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Anti-satellite weapon

ASAT acronyms:

  • DA/ASAT Direct Ascent/Anti-Satellite Weapon
  • DAA Direct Ascent Anti-Satellite
  • DANASAT Direct Ascent Nuclear Anti Satellite
  • DANASAT Direct Ascent Nuclear Anti-Satellite (weapon)
  • DASAT Direct Ascent Anti-Satellite
  • DSAT Defense Satellite
  • DSAT Defensive Satellite




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Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1990-1991

6

Modernizing and Equipping the Army

Modernization: Into the Post–Cold War Era

The Persian Gulf war in Southwest Asia served as both an end and a beginning for the Army's equipment and systems modernization programs. In one sense, the war was the ultimate proving ground for the equipment fielded during the Army's aggressive modernization program that began in the 1970s and reached fruition during the 1980s. The performance of the Army's equipment in the sands of Saudi Arabia was the test of the decisions that had been made when the Army, after emerging from the jungles of Southeast Asia, reconsidered the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact on the fields and in the forests of Central Europe. Even before all of the troops were withdrawn from Vietnam, the Army had initiated a wide-ranging re examination of its doctrine, force structure, and equipment. The demands of the Vietnam War had compelled the service to postpone its plans to modernize its forces. The Army's force structure was an amalgam of units, and most of its equipment was rooted in the 1950s.

As the Army reduced its size and began a reshaping process after Vietnam, the service's leadership realized that equipment and systems modernization needs could not be met all at once. Consequently, the Army projected its equipment needs for the next decade.

Five major pieces of equipment were identified as top priority—a main battle tank, an attack helicopter, a utility helicopter, an air defense missile, and an infantry fighting vehicle. This group of equipment, which became identified collectively as the “Big Five,” constituted the centerpiece of Army modernization throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Guided by the specific need to develop, test, and field weapons and technologies to offset the threat from the Warsaw Pact, the Army in the 1980s underwent the largest peacetime modernization in its history; fielding a vast array of equipment, in addition to the Big Five. This equipment ranged from tanks to mobile kitchen trailers to helmets, and modernization occurred in both the active and the reserve components.

When the President directed the deployment of Army active and reserve forces to Southwest Asia in August 1990, these forces were armed

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with the weapons and equipment developed during the last decade and a half. The lead brigade of the 82d Airborne Division deployed with AH–64 Apache helicopters, and Abrams M1 tanks and M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles were on board the ships that carried the 24th Infantry Division's equipment to Southwest Asia. Following in the wake were Patriot air defense system launchers from Fort Bliss, Texas, and the UH–60 Black Hawks of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). In Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq the plans, policies, and procedures that guided the development and fielding of this equipment and many other types were tested in combat. The Persian Gulf war validated—some in part, others more fully—the ideas, concepts, and hardware that had modernized the Army during the 1970s and 1980s.

The performance of Army equipment in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM also established a foundation for the future. Like the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Persian Gulf war did much to define the lethality and dynamics of the future battlefield. The Gulf war provided the Army with a performance baseline from which it could delineate further its future requirements and develop and field equipment to meet them. This baseline would be of critical importance for the Army's development of its modeling, designs, and simulations in the 1990s and beyond.

By the late 1980s the Army had begun adapting to budget reductions, with significant implications for the service's future modernization objectives. The rapid disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union removed a main pillar of the rationale that had supported large-scale defense spending. Lack of a specific “threat” and the desire for a “peace dividend” accelerated cuts in the Army's budget, which had been decreasing both in absolute terms and as a percentage of defense appropriations. Army decisionmakers were faced with difficult choices to ensure the most efficient use of the money appropriated. In addition, the Army's general modernization program was nearing completion. The Army would enter the twenty-first century armed largely with the equipment developed and fielded during the last quarter of the twentieth century.

In FY 89 the Army received $14.8 billion for procurement, but by FY 91 the service's procurement had been cut to $9.0 billion. (Offsetting somewhat the decrease in procurement funds, the amounts for research and development increased slightly.) By the end of FY 91 the situation had reached the point at which Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition Steven K. Conver warned that “Army modernization efforts are severely curtailed by constrained resources” and that “our procurement funding is dangerously low.” Because of the lack of funds, he declared, the Army was “at a crossroads.... Time and technology do not stand still. Tomorrow's battlefield will see increased firepower, better armor protection, and more advanced target acquisition sys-

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tems.” In Mr. Conver's opinion, the key to success on the future battlefield would be “the tough modernization decisions we make today.”

To adapt to the austere budgets, the Army developed a new modernization strategy. Recognizing that the total force could not be modernized all at the same time, the Army, in the late 1980s, embraced a strategy of modernizing by thirds. In practice, this meant that initial procurement of the most modern equipment would be fielded in the Army's forward-deployed and early deploying CONUS units, which included both the active and reserve components. The equipment displaced from the first group of units would be fielded to the second group, and displaced equipment of the second group would be assigned to the third. The Army believed that adoption of this strategy would allow a reasonably efficient stream of modernization within the force in view of limited procurement funds that would likely become even more restricted in the 1990s.

