referring to the tens of thousands of men in the bridgeheads on the east bank, whose surrender really made a difference. At any rate, this USMC paper counters this claim, asserting that Adan's bypassing of numerous Egyptian strongpoints had left considerable Egyptian forces in his wake who held there positions and did not consider themselves defeated.

Edward Luttwak was writing of another war, he cannot be used here. At any rate, his claim has nothing to do with the Third Army. If anyone is fringe here, it's Edward Luttwak.

Additionally, I object to the use of Saad El Shazly in this case. Firstly, he is a primary source, and since we have an abundance of secondary sources, we should not use Shazly. Do note that in this case, Shazly might make exaggerations to "prove a point", that he did nothing wrong and that Sadat, Ismail and others are to blame for all failures. An editor had shown me that the Journal of Military History viewed Shazly's book as "a personally writen hagiography in which General Shazly is at pain to demonstrate he did nothing wrong..." I previously thought otherwise, but I believe this assessment is correct to a degree. Whether I agree with Shazly or not is not the argument here; he has made incorrect claims and exaggerations to further his standpoint. One such example is the 130th amphibious brigade that crossed the Great Bitter Lake on October 6. Shazly claims that brigade made a daring raid deep into the Sinai attacking the mountain passes and the Bir Gifgafa Airfield, before returning safely. He is obviously attempting to glorify the crossing, his "achievement". No such fantasy story exists anywhere. In fact, one battalion of the brigade moved east, only to be destroyed by Israeli tanks, while the other seized the Botzer fortification (per Hammad). Despite all this, Jiujitsuguy will soon plead that I am guilty for first-degree cherry picking and for ascribing to extremist wild-eyed fantasies. Go ahead.

As to the lead. I have my reservations. First, it does not imply that the ceasefire was accepted by Israel; the UN issuing a resolution for a ceasefire that is ignored is not the same as that ceasefire being accepted then violated. Second, it is known that Sadat kept diplomatic back-channels open to the Americans throughout the war. When the Israelis continued their advance, he sent requests to both the US and the Soviets to send peacekeeping forces. Obviously, neither superpower would answer that pleading so as to avoid a nuclear confrontation. However the Soviets threatened that they would intervene. When the Americans stepped up their readiness, the Soviets backed down. Sadat then withdrew his request and instead asked for a UN peacekeeping force (Gawrych, page 231), anything to bring the war to an end, see Poliocretes's posts). In this regard I oppose that Egypt requested additional support, since this implies it wanted to continue the war or to reverse Israeli gains militarily. This untrue since Sadat was trying to end the war and limit Israeli gains. Eventually the war ended when UN peacekeepers arrived, which we cannot regard as "support" to Egypt. Do note that Sadat withdrew his request after the Soviets backed down (not after, as in your draft), and presented another request to the UN, all the while aiming to achieve the same end. Finally, as is evident, the "impending destruction of Third Army" is not at all certain.--Sherif9282 (talk) 09:54, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

I propose the following for the lead:

On October 22, the first UN ceasefire was imposed, then violated the following morning by advancing Israeli forces. Egypt requested the Soviet Union and the United States intervene to enforce the truce. Wishing to avert possible destruction of encircled Egyptian forces, threatened to take unilateral action if the two could not act jointly to stop Israeli violations. In response, the US raised its defense condition. To avoid a superpower confrontation, the Soviets, withdrew their threats. However, the United States pressured Israel to abide by the ceasefire. As an extra, we could add This, coupled with the arrival of United Nations peacekeeping forces on October 28, brought the war to an end.

It might need improvement though, suggestions? --Sherif9282 (talk) 10:29, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

For one thing, it does not belong in the lead. The lead should be succinct, a quick summary. As it is, your version would eclipse everything else that is already in there. It should read "The war ended on October 24, prompted in part by superpower tensions." Details should be in the body. Of everything that the 1973 war is about, the the last three days don't deserve such prominence. The fact that there was an agreement on October 22 but that it only came into effect on October 24 is simply not important enough for the lead. Your version, for instance, does not mention that the Syrians had not formally accept the ceasefire agreement of October 22, another detail deserving mention. It does, however, mention Israeli volations not once ("violated the following morning by..."), nor twice ("Israeli violations") but three times ("pressured Israel to abide"). Yes, we get the point. put it in the body. Poliocretes (talk) 15:28, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

The lead is already way too long. I strongly object to any changes that will make it even longer. I would suggest we concentrate on any possibilities of making it shorter. The analyses above are all interesting, and belong (in shortened form) in the body of the article. BorisG (talk) 15:57, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

Agreed. I admit I got carried away; the lead should be as summarized as possible. I suggest we devote a new section to that end. --Sherif9282 (talk) 21:33, 13 February 2010 (UTC)

Saad Mamoun

General Saad Mamoun suffered a heart attack on October 14. However that has nothing to do with the apparent "fallout" in Egypt. Mamoun had a heart attack due to medical reasons, and this had nothing to do with the October 14 attack, as opposed to what Shazly claimed in his book. Hammad asserts this from the medical reports issued on Mamoun after his heart attack. In addition, he presents a letter in his book sent to him by Mamoun personally, in which he too asserts his heart attack was unrelated to the October 14 attack. To dispel all doubt, Mamoun, following his recovery, was appointed commander of all Egyptian forces opposing the Israelis on the west bank.--Sherif9282 (talk) 07:56, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

Sherif, so now you're cherry picking what you like and what you don't like about Shazly's book. Where it suits your POV you cite him and where it doesn't you crticize and try to refute him. Moreover, there are other sources that classify his Mamoun's illness as a nervous breakdown directly linked the 14 Oct battle and I have cited them.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 15:19, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

Sherif, welcome back! I think your analysis of various statements by reliable sources should not in the slightest bit be reflected in the article text, because it is WP:OR. But as you started it, let me point a major flaw in your analyses. Somehow you assume, quite inexplicably, that if President Sadat said something to Nixon, it must be his true thoughts and intentions. And of course always truthful Nixon accurately relayed them to the public. And if General Mamoun said something about his illness in his book, that must be true as well. You think that politicians and generals always speak the truth? You must be kidding! Also, a new appointment of Mamoun does not contradict his earlier breakdown. Again, I don't think my corrections to your analysis should be reflected in the article; that would be WP:OR. Instead, all main points of view given in RS must be given. BorisG (talk) 16:04, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

Thanks BorisG! Do note that your comment on the credibility of generals and politicians applies to Shazly as it applies to Mamoun. Besides Hammad relies on medical reports, and I rely on Hammad. Mamoun similarly pointed to these reports in his letter.

As to JG, I'm not cherrypicking. Do note that Shazly is a primary source, and per WP secondary sources are preferred to primary ones. I assume the other sources you mention also rely on Shazly. Again I am not picking sources to my liking, but I'm relying on a reliable source. Shazly's book has a number of errors which I can point out to.

At any rate, how is a general experiencing a heart attack considered part of the "fallout" in Egypt?--Sherif9282 (talk) 10:16, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

"Do note that your comment on the credibility of generals and politicians applies to Shazly as it applies to Mamoun." No problem, I think we can mention both, without POV as to who is right.BorisG (talk) 14:16, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

It's not Mamoun I'm citing here. I should note that reference 82, which says Mamoun suffered a heart attack on October 13 (incorrect date), does not say why. Rabinovich must have been relying on Shazly. Regardless, I ask again, how is this even considered a "falling out"? --Sherif9282 (talk) 14:39, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

I am not sure Fallout is necessarily the right term, but I think it is important to discuss the domestic conseqeuncies in every country involved. Israelis have come dangerously close to Cairo, and this must have had domestic consequencies. You, Sherif, are actually based placed to describe these. One consequence I know of is Sadat's decision to distance even further from the Soviets, and to re-orient Egypt towards the US. But you should know much more...BorisG (talk) 16:30, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

You opened a whole new area of conversation right now. To reply very briefly here, a heart attack suffered on October 14th has nothing to do with the Israeli crossing of the canal. "Israel came dangerously close..." that can be said concerning Damascus, but certainly not of Cairo when it's still over 100 kilometers. Third, Sadat has been wanting to distance himself from the Soviets long before the war. He knew quite well the key to solving the MidEast problem lay with the Americans, but he remained with the Soviets because he needed military equipment for war in case diplomacy failed. Even Shazly acknowledged this. Sadat took steps to re-align the country towards the US before the war, and opened diplomatic back-channels to the Americans, but when they (the Americans) failed to utilize this to their benefit, Sadat lost hope on diplomacy and geared up for war. The meetings between Kissinger and Hafez Ismail (Sadat's National Security Advisor) in February 1973 (I believe) were part of this diplomatic effort on Sadat's part. However all this belongs in the section on pre- and post-war attitudes.--Sherif9282 (talk) 16:44, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

I agree that "pre- and post-war attitudes" is probably better way of describing what happenned in both Israel and Egypt. But to take you on your points, here is an extract from a book "The KGB and the battle for the Third World", based largely on documents from KGB archives. "After the humiliation of the six-day defeat in 1967, the early successes of the Yom Kippur War restored Arab pride and self-confidence. Militarily, however, though hre war began well for Egypt and Syria, it ended badly with Israeli forces sixty miles from Cairo and twenty from Damascus". Sadat drew the conclusion that, because of its unfluence on Israel, only the US could mediate a peace settlement..."BorisG (talk) 17:01, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

Now you're discussing the end state of the war!

As I said before, Sadat knew that only the US could exert pressure on Israel, making a peace agreement viable. He knew that before the war began, and that is based on facts, events and sources. Exactly what are we arguing here?

In this section, as far as I'm concerned, I want to know why Mamoun's heart attack is mentioned in its current context in the article. It certainly isn't part of some fallout, and has nothing to do with diplomatic consequences of the war. Aside that I'm also challenging the reason behind his heart attack. I'd rather keep the other discussions about the consequences of the war in the other section, where they should be.--Sherif9282 (talk) 17:24, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

Sherif, you keep on repeating that Mamoun suffered a "heart attack." Actually, there are at least two sources that say that he suffered a "breakdown" and attribute it directly to the disastrous turn of events for Egypt. And yes, the mental and physical incapacitiation of one of Egypt's highest ranking generals, caused by bad fortune on the battlefield is very notable and represents not merely fallout, but significant fallout from war.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:39, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

I did not write it and I'd rather wait for someone who did.BorisG (talk) 17:37, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

Obviously JG, you're ignoring everything I write. Medical reports state that Mamoun suffered a heart attack. However I suppose some author writing in the states or in Jerusalem without even bothering to consider what Arab sources have to say knows better when it states Mamoun had a nervous breakdown. Secondly, these medical reports state that the heart attack was attributed to reasons unrelated to the attack. Finally, Mamoun suffered his heart attack barely two hours after the attack began. In an attack which began at first light and ended at noon or afternoon, the Egyptians were not yet aware so early in the attack the extent of the losses they had suffered, which at that stage was still relatively low.--Sherif9282 (talk) 19:26, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

Hello Sherif. You made the following statement: "I suppose some author writing in the states or in Jerusalem without even bothering to consider what Arab sources have to say knows better when it states Mamoun had a nervous breakdown." Was General Shazly the person you had in mind when you made this statement? It is my understanding that General Shazly was the Egyptian Army Chief of Staff. But I could be wrong. Maybe he was a double agent working for the Israelis.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 21:46, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

Well, I was actually referring to Rabinovich, to whom the claim of "nervous breakdown" is attributed in the article. Sarcasm is not the way to go about this. Regardless, Shazly is mistaken for two reasons: Mamoun did not suffer a breakdown but a heart attack, as is stated in his medical reports (I'm sure Sadat intervened to have these reports twisted to indicate a heart attack, thereby undermining Shazly's credibility), second, Mamoun had a heart attack at 8:30 AM. As I said, the attack had barely been two hours since it started. The degree of casualties would not yet be known, and at any rate, they would not be relatively high yet. Within 48 hours, six different physicians had inspected Mamoun; all their reports did not attribute the heart attack to the failure of the attack (do note that at 8:30 it unknown whether the attack had even failed). Be realistic here people, Sadat's regime, being the monstrous dictatorship that JG constantly portrays to us, would this regime spare Mamoun if his heart attack had been related to the failure of the attack? I'd imagine court martial, or at the least forced retirement and obscurity, as well as being a scapegoat. Instead, Mamoun was assigned to one of the most crucial positions after the war: he was in command of the forces that would stem any Israeli advance towards Cairo! The "regime's" survival depended on him in case of a renewal of hostilities. And, if implemented, he would oversee the operation to breakthrough to the encircled infantry divisions of the Third Army. JG, You're always eager to point out that if Egypt wasn't such an autocratic, repressive regime, there'd have been an uprising in the whole nation over the massive failures of the political and military leadership. Yet this general who represents "significant fallout from war" is being rewarded. Do explain this paradox.

The notion that Mamoun suffered a heart attack due to the failure of the attack defies fact and reason. --Sherif9282 (talk) 00:09, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

The above analysis of fact and reason is WP:OR. I can write as much or even more to argue my POV but I won't because it is waste of time and really outside of Wikipedia policies. What we have to do is cite all significant POVs expressed in reliable sources. Even if some of them seem implausible to you or me.BorisG (talk) 12:09, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

It's not my analysis, which doesn't make this OR. This is more like presenting previously unknown information.

I need to know what Rabinovich says on this matter. Does he specifically relate the heart attack/breakdown to the failure of the attack? --Sherif9282 (talk) 13:27, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Actually Sherif, According to Rabinovich the 14 Oct attack began at 3:00 a.m. with a failed Egyptian commando assault on Lateral Road. By 7:00 a.m. Brigade Commander Col. Amnon Reshef was reporting "I broke their (Egyptian) attack. Improving positions to the west" {Rabinovich p. 354). So Sherif, even if we are to believe your claim that Mamoun had his nervous breakdown at 8:30a.m. (and you haven't even proven that) this event (Mamoun's breakdown) occurred well after the battle was underway and well after it was apparent that the battle was going badly for the Egyptians. That throws your entire theory off kilter. And in any event Sherif, your theories are WP:OR.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 05:53, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Thanks for failing to note that these are not "theories" and that they are not mine anyways. Hammad states the attack got underway at 6:30 AM in both armies. Rabinovich is obviously referring to the commando assault. The 21st Division only began encountering heavy resistance at 8:00 AM. Gawrych and this USMC paper also put the start of the attack at 6:30 AM. I think Dupuy says the same too.--Sherif9282 (talk) 09:18, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Sherif, you are suggesting that an army commander's 'heart attack' during a crucial battle of the war was unrelated to the stress from the battle, right? I suggest you put this theory in the article (with appropriate attribution) and let readers judge.BorisG (talk) 14:22, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Boris, I think it works the other way round for Wikipedia, it's not "can you prove this didn't happen", but can you provide reliable sources to show that it did happen. Anyway I'm just a Wiki editor with this article on my watch list, I'm not an involved medical doctor, if you are the same then your causal theory -- that some event created some medical emergency -- is only your personal opinion, no? Maybe some neutral and uninvolved editors should have a look at this discussion. RomaC (talk) 14:50, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

The article's statement about Mamoun's breakdown is sourced. I am not sure what else you are asking for.BorisG (talk) 15:32, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

RomaC. To say you are an uninvolved editor is just a tad disingenuous. You and Sherif have been in contact with each other for quite some time in connection with this article. You were even scheming with him to file an A/E on me because of my edits to this article. Please don’t take us for fools.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:01, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

I have found a third source that directly links Mamoun’s breakdown to the bad Egyptian fortunes on the battlefield. In his book, The Eve of Destruction: The Untold Story of the Yom Kippur War, Howard Blum writes the following in connection with Mamoun’s nervous breakdown: “He (Shazly) received further proof on how precipitously things had deteriorated when he asked to speak to Mamoun, and learned the general had not been napping. He had suffered a breakdown. The details of each of the failed assaults had rained down upon him until he collapsed under the unbearable weight. Now he lay in bed, a broken man, and commander of a broken army.” (Blum, p. 298) You now have three sources that posit this position; Shazly, Rabinovich and Blum.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:09, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

A broken man, commanding a broken army? Sounds more like journalism and story-telling than history. During the attack the 21st Division lost half its tanks. You still had the 18th, 2nd and 16th Divisions across the canal with their attached armor brigades, and the 23rd Mechanized Division on the west bank. A broken army?

Here's a review from Publishers Weekly: "Like Blum's The Brigade, this work is more reportage than history... Blum describes Shazly making his vision a reality against the opposition of virtually everyone else in Egypt... [His] approach seems an oversimplification, however... Pollack demonstrates that Egypt's military reform was an institutional process and not a one-man show."

Blum keeps narrating the love story of Nati and Yossi for some reason. I'm sure they had an important effect on tactical events and post-war diplomacy. This is simply not a source to rely on. --Sherif9282 (talk) 17:20, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

The Publishing house, HarperCollins Publishing, speaks for itself.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:53, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

What's that supposed to mean?--Sherif9282 (talk) 18:32, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

BTW Jiujitsuguy, RomaC said he is not an involved medical doctor. In fact, he admits he has the article on his watch list, which automatically means he is involved. You're still not paying enough attention to what people write down. --Sherif9282 (talk) 17:33, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

There is a place for a new section in the article to deal with the diplomatic "front".

Many here argue about the political consequences of the war. A new section that will present what happened behind the screen during and after the period of hostilities will help the readers to understand the long term impact of this conflict. Megaidler (talk) 14:14, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

The TOW missiles

In "Aid to Israel" It is mentioned that the TOWs were in Israeli hands since 11/10, although the first American cargo air plane landed in Lydda on 14/10. Can anybody source this statement?

