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Connally v. General Construction Co.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 30, December 1, 1925
Decided January 4, 1926
Full case nameConnally, Commissioner, et. al., Petitioners v. General Construction Company
Docket no.314
Citations269 U.S. 385 (more)
46 S.Ct. 126
DecisionOpinion
Holding
The Due Process Clauses require that any criminal law be clear enough that a common person would not have to guess what it prohibits or compels.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William H. Taft
Associate Justices
Oliver W. Holmes Jr. · Willis Van Devanter
James C. McReynolds · Louis Brandeis
George Sutherland · Pierce Butler
Edward T. Sanford · Harlan F. Stone
Case opinions
MajoritySutherland, joined by Taft, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Butler, Sanford
ConcurrenceHolmes, Brandeis
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. XIV

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case which determined that the Constitution's Due Process Clauses require criminal laws to be clear enough that a common person can understand (without guessing) what the law prohibits or compels. The Court reasoned, in the majority opinion for its unanimous judgment, that this rule against vagueness was "well recognized" and consistent with "ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law" and, accordingly, that it was protected by the guarantee of due process.[1] When a criminal law fails to provide a clear mandate, under the Court's holding, that law is unenforceable.

The case concerned Sections 7255 and 7257 of the Compiled Oklahoma Statutes, which together made it a crime for a government contractor to fail to pay their employees at least "the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed."[2][3] The Court concluded that this requirement was too indeterminate to pass muster under the Due Process Clause. The "current rate" of wages was a moving target that depended on a full complex of factors, including the specific type of work performed and the efficiency of the workers.[4] On a given day, it would not be possible to figure out with any certainty what wage the law actually required. The Court also took issue with the law's "use of the qualifying word 'locality.'"[5] What was "local" was something that reasonable people could disagree on, meaning that the law again failed to provide a definite standard.

Since the time of the Court's decision, the vagueness doctrine—as it became known—has evolved into an important feature of American constitutional law. The doctrine has been applied to a wide variety of circumstances and has even been cited in the courts of foreign states.[6][7][8][9][10][11] The Court's reasoning has also been extrapolated from its original criminal context to other areas of law, such as civil litigation and deportation.[12][13][14] These innovations in the use of the vagueness doctrine have dramatically furthered its reach.

Although the Court's judgment in this case was unanimous, not every Justice signed on to the majority's use of the vagueness doctrine. Justices Oliver W. Holmes and Louis Brandeis concurred in the judgment solely on the grounds that the wages paid by the respondent passed muster "under any criterion" which the challenged law might require.[15] As such, the two Justices did not think it was necessary to consider the vagueness issue in this case.

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The laws challenged in this case were enacted as part of a national trend favoring legislative regulation of wages and hours, both public and private.[16] Such wage and labor laws, which took a variety of forms, all had the common purpose of establishing minimum standards that employers would be required to meet. One form of wage law (a current-rate requirement) proved particularly controversial because it was thought to be especially indeterminate.[17] Those laws did not identify a specific wage that must be paid, leaving many employers to worry that there was no bright line that they could follow. To be safe from prosecution, employers would have to err on the side of higher wages, which could prove to be a potentially costly approach.[18] These concerns gave rise to the constitutional challenge against Oklahoma's current-rate law.

Current-rate laws

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Main article: Minimum wage in the United States

Current-rate laws were not unique to Oklahoma. To the contrary, such provisions could be found across the United States.[19] Among the states which had adopted current-rate provisions similar to Oklahoma's were: Arizona,[20] Delaware,[21] Idaho,[22] Kansas,[23] Maryland,[24] Massachusetts,[25] and New York.[19][26] In general, and as was the case with Oklahoma's current-rate law, these provisions required that workmen receive "not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed."[19] The main difference between this type of wage law and

References

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  1. ^ Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
  2. ^ Connally, 269 U.S., at 388.
  3. ^ Compiled Oklahoma Statutes 1921, §§7255 and 7257.
  4. ^ Connally, 269 U.S., at 393.
  5. ^ Connally, 269 U.S., at 394.
  6. ^ "Opinion analysis: Vagueness doctrine as a shield for criminal defendants". SCOTUSblog. June 24, 2019. Retrieved September 6, 2020.
  7. ^ Argentieri, Nicole M. (June 16, 2020). "Federal Public Corruption Prosecution After 'Bridgegate'". New York Law Journal. Retrieved September 6, 2020.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  8. ^ "Individual Criminal Liability For Failure To Disclose Data Breach Establishes A New Level Of Risk For Companies And Executives". JD Supra. Retrieved September 6, 2020.
  9. ^ "RCFP urges Supreme Court to narrow scope of federal hacking law". The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. July 9, 2020. Retrieved September 6, 2020.
  10. ^ "Kansas Knife Statute Held Unconstitutionally Vague". Reason.com. July 29, 2020. Retrieved September 6, 2020.
  11. ^ "Contempt Unbound: The Supreme Court on Prashant Bhushan". TheLeaflet. August 20, 2020. Retrieved September 6, 2020.
  12. ^ Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-499 (1982).
  13. ^ Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951).
  14. ^ Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018).
  15. ^ Connally, 269 U.S., at 396.
  16. ^ Vyver, Frank T. "Regulation of Wages and Hours Prior to 1938" (PDF). Law and Contemporary Problems. 6: 323–332.
  17. ^ Vyver 330.
  18. ^ Vyver 331.
  19. ^ a b c Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 541–545. 1931. p. 445.
  20. ^ Arizona Revised Statutes 1913, §3103.
  21. ^ Delaware Revised Code 1915, §2161.
  22. ^ Compiled Idaho Statutes 1919, §2324.
  23. ^ Kansas General Statutes 1915, §5870.
  24. ^ Maryland Public Local Laws, Code 1888, art. 4, §31a.
  25. ^ Massachusetts General Laws 1921, chapter 149, §§26 and 27.
  26. ^ New York Acts of 1921, chapter 50, §220.
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