The major modernization programs of the 1970s and 1980s and fielding of the Big Five were nearing completion. By the end of 1991 the Army contained over 100 battalion/squadron sets of Abrams M1 tanks, 69 battalion sets of Bradley fighting vehicles, 13 battalion equivalents of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), 26 AH–64 attack helicopter battalions, and 12 Patriot air defense system battalions. In FY 91 the Army concluded that it was necessary to accept some risk over the near term and midterm to protect future modernization and the technology base, which meant modernizing only the most essential warfighting capabilities in the near term. To guide its modernization strategy, the Army established six principles:

—The most modern equipment must be put in the hands of those first to fight.

—Future weapon systems must possess the lethality to defeat the enemy while maximizing soldier and system survivability.

—New or enhanced capabilities must be fielded faster than those of potential opponents.

—Systems must be designed with future modernization potential.

—Modernization must be affordable, and to ensure affordability, the force will modernize by one-third increments.

—New systems should require minimal new equipment training for soldiers, should be reliable, and should be simple to operate and maintain in combat.

To guide its modernization efforts, the Army developed a coordinated series of plans for a twenty- to thirty-year period. These plans looked at both the Army's broad needs and specific functional mission areas. The mission areas addressed the general technology base, heavy and light forces, and all aspects of the operational environment (close, deep, rear). The Army used the mission area plans to produce documents that guided

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and coordinated modernization between and within functional areas. Specific mission areas for which plans were developed or planning was initiated included the Army's technology base, armored systems, armor-antiarmor, aviation, air defense, close air support, command and control, intelligence and electronic warfare, fire support, tactical wheeled vehicles, ammunition, material-handling equipment, and soldier support.

The Army had published the first version of its technology base plan—the Army Technology Base Master Plan (ATBMP)—in early 1989. This initial version reflected the Cold War mentality and projected the needs of the Army's technological base in terms of the Soviet threat. An updated ATBMP provided a comprehensive blueprint that outlined the Army's technology base investment strategy. The investment strategy was designed to meet the Army's future requirements in an era with an unspecified threat and constrained budgets. The technology base program included research, exploratory development, and nonsystem-specific advanced development. In the process, the Army intended to exploit mature and emerging technologies to meet the service's future equipment needs.

An important aspect of the ATBMP was a new initiative called Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrations (ATTDs). ATTDs were designed to shorten the developmental cycle by identifying promising, high payoff products produced by the technology base, and moving these products expeditiously into demonstration/validation phases, full-scale development, and/or product improvement programs. ATTDs received special management attention within HQDA. This oversight was provided by the ATTD Senior Advisory Group (SAG), cochaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition (OASA[RDA]) and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Force Development. By March 1991 thirteen ATTDs had been approved. Some of the approved ATTDs and the applicable mission areas included AirLand Battle management (command and control), common chassis (armor/antiarmor), multirole survivable radar (air defense), soldier integrated protective ensemble (soldier support), and standoff mine detection (engineer and mine warfare). Modernization initiatives continued within each of the mission areas during FY 90 and 91, although budget constraints and shifting priorities slowed their pace and scope.

Armored Systems

Production of the Abrams M1 tank for the Army began in 1980, and by early 1991 almost 7,000 of the M1 and its upgrades, the M1A1 models, had been fielded. In support of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM more than 1,000 M1A1 tanks were fielded to those Army heavy

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units previously deployed to Saudi Arabia without the M1A1. These units included the 1st and 24th Infantry Divisions (Mechanized), the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Armored Division, and the 3d Armored Cavalry regiment. In FY 90 the Army prepared to acquire material needed to produce the next variant of the Abrams, the M1A2. The M1A2 was originally scheduled to begin full-scale production in FY 92; however, a changing world situation and a diminished defense budget necessitated changes in the M1A2 program. The Army decided to limit the number of M1A2s to that which would prove the production line's ability to produce the tank efficiently, in case of future need. Once production capability was proven, no more M1 series tanks would be produced.

Rather than spend increasingly limited dollars on evolutionary improvements of the Abrams tank, the Army opted to take the limited short-term risk of not having enough M1s in the event of war. Instead, funds would be used to develop a more technologically advanced armored vehicle for the long term through the Armored Systems Modernization (ASM) plan. In the near term and midterm, the ASM plan outlined product improvements for application to the current fleet of combat vehicles. The ASM plan's second phase focused on modernizing all armored systems to maximize operational capabilities and interoperability. The key to this phase was the procurement of several vehicles developed to be built on similar chassis. For example, the ASM plan called for a common heavy chassis for the Block III tank, the Combat Mobility Vehicle (CMV), the Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS), and the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). In a similar case, the Armored Resupply Vehicle (ARV)- ammunition, and the Line-Of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) vehicle would share a medium protection chassis.