I know there is a myth that the TOWs were used extensively during the 14/10 assault, but some sources dispute this. Megaidler (talk) 16:30, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

I've also heard of its use during the 14 Oct battle along with SS-11's but I am unfamiliar with any source that specifically states that TOWs were used during the 14 Oct battle. I have a vague recollection of Shazly mentioning it in his book but I'll have to look it up. The Insight Team of the London Sunday Times also mentions TOWs but I can't recall in what context. I'll look that up too. Although the first giant C-5s began arriving on 14 Oct, It is my understanding that Israeli cargo planes were already transporting equipment (though not on the size and scale of the U.S airlift) so it is possible that the Israelis had them in their possession by 14 Oct but I can't be certain.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:56, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

The main supplies started arriving on October 14, the "official" date for the start of Nickel Grass I believe. However some equipment arrived before, as early as October 11. This included the TOW's. See Gawrych, Jordan, as well as Operation Valiant: Turning of the Tide in the Sinai 1973 Arab-Israeli War, a paper published in the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in 1984. Hammad goes with this as well, so does Hanoch Bartov in a biography of David Elazar during the Yom Kippur War, Dado. Trevor Dupuy and Edgar O'Ballance support this too, though I'm not at all sure, I'll have to check.--Sherif9282 (talk) 12:47, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

In Lessons of Modern Warfare volume 1 by Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R.Wagner page 65 it is mentioned that throughout the war, the Israelis fired 20 TOW missiles, and 13 of them hit 9 Arab tanks. This number is insignificant, considering that the Arabs lost over 2,000 tanks. Megaidler (talk) 23:24, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

Well, that was over a few days and 20 fired, so the significance would depend on how many more they might have had, or eventually been supplied with. Hohum 00:20, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

That's impossible. TOW's wouldn't have been given any recognition if they were used on such small scale. This article states that TOW's and Mavericks accounted for the majority of Israeli tank kills (which the article puts at 1,900 Arab tanks destroyed). Hammad states they had a significant effect on the battle between Adan's Division and the Egyptian 25th Brigade on October 17. They certainly destroyed far more than 9 tanks. --Sherif9282 (talk) 00:40, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Previously I used to take part in a forum dealing with that war until I found that the real stuff is on wiki. There I've found that TOW info.

Its on www.militaryphotossearch.net Yum Kippur War (see last page) Hammed may be a decent person that wouldn't lie, but in the same time he may be naive and believes almost anything he is told. I am sure that many Egyptian reported that TOWs struck their tanks because they were unwilling to admit that their tanks were hit by someone who had no better gun range, or, they didn't see the ambushing Israeli tanks so they though they were hit by some long range weapon. The article about Nickel Grass claims that 1,900 Arab, not Israeli tanks were destroyed. Please read it slowly. The Defense Intelligence Agency may asses that the majority of Arab tanks were destroyed by guided missiles, but they know nothing on what was really going on the battlefields and it's impossible to know what killed a tank by satellite imagery. Megaidler (talk) 02:53, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Absolutely. I think you're right, Hammad must have been naive, and those intelligence geeks were probably throwing estimates around just for fun.

BTW, apologies, I meant to say 1,900 Arab tanks were destroyed; mistake rectified. --Sherif9282 (talk) 06:22, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

On page 160 of the Yum Kippur War forum Thread in militaryphotos, someone actually scanned and uploaded pages 64, 65 and 66 from Lessons of Modern Warfare volume 1. You may watch this on

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?68771-Yum-Kippur-War/page160.

The DIA researchers had no way back in the 70's of concluding what was the reason for the destruction of Arab tanks in the war. Even if they had access to protocols of the Egyptian Army, I am not sure that in the first years that followed the war, the Egyptian military leadership itself was aware of the causes for so many tank losses, because of the reasons I previously gave you. Megaidler (talk) 14:27, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Yes... so a historian researching the topic for five years was naive, tossing in everything he was told. The DIA didn't know what they were doing but were simply estimating for the fun of it. Egypt's military leadership, where somehow military leaders without being able to know what destroyed a tank. Anymore hypothesis here? Because I believe we're on the threshold of a breakthrough historical discovery here. --Sherif9282 (talk) 16:51, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Sherif once again you spiral into wild eyed fantasy. It is universally acknowledged that superior Israeli tank gunnery accounted for most of the tank kills during the war. I'm sure if you spend your days and nights trolling the internet, you'll find one or two sources that say that American aircraft were providing fighter bomber coverage for Israel. Sherif you should have been a radio announcer for radio Cairo during the Six Day War. You would have made them proud. Stick to reliable sources and stop wasting time with your analyses.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 18:15, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Please follow WP:CIVIL. Venting doesn't help improve the article. Hohum 18:23, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Agreed, my apologies to Sherif.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 18:47, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

Gawrych, on page 56, mentions that on October the 11th the Israelis had established a course for rapidly training TOW instructors. He is relying on Hanoch Bartov's Book – Dado, a biography of David Elazar. In that book, page 529 it is mentioned that on 11/10/73 a general staff meeting was taking place. At the end of the meeting, Maj. Gen. Herzl Shapir, the chief of the man-power department, told Elazar that the training of instructors, that would train other troops on operating the TOW and LAW weapons, had already begun. He didn't state whether this took place in the Middle East or in America. Megaidler (talk) 12:35, 14 March 2010 (UTC)

Bartov's book is made of two volumes. The second one describes Elazar's duty as chief of the general staff during the war, but there is an English version of this book, made of a single volume:

Bartov, Hanoch (1981). Dado: 48 years and 20 days (in Hebrew). Ma'ariv book guild. p. 423. ISBN 265-239-000-3. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: checksum (help) Translation from Hebrew to English was done by Ina Friedman.

According to what is written there, on 11/10/1973 Elazar was told that the instructor course has begun alredy. It is possible that the course had begun even before 11/10 but Gawrych concluded that this was the day the course has begun and some of the editors here in wiki concluded that this was the day the TOWs arrived the Middle-East. Megaidler (talk) 15:44, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

Emanuel A. Winston describes here how the TOWs reached Israel and who was the man responsible for this - Alexander Haig.

He is relying on this book.

• Loftus, John; Aarons, Mark (1997). The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed The Jewish People. St. Martin's Griffin. p. 658. ISBN 978-0-312-156-480.

Winston claims that the TOWs were used extensively on 14/10 but I don't know whether he is relying on the book or making his own conclusion. In case he is relying on the book, I don't know how Loftus and Aarons can know that the TOWs were the cause for so many tank destructions. Maybe this is only the authors' conclusion. They knew that highly sophisticated missiles reached Israeli hands. They knew that on 14/10 many Egyptian tanks were lost. They have made their own assessment. Megaidler (talk) 13:06, 28 March 2010 (UTC)

Sorry Megaidler, but unless you've met them personally and were told that they made their own assessment, you can't assume that. It seems that you're making a habit of questioning scholars that come to conclusions which differ from your own POV. Unless you've spent years doing proper research and have written your own book regarding the war, you're in no position to question these scholars, unless of course they are widely regarded as being unreliable. Regards, ElUmmah (talk) 21:37, 29 March 2010 (UTC)

Another US Army source: [1] Megaidler (talk) 08:20, 29 March 2010 (UTC)

However, others sources give different information about the usage of the TOW.

• Cordesman, Anthony H; Wagner, Abraham (1990). "The 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict". The Lessons Of Modern War. Vol. Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973–1989. Mansell. p. 300. ISBN 978-072-012-0455. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Cordesman, Anthony H; Wagner, Abraham (13 June 1991) [1990]. "The 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict". The Lessons Of Modern War. Vol. Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973–1989. Westview Press. p. 394. ISBN 978-081-331-3290. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help)

There is some info on the usage of AT missiles by both sides on pages 64, 65 and 66, but I don't know in which edition of that book. It is claimed that the Israelis fired 20 TOWs and 13 of them hit 9 tanks. Some one scanned these pages and they are available here in this forum, where some one of this article's editors who calls himself Kobr4 (probably Sherif) tries to argue now. Megaidler (talk) 16:26, 31 March 2010 (UTC)

Selecting Sources

It appears that Sherif has a lot of confidence in Gamal Hammad's book because of the decency of the person. However, even an honest man can be tricked and manipulated due to lack of reliable information. If we want to assess how much reliable is Hammad's book, we must compare his details, to those that were found reliable above any doubt. For example Israel claims it lost 102 jets in the war. That figure was confirmed in a conversation between American and Israeli official back in 22/10/1973. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-56.pdf

That contradicts the Soviet claim of 280 and Badri's claim of 200. How many Israeli jets were lost according to Hammad? Another figure is the number of POWs. Israel claims to capture over 8,000 as it is mentioned here: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2004/1/Background%20on%20Israeli%20POWs%20and%20MIAs

A Time report from 03/12/1973 confirms that: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908222-1,00.html

How many Egyptians were captured according to Hammad?

Regardless to Hammad, after we found how much reliable is Hassan El Badri, any information that comes from him should not being inserted to the article for the common good. It seems that El Badri is no better than Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf. No one who edits the 2003 Iraq invasion article dares to describe al-Sahhaf statements as reality. The same should be with Hassan El Badri. Never the less, I wouldn't believe anything Sharon has ever said. Megaidler (talk) 03:01, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

I am not sure such an analysis of reliability of sources is within Wikipedia rules. I think Wikipedia defined what sources are considered relaible, and we have to stick to that approach.BorisG (talk) 04:59, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Megaidler does raise an excellent point. According to Herzog, Pollack, Rabinovich and others, Arab accounts of the war spiraled off into wild eyed fantasy, creating scenarios that were clearly divorced from reality. According to the Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, Egyptian communications all along the chain of command were "peverted by lies" (Pollack citing the London Sunday Times , P 129). We should therefore take these sources with a grain of salt.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 06:10, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Just to underscore the above point, even Shazly in his book "Crossing the Suez" acknowledges that Arab accounts of the war, particularly after Oct 14, veered off into fantasy and a world of make-believe--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 06:18, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

In his review of Rabinovich's book, Michael B. Oren, author of Six Days of War, said the following:

"...the book's strength is also its major shortcoming. Rabinovich is overwhelmingly concerned with the Yom Kippur War and not with the October or Ramadan War, as all Arabs call it. The impact of domestic and inter-Arab politics on the war, the dynamics of Arab decision-making, the view from the Arab lines -- all are scantily explained. Portraits of Arab participants are mostly two-dimensional and meant to serve as targets for Israelis. The reason Rabinovich gives for this shallowness -- "The Arab side of the war is poorly documented" -- is simply untrue. Myriad books and articles on the Arab side, and even some documents, are available. Arab veterans, no less than Israelis, are willing to share their stories. Accessing these sources requires knowledge of Arabic and the ability to travel freely through the Arab world -- clearly obstacles for Rabinovich. Of the 125 interviews he conducted for the book, very few are with Arabs."

Chaim Herzog, writing a book that first and foremost aims to tell the war from the IDF point of view, and in view of the positions he held, was bound to be biased. Pollack was referring specifically to military communiques issued during the war.--Sherif9282 (talk) 09:27, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Yes. Dupuy, and I believe others, have called some of Herzog's claims unreliable. Really, one should not expect much more neutrality from a future president of Israel, Herzog, than a current president of Egypt, Sadat. Pollack's reputation has (imho deservedly) nosedived as the Iraq war dragged on, his Threatening Storm coming in for much criticism. Repeated in many books is this joke among 1973 Israelis, who learnt about major events from Arab, not Israeli broadcasts: The Arabs and Israelis have come much closer and learnt from each other after 1967: our army taught the Arabs how to fight, and their radio announcers taught ours how to lie.John Z (talk) 10:19, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Thanks for pointing that out John Z. On a side note, Badri did not claim Israel lost 200 aircraft, he attributed that figure to Western estimates, though he did not specify which. Hammad does not state casualties, neither KIA, WIA, tanks, aircraft... He and Shazly were corresponding while Hammad was completing his book, and Hammad included these letters in his book, in appendixes. In them Shazly also refused to give away the total tank losses of the war so as not to be accused of revealing military secrets. I suppose the same applies to Hammad. However, Shazly points out that Egyptian tank losses were far less than what the Israelis claim. Hammad also makes reference to thousands of Egyptians falling prisoner during Adan's drive south, non-combat personnel part of the administrative and supply bases that formed the rear units of Egyptian forces that had crossed the canal. Among these prisoners were also a significant number of civilians per Hammad. --Sherif9282 (talk) 11:41, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

We all should see the differences between bias and lies. Herzog, Rabinovich, Sadat, Shazly, and Hammad are all biased but being biased by itself, has nothing with reliability. However, Sadat and Badri proved to be more than just biased. These two men wrote things, that it came clear later that were pure fictions. Sadat may claim that he was going to annihilate the Israeli forces on the west bank of the canal unless Kissinger was threatening to send troops, and Badri may claim that the Egyptian succeeded to sink four Israeli vessels on 08/10, but al-Sahhaf may also tell that American soldiers were committing suicides by hundreds in the gates of Baghdad on 2003. Reliability is much deeper issue than bias. Megaidler (talk) 13:52, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

Bias can eventually influence reliability. Besides where is this argument going? Sadat and Badri are almost unused here. What are you trying to achieve?--Sherif9282 (talk) 17:00, 11 February 2010 (UTC)

I'm going to make some edits referenced by a new source:

"Yom Kippur War Lexicon" by Eitan Haber and Zeeev Schiff, 2003 (in Hebrew).

The book has an irregular form. It is like an encyclopedia where information is presented in values which appear in alphabetical order. Megaidler (talk) 18:26, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

A Message to All Egyptian Nationalists

You are probably unaware of the situation here in Israel.
The press here is relatively free and uncensored. Government policies are deeply influenced by public opinion, especially trough the election for the parliament. Every one is allowed to vote and almost every party can present its candidates, including Pan-Arabic nationalists. The population is educated. Almost half of the population finished high school successfully. Over 70% of the population has access to the internet.
In the YKW there were 450,000 Israeli soldiers out of 3,000,000 people, Over 10% of the population. In these circumstances it will be very hard for the government to hide information like casualties.
Following the war a lot of public pressure was put on the government, for revealing the truth. It eventually caused the Labor party to lose the administration in 1977. Many veterans tell their story without asking approval. Many unpleasant facts were revealed. The government knows this and generally it doesn't try to hide information except when it comes to national security and foreign relations. Some information like nuclear weaponry or intelligence sources is still secret. However, there is no security risk in revealing the names of the fallen, and the quantity of lost equipment.
The Israeli authors of the book I am relying on are decent. They are unafraid of hardly criticizing the politicians. One of them, Eitan Haber strongly criticized Meir and her cabinet for rejecting Sadat's Sinai-for-peace offer and thus leading the region to war. However, other historians disagree with Haber.
This book is far away from cheap propaganda. Instead of arguing with Israelis, ask your own government to uncover the truth. Megaidler (talk) 23:50, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

How kind of you to enlighten us poor, ignorant souls. Care to stop forum-posting? --Sherif9282 (talk) 08:38, 18 April 2010 (UTC)

Ze'ev Schiff

The first issue I wish to raise concerns the use of Ze'ev Schiff's book, October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973.

There is no doubt in my mind that the author is a reliable authority and respectable researcher. I am aware of the various positions he has occupied throughout his career.

Yet I view the book as unreliable. This is due to the fact that the book was published in January, 1974, as you can see on Amazon. This fact has many implications and consequences. For its time, the book was probably as reliable as it could have been as a source of information on the war. This no longer applies.

For starters, the Agranat Commission had not yet completed nor published its findings. Generals and veterans of the war were yet to publish their memoirs. A lot of facts were in the dark, and information about the war from the Arab point of view was non-existent. Jiujitsuguy claimed that Schiff's book was more reliable than more recent works on the war because historical revisionism had not yet stepped in and memories were 'fresh'. Yet he later contradicts himself by saying Israeli society is very open. If that's the case, why is there any kind of revisionism going on? I give both claims no weight to be frank.

Even Schiff acknowledged that his book has its expiry date, writing in the introduction to his book: "Years will pass before all the facts about the Day of Atonement War will be known. And even then the truth will be one side of the coin. The other side will be exposed only when the Arabs choose to open their files."

By now, all the facts of the war are available with a little bit of hard work and research, and the 'other' side of the coin has already been sufficiently exposed through the few Arabic-language books that have been translated to English.

Since the book was made so soon after the war, there were other issues as well: "The problem is made more complex since leaders and generals are each presenting their own "truths"... when I began to collect the facts and details, I was faced with irreconcilable contradictions, an Israeli "Rashomon" played out by senior officers."

Schiff also presents himself as a journalist not historian, or at least acknowledges that he authored the book in the capacity of a journalist: Nevertheless, I do not believe journalists have the right to judge the men appointed to conduct Israel's wars... I have, as much as possible, avoided judging and giving "grades". That duty must be left to the historians..."

Bottom line, Schiff's book is no longer reliable, so I object to its usage here. Opinions? --Sherif9282 (talk) 12:48, 21 November 2009 (UTC)

Sherif9882, you make a good case why Schiff might be outdated, but is all very academic, you haven't proven your point. I don't quite understand why we should dismiss Schiff out of hand. Of course opinions change as years go by and new facts come to light, but that doesn't make each and every statement made near the event misinformed. As it is, the article contains only a single reference to his book, and not a very contentious one. Did you have something in mind? Poliocretes (talk) 20:47, 21 November 2009 (UTC)

I didn't understand that first sentence very well, and a clarification would be appreciated, but to reply nevertheless.

