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Hilary Putnam[edit]
Hilary Putnam rejects descriptivist ideas about natural kind by elaborating on semantic concepts in language.[1] Putnam explains his rejection of descriptivist and traditionalist approaches to natural kinds with semantic reasoning, and insists that natural kinds can not be thought of via descriptive processes or creating endless lists of properties.
In Putnam's "Twin-Earth" thought experiment, one is asked to consider the extension of “water” when confronted with an alternate version of “water” on an imagined “Twin-Earth.” This “water” is composed of chemical XYZ, as opposed to H2O. However, in all other describable aspects, it is the same as Earth’s “water.“ Putnam argues that the mere descriptions of an object, such as “water,” is insufficient in defining natural kind. There are underlying aspects, such as chemical composition, that may go unaccounted for unless experts are consulted. This information provided by experts is what Putnam argues will ultimately define natural kinds.[1]
Putnam calls the essential information used to define natural kind "core facts." This discussion arises in part in response to what he refers to as “Quine’s pessimism” of theory of meaning. Putnam claims that a natural kind can be referred to via its associated stereotype. This stereotype must be a normal member of the category, and is itself defined by core facts as determined by experts,. By conveying these core facts, the essential and appropriate use of natural kind terms can be conveyed.[2]
The process of conveying core facts to communicate the essence and appropriate term of a natural kind term is shown in Putnams example of describing a lemon and a tiger. With a lemon, it is possible to communicate the stimulus-meaning of what a lemon is by simply showing someone a lemon. In the case of a tiger, on the other hand, it is considerably more complicated to show someone a tiger, but a speaker can just as readily explain what a tiger is by communicating its core facts. By conveying the core facts of a tiger (e.g. big cat, four legs, orange, black stripes, etc.), the listener can, in theory, go on to use the word "tiger" correctly and refer to its extension accurately.[2]
- ^ a b Bird, Alexander; Tobin, Emma (2018), Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), "Natural Kinds", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2019-11-23
- ^ a b Putnam, Hilary (1970-07). "IS SEMANTICS POSSIBLE?". Metaphilosophy. 1 (3): 187–201. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1970.tb00602.x. ISSN 0026-1068.
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The section about Hilary Putnam's theories of natural kind was written with perceived future edits on the article as a whole in mind. The article as a whole needs editing to remove bias and an overall argumentative tone in favor of a more informative structure. This section does respond to some of Quine's thinking (what Putnam refers to as Quine's pessimism) but it is not intended to further argue a view on natural kind. Putnam's thought experiments (the Twin-Earth and Lemon vs. Tiger) are meant to clarify what natural kind is.