During FY 90 and 91, production and fielding of infantry and cavalry fighting vehicles also continued. By March 1991 Bradley mechanized infantry and cavalry fighting vehicles had been fielded to forty-seven battalion- size units. Production and fielding also continued on the Army's older armored personnel carrier, the M113. Deliveries of the latest version, the M113A3, were scheduled for completion in FY 91. Because of the changing threat and a realignment of budget priorities, the Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to restructure the ASM program with AFAS and ARV as the lead systems. Block III, CMV, and IFV were deferred indefinitely; LOSAT was returned to the tech base.

Aviation

The AH–64 Apache helicopter became the Army's primary attack helicopter in the 1980s. Production in quantity was initiated in 1982, and

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fielding of the Apache to the active component began in 1986. By November 1990 the Army had received 629 of its planned 807 helicopters to equip 40 battalions. The autumn 1990 budget agreement between the Congress and the President, however, precipitated the Army's decision to terminate the Apache procurement program at the end of FY 91.

Another of the Army's major modernization initiatives was its next generation light helicopter (LH). The Army intended the LH to replace its aging fleet of observation helicopters, OH–6 and OH–58 A/C's, and the AH–1 attack helicopter. Army leadership claimed that, along with the ASM plan, the LH was a critical element in the Army's long-term modernization effort. In 1988 the LH was approved for competitive demonstration/ validation development phase. At the end of this phase, a single contractor would be selected to produce the LH. Two contractor teams, Boeing/Sikorsky and McDonnell Douglas/Bell, submitted proposals for a preliminary LH design. In April 1991 the Department of Defense awarded the contract to the Boeing/Sikorsky team for the production of a prototype LH for the demonstration/validation phase. This phase was projected to last fifty-two months. Its objectives included completion of aircraft design, production of a prototype, and execution of a flight test program. The new LH was named the Comanche.

Air and Missile Defense

Another important part of Army modernization is the Forward Area Air Defense System (FAADS) for the division area. The Sergeant York air defense gun system (DIVAD) was canceled in 1985 because the Army concluded that neither single nor multiple weapons acting independently could defeat the forward area air threat. FAADS has five components, and integrates complementary weapons, sensors, and a command and control architecture to provide maximum protection to divisions in combat. Line-of- sight-forward-heavy (LOS-F-H) is provided by an air defense antitank system (ADATS) that integrates electro-optic sensors, a search radar, and eight laser-beam-riding missiles on an armored tracked vehicle. The non-line-of-sight system consists of a Fiber-Optic-Guided Missile (FOG-M) mounted on a tactical wheeled vehicle. The Avenger missile system serves as the line-of-sight-rear (LOS-R) element. The Avenger has multiple Stinger missiles and a heavy machine gun mounted on a tactical wheeled vehicle. The command, control, and intelligence (C2I) module integrates, processes, and distributes aerial target information gathered from sensors. The final component of FAADS is the combined arms initiatives (CAI), which includes installation of air-to-air Stingers on the OH–58C/D helicopter, improved air defense sights for the Bradley fighting vehicle, and antihelicopter ammunition for tanks.

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In developing FAADS, the Army decided to rely heavily on nondevelopment items (NDIs), which is the application of commercially developed products and product improvements. The strategy for acquiring FAADS included obtaining and distributing FAADS components as soon as they became available. Because of this approach, the development and distribution of FAADS components has not followed one schedule. The Martin Marietta ADATS, selected in 1987, was expected to enter full-scale production in FY 90, but reliability problems deferred a procurement decision until at least FY 92. In December 1988 Boeing Aerospace and Hughes Aircraft Missile Systems began full-scale development of the FOG-M, but the Army terminated this contract in January 1991 because of cost overruns. The Secretary of the Army approved Boeing Aerospace's Avenger as the standard item for the LOS-R component in February 1990. The Avenger went into full-scale production in April 1990 with a planned procurement of 1,779 units.

The Hawk and Patriot air and missile defense systems provide other forms of protection to Army units. Originally fielded in 1960, the Hawk is designed to provide air defense missile protection against low- to medium- altitude air attack. A product improvement program (PIP) for the Hawk that started in FY 89 and continued into FY 90 will give the Hawk a low-altitude, simultaneous engagement capability and enhanced electronic counter-countermeasures. A cooperative program between the Army, the Marine Corps, and the government of the Netherlands was initiated to enhance the system's mobility. The Army's Patriot air defense system is a medium- to high-altitude ballistic missile defense system. A mobile, all-weather system, the Patriot provides air and missile defense for the field army and vital military bases. By October 1991 the Army had deployed ten Patriot battalions—seven to Europe and three within CONUS. During FY 90 and 91 the Patriot's software was further upgraded to enhance its antitactical missile capability. The initial upgrade (PAC I) was completed in 1988, and the second (PAC II) was accelerated during the deployment for DESERT SHIELD. Thirty-five separate and additional software changes were also introduced for the Patriot system during the Persian Gulf war.