My problem lies not with the man, but with the book: October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973. I agree it was reliable, but only for a certain time period. There are numerous alternatives to Schiff, and these should be used instead. I'm sure Schiff's book contains opinions and facts which still hold true, but in that case why not just use the other alternatives available to us? In other cases where what he says contradicts a newer source, we should go with the latter. Jiujitsuguy seems to rely on the book heavily, and I simply object its use.

As to the one time he is used in the article; that's another book. The statement attributed to him is in fact contentious, but I'll get back to that later.

BTW, call me Sherif to cut things short. :) --Sherif9282 (talk) 22:19, 21 November 2009 (UTC)

I don't think it is reasonable to exclude an entire book based on the idea that some of its information may be outdated. It is reasonable to exclude specific references to it when they are proven to be outdated through use of a better source.

"Jiujitsuguy seems to rely on the book heavily" - Sherif

Where?? It's currently used once as far as I can see. Hohum (talk) 02:40, 22 November 2009 (UTC)

I don't understand why it isn't reasonable to exclude October Earthquake after all the reasons I gave. Nevertheless, I would be satisfied if information in the article is referenced to Schiff provided he does not contradict newer sources. How's that? --Sherif9282 (talk) 02:40, 25 November 2009 (UTC)

• Uacceptable. Schiff's factual accounts of the war are largely in line with others including Luttwak, Herzog, Rabinowitz and the London Sunday Times. In addition, his stature and connections gave him unprecedented access to field commanders, intelligence officers and the highest political echelons. His views should be given at least equal weight to your sources, who I'm sure had no access to David Elazar, Rafi Eitan, Dani Matt and Ariel Sharon, just to name a few.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 03:18, 25 November 2009 (UTC)

• I also reiterate my objection to non-English sources for an English reading audience when English sources are readily available. Those include Luttwak, Herzog, London Sunday Times, Rabinowitz and Schiff and those are just for starters. Currently, the article relies heavily on Arabic and even some Russian sources. It is patently unfair to the English reader. Is one expected to have an Arabic/English or Russian/English dictionary on hand when reading this article? Moreover, one can not accept this article as reliable in its current form when the sources upon which the article is based, are impossible to read.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 03:40, 25 November 2009 (UTC)

• In addition to being heavily reliant on Arabic and Russian language sources, the article is fundamentally flawed for other reasons as well. It creates a euphoric world of make-believe where the military story of the war ends with the conclusion of its initial phases. I recommend that the lead be reverted to the previous version but incorporating Hohum’s de-weasel suggestions.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 04:45, 25 November 2009 (UTC)

• I also object to using Major Steven J. Piccirilli as an RS. He's a relative unknown, has done no original research of his own and his work has not been cited or republished in any reliable publication. It looks as though he just compiled a thesis for school work. My daughter wrote a book report on the Yom Kippur War, perhaps I should include this as a source as well. I find it astounding that you would include a "no-name" like Piccirilli as a source and devote an entire section to his "work" but in the very same breadth, object to Schiff.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 21:56, 25 November 2009 (UTC)

Hammad had access to numerous books authored by Israelis and Westerners, books which he cite in the bibliography for his book. So he was well-aware of the details of the war from the Israeli-point of view. However, Rabinovich for example, had access only to publications by very high Egyptian figures, like Shazly or Heikal. Hammad on the other hand, having formerly served in the army and having his own connections, had access to many political and military people in both Egypt and Syria. At the time of his book, Schiff didn't have access even to Shazly or Heikal!

Not to mention the fact that, as Schiff acknowledged in his book, Israeli officials were content at the time to issue statements that contradicted each other, presenting their own versions of the 'truth'.

To address your other points, I'm not expecting the English reader to take language courses to read this article, since it's already written in English! By importing foreign-language sources to the article we're helping the reader so he doesn't have to read the original sources with a dictionary in his other hand. Of course it would be better to use English language sources whenever possible. That probably applies to the Russian-language sources. Hammad however is irreplaceable as a source for many reasons, including those I've just mentioned. If WP guidelines permit the use of foreign-language sources, what's the problem?

As for Piccirilli. His academic thesis, published for the Command and General Staff College, is a secondary source. Not conducting original research does not make him unreliable. It's quite natural for him to be unknown, he's in the USMC after all.

To illustrate an example where Schiff or the London Sunday Times may be mistaken is the issue of the heli-borne commandos on October 6. Schiff states that most of the choppers were shot down and the rest of the commandos were rounded up, and the Sunday Times coincides with this version. However Herzog only states 14 losses, and so does Hammad, who also writes accounts of some of their operations. Gawrych also states the commandos inflicted damage, and directly quotes Adan, making it very clear the commandos did accomplish some of their missions and were not a mere 'nuisance'.

Hey, hang on a second... doesn't Schiff have access to top figures like Adan, among others? The how could he make such a mistake? Even though A History of the Israeli Army is far more recent than October Earthquake. How come he didn't get Adan's statement, which reflects fact, into the book? Schiff didn't have to even interview him! He could have just read his memoirs, which are available to English readers as well around the world. Unless Hammad, Gawrych and others are mistaken, and for some reason Adan is also making this up, which makes Schiff on top of the world. I guess that possibility is more likely for you.

What I'm trying to illustrate is that, for all his credentials, can still be mistaken some times. This holds far more true for October Earthquake due to factors outside Schiff's control, as I've stated time and time again in my argument as to why that book specifically, and not the author, is IMO no longer reliable.

I'm also not convinced of the flaws you point out in the article. The article clearly shows that the military end state was quite different from the beginning. The lead accurately summarizes the article. In fact, your version of the lead had some serious flaws. I would point them out but I've run short of time. Will you be more specific about what you see problematic with the article? Next time I write, depending on whether you have replied or not, I will answer you and point out the flaws existent in your version of the lead. I should note that the bulk of the article remains to a large extent similar to the version made by Raul654, who used solely Rabinovich as a source for the entire article. --Sherif9282 (talk) 00:20, 27 November 2009 (UTC)

Summarizing the lead

Some have suggested that the article lead needs summarizing. I see it also needs to be changed significantly. Let's see if we can achieve that here.

First however I would like to point out that I believe some editors have not been entirely faithful. First they accept this lead which is supposedly a compromise, which mentions Soviet threats of intervention without the wider but no less important context of superpower tensions and ceasefire violations, then produce a single sentence that brings it all together (where was that before?). Similarly it is fine for the lead to include details such as 260 Egyptian tanks destroyed, despite stating now that the lead needs to be summarized. Please understand I am not accusing and am not trying to criticize anyone. I may be entirely wrong as well, in which case apologies are in order. All I ask is that editors be sincere in their editing. Regardless of the rhetoric accusations against me, I, and I'm sure everyone here for that matter, only want what's best for the article. Let's continue with that spirit.

Here's a suggestion for the second paragraph:

Attacking across the Suez Canal, the Egyptians were successful during the first four days of the war, after which the front settled into a stalemate. Following a failed Egyptian attempt to renew the offensive, the Israelis counterattacked, striking at the seam between two Egyptian armies. In over a week of heavy fighting, the Israelis crossed the Suez Canal, and encircled elements of Egypt's Third Army after a United Nation ceasefire failed. On the Golan Heights, the Syrian attack achieved modest gains during the first 24–48 hours, after which momentum began to swing in Israel's favor. Within the first week, the Syrian offensive was repelled as Israel launched a four-day counter-offensive into Syria. A ceasefire imposed on October 24 ended the war, prompted in part by superpower tensions.

I will try to discuss the changes in order. Details on Egyptian losses on October 14 was removed; I could add Israeli losses during the first few days, but does that belong here? Certainly not. Redundancy is reduced: instead of "more than one week" it is "over a week", "themselves" is removed to make simply "the Israelis crossed" and "encircled" is used instead of "cutting off from any form of resupply". For the end of the war I used Poliocretes' suggestion.

Also, I changed it to write the Egyptians were successful during the first four days, not the first two. For one, Jiujitsuguy claims the Egyptians never made an advance after the second day, October 7. In fact, the Egyptians advanced all along the frontline on October 8, the third day, to widen their bridgeheads. Second, "success" does not entail territorial seizures only. On October 9, the fourth day, an attack by one of Sharon's brigades directed against the 16th Divisions was repulsed, with heavy Israeli losses. (Hammad and Gawrych)

In brief, the paragraph is shorter, more balanced, and more accurate.

As a side note, I suggest that mention of the war beginning with Yom Kippur be coupled with the fact that the war coincided with Ramadan. Significant as it to note the war began on that day when explaining initial Israeli surprise, I also believe it is worthy to note that the fighting coincided with Ramadan, which meant Arab soldiers were fasting throughout the war. Isn't that significant in its own right? It could be added as "... and coincided with the month of Ramadan."--Sherif9282 (talk) 02:41, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Sherif I certainly sympathise with your idea of amending and shortening the lead, but I don't have time now to look in detail. As for 'compromise', I only speak for the last par. I cetainly agree there is too much detail in other paragraphs. Actually, even the last par is too long, but it didn't occur to me at the time. It was hard enough to reach some compromise, even without length constraint (see Intro section above). But I would be glad if someone shortened it while preserving the balance.BorisG (talk) 03:01, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Oppose. Sherif’s proposed version of the lead is factually inaccurate. By 9 Oct the Egyptian offensive stalled and was contained per the below referenced sources:

• “By 9 October the Israelis had brought the Egyptian advance to a halt short of Isma’il Ali’s goal of the so-called “Artillery Road,” which paralleled the canal 10-15 Kilometers to the east.” Pollack, p. 114.
• “From 9 October Southern Command continued to fight a containing battle, recouping their strength while successfully holding Egyptian attempts to advance. Indeed, apart from a small area lost as a result of the Egyptian attacks on Arieh’s brigade in the area of Hamutal on the 8th, the Egyptians did not advance one yard during the remainder of the war." Herzog, p. 199.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 07:56, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Support, I'm fine with the paragraph Sherif suggested, even though I would like to be named when criticized. I was not aware that throwing around an idea is somehow "unfaithful" (and to who exactly?) or insincere. Poliocretes (talk) 09:08, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Sherif9282 says 4 days, Jiujitsuguy said 2 days but now appears to insist that it was less then 4. How about 3 days (6, 7 and 8th October)? Overall, the paragraph proposed by Sherif9282 appears to be very balanced and to the point.BorisG (talk) 09:21, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Comment Agree that compromise is inappropriate. This is a featured article and needs to be treated as such. We cannot present info that is factually inaccurate or disputed just to make each other OK. A lead needs to work as a standalone for the rest of the article. That can be one of the more annoying standards for editors readers alike depending on personal preference and habits. If the general idea of the proposal proposal is accepted: two, three, or four may need to be turned into "After the initial attack", "During the opening hostilities", and/or "the opening stage of the conflict involved..." Cptnono (talk) 09:34, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Again Jiujitsuguy only focuses on territorial changes. To discuss the point, on October 7, Egyptian bridgeheads were around over four kilometers in depth. On October 8, after the failed Israeli counterattack, the Egyptians advanced again. The Egyptians seized sections of artillery road, although not all divisions achieved this, but at the least the bridgeheads were nine kilometers deep. You can even look at the US Military Academy's maps [2], it's evident large parts of Artillery Road are under Egyptian control.(Gawrych, p.40)

As I said, success does entail territorial gains alone. On October 9, an armored attack by Tuvia Raviv's brigade (with Amnon Reshef's support) against the 16th Division was thwarted, the Israelis losing 50-60 tanks in the process. That represents a significant achievement.(Gawrych p.54, Hammad pp.192-193) In light of this, Jiujitsuguy's opposition is unfounded, and it remains that the Egyptians were successful for the first four days.--Sherif9282 (talk) 11:07, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Just to clarify, I would like to see the entire lead amended, particularly the 2nd and 3rd paragraph. I just thought we get the 2nd paragraph out the way first because it was easier to reach an agreement upon. --Sherif9282 (talk) 11:24, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

I fully agree with Cptnono that the lead should not be a compromise but should ionstead contain only statements which cause no controversy at all. However this is easier said than done. May I just note that when it was FA, the lead was regarded by some as flawed.BorisG (talk) 11:33, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Is there some reason it can't say something along the lines of ...advanced on the first two days, held position on the next two, and was under pressure after that? (Just an example - fix for accuracy) - and allow the main body to explain. Or... simply admit that it's disputed in the lead - give up the idea that there is a single truth? Hohum 16:34, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Because it's not accurate? The Egyptians advanced on the first three days, and simultaneously on the third day held their positions, and held them again on the next day. But why the complicated summary? In fact Hohum, your suggestion says mostly the same thing mine did, but in different words. Two days of advance plus two days holding positions equals four days of success. I think the suggestion I presented is the most accurate, balanced and to the point. Additionally, I have refuted and rebuked the grounds on which Jiujitsuguy opposed my suggestion. Unless there is further opposition as to why it should not be implemented, it will be; the suggestion has the support of Poliocretes, BorisG (I believe), and myself. --Sherif9282 (talk) 17:17, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Once again Sherif ignores the noted sources. The Egyptians did not register a single advance beyond the 8th. Please refer to sources noted above.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 23:58, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Categorising holding as "success" while on the offensive is clearly disputed. The lead doesn't have the space to go into this. Also, please re-read the (now bolded) part of my suggestion. I don't see how a single concise sentence is complicated. I see that you'd prefer not to give up the idea that wikipedia should show your "single truth". That isn't going to work. It's clearly disputed by reliable sources - so there isn't an option for a single truth.

Consensus is not declaring a fait accompli when there clearly is significant discussion going on.

For the lead, phrasing it without using the terms success and failure when a neutral description will do, will stop this chest thumping and grandstanding. e.g.: Period of advance, period of hold, period of pressure. Leave it to the body to explain the complexity and different POVs.

If you can't do that (aimed at all editors) and persist in trying to grandstand in the lead with your favourite, exclusive version, it's obvious that you're POV pushing. Hohum 22:46, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Actually Sherif, you're wrong again. As I proved to you, the Egyptians did not advance one yard beyond the 8th. This is not for lack of trying. In fact, they did try to advance but were repulsed on each occasion with high losses. A notable battle occurred when an Egyptian mechanized brigade attempted to advance toward Ras Sadur and they were obliterated (Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, p.256). So it's not just that the Egyptians were contained, they were being bloodied and that is failure. You do not have consensus for change. Not based on sources and not based on editors.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 23:51, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Concerning the Syrians, they were ejected from the Golan after four days and the counter-offensive into Syria proper began on the 5th day, 11 Oct, and this is accurately reflected in the Lead. Sherif's change is inaccurate in this regard as well.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 00:10, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

I have changed the Lead to reflect that the Egyptians were successful during the first three days per noted sources and BorisG’s recommendation. I have also removed the sentence dealing with the 14 Oct Egyptian tank losses, per Sherif’s concerns. I believe we now have a factually accurate, heavily sourced, concise Lead that summarizes the article. The last paragraph of the Lead was debated and discussed by myself, BorisG, Gatoclass and Cptnono as noted by these discussions. I didn’t like the end result but relented in the interest of collaborative editing.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 00:57, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

This categorization is only disputed if you see the offensive as still resuming. According to Gawrych (p.53), Operation Badr concluded on October 8. He describes the Egyptians as conducting probing attacks to expand their bridgeheads on October 9, the fourth day, which were met with costly Israeli counterattacks. He also breifly mentions an effort by the 16th Division to seize several ridges ahead of it. Hammad concurs that the operation concluded on October 8. The Egyptians consolidated their divisional bridgeheads into army-size bridgeheads, at the same time advancing. Hammad states that the 16th Division seized the ridges ahead of it (the attack mentioned by Gawrych), and that the 19th and 7th Divisions of Third Army captured several new positions to the east. By the end the 9th, both armies had consolidate their bridgeheads, and the Egyptian offensive ended.(p.182-185, 194-200) As a side note, it has also been pointed out that some of Herzog's claims were questioned in terms of their reliability, and he is not bound to be neutral. As for the attack mentioned by Jiujitsuguy (which took place on October 10), that brigade, throughout October 8 to October 10 had been in combat as well under air and artillery strikes. The attack, which took place on October 10, compounded losses to around 25-33% of the brigade's strength, which is far from obliteration.(Hammad, 684-695) However that attack took place on October 10, and it does not mean the Egyptians were still on the offensive; that attack was carried out by a single brigade in a southerly direction, unrelated to the rest of the front which was east-west.

If the operation ended on the 8th, and the Egyptians consolidated their positions on the 9th, all the while repelling Israeli counterattacks, then the fourth day was a success for the Egyptians.

Finally, the Syrians were out of the Golan by October 10 (the fifth day), and the Israelis counterattacked on October 11 (the sixth day). Saying all this occurred within the first week is factually accurate (a week, being seven days, incorporates these events, right?). --Sherif9282 (talk) 13:18, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

It’s astounding that you would make this type of bold edit while discussions on the matter are still being held. This is especially true in light of the sources that I provided (and I can provide you with more) proving my point. What’s even more astounding is that your edit was made after attempts were made to address your concerns by removing the 14 Oct tank losses and changing the days that the Egyptians were successful from two to three days. It appears that you took these attempts to address your concerns as signs of capitulation weakness rather than genuine attempts at collaborative editing. The current version of the lead is well-sourced and factually accurate. Any further changes to it will be to the article’s detriment. There is no consensus for the changes that you made; No consensus in terms of sources and no consensus in terms of editors.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:44, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

I did not take these edits in the way you depicted them, far from it. Please don't twist things into what they are not. Discussions here revolved around the issue of how to phrase the opening events of the war. There were no objections brought forward on the statement of A ceasefire imposed on October 24 ended the war, prompted in part by superpower tensions which is certainly more neutral than the current version, to the point, and an accurate summary. Also, since your objections regarding the events on the Golan Heights were due to mistakes with the timeline (calling October 10 the fourth day when it is in fact the fifth), while my suggestion was linguistically sound and factually accurate, I went ahead and implemented those two parts, having the support of Poliocretes and BorisG. I did not edit the part on Egypt's assault since it was a dispute that had not been settled. In fact, you took BorisG's suggestion, which was given in the midst of a discussion that was still ongoing, turned it into a recommendation, and added that to the article, even though you don't have consensus either!

