User:AlbertoOhist73/sandboxAO73
| Recapture of Fort Vaux | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Battle of Verdun 1916 and World War I 1914-1918 | |||||||
 Cover page Mangin Group and storming of Fort Vaux 's war diaries | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 France |
 Germany Empire | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
G.A.C Commander G.A.C Artillery Commander Chef Commander 230th RI Commander Lt-colonel Vidal |
Commander in chief Cdt Maas-Ost-Groupe Area commander 34th DI Commander 9th D Commander 13th DI Commander 25th D Commander 54th D Commander 33rd D Commander 53th RD Commander Generalleutnant George von Engelbrechten | ||||||
The recapture of Fort Vaux (French: Reprise du fort de Vaux) by the French troops was a military engagement between October 24 and November 3, 1916 ; during the Battle of Verdun on the French Western Front in World War I.
Fort Vaux has been in the hands of German troops since the beginning of June 1916. This French structure is one of the essential points of the fortification belt around Verdun.
Context[edit]
Following a series of German offensive victories (capture of Fort Douaumont, Fort Vaux, Damloup battery, etc.) General Mangin took command of Group D then D and E on June 19, 1916. (Also named Group Mangin).
During the summer, fighting never stops in the area. Each side fights hard for every meter of land. The front constantly moves a few meters or even a hundred meters, and the ground conquered one day by one side is retaken by the adversary the next day.
For example, on July 1, 1916, we observe the most pronounced advance of the Germans towards Verdun. They will be stopped at "La Poudrière", only about 2 km (1.2 mi) from the outskirts of the city of Verdun and 4 km (2.5 mi) from the city center. On the other hand, at the beginning of August, French troops brought the fight to the Fumin woods, only 800 m (0.50 mi) from the Fort.
A most typical example of this territory, tirelessly taken and retaken at the cost of many lives, is the village of Fleury-devant-Douaumont; it changed hands 16 times between June and August 1916, between French and German troops.
Neither side manages to have superiority. The Germans dominated many strategic points, which blocked all attempts at French progress. Specifically, Fort Douaumont, Fort Vaux, Battery of Damloup, the small “depot” (deposit base), post Thiaumont and large numbers of isolated batteries (batteries of the quarries, of the false coast, etc.) as well as many ridges, are in German hands. The French troops, who advance through ravines, gutters and exposed open spaces are systematically pushed back at the cost of many lives. However, French troops managed to keep the forts of Souville and Tavannes, which stopped the advance of German troops towards Verdun.
On September 7, Lieutenant-Colonel Viotte, commander of the 230th regiment of infantery, says :
“The situation is less alarming than in the spring but not that good. Over thousands of hectares, the enemy has created a hell of carnage and fire; day and night, its artillery pours an avalanche of projectiles on our lines and the numbers (soldiers) continue to shrink rapidly; the wear and tear is extreme and we feel that an entire winter spent in these conditions would be terrible against an adversary who still holds key points of support on the battlefield.”
It is clear that there have been few convincing outcomes from isolated attacks carried out since June, and we know that the Germans have shifted a significant portion of their resources to the Somme front.
On September 17, 1916, a real turning point occurs when General Mangin made the following proposal; a new strategy before winter and before a reinforcement of German troops from other battles. This change in strategy is backed by his superior, General Nivelle, who will encourage him to always surpass himself.
General Mangin’s proposal[edit]
Note n°2323/3 from General Mangin to General Nivelle, commander of the French Second Army; here is an extract:
“The operations carried out by the D.E. group now form an additional barrier, in front of Verdun, on the war front: rump 321, entrenchment Z... Vaux-Chapitre Woods. But we are not sure that this barrier will sustain a major attack; there is therefore a great interest in building an additional barrier ahead to create more distance between the Germans and Verdun on one hand, and at the same time to make it impossible for them to attack the barrier defined above.
1- The analysis of the terrain sets the objective of this frontline around Fort Vaux and Fort Douaumont. We would be uncomfortable with this new front because the Germans would see everything from Fort Douaumont and communications would be difficult. But tactical interest takes precedent over all other considerations.
2- We are wondering whether this method of small offensives, which so far has given good results, can continue to be used. We do not agree. Indeed, if the successes obtained are largely due to the superiority of our troops, the terrain also has a certain influence. The German position formed a pocket in our lines, this pocket being located in a ravine around which we held most ridges. The enemy could therefore be very easily isolated from its rear by artillery fire. Furthermore, local attacks could create synergies that provided major cover. But in order to move our current line forward, the same method is no longer possible, and it is through large-scale action that we must proceed.
Military tools needed:
- Infantry: war front to attack approximately 4000m, 1 battalion per 300m = 12-13 battalions.
-Enemy: 1st line 13 battalions, 2nd line 5.5 battalions, 3rd line 2.5 battalions and 37 battalions in reserve.
However, of the two sides, the one with most reserves will have control of the battlefield. A total of 48 battalions, or 4 Divisions, are therefore necessary to carry out the operation. Taking into account the reliefs, in reality only 2 additional Divisions are needed to support the two currently mobilized (Divisions 55th and 133rd).
- Additional field artillery to go with the increase of two more divisions.
- Short artillery needs are already satisfied; there would be serious advantages in increasing the number of rapid-fire weapons and a battery of 370mm guns supplied with 400 rounds would be required for destructive fire on the forts of Vaux and Douaumont. The 2 howitzers of 270mm and the 2 howitzers of 280mm are not enough.
- Long heavy artillery: 143 German batteries, we can counteract with 49 of our own, so we would need an additional 94.
On September 21, 1916, General Nivelle approves of this offensive plan [5] (and Annex No. 562[6]).