Fire Support

In the 1980s the Army investigated the implications of the massive numbers of Warsaw Pact artillery and the significantly smaller number possessed by the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in the event of a land war in Europe. Analysis revealed that artillery would provide 75 to 80 percent of the combat power of a Warsaw Pact main attack. Consequently, improvement

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of the Army's artillery systems, especially those assigned to the heavy (armored and mechanized infantry) divisions that would fight in Europe, became of paramount concern. A 1988 Defense Science Board study, Countering Soviet Fire Support Systems, agreed with this analysis. The study recommended accelerated development and fielding of fire support systems and significant increases in the allocation of Department of Defense funds to boost research, development, and acquisition.

The Army's primary field artillery weapons system for its heavy divisions is the M109 howitzer, a self-propelled, 155-mm. howitzer first introduced in the 1960s. Although the M109 howitzer had been upgraded several times by the mid-1980s, after more than two decades of service, the Army decided to conduct another major upgrade. The howitzer improvement program (HIP) was initiated to incorporate new technology and an improved capability to counter the Warsaw Pact artillery threat. In February 1990 the HIP howitzer was designated the M109A6 and approved for low-rate production. Five months later it was officially named the Paladin. The Paladin's improvements included a new cannon with a 25 percent increase in maximum range to 30 kilometers, improved crew protection against artillery fragmentation and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) hazards, automatic fire control, a position-locating device, SINCGARS radios, driver's night vision capability, and built-in test equipment. The Army planned to procure 824 Paladins, and production began in October 1991.

Another significant improvement in field artillery capabilities was provided by the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS). The ATACMS gives the operational (corps, army, and theater) commander a responsive, reliable, and survivable tool to fight the deep battle. Fired from the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launcher, the ATACMS is a conventional, surface-to-surface, semiguided missile. It has a dual capability warhead carrying either antipersonnel or antimaterial munitions. Low-rate initial production (LRIP) began in FY 89 and continued in FY 90. Production of 276 missiles was planned for FY 90 and 452 in FY 91. During FY 90 and 91 the Army completed fielding the AN/TPQ–36 and AN/TPQ–37 radars. These radars are the Army's counterbattery and countermortar detection systems that identify the location of enemy artillery, mortars, and rockets. In FY 90 modifications of the AN/TPQ–36 were made so that HMMWVs could move it. A self-survey capability was also added. Equipping of the first Army field unit with the modified radars was expected by the last quarter of FY 91.

The M119 is a lightweight 105-mm. howitzer developed by the United Kingdom and procured by the U.S. Army to replace M101A1 and M102 105-mm. howitzers in the Army's light divisions. The M119 uses standard 105-mm. ammunition and has a range of 14,300 meters. This range can be

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extended to 19,500 meters with rocket-assisted projectiles. The 7th Infantry Division received the first M119s in December 1989. Completion of fielding of the M119 to U.S. Army light units was expected by late 1995.

Combat Support/Combat Service Support

The battlefield capabilities of heavy engineer units were modernized with fielding of the M9 Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE). The ACE is a tracked, lightly armored, earthmoving vehicle designed to move on the battlefield and withstand hostile fire. Its design allows it to accomplish a myriad of engineering tasks such as digging, dozing, hauling, scraping, and grading. ACE fielding began in late 1989 and was accelerated for units in Southwest Asia during November–December 1990. The Army's research and development community responded rapidly to another major need identified in Saudi Arabia. Three months after being asked to develop a mine rake that could clear a lane the width of a vehicle through a minefield without exploding the mines, AMC produced and tested a prototype. Models were fabricated at Letterkenney Army Depot and shipped to the Middle East in January 1991. Army units successfully used the rakes to penetrate Iraqi defenses in February 1991. The German government donated sixty M93 Fox NBC detector vehicles to the U.S. government for use in the Persian Gulf, fifty for Army units and ten for the Marine Corps. The M93 Fox is 6-wheeled, armored, NBC reconnaissance vehicle that performs sophisticated NBC detection tasks while in motion.

A vital component of the Army's peacetime and wartime sustainment capability is its fleet of tactical wheeled vehicles. The fleet is divided into three classes—light (less than 2½ tons), medium (2½ to 5 tons), and heavy (greater than 5 tons). Modernization of each of the three classes continued during FY 90 and 91. In August 1989 a new five-year contract was awarded for 33,000 HMMWVs, a light vehicle that is replacing the quarter-ton truck. Production of the HMMWVs began in March 1990. The workhorse of the Army's tactical mobility fleet is the medium truck. Increased operating costs and age, however, significantly affected the reliability and performance of the Army's fleet of medium trucks, especially the 2½-ton models. In 1988 three contracts were let to manufacturers for prototypes of 2½-ton trucks for competitive evaluation and testing.