Rather than make false accusations, reply to the points I have raised. I gave you two sources that counter your two (the reliability of one of whom, I and another editor question, and for the reasons presented), and I also provided a decent amount of detail and explanation. --Sherif9282 (talk) 21:11, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

I have reverted most of John's revert. I trimmed out the collapse line for now since it sounds like there is a ispute. I did not cut the resupply line because a logistical resupply is much different from some water in the area.Cptnono (talk) 22:38, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

Well then, what are the problems with the suggestion in respect to the war in the north? --Sherif9282 (talk) 23:27, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

A problem with the current version is that it implies the Israeli counter-offensive ended with the war's end; the mention of the counter-offensive being followed by Soviet threats if Israel did not cease its counter-offensive seems to indicate so, when the reality is far from it. --Sherif9282 (talk) 23:30, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

Another issue: 50 miles to Cairo? That's 80 kilometers. The universally accepted version is 101 kilometers. Hammad recounts an attempt by the Israelis to advance further westwards from that point, but they were repelled by Egyptian tanks. Don't have page number right now, but I'm certain of it. As to Damascus, the article says 40 kilometers, apparently cited to Rabinovich. (When this article was made FA, it was entirely reliant on Rabinovich, whom Raul654 relied upon as his only source; that detail was in the article then) Which is a mistake.

PS., moving how close the Israelis came to either capital doesn't solve the aforementioned issue. --Sherif9282 (talk) 23:42, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

What will?Cptnono (talk) 23:49, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

Writing that the offensive had its own end, as in Within the first week, the Syrian offensive was repelled as Israel launched a four-day counter-offensive into Syria. This is based on what the article says: From October 11 to October 14, the Israeli forces pushed into Syria. That's four days, and the offensive began before the first week was out. --Sherif9282 (talk) 23:53, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

This version of lead eliminates the numbers game on the Syrian front & makes clear that Soviet threats of military intervention were prompted by events in the south. The prior version made it seem as though Soviet threats were prompted by events in the north.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 01:09, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

The Israeli counter-offensive still seems "open-ended", and the lead does not match the order in the article. I've returned the para to the original order, and pointed out that there was a time-frame to the Israeli counter-attack. Also, there were Third Army units encircled on the west bank too; Suez City, possibly defensive pockets that were bypassed by Adan. --Sherif9282 (talk) 09:09, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Regarding the second paragraph of the lead, I think it must be mentioned that the Soviets threat of intervention did not come only because of Israel's violation of the cease fire, but especially because of the critical situation of Egypt's trapped troops. They did not use their threats because Damascus was in range of the Israeli artillery. If there are any doubts about the situation of the 3rd army, please leave your comments on the section I have made to discuss this issue. Megaidler (talk) 17:47, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

I would like to raise two issues here.

• First: three or four days? What is clear is that Operation Badr ended on October 8. The crossing had succeeded, bridgeheads had been established and Israeli counterattacks repelled. At that point, either side switched to the defensive, but both launched attacks. According to Hammad, the Egyptians received orders to consolidate their bridgeheads on October 9. Both Second Army and Third Army captured several positions that day. According to both Hammad and Gawrych, Sharon's division launched a large attack against the 16th Division that day, which failed with losses of 50-60 tanks. That alone, constitutes a significant success. Now Jiujitsuguy will counter with Herzog, I am sure. In anticipation of this, what does Herzog say about the fighting on October 9?

• Second: the final paragraph is loaded with problems. To begin with, it considerably lacks NPOV. The Arabs were on the brink of defeat by war's end (this is a controversial issue, and here WP is ascribing to one side) and Arab military ineptitude may not always be a given (as noted by RomaC, this is as non-neutral as it gets). Then, there are inaccuracies as well. The fact that both parties had suffered setbacks at different stages of the war led to a more realistic attitude on both sides. This is only true with respect to Israel. Sadat and his commanders entered war knowing very well they could be defeated again. Exactly what "realistic attitude" did this war bring to Sadat? The reality is, there was no change in Egyptian mentality. The only change came from the Israelis. That this can be disputed is beyond me; I can only imagine what the counter-argument will be. --Sherif9282 (talk) 21:22, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

I am well aware of the 09/10 attack led by Sharon toward Suez city from many sources in Hebrew. From what I have read in some books, if it was up to Sharon the attack would have proceeded and his forces wouldn't have to pull back, but Sharon was given orders to retreat by his superiors in the middle of his offensive. Sharon did not have advances on this day, but according to Gawrych, his failed assault, followed a failed attempt by the Egyptian 16th Division to expend its bridgehead. Both Sharon and Hafez tried to advance and both halted. According to Gawrych, Sharon lost about 50 tanks but we don't know how much Egyptian tanks and men were lost on this day. The 09/10 is clearly not an Egyptian day of success, according to Gawrych. Megaidler (talk) 00:29, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

Megaidler, I've read Gawrych over and over and I am bewildered as to where he says what you claim. First, Sharon's attack came in the direction of Ismailia, not Suez, there's a huge difference. Second, Gawrych states the 16th Division attacked in an attempt to expand its bridgehead, but makes no mention whether it failed or not. Also, Sharon's attack lasted for the better part of the day, which rules out that it was interrupted by the interference of Sharon's superiors. The attack had achieved some gains at first, but the Egyptians counterattacked and retook all lost ground. In fact, in page 54 here, Gawrych states that October 9 yielded fine results in terms of Sadat's strategy of inflicting maximum casualties on the Israelis. --Sherif9282 (talk) 06:55, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

Regarding the final paragraph, my views are very different from Sherif's, and I largely agree with the current form of that paragraph (which was itself a compromise). However I think he has a point that interpretations do not belong in the lead unless they are are widely and universally accepted. Statements backed by reliable sources can be included in the article body even if they are widely disputed. (In typical Wikipedia style, according to A, the earth is flat; however B asserts that this is not precise, and so on:). However this is not the case in the lead, which is not the place for these sort of disputes, unless they are absolutely central to understanding of the subject. I don't think this is the case here. We can drop all interpretations of the consequencies of the war from the lead. I suggest we stop referring to sources when discussing the lead, because it is supposed to be a consensus summary of the article, and is not supposed to be directly based on (or refer to) the sources. For example, when discussing four days or three days of Egypt's success, why not just say the first few days? This won't just be a compromise between editors, but would be a correct statement, whether in reality it were two or four. BorisG (talk) 03:42, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

In the context of my statements above, I would also like to explain the use of the word 'compromise' above. I believed that the statements in the final paragraph of the lead represented not just a compromise among a handful of editors (which would be against wikipedia rules), but indeed were formulated to represent a wide consensus. While I was strongly against talking about Israeli victory, I thought is was widely believed that The Arabs were on the brink of defeat by war's end (well, the wording could be better, but in essence, that's how it looked in 1973, if you remember). Well, we now see that Sherif disagrees, and it is reasonable to assume that this is not just his view, but it is shared by a significant number of people.

Next, we have The Israelis, by contrast, were forced to the realization that Arab military ineptitude may not always be a given. This is extremely badly worded, but who can disagree with the essence of this statement? If it is POV, whose POV is it? I think it is universally accepted that the war ended the sense of invincibility and complacency in Israel, which followed the Six-days War. Is this disputed?

Finally, we have The fact that both parties had suffered setbacks at different stages of the war led to a more realistic attitude on both sides. Here I strongly believe that the sentence represents the wide consensus, and that Sherif is being unreasonable. Surely the war contributed to more realistic attitude on all sides, and not just on both sides. It does not say to what extent each side had been affected. How can a major war not change attitudes of a major party at all? Some believe Israeli positions were affected to a greater extent, some believe the opposite, but surely the current sentence represents a well worded compromise view (if in somewhat vague form)? But if people dispute this, then we need to take it out, I guess.BorisG (talk) 07:02, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

The first sentence doesn't strike me as being NPOV. The second sentence is horrendous. Here, ineptitude is portrayed as a default nature of Arab militaries. It also makes no mention that the war ended the sense of invincibility and complacency; are the readers supposed to come to that conclusion on their own? The third sentence, I completely disagree with BorisG. As I said, Egypt's mentality pre-war cannot reasonably warrant a new post-war attitude. Perhaps they were influenced by events of the war, but only very slightly. Sadat already knew the US held all the diplomatic cards to solving the conflict, he knew he could not liberate all the Sinai militarily, and he believed there was a very good chance the war would be a defeat. Before the war diplomacy had been tried repeatedly and futilely, so no one can claim the war forced Egypt to turn to diplomacy. That claim can only be applied to Israel. Also, the paragraph does not discuss the post-war concussions in Israel, how the US was forced to change its lackluster attitude towards the Middle East conflict, or how Egypt realigned itself to the West, far from the Soviet Union, after the war.

How can a major war not change attitudes of a major party at all? I guess you realize this is a rhetorical question which I can't answer. I've already shown that the war brought no real change to Egyptian mentality, certainly nothing as the change brought upon the Israelis or the US. Ask me a specific question, and I'll answer. To prove the point, if Israel, pre-war had been willing to enter into negotiations and had not been surrounded by a false sense of invincibility and complacency, while the US was determined to play the role of peacemaker and apply pressure on Israel, and given that the Egyptians tried to find a diplomatic solution first prior to embarking on a war, there would never have been a war, and Camp David would have taken place long before its time. Can this really be denied? --Sherif9282 (talk) 07:48, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

"Here, ineptitude is portrayed as a default nature of Arab militaries. " No, it is portrayed as a naive and false perception of Israelis. But I agree the wording is extremely poor. It was certainly not written by me. Need to change it.

A widely held view is that Sadat's peace initiative culminating in his historic visit to Israel was a direct result of the Yom Kippur War. But I knew from Sherif's earlier comments that this view is not universal. Thus a new much more vague version was placed in the lead. This is still not good enough for Sherif. Well, then propose a new version and battle it out with JG. BorisG (talk) 08:54, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

What versions are you referring to precisely? Neither versions mentioned Sadat's visit. Whatever, we have two separate issues here; the peace efforts, which had been undertaken by Sadat pre-war but failed (then, post-war, it succeeded, I wonder why?...), and the visit, made to revive peace negotiations which were threatened with stalling. Conversely, one could argue that the political outcome of the war (a clear Egyptian success in that regard) permitted Sadat to perform such a visit.

Also, Israeli realization that Arab military ineptitude may not always be a given doesn't say anything near the Israelis had a false and naive perception. At least we agree that the paragraph needs to be changed, but I'm not going to "battle" anything out with JG; you, John Z, Poliocretes, Cptnono, CO'48 and RomaC are involved editors and should participate in discussions as well to help reach a consensus or compromise. I'll propose a new paragraph soon. --Sherif9282 (talk) 11:00, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

Please do. But please remember that the lead is currently far too long and need to be made shorter, not longer.BorisG (talk) 13:25, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

Before I present a suggestion, is it contested that Egypt's attitude was not significantly changed by the war, or that a realistic Israeli post-war attitude is what opened the way for negotiations? --Sherif9282 (talk) 15:41, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

Yes it is hotly contested. As I said, some believe Egyptian attitudes changed to a greater extent than in Israel. I think it may even be a majority view, but if not, it is a view of at least a significant minority.BorisG (talk) 16:00, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

More generally, I suggest to avoid any discussion of attitudes, as true thoughts of politicians may never be known. To take a most clear-cut example: most people agree the war was a key factor in Israel's willingness to give up Sinai in eachange for a peace treaty. And yet, how can one be assured? So many factors influence politicians' decision. Domestic factors, internal party politics, intra-cabinet rivalries, inter-institutional conflicts (cabinet vs militaty etc), relationships with other countries, etc., etc. It is better to avoid discussing these in the lead, which is supposed to be clear-cut.BorisG (talk) 16:00, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

How can one be assured? Well, in 1971, Sadat made his "peace initiative", with the end result of an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and a peace agreement with Egypt. Israel refused, wanting to retain parts of the Sinai for "security". In 1973, he repeated his proposal to Kissinger, who replied Egypt should make concessions and that the US could only exert so much pressure on Israel. How much pressure it could exert was soon evident when the US supplied Israel with some 50 F-4 aircraft. See this paper. Sadat eventually got back the entire Sinai without yielding any concessions and Israel did not retain any part of the Sinai. These facts (no analysis or claims of politicians' agendas here) show just whose attitudes changed. So when Luttwak, for instance, claims that Anwar Sadat's "realization" that he had come close to catastrophic defeat led to him signing a peace agreement with Israel, it is nonsensical, because, aside that he states with all authority how Sadat realized this and was forced to do that, when it is difficult and perhaps impossible to know the real intentions of politicians (as you pointed out)... events and facts before the war all prove otherwise. These claims have no grounds; they're baseless. Anyway, here's my suggestion:

The war had far-reaching implications for many nations. The Arab World, which had been humiliated by the lopsided defeat of the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian alliance during the Six-Day War, felt psychologically vindicated by successes early in the conflict. This paved the way for economic reform and liberalizations in Egypt under the infitah policy. In contrast, the war effectively ended the sense of complacency and invincibility in Israel. This realistic Israeli attitude, coupled with newfound, determined American efforts at mediation, paved the way for the peace process that followed. The Camp David Accords, which came soon after, saw the return of the Sinai to Egypt and normalized its relations with Israel—the first time any Arab country had recognized the Israeli state. Egypt, which had already been drifting away from the Soviet Union, then left the Soviet sphere of influence entirely.

The paragraph is roughly the same length or just a tad longer than the current version. However, it covers much more: post-war economic reform in Egypt, and that country's re-aligning away from the Soviet Union (details which were in the old version), and also mentions post-war American mediation. --Sherif9282 (talk) 17:02, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

I do not oppose outright this Sherif's suggestion (I would remove 'by contrast'). However I don't like it because it is too detailed for the lead, in my view. Yes, it covers much more than the previous version, and that I see as a problem. Let's see what others think.BorisG (talk) 03:24, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

On facts, etc., peace initiatives may be genuine, but may be just a tactic to confuse the enemy, or your domestic associates/rivals, or world powers... I am not saying this was the case with Sadat, but it could be. Unless an initiative results in a deal, no one knows whether it is genuine. On that basis, it is not possible to say whether the war increased Sadat's determination to reach a peace deal.BorisG (talk) 03:24, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

More generally, regardless of what you or I perceive as nonsense, any analysis given in a 'relaible source' can be included in the article. And anything that contradicts any statement in the article does not belong in the lead.BorisG (talk) 03:34, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

I'm, fine with replacing "in contrast", I just can't find the right wording. I disagree that it's a problem for the para to cover more detail; considering it's almost the same size, it is much more comprehensive. I can't see the reasoning behind your opposition.

Also, I know you're right regarding your last post, but I believe it would be beneficial to the article if we use a little common sense and don't just toss in every 'reliable source', but obviously, anyone can, and that can't be stopped. (unless it were WP:Fringe --Sherif9282 (talk) 07:48, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

Sherif, I do not say the new paragraph is worse than the previous one. Both are far too long, in my view. But as I said, I am not opposed. Let's see what others say. BorisG (talk) 08:43, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

Where is everyone? Discussions just abruptly ended. --Sherif9282 (talk) 14:12, 24 February 2010 (UTC)

Not wanting to keep y’all waiting, here are my two cents. ‘In contrast’ would be better as ‘In Israel’. I would prefer switching the positions of the two psychological states, since the invincibility developed and the complacency tended to result from that. Something about, say, ‘despite its military power’ should be added to the sentence end, in place of the current Israel mention. I do not agree with ‘coupling’ Israeli attitudes and ‘determined American efforts’ in the same sentence; too much SYNTH in that. I think this is better (per Quandt, p125), ‘The war also changed many American assumptions and it pursued a newfound…, which…’. (hopefully understandable). While I agree that the lede is long, we are not at a propitious moment, as Boris might like. I might however suggest this for the following sentences: The Camp David Accords to follow, brought the return of the Sinai to Egypt and normalized relations—the first peaceful recognition of Israel by an Arab country. Egypt continued its drift away from the Soviet Union and left the Soviet sphere entirely. Regards, CasualObserver'48 (talk) 15:31, 24 February 2010 (UTC)

Kudos for the excellent suggestions. I've implemented most of them with a few other changes:

The war had far-reaching implications for many nations. The Arab World, which had been humiliated by the lopsided defeat of the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian alliance during the Six-Day War, felt psychologically vindicated by successes early in the conflict. This paved the way for economic reform and liberalizations in Egypt under the infitah policy. In Israel, the war effectively ended the sense of invincibility and complacency. The war also challenged many American assumptions and it pursued newfound efforts at mediation and peacemaking. These changes paved the way for the subsequent peace process The Camp David Accords to follow, brought the return of the Sinai to Egypt and normalized relations—the first peaceful recognition of Israel by an Arab country. Egypt continued its drift away from the Soviet Union and left the Soviet sphere entirely.

Compare with the earlier draft above. This version is also slightly shorter and more balanced. --Sherif9282 (talk) 17:06, 24 February 2010 (UTC)

No comments for a almost a week now. I'm giving it a shot and implementing the suggestion in the article lead. Give it a chance and improve as necessary. Regards, --Sherif9282 (talk) 22:10, 1 March 2010 (UTC)

First lede-para edit

I realize this is a bold edit, but I believe, inter alia, OR wording is a wiki-no-no, especially in the lede. The edit removes the phrase ‘against Israel’ and adds ‘Israeli-held’ appropriately. It also re-orders the prose to put the religious significance first, based on name-WP:notability, and keeps war-related mentions together; the edit shortens it, and improves the flow using the existing text. The second part of the edit deletes the ref (no English WP:V), including its incomplete and non-notable mentions. These two other particular problems include its one-sided presentation of ‘[leaders] were aware of considerable danger that an attack was likely, but had decided not to act’, without any mention of why they would conceivably do that, and the immediate non-notability and apparent advertising of a book, which is unmentioned elsewhere, either in the body or as a reference. The new ref is a fully verifiable RS and notes additional article WP:N, which from a more global view is to be included in the lede. Regards, CasualObserver'48 (talk) 03:34, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

I have no objection to CasualObserver'48's edit--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 04:20, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

The second lede paragraph, again

Yes, again a BOLD edit, as is our mandate. Please give it a chance; existing content was used to the greatest extent possible. Comments to this effect[3] have been at talk for 10 days, with only a few points commented and addressed. I also noted the article’s important FA status, and none of those specific points were seriously commented upon; thus, the bold edit. It does not include however, my third bulleted point about previous cease-fire lines, because bold will only work so well, and that does require discussion; I wanted the edit to be sustained. Those knowing the specifics better, should correct any improper temporal references that may have crept in.

The edit, which adds less than two lines, makes changes that are relevant, adds context, mentions more material included in the article, and makes the paragraph considerably more coherent. I summarize the edit this way:

• The lede at least should be in chronological order, even if the article body isn’t, sorry; I moved the Syrian mention up between the early and late Sinai fighting, because the latter is closely related. I also moved the sentence beginning ‘By the end…,’ to the end.
• The first sentence starts with a bigger bang, and is reflective of its impact on Israel and the world; the terms ‘massive’ and ‘heavily fortified’ were added, and the Herzog cite was moved to ‘three days’, which it references. In the later prepositional phrase, the terms ‘they dug in’ and ‘southern’ were added.
• In the Syrian mention, the edit keeps time units consistent, adds ‘northern,’ and provides better-weighted word-choice balance. The miles were ‘modest’, but those miles were much closer to Israeli population centers; in those days and for those reasons, Dayan was in a dither, and Golda ordered some nuclear preparations. The edit tries to balance this due weight by some changes to the successful Israeli counter-attack.
• In the second Sinai mention, the edit adds ‘To relieve this pressure’ for continuity, but keeps it short, adding ‘ but decisively’, with weighted punctuation. The edit continues the rapid flow of events with a semicolon, and summarizes the overall results with the non-military term ‘isolated’, which seems more appropriate for this pre-cease-fire time.
• ‘Encircling’ is maintained for later events after the first cease-fire, in which the terms ‘initially’ and ‘cooperatively’ were also added to the super-power mention.

The edit and comment took considerable thought and time; I hope these are given due consideration. With the greatest respect for content, CasualObserver'48 (talk) 08:48, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

I'm fine with the edit. However, considering that the Suez-Cairo Road was still open at the time of the ceasefire, then technically the divisions across the canal were not isolated yet. The encirclement only happened on the 23rd, after the ceasefire. I've changed the paragraph to reflect this, added "over a week" to be more accurate, and removed Herzog; the lead shouldn't contain citations. The change might need improving for prose or balance. --Sherif9282 (talk) 11:40, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Thanks, as requested; next? CasualObserver'48 (talk) 11:58, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

The Suez Canal was defiantly not heavily fortified since most of its forts were not garrisoned. There is no challenge in bypassing an unmanned fort. I mentioned the background for the super power crisis. I tried to keep this paragraph short. My suggestion for the second lead paragraph is:

Attacking across the Suez Canal, the Egyptians were successful during the first three days of the war, after which the front settled into a stalemate.The Syrians attacked simultaneously in Golan Heights, and achieved threatening gains during the first 48 hours, but their momentum waned. The Syrian offensive was repelled as Israel launched a four-day counter-offensive into Syria. To relieve this pressure, the Egyptians renewed their offensive, but failed to advance. The Israelis then counterattacked at the seam between the two Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez Canal, and advanced southward in over a week of heavy fighting. After an agreed UN mediated cease fire had failed, the Israelis completed the encirclement of two Egyptian divisions, bringing them to the verge of collapse, and took thousand of Egyptian prisoners. This promoted superpower tension, and a ceasefire was imposed cooperatively on October 25 to end the war. By the end of the fighting, Israeli forces were 40 kilometers from Damascus and 101 kilometers from Cairo. Megaidler (talk) 18:01, 26 February 2010 (UTC)

Oppose; current paragraph is better, more balanced and neutral... this suggestion also presents disputed matter as concrete fact. --Sherif9282 (talk) 10:58, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

Disagreement over the lead

• The "heavily fortified" Suez Canal:

The Egyptians did not attack a heavily fortified area. Entering or bypassing an ungarrisoned fort is not harder than a tourist visit to an ancient medieval fortified castle. The Egyptian astonishing six hour overcome of the almighty Bar-Lev line is a myth that must be shattered.

Question to CasualObserver'48: Are you aware that only 500 Israelis were inhabiting the forts along the almost 200 km Suez Canal, and the last fort fell after more than six days?

• The encirclement of the 3rd army:

The Israeli post cease fire advances, which ended with the encirclement of the 3rd army, did not start immediately after the UN cease fire came into force. During the nigh of 22-23/10, sporadic fire incidents occurred between Israeli and Egyptian troops, since there were no clear lines between opposing combatants. That’s according to Gawrych. The Israelis used it as an excuse for further advances. The current lead may cause the readers to conclude that the renewed Israeli offensive was a violation of the cease fire, and caught the Egyptian troops by surprise. Actually, the truce was no longer in force that time.

Considering that there is no consensus here for these two issues (at least), I decided to take unilateral actions. Megaidler (talk) 21:56, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

Don't ridicule the collaboration process in this way. Exactly who has no consensus, and exactly how does that mandate you taking "unilateral action"?

The Bar Lev Line is heavily fortified. The forts were positioned to defend the main advance axes in the Sinai, so your mention of the 200 kilometer long canal is merely rhetorical. The original plan was to garrison the line with 800 men; at 500 or more this is more than half the planned number, although it potentially may be more (at 500 in 16 forts we have 31 men per fort, however Fort Lahtzanit had around 86 men, while Fort Orkal had 44 men). You also neglect to recount hundreds of Israeli tanks and around 8,000 infantry who could reinforce the line in 30 minutes to two hours.

As for the ceasefire, given the nature of opposing dispositions at the time, it was natural that firefights would break out, all the more so when the ceasefire has only just been implemented. The Israeli advancement was indeed in violation of the ceasefire per sources and facts. Even so, it is not explicitly said that the Israelis violated the ceasefire. --Sherif9282 (talk) 22:21, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

Also, it is disingenuous to claim that the Israeli encirclement did not begin immediately after the ceasefire. So it began before the ceasefire and continued regardless of it? Even then that counts as an Israeli violation of the ceasefire, and that's what it is whichever way. --Sherif9282 (talk) 22:25, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

To answer your 1st question, Medaidler, concerning the usage of the term "heavily fortified" to describe the Suez Canal, I consider the included mention of the Bar Lev line to support that wording. I will note that my description seems to be considerably different than your unreferenced assertion that it was militarily bypassed or not garrisoned at the time, although I agree that these factors, should they be RS'd, would have contributed to the Egyptian's astonishing six hour triumph over 'the almighty Bar-Lev line', as you put it. Whether that historical event is a myth that should, or could be shattered would again depend on the RSs introduced and accepted. I will note, the Labor govt caught hell in the post-war investigations, but that does not seem lede-type content. And, I never heard of such a thing; I was both unaware of that assertion, and do not remembering reading about it in the existing article.
Concerning your 2nd question about the encirclement of the 3rd army, I absolutely agree that 'the Israelis used it as an excuse for further advances', as you put it; I do not agree however, that such wording would be a neutral, workable, collaborative, or politically correct statement of those events. With the current reasonably good word-smithing choice, we seem to have come up with a less-direct and consensually acceptable way to weasel around such a blunt statement of events, although the Soviets certainly thought so and said so, as is ref'd in the article. While my edit added the new term 'isolated' and used 'a week' (Oct 15-22), Sherif apparently felt it better without that new term, and also changed the temporal reference back to the previous 'more than a week' wording, attempting to bridge the apparent difference in the date of that offensive, which was so closely tied to the failure of first cease-fire. I am fine with that, the lede requires such sensitive, weaseled usages, and seems a collaborative approach to editing here. Regards, CasualObserver'48 (talk) 13:56, 28 February 2010 (UTC)

Improving, but still...

While the middle paragraph is improving, I still see some lede-type content missing, and some weight-balancing needed. I will note that some of these also require addition to the article itself, before they may be legitimately added in the intro, but by noting these, a consensual lede would be easier to write. Main points I see include:

• The important differences between the two fronts: The Golan was both strategic and much closer to population centers, while the canal was strategic and Egypt a far larger foe, there was still much Sinai left to cross, so it still provided the strategic depth and attendant time.
• I do not agree with ‘stalemate’; it is too passive, as used. Egypt rapidly advanced and then dug in, as intended and under their air defenses. Egypt’s failed renewal was mostly to relieve pressure on Syria; it was both counter to their intent and beyond their air defense. The lede, at least, should discuss one war, not two fronts.
• Along similar one-war lines, the terms ‘into Syria proper’ (OR?) and ‘crossed the Suez Canal’ are valid, but do not provide their proper wiki-weight. If these are replaced with the valid and more relevant term ‘the cease fire line’, you may understand the tenor of the problem, as noted in the first lede para. Quandt continually refers to a (changing) cease-fire throughout the ebb and flow of the battlefield, but these re-crossings of those lines were the last straw for the super-powers.
• The highly relevant Israeli movement beyond the first cease-fire line is not mentioned, and should be.
• Only the threat of Soviet support is mentioned: why not the early El Al and Nickel Grass stuff from the US? Some definitely did arrive early, including the priority “electronic equipment” and “the new stuff we never had before.” Israeli air and tank losses were much higher in the early-war; for the Egyptians, their losses were late-war, as I understand things. These were big changes; using the phrase 'both superpowers' would quickly draw consensus.

Regards, CasualObserver'48 (talk) 05:32, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

I believe it is sufficient to mention that superpower tensions ended the war, and that mentioning Soviet threats is unwarranted. This is mentioned without the wider context, affecting the balance of the lead. --Sherif9282 (talk) 16:18, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Regarding the superpowers assistance for their allies, only the Soviet threatened to intervene directly. Both the U.S and the Soviet Union delivered arms to their allies throughout the war. The Soviets even used their own transport planes and ships on an earlier stage then the Americans. Both sides had sophisticated weapons but the Arabs started the war with night vision equipment and SA-6. The Israelis received their high tech weapons like TOWs, Srikes, and TV guided bombs during the war and had no sufficient training for using it effectively, maybe accept the Shrikes. If the lead is to include American aid, it must include Soviet aid as well. Megaidler (talk) 17:41, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

American aid was much more influential to the course of the war. Aside that, your claims with regard to training is OR. I've attempted to point out to the resupply efforts, while also removing the mention of the Soviet threats, for reasons mentioned over and over. In this regard, the final point raised by CasualObserver would be addressed, and the lead can be reorganized so events in the Sinai are discussed first then those in the Golan, corresponding to the order in the article. Non-neutral wording is also removed. --Sherif9282 (talk) 18:58, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Alright, to re-raise a point here, what's with the distances in the lead. The Israelis were no more than 101 kilometers from Cairo, and according to the article, they were 40 kilometers from Damascus. Right now, the lead claims they were 80 kilometers from Cairo (which is way off mark) and 30 kilometers from Damascus. --Sherif9282 (talk) 07:23, 17 February 2010 (UTC)

Situation of the trapped Egyptian forces

Regarding to the research made by Richard Owen. I assume Owen mentioned that on 19:00 22/10, the time the first cease fire was to start, scattered Egyptian units were located behind the Israeli bypassing forces, maintaining their combat integrity and were ready to fight. But on 23/10 about 6,000 Egyptians, which were behind Adan's main forces, fell prisoners to Israeli units that followed Adan. This must be considering those scattered Egyptian combat units.

Elyashiv Shimshi, than a tank battalion commander, wrote on his book "Storm in October" that on the night between 22/10 and 23/10 an Egyptian unit caused heavy casualties to his battalion some where on west bank, relatively close to the water line, but he did manage to escape. He mentioned that on the following day, 23/10, he and his battalion stormed the same Egyptian troops that caused them heavy casualties the night before, and that Egyptian unit simply collapsed. Its men were being taken prisoners.

Regarding the two encircled divisions on the east bank, the 7th and 19th, even if in some places they managed to repulse hasty Israeli attacks, it doesn't change the reality that they were on the very verge of collapse. They had no more air defense. All of the SA-2 and SA-3 batteries that provided them cover were destroyed or captured by 24/10 and no one counted the Egyptian Air Force when it comes to air defense, unless you believe the El Mansoura story. Those two divisions were deployed on a place where it was impossible to find food and water, what made them depended on supplies. After the Israelis finally cut the most southern road to Suez, it was impossible for the Egyptians to supply and reinforce their trapped men, and only few days were left before hunger, thirst and air bombing would submit them to surrender, except in Suez I think. After all, the army marches on its stomach.

I am sure that all of these referenced authors, who claimed that the 3rd army was on a critical point, knew what they are talking about. Never the less we should be accurate and mention that only the 7th and 19th divisions were trapped, while some 3rd army units were far on the west. Another source that gave his confirmation for the catastrophic situation of the trapped troops is a retired Egyptian commando officer named Salama El Sayad. He gave his testimony to a BBC team producing a program on that war for 20th Century Battlefields. That BBC team was not allowed to film in Egypt. It's available on you tube, were I previously tried to argue with some ignorant Egyptians until I found it is pointless. Megaidler (talk) 17:03, 14 February 2010 (UTC)

Two things: 1)It would be good if you can provide the youtube link. 2)It would be better for every body, including you as an editor in Wikipedia t watch your language. Describing people as Ignorant is not an indicator of civility; While you have the total freedom whether or not to be a civilized person in your life, the rules in here happen to be obligating editors to act civilized even if they are not.

As for you fantasia-style POV, perhaps you can consider thinking about the Israeli forces that encircled them in the same way; their connection with the rest of the IDF was a relatively narrow strip of land that can be cut by efforts of the Egyptian armies on the west, they had not enough anti-air units, if any, and they were in range of Egyptian artillery, and SSMs. Think about that, try to familiarize your self with the system in here, then come back if you want to continue this discussion. ( ΡHARAOH  The Muslim  22:07, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

Might I add that the IAF didn't have the air supremacy in this conflict like they did in 1967. If they did, it would have been a simple matter of bombing the Third Army relentlessly until they surrendered. Don't forget that the Egyptians still had the mobile SA-6 and shoulder-held SA-7, as well as the EAF which was more competent and had better trained and experienced pilots than in '67, and so were able to prevent the IAF from obtaining the air supremacy they desired. Also, the Third Army wasn't "trapped" on the east bank, their bridges were still intact, if the situation required it, they could have withdrawn to the west bank of the canal to engage the Israeli forces. This is in fact what Shazly proposed but Sadat overruled it because it eliminates the whole point of the war, which was to gain a foothold in the Sinai, which would eventually pave the way for diplomacy. This is why Sadat opted for a ceasefire to end the war while the foothold in the Sinai remained under Egyptian control. Another thing, don't forget the naval blockade the Egyptian navy imposed on the Mandab Strait. This, coupled with the mining of the Gulf of Suez, meant that oil shipments to Israel ended. How long would they be able to last without oil? Anyway, that's just my take on this ElUmmah (talk) 23:25, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

Why don't you say the truth about 6th October war?

Why did you put that israil had won the war.

That -simply put- is NOT true. It's very frustrating seeing this false propaganda of Israel's victory spreading on the Internet. Realizing that; Probably twenty years from now The war would be a dead history and people would remain believing that the victory was for Israel's army. Of course, since what we -Egyptians- know about the war is very little basic information that we were taught at the fifth grade at school, Beside 99% of this information is about How brave, smart was our president; Husni Mobarak..I pity US! It's shame seeing how we forgot about our OWN war, our OWN soldiers who lost their lives so we could walk down the streets without being shot, without living to witness the ugliness of war.

Basically, I would like to explain why foreigners think Israel won.

First, " They think Egyptians lost the war because Egypt's third Army was destroyed"

--> I would totally understand your point if we had ONLY the 3rd Army out there. What about the rest of the Army?! Not because Israel conquered a part of our army then this means we are beaten! That was ONLY one round, people!! Did we surrender?! Was the war over?! NO.

Second, "Israel won at the end of the war."

Well, to Understand what really happened..We have to know Egypt's goal behind the whole war. After Israel invaded Sinai, 1967. We failed to get our land back by any peaceful democratic manners [I am not surprised] so we HAD to fight. Our goal was not to destroy all Israel's Army, It was only to get back our land by putting troops on the east side of the Canal that faces Israel and keep going from there. After that; Get our land back with negotiations. That was what the Egyptian president during that time - Anwar El Sadad- ordered his commanders to do.