A centerpiece of the Army's efforts to develop its family of heavy vehicles is the palletized loading system (PLS). The PLS is a 16½-ton tactical vehicle composed of a prime mover equipped with an onboard load/unload capability and a 16½-ton trailer. It is designed to perform line haul, local haul, unit resupply, and other logistical missions in support of mobile combat operations. After approval by the Defense Acquisition Board, a contract was signed in September 1990 with Oshkosh Truck for

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2,700 of these vehicles and associated equipment under a LRIP schedule beginning in September 1991.

Reserve Components Modernization

The integration of the active and reserve components required by the Total Force policy extended to modernization activities. By FY 91 the Army aviation modernization plan had equipped two Army Reserve (USAR) aviation battalions with UH–60 Black Hawk helicopters. In July 1990 the Army approved the attack helicopter Company E concept for testing. Under this concept USAR attack helicopter companies would be augmented with an additional package of staff and sustainment personnel. The Reserve company would be collocated with an active component unit and use active component equipment for training. Other types of USAR units also received modern equipment during FY 90 and 91. The 100th Training Division acquired some M1 tanks during FY 90 and anticipated others because of active force reductions at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Medical units were issued the Minimum Essential Equipment for Training (MEET) sets as part of the Deployable Medical System (DEPMEDS). It was anticipated that forty-three MEET sets and one regional training set would be fielded to the Reserve by FY 91. Other systems fielded to USAR units included HMMWVs, M939 series 5-ton trucks, 9-mm. pistols, position azimuth determining systems (PADS), and mortar ballistic computers.

A key program that influenced Army National Guard (ARNG) modernization efforts was the equipment readiness program initiated in 1985. This program identified unit equipment needs and guided modernization activities to fill unit shortages. In FY 90 the Army planned to equip four ARNG tank units with Abrams M1 tanks. By the end of FY 91 Army officials anticipated that all Guard armor units would be equipped with either M1 or M60A3 thermal sight tanks, instead of M48A5s or M60/M60A1 tanks. The Army aviation modernization plan also included portions dedicated to the ARNG. Initial plans called for fielding of AH–64 Apache helicopters to fifteen Guard attack battalions and early fielding of the light helicopter, Comanche. These objectives were subsequently changed to fielding Apaches to twelve battalions and outfitting ten lift units with upgraded CH–47D Chinook medium lift helicopters. Among the efforts to modernize the Army's tactical wheeled vehicles was a program to replace the Guard's 212-ton and 5-ton gasoline truck engines with multifuel engines.

A continuing success story of reserve component modernization was the Dedicated Procurement Program (DPP). Congress established the DPP in 1981 to assist the reserve components in reaching their readiness goals. By 1991 the ARNG had committed over $1.6 billion of DPP funds

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to correct unit equipment shortages. Similar actions were taken by the USAR. From FY 81 through FY 90 the Reserve's DPP was used to purchase more than 38,000 pieces of equipment at a cost of approximately $980 million. This equipment included 3,053 5-ton trucks, 2,656 semi-trailers, 649 VRC 12-series radios, 9,815 night vision devices, 22 improved TOW vehicles, and 785 other pieces of equipment.

The Army's Role in the Strategic Defense Initiative

The Army has the mission of providing the ground-based surface-to-air, air defense of the United States. Under this mandate, the Army has been conducting research into defense against ballistic missiles for more than thirty years. During FY 90 and 91 the Army's research and experimentation continued, but in January 1991 President Bush announced a plan to redefine and limit the scope of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The new plan, christened the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), was intended to provide a highly effective defense against limited strategic missile attacks.

Toward this end the Army planned and conducted experiments on free electron lasers, neutral particle beams, artificial intelligence, and neural networks. In January 1990 the Army conducted a test of the High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor Kinetic Integrated Technology Experiment (HEDI-KITE-1). The test was an initial examination of state-of-the-art ballistic missile defense technologies intended to provide the last layer of a defense system through the use of kinetic energy weapons to intercept missiles. In January 1991 the Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS) successfully intercepted an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This event was particularly notable because the interceptor discerned the ICBM as the correct target even though the missile was accompanied by decoy s.

The Army in Space

The U.S. Army Space Command (ARSPACE) is the Army component of the U.S. Space Command. ARSPACE has responsibility for the ground portion of designated space systems and provides space systems support to operational forces in combat. In the Cold War's waning days ARSPACE initiated an intense program to develop an antisatellite system to counter Soviet capabilities and protect U.S. systems. In December 1989 the Defense Acquisition Board selected a ground-based antisatellite concept promoted by the Army, and the Army became the lead service for its development. The concept envisioned a ground-based kinetic antisatellite system capable of intercepting and destroying low earth-orbiting satellites.

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In July 1990 the Army Space Council approved a research and development program for two tactical satellites intended to provide space capabilities to the tactical commander. One satellite was an all-weather, day and night intelligence system. The second satellite would provide the Army with an all-weather, 24-hour, antijam communications capability. This program was the first attempt by the Army since the early 1960s to provide Army-owned and Army-operated space systems to its commanders. During DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, ARSPACE provided Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation, weather, and terrain support to commanders and units on the ground.

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Google is neither affiliated with the authors of this page nor responsible for its content. These search terms have been highlighted: antisatellite Page 1 The Concept of Space Combat Whereas those who have the capability to control the air, control the land and sea beneath it, so in the future it is likely that those who have the capability to control space will likewise control the earth’s surface. —Gen Thomas D. White Chief of Staff, USAF, 1957 Imagine a different set of events leading to the 1991 Gulf War. First, imagine that Saddam Hussein was able to procure a reliable source of space-derived data. 1 Or that his contract with Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE) for a military reconnaissance satellite had been successful. 2 Or, barring that, he might have contracted with France’s Matra Defence Space for the development and launch of a military reconnaissance version of their satellite pour l’observation de la terre (SPOT). 3 Such capabilities would have allowed Saddam to monitor the deployment and beddown of all coalition forces. He could have targeted ports and airfields as forces arrived in-theater. He could have attacked Patriot batteries before they were operational. Even if he did not attack during the buildup, he would have never missed the “left hook,” which was key to the coalition strategy. Along with the acquisition of ballistic missile technology and the development of nuclear and chemical weapons, imagine he had more aggressively pursued development of his indigenous space launch capability to launch militarily significant satellites. 4 A space launch capability provides the foundation for conducting physical attacks on many military satellites, either through direct ascent or co-orbital antisatellites (ASAT). A preemptive space denial campaign could have negated US and allied capability to maintain their knowledge of the theater. 5 With a space launch capability, Iraq could have had space-based weapons which could attack Persian Gulf neighbors or any member of the coalition, including the United States. Any simple reentry vehicle could have had profound psychological effects on the US 99 Page 2 population, as buzz bombs and V-2s did on the population of London in World War II. The US has never been attacked from the air and, certainly, never from space. Fortress America could have been vulnerable. At this writing, Iraq is rebuilding its ballistic missile research program at new laboratories and rebuilt research and development centers. 6 Finally, imagine that the invasion of Kuwait didn’t stop at the Saudi Arabian border but pushed further south to Riyadh and beyond. Mobile Scuds could have been deployed south and used against airfields and ports, in effect strategically cutting off Saudi Arabia from the rest of the world. Without the “land carrier” of the Saudi Arabian peninsula, the strategic buildup of air and ground forces could not have occurred. In spite of the availability of aircraft carriers off the Saudi Arabian peninsula and air bases in Egypt and Turkey, and even intercontinental bombers based in the US, an air campaign would have been next to impossible to execute. Some other form of combat power “in the theater” would have been useful—perhaps precision- guided munitions based in space. Any combination of these three scenarios would have, at least, reduced US strategic options and increased casualties. Any of these scenarios by itself would have significantly altered the outcome of the confrontation. Today, the US has little or no way to deny space to its opponents. It has no active means of protecting its space order of battle. 7 If forces are not deployed in an area of interest, a capability to strike from space might provide some strategic and tactical regional options. 8 Definition and Relevance Space combat can provide those options. Space combat employs space in the execution of missions. Space combat forces would provide commanders additional tools and methods for engaging an enemy. The missions of space denial, space strike, and space protection comprise space combat. 9 Space combat is the hostile application of destructive or disruptive force into, through, within, or from space. This definition includes actions taken against space systems that are ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II 100 Page 3 not in space. 10 Space denial is the hostile application of destructive or disruptive force against enemy space systems to deny the enemy’s use of the space medium. 11 Space strike is the hostile application of destructive or disruptive force from space against natural-body-based (earth, moon, and asteroid) targets. 12 Space protection is the active, defensive application of destructive or disruptive force to defend friendly space systems. 13 This essay examines the importance and usefulness of space combat and proposes a preliminary theory of space combat. It asserts that a theory of space combat is required to understand and effectively employ US space capabilities against existing and future space threats resulting from the proliferation of spacefaring technologies. Space Combat Employment Why is space combat useful? What operational utility does it bring to military operations? Space denial makes the high ground of space unavailable to an adversary. The most important current space missions are the force multipliers: surveillance and reconnaissance, warning, navigation, environmental monitoring (weather), and communications. The significance of these missions was not lost on the military forces of the world during Desert Storm. 14 If an adversary possessed or had access to force multiplying space systems, friendly operations could be put at risk. Friendly forces could be under constant observation. Sensors of all varieties based in space could track force deployment and supply movement. This information could be decisive in an information dominance sense. Space denial allows friendly forces to operate without being observed. Other force enhancing space systems can benefit our adversaries. Enemy munitions could be precisely guided by Global Positioning System (GPS)-like signals. Satellite communications enhance theater operations when a communication infrastructure does not exist. Weather information from environmental monitoring satellites supports campaign planning and execution. A space denial capability removes the benefits such force enhancement systems provide. THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT 101 Page 4 Space denial also prevents the passage of enemy military platforms through space. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) are current candidates. These vehicles usually have an exoatmospheric phase where they are vulnerable to space denial weapons which could be ground- or space-based. Expendable space launch vehicles (SLV) are another type of platform to be denied. Closing space lines of communication prevents the deployment of new space platforms and the reconstitution of existing space systems. Reusable, recoverable space vehicles which take off vertically, like the space shuttle or the experimental single-stage-to-orbit Delta Clipper, or horizontally, like a US National Aerospace Plane or German Sanger, might also be likely targets if they are carrying force enhancing satellites or weapons deliverable from the vehicle. Space strike brings a new set of war-fighting tools to terrestrial fights. Just as space-deployed systems provide space combat support capabilities to a surface fight, they can also provide offensive firepower. Space strike systems can provide an increased capability for prompt, intense, lethal or nonlethal, parallel attack against terrestrial (land, sea, and air) targets with minimum risk to allied personnel and minimum collateral damage. Lowell Wood of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory clearly sees a requirement for the future USAF to block large-scale attacks by large quantities of compact, ultra-precision munitions launched in inconvenient locations with only hours notice. 15 One can postulate that future force postures will continue to move away from large, fixed overseas bases and the accompanying logistics support. Future US forces will be more expeditionary and will have to respond upon short notice. A premium will be placed on early show of force in an attempt to diffuse crises. 16 Space strike forces could do that. These capabilities could be applied at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as across the spectrum of conflict. They could be used to deter, defend, and defeat. Space strike could be applied singularly as a show of force or independent flexible deterrent option, or integrated into joint, coalition, or combined operations. ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II 102 Page 5 Space protection provides security to space systems beyond traditional passive defense mechanisms. Space systems based either in space or on the ground could be defended by space systems in space or on the ground. Space protection systems (counter-ASAT) could defeat antisatellites engaging our satellite or launch systems. Such systems are the P-51 escort fighters of the future, providing defensive firepower for our space force multipliers and space strike systems (the B-17s of the past). The Significance of Space Combat Why is the subject of space combat important? First, residual military space capabilities exist in the former Soviet Union (FSU). These capabilities could again threaten the US and allies or proliferate to other nations. The US may need to counter these capabilities. Second, space technologies are proliferating and third world countries are developing military space capabilities (combat and combat support). These countries could threaten the US and, again, the US may need counters. Third, space combat concepts have existed since the time of sputnik and are part of US military doctrine and thought. But these ideas have not gone much past the conceptual and, in some cases, the experimental stage. Finally, in spite of past US attempts to acquire elements of space combat, like antisatellites and space-based ICBM interceptors, no US operational space combat capability exists today. The Emerging Space Threat Many nations learned a great deal from the Gulf War. They noted not only the significance of precision-guided munitions, but also the importance of space-based force enhancement. Access to space systems may make the difference between victory and defeat in future wars. These nations are attempting to acquire space-derived data through their own military systems or through international commercial systems. In addition to learning the importance of access to THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT 103 Page 6 space-derived data, they learned the importance of denying enemies access to space-derived data. Space combat support systems have become high-value targets. The threat of observation can be most disarming for commanders, especially if their strategy is maneuver-oriented. An Air Force Space Command National Security Industries Association study stated that imaging systems have direct military utility in: $ Technology verification of an enemy’s capabilities; $ Analysis of terrain features for combat planning; $ Surveillance of forces and their movements; $ Targeting of hostile forces; and $ Assessment of battle damage. 17 Commanders can take some actions to minimize observations, but it will be impossible to totally avoid detection. Multiple sources of space data exist. Data can come from military, civil, or commercial satellites owned by the using country or owned by another country. Some nations have “intelligence-sharing agreements” or commercial arrangements with spacefaring nations. Other aspiring nations are pursuing indigenous capabilities. 18 Space launch by itself is not a threat per se, but it is required for an indigenous space combat capability. A space launch capability enables the other space combat and force enhancement missions. Space launch technologies also enable ballistic missile development. Third tier states attempting to procure ballistic missile or space launch capabilities are Libya, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Taiwan, South Africa, and South Korea. 19 A space launch capability is an incremental step toward a counterspace capability. If an enemy can launch a satellite, it can certainly launch an elementary antisatellite. A simple ASAT would consist of a nuclear weapon on top of a ballistic missile. A more sophisticated one could employ a conventional or kinetic kill warhead which requires more accurate tracking, targeting, and guidance. The only country, other than the US and FSU, to start the development of an ASAT capability was China, which conducted a ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II 104 Page 7 co-orbital ASAT program up to the early 1980s. Except for Russia, no other country is openly pursuing a space strike or space protection capability. But with the proliferation of advanced space technologies, other countries may soon have this capability. Current US Military Thought about Space Combat Current space combat thought is important to future resource allocation and to research and development decisions. Also, it will influence the employment of space weapons. Current US military thought is found both in official doctrine and in professional journals and other military writings. Official US military doctrine is beginning to address the integration of space operations into joint operations. Doctrine tends to focus on force enhancement and space support, though space combat missions are beginning to get more attention. Professional journals and other military writings have the same force enhancement slant, but more articles about space combat are beginning to appear. Surface Service Thoughts on Space Combat The three surface services (Navy, Marines, and Army) generally see military space operations in a force enhancement function. The US Navy is primarily interested in exploiting space for its force multiplier and information domination capabilities. 