Question Now, Did we succeed?! I am proud to say, YES.

During only the first six hours of the war, We conquered over Barlife line which was believed to be invincible. We caused a lot of damage and destruction in Israel's army. Syrian army also was able to destroy any protection method that Israel used and prevented them from using Nobelium tubes. As Egyptians, we were able to get back Suez Canal and a part of Sinai then we got the rest by peaceful manners in 1974...Just like we planned to.

Beside, During the war; Israel was trying to control and capture one city so they could launch propaganda about their courageous success, they tried to capture Suez Canal but they FAILED. So you wanna convince me that an army that couldn't capture ONE city won over the entire war?!! Use your common sense.

Bottom line: We reached our goal from 6th of October War. We took our land back, that makes us victorious. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.68.19.254 (talk) 06:12, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

You didn't take anything back. You were given land, by negotiation, years after the fact. You failed to "take" the land back. That's the least of the problems with your post. Biggest of all is the lack of any actual suggestion of an edit to the article. --OuroborosCobra (talk) 07:03, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

Why not delete this post and this one too? They're pretty much WP:FORUM posts, don't suggest any edits or improvements to the article, and simply clog the talk page. --Sherif9282 (talk) 00:14, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

You gained the land back at Israel's and the US's whim. That is one reason among many why it is generally agreed Israel won. All in all it could be seen as Egypt launched a pointless war , when it never even tried negotiating for peace prior to this. In fact prior to Egypt commiting to peace with Israel peace between the arabs and Israel was considered taboo to arab countries, and they had numerous meetings continually stating that they will not negotiate with Israel or officially lift the state of war (albeit cold) they were in since its inception. --70.80.16.65 (talk) 01:49, 18 April 2010 (UTC)

If you're going to actually make suggestions on how to improve the article, then you are more than welcome to do so. However, please avoid making pointless additions to the talk page, which do nothing but clutter the page which is used by editors who are actually dedicated to improving the article. Thank you, ElUmmah (talk) 02:32, 18 April 2010 (UTC)

A very good FA point

Cptnono makes an excellent point by noting above that this is still a Featured Article, though I have my doubts concerning its present status. I will point directly to the link of this article’s former FA glory, use it as a benchmark, and suggest all interested editors take a few minutes and give it a quick read, because it is a good quick read. The current version, while still including much from earlier and greatly expanded since, just seems too big, or more properly, just doesn’t stick together in a readable, coherent, ‘for the benefit of the readers,’ encyclopedic way. Exactly where the current version differs, includes some very important aspects of the five-legged crutch that supports us all and is the project, IMO. Others will see what they see, but I tend to see that many significant differences are simple deletions, burying, and the weaseling of highly relevant prose; some of these constitute much of the glue that once held this article together and made it a FA. The organization is poor within current sections, and this detracts from meaningful comprehension and flow. I believe much of this content/organization should be re-introduced. I am not a tank-counter-type; I brought Quandt's Peace Process. I tend toward presenting the whole forest, while accepting we must mention individual trees; only some trees are tall, and most are just plain trees among many. Regards, CasualObserver'48 (talk) 01:52, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Just thought I'd point out that editors expressed their support for my efforts to improve on an article that was lacking in content and balance. I offer these comments [4] [5] [6] by Mikrobølgeovn, Cptnono and Poliocretes as proof of what others see as an improvement.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 02:22, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

I didn't intend anything along those personal lines, and am sorry if they were taken as such. CasualObserver'48 (talk) 05:41, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Skimmed the FA version, yeah concise and clean. Notice the "improvements" right away -- the number of Arab belligerents has doubled, and Israel has emerged the victor. Way to go Israel! RomaC (talk) 16:30, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Sherif suggested my comment above was not constructive I agree so striking it, echo CasualO's suggestion that editors look at the older version, which is not perfect, but is a concise and very readable article. Point is, we're here to serve readers, not editors. RomaC (talk) 03:17, 17 February 2010 (UTC)

Wow

"The Israelis, by contrast, were forced to the realization that Arab military ineptitude may not always be a given." Just 'wow' RomaC (talk) 06:13, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

Thanks BorisG for rewriting that sentence, that it was in the lead speaks to some problems with this article, if more of those involved here could edit dispassionately the article would benefit. Cheers, RomaC (talk) 11:36, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

Requested move

The following discussion is an archived discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

The result of the move request was: do not move. — ξ^xplicit 03:53, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

---

Yom Kippur War → 1973 Arab-Israeli War — The title of Yom Kippur War for this article states that this article is written from an Israeli perspective and the generally accepted, scholarly title used in public debates is the 1973 Arab-Israeli war which is a more neutral title.

Oppose. This was discussed and disputed at an enormous length years ago and the current title somehow won the day. It was a featured article after all. BorisG (talk) 16:45, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

Comment I myself proposed a move a long time ago, but after going through the talk archives I've seen this is futile. Also, WP requires us to name articles by their most identifiable name. In this case, the Yom Kippur War receives more Google hits than all the other names. While not explicitly opposing, I don't think a move is appropriate for these reasons, and at any rate, this is not the time to consider a move; the entire article is undergoing changes. --Sherif9282 (talk) 17:10, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

Oppose Per WP:COMMONNAME, and WP:MILMOS#NAME. The most commonly recognised English name for this conflict is the current article name. Previous discussions for page move: 0/15/1, 8/30/0. Hohum 19:25, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

Oppose Agree completly with Hohum. A case of WP:COMMONNAME and WP:MILMOS#NAME. Flamarande (talk) 19:39, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

Oppose. Support the more common term. RomaC (talk) 11:40, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

Oppose agree with Hohum's statement Weaponbb7 (talk) 18:52, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

The above discussion is preserved as an archive of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

Egyptian strategic victory?

There is two things in this article that honestly disturbes me:

I simply can't understand how this could be an Egyptian strategic victory in military means. Egypt was completely defeated on the battlefield. It's army was stuck on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, and the Israeli Army were free to march straight to Cairo. I believe that this so-called strategic victory was not a result of what happened on the battlefield, but a result of the reactions of the Israeli leaders. Remember that the Camp David-accords were signed five years after the war was over.

The other thing is that this article states this as a tactical Israeli victory, instead of a pure military victory. Can anyone explain to me why this was only a tactical victory, and not a clear military victory? --Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 14:24, 5 March 2010 (UTC)

Long-term effects of the war contains an assertion by Piccirilli, that it was an "Egyptian strategic and political victory". We shouldn't including our own syntheses or conclusions, but rely on those of reliable sources. Other cited sources differ somewhat, so I think the infobox should say 'disputed'.(Hohum ^@) 22:25, 8 March 2010 (UTC)

Take a look at this line in the article:

The war is described as a military stalemate and an Egyptian strategic and political victory by Major Steven J. Piccirilli, USMC....

The problem with the Piccirilli reference is that he doesn't really define the terms "strategic" and "political" clearly. Rather he seems to use the phrase "strategic victory" (from what I can gather from the quote in reference 152) to describe the initial phase of the war, but then extends it to characterize the war as a whole, which makes no sense to me. I mean, that's like saying that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a strategic victory (which is true) but then saying the result of WW II was "U.S. military victory, Japanese strategic victory". That's my $0.02. Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 16:08, 17 March 2010 (UTC)

In my view, such contentious assertions, whether backed by sources or not, have no place in infoboxes. Some sources say israel won, some say Egypt won, but discussion of this, including references to sources, is appropriate for the text, but not for infobox. There was no capitulation, nor admission of defeat by either side. - BorisG (talk) 17:18, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

I agree completely. There are way too many editors who want to summarize results in the infobox, but yet don't understand what a "summary" is. Splitting results into "tactical", "strategic", and/or "political" is a matter for the body of the article, not the infobox. (See also by response to Hohum below.) Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 00:40, 20 March 2010 (UTC)

Sources-wise, Jordan also writes that Arab grand strategy was successful. --Sherif9282 (talk) 18:37, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

Shouldn't the determination of a victory be based on the objectives of the opposing sides? For the Israelis, I would say that their objective would have been simply to stay alive. For the Egyptians, on the other hand, I don't see how getting militarily defeated, or even stalemated, could have been a war-objective. Also, I agree with BorisG regarding the infobox. The infobox should only contain three possible results: Red Team Win, Blue Team Win, and Inconclusive/Stalemate. Everything else, including "strategic" or "political" victory, should be put into the body of the article. Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 16:08, 17 March 2010 (UTC)

For use in wikipedia, the determination of a victory is what reliable sources say, not our own syntheses or conclusions. The infobox should have a specific result in it if that is what the sources say - so, Red Team Win, Blue Team Win, Stalemate or whatever the sources agree on - but if reliable sources differ significantly, it should say Disputed - leaving the explanation to the main body of the article. The latter is clearly the case with this conflict. (Hohum ^@) 19:13, 17 March 2010 (UTC)

In my opinion, the goal of the infobox is, both, to leave the explanation to the main body of the article, and to provide the reader with the consensus view among historians. That is what my suggestion, in fact, does. To say it is "disputed" (which is not what it says as I'm writing this) does not reflect a consensus among historians. Take, for example, the Battle of Antietam. I have read several authors who have classified it variously as a "Union Victory", a "Decisive Union Victory", a "Strategic Union Victory", and "Tactically inconclusive, Union Strategic Victory". There is no consensus on the level of victory among these authors, but there IS a consensus that it WAS a Union victory, and that is what should be in the infobox.

Right now, the infobox says:

Israeli tactical victory, Egyptian political victory and a UN cease-fire after UNSCR 338, 339 and 340, leading to the Geneva Conference and the Sinai Interim Agreement.

Although I agree that it was an "Israeli tactical victory", I agree only in the sense that they recovered form the surprise attack and forced (or WERE forced to accept by the U.S.) a stalemate. The idea that Egypt achieved a political victory while the Israelis didn't is not supportable by a consensus of the available reliable sources. Both the Egyptians and the Israelis profited politically, as can be seen in the body of the article. Therefore, the infobox should simply read as Inconclusive or Stalemate. At any rate, I'm not inclined to change what the infobox says in this article, since 1) I don't have a dog in this fight, so to speak; and 2) this issue needs to be addressed on a military history project level. Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 00:40, 20 March 2010 (UTC)

Well, Egypt's goal was not to prevent Israel from profiting politically from the war. We can think of it as a win-win situation, Egypt gets back it's land, and Sadat gets the support he needed for making his reforms, while Israel gains peace. Before the war, Egypt offered the same deal to the Israelis, but they refused it. This is to say, Egypt achieved it's goals, but Israel was still able to prevent a complete Egyptian military victory. ( ΡHARAOH  The Muslim  21:12, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

Why have discussions regarding the article suddenly ended? The article remains extremely biased and unbalanced and changes need to be made. I'm willing to contribute but I'm a new user and so I'm still getting used to Wiki rules and policies. —Preceding unsigned comment added by ElUmmah (talk • contribs) 17:51, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

Well, if you have something to say, then say it. What makes this article so biased and unbalanced? Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 19:12, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

I don't think listing each and every fault would be necessarily the best way to solve this. What I had in mind was going through the article from start to finish. But to answer your question, I find that it generally manages to undermine all Arab, particularly Egyptian, achievements while at the same time exaggerating Israeli successes such that it prompts the reader to come to the conclusion that the Israelis won another crushing victory over the Arabs. Of course, others may differ in their view, which is why I suggest we go through it step by step to find a good balance. ElUmmah (talk) 03:44, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

Free time is elusive nowadays.

Although I don't agree with you that the Israelis profited politically (certainly no where near Egypt's gains), and I can't see where the article says so (care to point out?), I agree that the infobox should be changed, while details/disputes are discussed in the article.

However, it shouldn't be as simple as Stalemate or Inconclusive. Both conclusions are mistaken, and Stalemate in military terms, is disputed. I propose we write something along Disputed: Military stalemate/Israeli military victory then Egyptian political victory then the ceasefire and post-war resolutions. --Sherif9282 (talk) 19:37, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

I do not think the sources disagree about the results. While a Pro-Israeli author like Rabinovich would see Israeli forces that crossed, which numbered about 20,000 men and 500 tanks were enough to actually defeat the remaining forces f the Egyptian army that have not yet participated in the war, knowing that out of a military incorporating more than a million individuals, Egypt participated with only 300,000 of them, of which about 80,000 crossed.

Another source would still agree that Israel was successful in preventing Egypt from achieving a complete military victory, but not necessarily able, or willing to threaten Cairo.

In other words, all sources agree that Egypt was able to achieve the crossing with losses that make Egypt's own pre-war estimates look gigantic. Sources agree that while Israel could not capture any Egyptian city as it planned, nor flanking the second army, the Egyptian were also not able to sustain a continuous line of advance, and suffered ended up having their forces separated on the west bank. Finally, sources do not disagree on the fact that the Egyptian military achievement in this war directly resulted on the retreat of Israeli forces from a large part of Sinai, and enabled Egypt to gain foothold on Sinai, and be controlling both sides of the Suez canal, and giving Sadat the support he needed to make his reforms to bring back the rest of Sinai, end the no-war-no-peace state with Israeli, and be an ally to the United States; all of which he planned for.

I believe that stating the political, and land changes that resulted from the war, while leaving the who won question be answered by the reader to be sufficient. ( ΡHARAOH  The Muslim  21:52, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

We can't add such details in the infobox, it would be too much. --Sherif9282 (talk) 23:28, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

I agree with Sherif, should just leave it as disputed and let readers come to their own conclusions. ElUmmah (talk) 03:21, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

I think the old wording "tactical" was left when someone placed "strategic", so I changed it to "military". not sure if there's a place to discuss "political" gains of wars in the infobox, but if there was any military victory, then all historians agree that it was Israel's decisive and complete victory. Amoruso (talk) 04:24, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

You're wrong there, not all historians agree it was an Israeli victory. Don't POV push. ElUmmah (talk) 02:19, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

I am not seeing consensus to include "strategic" in the infobox from the above conversation. If anything it is the opposite. For now, strategic needs to go. This unclear and minority viewpoint shouldn't be used as leverage to blank the parameter but that is also an option if there is a clear consensus based on the sources after further discussion.Cptnono (talk) 04:42, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

It's obvious that there's much dispute regarding whose victory the war was. I know of several sources that state the war was an Egyptian strategic and political victory and that the war ended as a military stalemate (which means "Israeli tactical victory" is also disputed). If you wish to discuss it further, then it ALL has to go, not just strategic. We could simply leave it as disputed, or state the result to be just a UN ceasefire resolution, until we establish consensus.ElUmmah (talk) 04:59, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

No, it really does not all need t go. We can discuss that further but consensus is not in the favor of keeping strategic and it is a minority viewpoint with confusing wording. Simple as that.Cptnono (talk) 05:12, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

Nor is it in favour of removing it. It's not a minority viewpoint as you claim, like I said, several reliable, scholarly sources state the war as an Egyptian political AND strategic victory, and so it will remain. Simple as that.ElUmmah (talk) 05:26, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

Here's what I propose

UNSCR Ceasefire, etc...

Military stalemate/Israeli tactical victory; disputed

Egyptian Political and Strategic victory

Or something along these lines. --Sherif9282 (talk) 09:05, 18 April 2010 (UTC)

It's pretty clear that military (tactical and strategic) and political outcomes are all strongly disputed, there is no clear and undisputed result to solely support either side. A factual outcome such as the ceasefire resolution is not disputed. I'll repeat for the nth time - make the main body text complete, then update the infobox to reflect it. At the moment, all it should says is

UNSCR Ceasefire

Military and political outcome: Disputed

(Hohum ^@) 11:48, 18 April 2010 (UTC)

I don't agree that the political outcome is disputed, but I'm fine with that, it's what the article used to say. --Sherif9282 (talk) 13:28, 18 April 2010 (UTC)

The political, strategic outcome is not really strongly disputed - it was a limited Egyptian victory. If one looks at most recent sources, and they represent a minority opinion, adduced in opposition to this, one sees that they tend to characterize themselves as objections to the consensus/majority view that the Egyptians were more successful strategically, met their long-term objectives better than the Israelis. There is more agreement in the scholarly world than here.John Z (talk) 19:29, 18 April 2010 (UTC)

Wikipedia includes reliably sourced minority viewpoints, it doesn't include fringe ones. If there is a credible dispute, the infobox should reflect that, the level of dispute is something for the main body. (Hohum ^@) 21:23, 18 April 2010 (UTC)

Israeli victory

(This should be discussed separately from the proposal to remove "strategic" victory even though it is expected that there should be some crossover in discussion)

Highly assessed articles using the military conflict infobox show that more than just x or y victory, disputed, or inconclusive is possible. It is clear from reading the archives of this talk page (type in victory in the search box) that the UN deal was key to whatever labels are applied. Most sources discuss an Israeli military victory from what I have seen. "UN brokered ceasefire stopped Israel short of a clear and complete military victory" is an option that I feel is not overly lengthy. See: TIME. "See aftermath" with a link is also a possibility according to Template:Infobox military conflict but this does not seem common across the project.Cptnono (talk) 05:28, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

I should hope you will be able to provide more reliable and accurate sources than the article you have just provided, which is riddled with inaccuracies. The Israelis were stopped at the gates of Suez, their soldiers barely able to get out alive, much less control most of the city. The Israeli forces were were not 45 miles away from Cairo (it's astonishing where this number was pulled from) and they had not trapped the entire Third Army. These are but a few of the inaccuracies the article possesses. Your suggestion of "UN brokered ceasefire stopped Israel short of a clear and complete military victory" is unacceptable,as it is not only untrue, but biased as well. I have many sources to prove otherwise. The majority of sources I have seen that claim the war to be "a complete Israeli military victory" are either Israeli or based on Israeli sources. This dispute regarding the infobox is ridiculous, if people feel so strongly about it then we should simply remove all these "victory" assertions from the infobox and leave it to the main body to explain.ElUmmah (talk) 05:47, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

Time Magazine is a fine source.Cptnono (talk)

Yes it is, but this article is far too old and too soon after the war to be considered accurate. You can see quite plainly that there are numerous problems with the article. There are sources that state the Israeli logistical line to the west bank was threatened, so the tide could have gone either way. At any rate this is too controversial a claim to make. BTW, where are these Department of Defense statistics? --Sherif9282 (talk) 09:01, 18 April 2010 (UTC)

Where in the article does it say "strategic victory"? Where? The article does not back up the infobox with that term in. The sources do not back it up. It isn;t backed up despite people saying it is.Cptnono (talk) 20:33, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Why should Israeli tactical victory be seen as disputed, while a strategic and political Egyptian victory is not questioned? Israel repelled the invasion, and penetrated deep inside both Egypt and Syria. In both cases, the road to the Arab capitals were open for the IDF. The military victory was total.--Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 17:18, 27 April 2010 (UTC)

Article length

WP:LENGTH suggests "Readers may tire of reading a page much longer than about 30 to 50 KB, which roughly corresponds to 6,000 to 10,000 words of readable prose."

This article is currently at about 15,000 words / 95KB of readable prose.

This will require a concerted effort to cut out the chaff, and/or identify and split suitable sections to their own article(s). (Hohum ^@) 22:19, 8 March 2010 (UTC)

I support this suggestion. Maybe we can split it into the Sinai front, and the Golan front main articles containing respective details, and leave this one for general information. ( ΡHARAOH  The Muslim  06:56, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

Unfortunately, this non partisan, but significant problem with the article has attracted far less comment than how a single sentence should be phrased in the lead. I invite editors to consider whether they actually want to improve the article for our readers. (Hohum ^@) 21:52, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

So readable prose is under 88k. This could be acceptable under WP:SIZERULE and is thorough. There was awhile that many Israeli aspects were not mentioned and that caused the article to bot be thorough. I could understand some trimming here and there but the Golan Heights should not be tagged. It was an important part of the war and deserves some in=depth info. That tag needs to be removed.Cptnono (talk) 04:40, 28 March 2010 (UTC)

According to this, readable prose is ~98KB/15,000 words.

The tags that I just added for sections suggest that they should at least be split into subsections for readability - this doesn't mean anything has to be deleted, although the article is in general too long, and could be more concise while keeping the same information. (Hohum ^@) 06:16, 28 March 2010 (UTC)

I think we should split the article only after all disputes are solved. Megaidler (talk) 13:27, 28 March 2010 (UTC)

Given the subject, I think that is an unrealistic criteria ;-) (Hohum ^@) 18:12, 28 March 2010 (UTC)

Regarding the tool "Do not rely on information presented here. This tool produces incorrect output due to limitations in its wikitext to HTML parsing and a spurious syllable counter; not to mention the uncertainty of the readability algorithms." Do it manually.Cptnono (talk) 03:51, 1 April 2010 (UTC)

Sure, we'll count 15,000 words manually. <rolls eyes>. The tool is good enough for an estimate. This article is way over length. (Hohum ^@) 21:05, 2 April 2010 (UTC)

Or you could learn how to use a computer <rolls eyes>. The estimate is over what I found by copy and pasting it into Word and removing the non readable text. It is within the guideline. It is not by much and I would assume some trimming is possible. However, it only told one aspect of the story a few months ago so some alterations were needed.Cptnono (talk) 02:44, 3 April 2010 (UTC)

Using another computer program is hardly manual. I have just done the same and it came to ~96KB of characters / ~15,000 words, without any wiki markup, reference text, etc. 50% more words than the maximum suggested by WP:LENGTH is far too long. the point of having articles is so that our users will read them - I doubt many will read all (or even half) of this one before becoming bored. Even interested editors seems to spend most of their time arguing over what's in the early sections. (Hohum ^@) 14:23, 3 April 2010 (UTC)

Regardless of what it is called, we came to two separate numbers. Maybe one of our copy pastes back into the sandbox or removal of readable prose was off) Neither is over the maximum suggested especially when that is a blurry line. Trimming is fine but the push JJG made was to include information that was necessary. I would be surprised if it could not be tightened but removing a section as (previously proposed)that describes a significant part of the war is hardly a good option. Rabinovich is cited often enough. That may be the problem (as mentioned in Archive 2).Cptnono (talk) 02:15, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

Aid to The Main Combatants

In "Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War" (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R1864.pdf) by William B Quandt, (May 1976), data about the Soviet airlift is shown on pages 25-26 (pdf pages 37-38). It appears on diagrams that between October the 6th and October the 24th, the Soviets airlifted to the Middle East equipment weighting 12,500 tons. 6,000 tons were delivered to Egypt, 3750 tons were delivered to Syria, 575 tons were delivered to Iraq and the rest were also flown to the Middle East but final destination is unknown. That is in contradiction to Shazly's claim that most of the airlifted hardware was delivered to the Syrians. Megaidler (talk) 13:17, 14 March 2010 (UTC)

Nice try, Migo. On the same source on page 49, it cites that the airlift delivered 12,500 tons, while the sea lift delivered 63,000 tons. The same source also states that the soviet aid was not completed until 1975; It states: "Throughout most of 1974, and 1975, the Egyptians received very little military equipment from the Soviets.".

I for one cannot find to which source exactly does the author cite his details about the airlift, but i know he was not the head of staff of the Egyptian forces during this war, and so i think that El-Shazly would be a much more reliable source in this case. ( ΡHARAOH  The Muslim  05:54, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

There is a possibility that Shazly could have been biased. I think that Quandt, in view of the position he held during the war, may be considered a primary source. Also, the statements referenced to Quandt in the article refer specifically to the airlift during the war, not the sealift, although that latter part is also important and should be mentioned in the article. I will edit that section soon. --Sherif9282 (talk) 15:17, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

According to Haber & Schiff, page 382, Israel transported 5,500 tons of equipment by its own via 170 flights mainly from America and Europe. Between 14/10 and 15/11 the U.S. transported 22,497 tons of equipment via 536 flights. 8,755 tons of these were transported until 24/10. The seaborne operation has begun on 10/10, when ships were being loaded with military equipment. 16 ships transported 90,000 tons of equipment; most of it arrived after the cease fire. Until December, Israel had received:

40 F-4, 46 A-4, 12 C-130, 8 CH-53 , 40 UAVs, 200 M-60/M-48A3 tanks, 250 APCs, 226 vehicles, 12 chaparral SAM batteries, 3 HAWK SAM batteries, 36 155mm artillery pieces, 7 175 artillery pieces and large quantities of 105mm, 155mm and 175mm ammunition.

Most of the delivered aircraft arrived during the war and most of the large equipment arrived after it. The total cost of the equipment was about 800 $ million. During the same period the Soviets delivered 340,000 tons of equipment to Egypt and Syria. Megaidler (talk) 18:26, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

340,000 tons in three months!

Apparently Quandt says the Soviet sea resupply (63,000 tons) proceeded until early 1974; in other words a little over a year! The American sealift was 33,000 tons. I've never heard such figures. --Sherif9282 (talk) 19:49, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

Yoram Saade translated Shazly's book from English to Hebrew and it was published in Israel in 1987.

Shazly, Lieutenant General Saad el (1987) [1981]. The Crossing of the Suez. Israel: Ma'arachot publishing house. ISBN 965-05-0346. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help) Shazly in chapter 7, described the assistance that Egypt, Syria, and Israel received for the war effort. He claimed that until the end of the war, some 15,000 tons of equipment were delivered to Egypt and Syria via 900 flights of An-12 and An-22. Until 30/10, 63,000 tons have reached mainly to Syria. Until 30/10 33,210 tons of equipment reached Israel via sea by the Americans. The U.S. delivered some 22,000 tons of equipment via airplanes, but Shazly did not mention how much of these arrived before the cease fire. Shazly details do not contradict the data shown in Quandt's document or in the book written by Haber & Schiff. Quandt and Shazly refer to the period that continued until the end of the war or until 30/10. Haber and Schiff refer to the period that continued until the beginning of December, and they mentioned that only 40% of the 22,000 ton American airlift and less than 50% of the 90,000 ton American sea lift reached the Middle-East until the end of the war itself. Megaidler (talk) 15:58, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

The huge addition made to this section was unwarranted. A great amount of inconsequential details were added, such as mentioning countries that sent token battalion size-forces (which had no effect on the war), some of which did not even reach battle. This article needs to be summarized, not clustered with additional unimportant details. --Sherif9282 (talk) 08:14, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Surprisingly I did not hear any protests for making this article too long when I have made addition to the section dealing with the aid for Israel. If this article is too long, I do suggest the removal of the comparison to Vietnam. I think that making a summarizing paragraph for the entire section dealing with the foreign aid will make this article easier for reading. Megaidler (talk) 20:35, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Regarding the aid to Egypt and Syria, ElUmmah is actually the one who removed my edits. The argument for making this article to long is somewhat strange. There were no protests when I put additional information for the section dealing with the aid to Israel. Actually, I think the "aid to Israel" section is much more detailed since it includes the circumstances for "Nickel Grass", as well as accurate description of the delivered equipment. The "aid to Egypt and Syria" section is much longer than the "aid to Israel" because the aid itself was much larger. I suggest summarizing the section dealing with the foreign aid, and making an entire new article for this subject. Megaidler (talk) 11:48, 25 April 2010 (UTC)

The Initial Attacks

According to Haber & Schiff, page 32, 128 Egyptian airplanes participated in the initial air strikes. Before evening, 45 Egyptian helicopters carrying commandos took off. Megaidler (talk) 18:26, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

According to Haber & Schiff, page 306-307, since only 16 out of the 30 strong-points were manned, there were gaps between them and there was no continuous view over the canal. The first wave of 8,000 troops crossed through these gaps and encircled the strong-points. Many tanks were ambushed before reaching the water line and those who did were hit by direct fire from the western sand ramps that were higher than the eastern ramps. Megaidler (talk) 18:26, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

On the commandos, Hammad's describes the Sa'iqa operations in detail. For the October 6 airdrops, I can add up to a total of 42 helicopters; not far from your figure. However, these 40+ helicopters made airdrops all over the Sinai, from the Mediterranean cost to the various mountain passes and along the Gulf of Suez.

I've never heard of such a number... 128 aircraft? The universal number is 200 or more.

As for the strongpoints, their were only 22 fortifications by the time of the war, not 30. Of these, 16 or 18 (not sure which) were fully manned, the rest partially manned or occupied by observation teams.

All in all, I'm confused as to why you're writing this here. Shouldn't you be adding it to the article? I'm just concerned you may be doing WP:OR. --Sherif9282 (talk) 19:29, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

What exactly is the point of this discussion?! Are you saying that crossing the canal was a piece of cake, and should not be considered a military achievement, Megaidler? because in this case we can simply end this by citing sources that does regard it as a serious military achievement. ( ΡHARAOH  The Muslim  21:00, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

Situation On the Outbreak Of The War

Lt. Colonel (ret) Yossi Abudi was chief of the Israeli history branch. In the following articles, he describes some of what happened on winter 1973. Unfortunately it is only in Hebrew.
http://www.fisherinstitute.org.il/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/num27.pdf
On the out break of the war Egypt had 146 SAM batteries and Syria had 36.
On the Suez Canal area there were: 15 SA-2B, 10 SA-2C, 20 SA-3 and 10 SA-6
On the rest of Egypt there were: 26 SA-2B, 21 SA-2C, 44 SA-3
On the Golan Heights area there were: 3 SA-2B, 3 SA-2E, 5 SA-3
On the rest of Syria there were: 3 SA-2B, 4 SA-2E, 3 SA-3 and 15 SA-6
Megaidler (talk) 11:01, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

According to Haber & Schiff, p 30 31
The Egyptians had some 150 SAM batteries (62 in the Suez Canal area), 600 fighters, 40, bombers, and 160 aircraft of other kinds (helicopters, trainers and transport airplanes). The aircraft were stationed in 27 airfields. Before and throughout the war Egypt received assistance in aircraft from Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and USSR.

The Syrians had 36 SAM batteries (25 in the front), 350 fighters, and 70 aircraft of other kinds (helicopters, trainers and transport airplanes). The aircraft were stationed in 15 airfields. Throughout the war Syria received assistance in aircraft from Iraq and USSR.

In the Out break of the war Israel had some 350 combat jets and 200 aircraft of other kinds (helicopters, trainers and transport airplanes and light airplanes). The aircraft were stationed in 9 airfields, 3 of them in the Sinai Peninsula.

According to Haber & Schiff, p 382, Israel had received 40 F-4, 46 A-4, 12 C-130, 8 CH-53, 40 UAVs from the U.S. Most of the airplanes arrived during the war. That brings the number of combat jets, the Israelis have used throughout the war to no more than 440, and the number of aircraft of other kinds to no more than 260. If the number of helicopters was 84, that means that there were some 440 combat airplanes, 84 helicopters and some 160 aircraft of other kinds. Megaidler (talk) 11:01, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

According to this article, the number of operational Egyptian fighters in the outbreak of the war was approximately 400. The total number of all Egyptian combat airplanes in the outbreak of the war, including bombers and aircraft in storage is about 570. This number does not include the aircraft sent by other states to Egypt, like Iraq and Libya. The Israeli started the war with some 350 combat airplanes. During the war the, the U.S delivered some 90 airplanes to Israel, bringing the number of combat airplanes used by Israel to approximately 440. However, after so many pilots have been killed, captured and wounded, the Israelis had lack of pilots for manning these new airplanes. Megaidler (talk) 11:48, 25 April 2010 (UTC)

The Bar-Lev Line

According to Gawrych-PDF p.16 the Israelis expected to counter a limited Egyptian crossing by executing plan "Dovecote", a limited counter attack, using only active duty forces, not reserves. According to Gawrych-PDF p.18 plan dovecote called for manning the Bar-Lev line with 800 men and to deploy some 200 tanks on the water line between Qantara and Port Tawfiq. An additional tank brigade was to counter attack against the Egyptian main effort.

From Gawrych, we can conclude that even if the Israelis would act according to "Dovecat", it is less than what should be done for countering the crossing of all 5 Egyptian Infantry divisions. Considering that one of the tank brigades was to "counter attack against the Egyptian main effort" we can conclude that the Israelis expected the Egyptians to concentrate their attack on a single sector. In some places I have read that during the first hours of the war, the Israeli command tried to locate the sector of the main Egyptian crossing effort but later it was understood that there was no such place, the Egyptians have crossed all across the canal. I'll try to get the source.

According to Haber & Schiff, p. 306-307, on the 06/10 afternoon 532 troops were in the strong-points, 9 tanks were in the water line and 7 gun batteries were in range. Only 16 out of the 30 strong-points were manned, there were gaps between them and there was no continuous view over the canal. The first wave of 8,000 troops crossed through these gaps and encircled the strong-points. This is all according to Haber & Schiff. Not my OR. According to Gawrych-PDF p.16 there were 30 strong-points not 22. Maybe there were 22 forts, and some of them were incorporated of multiple strong-points located next to each other. According to Hammad p. 73, there were 22 forts comprising 35 strong-points, (reference was given by Sherif). Megaidler (talk) 11:01, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

Haber and Schiff, p. 275, Only 16 strong points were occupied out of 30. "Budapest" was the only fully manned strong point. 7 were evacuated, one survived and the rest were captured, by the Egyptians. Megaidler (talk) 19:59, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

Recent reversion

(Moved from my talk page (Hohum ^@) 01:22, 26 March 2010 (UTC))

Hi, I noticed you reverted my edits for the Yom Kippur War article. If I violated any Wiki policies I apologize, I recently made my account and I'm still getting used to editing. I'm a bit confused though, why were my edits WP:PEACOCK? I was simply stating what the sources stated. My removal of references was unintentional, and the lack of an edit summary is my fault. However, I do feel these edits are necessary, is there any way to implement them? Regards, ElUmmah (talk) 01:10, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

Sorry, WP:POV might have been a better description of my impression of a set of edits where "The Egyptian strike was so successful that...", replaced referenced phrasing which described heavy Egyptian losses.

Adding to this; a lack of edit comments, and removal of existing sources - will typically result in editors making a quick reversion.

(Hohum ^@) 01:22, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

Agreed, perhaps it could be re-phrased. I tried adding "despite 5-18 aircraft losses" and referenced both Shazly and Pollack to account for the dispute. My lack of an edit summary is my fault though, I won't forget to do that from now on. However, it IS disputed as to the number of Egyptian planes downed in the first air strike, and many sources state that it was the high success rate that prompted Cairo to cancel the second wave, rather than heavy losses. The fact that this statement is disputed should at least be mentioned. Also, Shazly stated in his book that there was a loss of 5 planes, not 10, which I corrected but was reverted. Finally, regarding the mentioned dispute between Shazly's figures and other sources (...280 men killed, 10 aircraft and 20 tanks, though this account is disputed especially in connection with Egyptian aircraft losses). I removed this because the number of Egypt's aircraft losses is a dispute in itself, so I didn't think it should be used to counter Shazly's figures. ElUmmah (talk) 01:40, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

@ELUmmah: Another note, it would be better if you could group your contributions into a single edit, making it simpler for other editors. Also, if someone is going to revert you, with a single, large edit, your entire addition will be seen prior to reversion, better than finding yourself being reverted midway through your edits.

I don't agree with Pollack, but he is considered a reliable source, and thus his version should be included as well. We should reconcile between the opposing accounts and include both in the article. However I oppose the "heavy losses" phrasing. The loss of 18 aircraft from a strike force numbering around 220 aircraft (an 8% loss) sounds quite acceptable. Given its combat history with the IAF, I believe the EAF would have been expecting far greater losses. In Egyptian accounts, the 5 aircraft figure is described as "negligible losses"; adding 13 to that number doesn't turn it into "heavy losses". --Sherif9282 (talk) 09:07, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

Does the source used describe it as heavy? An aside - after only ten missions, with a 10% loss rate per mission, strength drops to about 30%. I believe multiple missions per day would be the norm in this war, so they would have only a few days life expectancy. When RAF loss rates were in this region in WWII, aircrew losses were considered heavy. (Hohum ^@) 18:51, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

To Sherif, I apologize for the multiple edits, it was unintentional, I was still getting used to citing sources on Wiki and as a result I got the format wrong a few times and had to correct them. I think I have the hang of it now though. I agree we should include both accounts, to say that the second wave was cancelled only because of the EAF's losses, as opposed to the high success rate achieved, would be incorrect. Both should be mentioned, though I too disagree with Pollack's analysis. Hohum, no Pollack doesn't describe the losses as heavy, however he states that it was these losses that prompted Cairo to cancel the second, which is disputed. How about this:

The airstrikes proved highly effective, despite the loss of 5-18 planes. The high success rate achieved, coupled with these losses (due to the arrival of IAF fighters) prompted Cairo to cancel a second wave of airstrikes.

This is just rough, let me know what you think of it and feel free to make any changes.ElUmmah (talk) 21:09, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

Was there a consensus for the photo in the header?

At the time such a photo was removed according to consensus, since it paints a false picture. It shows the first stage of the war and perpetuates propaganda that this is the outcome of the war. Since Israel won decisively in the end, it is wrong to put such a picture as the lead for the article. So if there was no discussion over this, I will remove the photo. Like another user said: "Since this article is about the entire war (as opposed to the initial phase), I think that an image (if any) in the warbox should represent the entire war and not only the initial phase. Back to my example: the fact that Napoleon entered Moscow is not as important as that in result he lost 98% of his army and the Russians conquered Paris" Amoruso (talk) 04:05, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

couldn't find anything except the original objection. removed it. Amoruso (talk) 04:17, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

Reverted. The crossing of Suez is an iconic image of this war in every sense. It's an event that shattered all previous assumptions about the AI conflict and one which led to major changes in the political shape of that conflict. It's difficult to imagine a more appropriate image for this war. Gatoclass (talk) 06:10, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

It's very easy to imagine other images. For example Ariel Sharon in bandaged head crossing the canal back. You can either make a montage or leave it out. This doesn't represent the war - it represents the first phase - and you can place it there.Amoruso (talk) 08:47, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

The image has been in the article for four months and AFAIK not one person has objected to it until you came along. Please don't make such changes before sounding out consensus, thanks Gatoclass (talk) 13:48, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

"If the only thing you have to say about a contribution to the encyclopedia is that it lacks consensus, it's best not to revert it." - WP:DRNC.

While the image is probably not the most representative of the article content, how about seeking consensus on a better one before removing it. Even if it's not the best lead image, it should be in the article somewhere. (Hohum ^@) 14:27, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

It should definitely be in the article but not in the lead. It gives a false impression. See the original discussion here. Amoruso (talk) 15:15, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

I went for compromise.. I think the caption should reflect that it turned around. Change wording if you wish... if it reflects the developments of the war, I won't try to remove the photo unless we find a better one (or two together is best IMO). Amoruso (talk) 15:41, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

The discussion linked to was four years ago, and didn't reach a strong consensus IMO. (Hohum ^@) 20:45, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

Not only that, but the four-year-old discussion Amuroso linked to actually has a 3 to 2 consensus in favour of the image. Gatoclass (talk) 06:07, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

3 to 2 consensus???? :) - BorisG (talk) 08:38, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

Well, it's 60% in favour, but the point is that even the old discussion Amuroso pointed to in support of his view shows that he was in the minority. I note also that another of those users at the time described the image as "iconographic" which echoes my own comment above. Gatoclass (talk) 09:33, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

I suggest presenting a collage of multiple photos instead of one. The collage will include the current photo, this beautiful one, a photo of supplies delivered to the 3rd army through Israeli check points and a photo of Syrians in the Golan Heights. Megaidler (talk) 10:15, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

There's no collage for 1948 Arab-Israeli War, no collage for Six-Day War, why should there be a collage for this one? Gatoclass (talk) 10:44, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

That's because the photo here only represents a first phase of the war and not representative of the outcome. By the way, there were more discussions perhaps on the page reverts itself, but a large majority of people supported the removal of the resulting-fraudulent picture, and now it also has a fraudulent-resulting caption and victory section, and what appears to be WP:OWN behavior by a specific user (not you). Amoruso (talk) 14:43, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

Some war/battle articles use collages, some don't. It depends on the editors who are developing the article - that's us.

Collages can give a flavour of several aspects - which keeps editors happy that their favourite pov is represeanted. However, images in the collage tend not to be repeated in the main text, which can be a loss. They can also be rather cluttered - trying to fit too much in - and compiling them can use a lot of discussion time.

My preference is either an uncontroversial image which is still representative (not necessarily an easy image to agree on), or a map - which in this case is pretty straightforward. (Hohum ^@) 11:21, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

I agree that collages often look cluttered and are not very effective. Much better to have a single good image IMO, and I think it would be difficult to find a more eloquent image for this war than the current one. Gatoclass (talk) 12:33, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

I agree that a map is a good idea. There used to be one before showing the different areas taken before and after the war. At any rate, the caption should be changed before someone reverted the page without justification. Amoruso (talk) 14:43, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

Israeli victory?!!

This article became nothing but an Israeli propaganda thanks to MegaIdler..
How on earth can you consider the YKW an Israeli victory??, even the Hebrew article don't dare to mention that.
And what's your source?? they are all Israeli historians. Well, Arab historians on the other side say it was an Arab victory. I think since it's an English article, we should depend more on western or even Russian sources, not on Israeli school books.
The most reliable western historians about YKW are Dupuy, O'Ballance, Blum, and Gawrych. They agree that the war was an Egyptian political and strategical victory, and it was a military stalemate on both fronts.
Let me quote Dupuy first, "As a result of honorable fighting waged by both Egyptian and Syrian armies, the Arabs restored their own pride and self-confidence, which led to the reinforcement of Arab influence on the international arena in general. Strategically and politically speaking, there is no doubt that Egypt has won the war."
He also said, "Thus, if war is the employment of military force in support of political objectives, there can be no doubt that in strategic and political terms the Arab States - and particularly Egypt - won the war, even though the military outcome was a stalemate permitting both sides to claim military victory."
And Gawrych's book is talking mainly about an Egyptian political victory out of a limited military success, and he condemned those who talks unabashedly about an Israeli victory. Blum also agree with that.
As for O'Ballance, and as his book's name implies, there was No Victor, No Vanquished. And dozens of respectful western and Russian historians agree with this statement.
The same applies to both sides casualties and losses during the war. Herzog and Rabinovich are Israelis. MegaIdler uses Israeli statistics for IDF losses, and Israeli estimates for Arab losses too!!
Why do you ignore Arab data, western and Russian estimates and depened only on Israeli sources??
I have sources about Israeli, Arab, Western, and Russian estimates about both sides losses during the war, and When I tried to add it to the article, MegaIdler not only deleted it, but he also said that O'Ballance had a lack of knowledge!!
So MegaIdler who is a college student, has more knowledge than colonel Edgar O'Ballance, the British military historian, who authored dozens of history books!!!!!
According to O'Ballance and many other sources, non-Israeli figures about Israeli casualties are 8,000 killed and 20,000 wounded. And according to a CIA report published on 11th of October, IDF had 3,000 killed, 15,000 wounded, and 1,000 PoWs of whom 43 are fighter pilots, so the number 8,000 killed seems to be logical. Many says that maybe CIA was exaggerating to hasten Operation Nickel Grass, but anyway this remains a CIA and a reliable report.
The Arabs also had 8,528 killed and 15,000 wounded including civilians according to most western figures. 15,000-18,500 killed is just an initial IDF estimate. Well, Egyptian army estimated that IDF had 18,000 killed and 27,000 wounded. Do you want me to add it, huh?
This applies also to tank and air losses, and the number of Egyptian PoWs is exagerrated too.
I think we should cooperate to achieve an unbiased article, or we should start another one from pure Arab perspective. Vicimanno (talk) 18:55, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

Throwing accusations about will get you nowhere, nor being snyde or confrontational. Focus on content, not editors. Also useless is suggesting creating a purely POV fork. Include your information in the article with references. If your sources are questioned, take it to WP:RSN for them to say whether it is considered reliable or not.

However, I will advise again that arguing over the contents of the lead or infobox (you don't make it clear what sections you take issue with) - is mostly wasted unless it doesn't summarize the main article text. If the problem is that the main article text needs improving, do so. I also advise against removing already sourced information, if reliable sources differ, include both/all/a representative range.(Hohum ^@) 19:31, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

OK Huhum, I will remove "Israeli tactical victory" and add "Military stalemate on both fronts" according to the mentioned western references above, anyone has other suggestions?? Vicimanno (talk) 19:49, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

What part of the article supports stalemate? It's disputed in the article - so that is what the infobox should say. (Hohum ^@) 01:38, 12 April 2010 (UTC)

The CIA report of high Israeli casualties was published only on 11/10/1973. Therefore it is only an initial inaccurate estimation, and it is not represent the current U.S estimations of the 1973 war casualties. Accurate details can only be found after a much more serious research. The only sources of information the CIA had by 11/10 is its previous knowledge of the size, location and equipment of the opposing forces, as well as Golda Meir crying for help while in panic. It was done before the first flight of the SR-71 plane. That means they had even no aerial photos when this report was made. The assessment of 3,000 dead, 15,000 wounded 1,000 POW and 200 destroyed aircraft was a mere guess.
The best source for Israeli casualties is the State of Israel. Israel can count better then anyone else the number of its own losses, as well as the number of Arab POW it captured. The names of all 2,693 fallen Israeli soldiers from the out break of the war until the separation of forces with Syria are listed.
Regarding the Arab losses it is also the same. The Arab régimes can count their own losses better than any one else. However, as I have mentioned before, there is a problem with the Arab casualties count. Until now the governments of, neither Egypt nor did Syria publish official details of their losses. These corrupt governments have something to hide. This is highly severe when it comes to fallen soldiers. Hiding the name and the death of some one who fought for his nation is a dishonor for the martyr and his family. Therefore we can only estimate Arab casualties.
The 1st best source for estimation is Israel because it was the one who confronted the Arabs and can get a lot of information about the combat. The 2nd best source is independent Arab journalists that had access to some secret documents of the Arab armies and they are not afraid to violate the censorship, maybe someone like Gamal Hammad. The 3rd best source is the intelligence agencies of many countries. The 4th best source is independent authors like Dupuy, O'Ballance, Blum, and Gawrych.
When ElBaradei becomes president of Egypt, there is a possibility that the Arab Republic of Egypt will finely publish its casualty's data. Until then, we are left only with assessments. Megaidler (talk) 21:17, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

The CIA did not pull that number from their imagination, they had a basis for it. While I agree the figure was probably off due to it's being estimated prior to the war's end, that's no reason to completely dismiss it. If you follow that logic, then Schiff's book "October Earthquake" should also be dismissed, since it was written immediately following the war, and so would not be as accurate as more modern estimates. You're saying Israel is the best source to estimate Arab losses?? Truly, you astonish me! If it was up to you this entire article would be based solely on Israeli estimates and information, and you would disregard all secondary sources and Arab primary sources (unless of course, they agree with your own POV). Gawrych's estimates, as well Dupuy's, O-Ballance's, Rabinovich's and all other reliable scholars regarding the conflict WILL be used in this article, as they are all reliable scholars. I note that you have, for the THIRD time now, removed referenced material. Not a single one of my edits are unreferenced yet you continue to revert to suit your own POV. If you have a problem with my sourced material, discuss it BEFORE making changes. Thank you, ElUmmah (talk) 22:17, 11 April 2010 (UTC)

Holy crap. Since you can't agree on anything, include the all the numbers and attribute them to their sources. How many times does this article have to go around this loop? Stop trying to remove or replace references that you can't get consensus to remove, and that aren't deemed unreliable. If you have a differing information, include it and include the citation. Wikipedia articles are expected to have conflicting information when sources are contradictory. (Hohum ^@) 01:38, 12 April 2010 (UTC)

Hohum, I completely agree with you, and that's what I have been doing for all my edits that involve controversial information. The whole reason behind this argument is that Megaidler is constantly removing my sourced material and all other material that does not suit his POV and deeming his sources the correct ones. My attempts to include both sources results in him quickly reverting without discussion.Regards,ElUmmah (talk) 02:45, 12 April 2010 (UTC)

How could this be a military stalemate? On both fronts, Israel repelled the Arab invasions. On the Golan front, the IDF chased the Syrian army deep inside Syria itself, and threathened Damascus. On the Sinai front, the IDF crossed the canal, surrounded the Egyptian forces and were free to capture Cairo. The Arabs lost the war in every way, both tactical and strategic. I also doubt this being a political Arab victory. Before the war, the Arabs were seeking to exterminate Israel. After the war, they were willing to give peace for land. The Arabs had to change their foreign policy in order to regain lost territory through diplomacy. This was a decisive Israeli victory in every way. --Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 17:37, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Agreed. This really is not that complicated. Type in Yom Kippur War plus victory in google news archive and book. Israel came back for the military win according to the majority of sources. The Arabs held on long enough that they did not need to declare surrender and their people rejoiced in some good politics. This was magnified with the peace talks being just fine for them. I think my favorite headline was "We [Israel] never win, they [Arabs] never lose" but it doesn't need a complicated infobox since it isn't complicated.Cptnono (talk) 17:49, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Could you (all) please limit yourselves to doing what this talk page is intended for - discussing what information, from what sources, should be included in the article. This isn't a venue for argument in the sidelines. Plenty of sources give different views on the outcome, include them in the text, summarize them in the infobox, stop pushing your favourite. (Hohum ^@) 17:47, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

How could anyone call this a strategic Egyptian victory? That doesn't make sense, as the Arab forces were driven far back into their own territory. Please, anyone, explain this to me.--Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 19:40, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

What do you think referring you to do a google news archive search was Hohum? The sources are all right there. Did you even read the comments or did you just assume? In fairness, I did see strategic in two different sources the other day. (different war it turns out after a second look) It can (and obviously has been) read in two different ways. It appears (even the sources mentioning it are vague) that those using "strategic" are discussing the outcome after the peace/whatever process. I can't tell for sure without looking at more though. And the article does not say it was a strategic victory anywhere else so depite assertions in edit summaries and this talk page, the infobox does not match the article by saying it. I see that some sources are mentioned above also (I totally ignored them sorry about that) but those do not clearly lay out what "strategic" is which leads to it being vague. It also is in conflict with "military" victory depending on how you read it. Please, clarify it in the text. Maybe I was wrong and we do need a "victory" subsection. I am finding more and more sources sayuing "military" victory for Israel so I wouldn't mind expanding that since the infobox is not necessarily the place.Cptnono (talk) 20:06, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

I highly favour the infobox to include "Israeli military victory". Israel won on the battlefield, and the Arabs gained absolutely nothing out of the war, except for some "pride". Israel returned Sinai to Egypt 5 years after the war, so this does not belong in the infobox. --Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 22:08, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

I am seeing more and more sources saying "military victory". I actually haven't looked up "tactical" but assume that is used less and if anything means the same thing. Strategic was in some sources provided above but it is not clear and confusing. "Military" is in the majority of sources for Israel. "Political" has some reasoning for the Arabs. "Strategic" is just not clear and is casing confussion. I do not want that one single word to prevent the infobox from saying the other two. I think it is a disservice to the reader. However, I am warming up to the idea of ""See the 'Aftermath' section"" per Template:Infobox military conflict. Howeverx2, people have said the article is too long and for this to happen we would certainly need a separate subsection so that the reader does not have to comb through everything to see who was victorious. This is an important aspect of the subject and needs a separate section. So, there will be even more kbs if we go this route. We can limit other stuff (I still think that one author is recieving to much play) but that is another discussion. So what is next? What are people prefering now? Part of me feels this is bowing to edit warring but we have to move forward one way or the other.Cptnono (talk) 22:45, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

From the existing text body. "The war is described as a military stalemate and an Egyptian strategic and political victory by Major Steven J. Piccirilli".

Again, get the main body text reflecting what the sources say, and then reflect that in the infobox and lead. If you have reliable sources which present something else, include what they say in the article. I am not required to go find them for you. WP:PROVEIT. It really doesn't matter what you "highly favour" it matters what the sources used say.

This will ultimately almost certainly lead to an expansion of a section dealing with what the aftermath was, which will almost certainly reflect that there is ongoing disputes about who gained what - leaving the infobox with something like "Military and political outcome: Disputed, see XXX section. + Ceasefire, UN resolutions, etc."

Again, stop trying to push your favourite interpretation. Although some outcomes have minority support, unless they are fringe, they should be included.(Hohum ^@) 22:51, 20 April 2010 (UTC)