20 However, the Navy has acknowledged the importance of space control as a contributor to battlespace dominance. 21 Like the Navy, Marine Corps space thought is focused on the force-multiplying effects of space systems. 22 The US Army credits the exploitation of space-based capabilities (along with other technological advances) with increasing “the lethality, range, accuracy and reliability of our weapons systems.” 23 Brig Gen Robert Stewart, the Army’s first astronaut, captured the Army’s view on space: “The Army’s role will be what it’s always been: to assure proper support to the combat soldier. He is the element to project force on the battlefield, and everybody else in the Army exists to help him.” 24 The Army sees the day when it will THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT 105 Page 8 man “ground-based ASAT firing batteries” in support of USCINCSPACE. 25 In spite of its work in strategic defense, the Army plans to exploit space in support of ground forces. US Air Force Thoughts on Space Combat In his article, “The Uniqueness of Space Doctrine,” Lt Col Charles Friedenstein said the 1979 version of Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 “cracked the door on our use of force in space by stating that it should ‘enhance deterrence by developing the capability to deny or nullify hostile acts in or through aerospace.’” 26 This type of space operation was called space defense. In 1982, AFM 1-6, Aerospace Doctrine: Military Space Doctrine, became the first separate space doctrine. It officially acknowledged for the first time there were some “potential warfighting missions.” 27 Space strike and space denial are clear missions. Both AFM 1-1 and variations of AFM 1-6 have evolved the space missions. 28 The latest draft of Air Force Doctrine Directive (AFDD) 4, Air Force Operational Doctrine: Space Operations, appears to be a small doctrinal step forward. Though AFDD 4 seems to focus on enhancement capabilities and information dominance (e.g., information warfare, information combat, and integrated reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition), it does introduce the concepts of integrated application of firepower (including the possibility of space strike), space-based BMD, and integrated air and space control. 29 The Case against Space Combat In spite of the argument for space combat power, the US is not falling all over itself to develop it. Several arguments against space combat exist. The first is the physical challenge of getting into space. The current fleet of SLVs and the space launch infrastructure are not designed to be tactically responsive. 30 The existence of the Russian spacelift capability is proof that responsive launch is achievable. The Russian system may be more expensive (which is debatable) and not as technologically sophisticated as the US system, but it is militarily responsive. ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II 106 Page 9 Second is the cost of spacelift. Individual space launches range in cost from tens of millions to hundreds of millions of dollars. The cost of launch may be the single greatest drag on the development and employment of space combat systems. In spite of this cost, some rudimentary space combat systems could be and have been developed; for example, the air-launched miniature homing vehicle antisatellite. The approach and cost of space launch are recognized problems that multiple recent studies have addressed. 31 An associated challenge is that of maneuvering in orbit. Orbit changes can use up large amounts of fuel (which is either not replaceable or replaceable only at great cost). New propulsion technologies may be required for maneuverability. Inexpensive and responsive lift and on-orbit propulsion are required to employ space combat power. This approach assumes they will be available in the foreseeable future. The third challenge is the cost of space combat systems. The cost of development and test of space combat systems can be substantial, but perhaps the highest recurring cost is the cost of spacelift or launch. Thirty-three billion dollars were spent on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and not a single operational system was produced. 32 Fourth, political resistance in Congress stifles the development of space combat systems. Congress has been concerned about the possible violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The ABM Treaty prohibits the basing of ABM weapons or detection devices in space. President Ronald Reagan, when he announced SDI, took a “broad interpretation [of the Treaty that] would have permitted virtually unlimited testing and development of spacebased ABM systems or components, provided they employed so-called ‘exotic’ technologies (other than missiles or radars).” 33 President George Bush continued support for the broad interpretation in his SDI budget request, which would have funded both an allowable fixed ground-based ABM system and a space-based system using Brilliant Pebble interceptors. 34 The Clinton administration has turned around the 10-year-old decision and has embraced the traditional or narrow interpretation of the treaty, which “prohibits the development, testing THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT 107 Page 10 and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based and mobile land-based ABM systems.” 35 A fifth challenge to space combat is technical viability. Many respected scientists and engineers doubt that space combat systems can be developed. After 10 years, the SDI did not produce the global protective umbrella originally promised by President Reagan. One final argument against space combat is that the employment of space combat weapons violates the self-imposed space sanctuary policy established by President Dwight Eisenhower. President Eisenhower wanted to preserve space for peaceful purposes. To establish the principle of freedom of space, to protect US satellites from interference, and to avoid an arms race in space, the US pursued the goals of protecting the right to collect data from space, which was particularly important during the early days of the cold war. This policy was at odds with the desire to develop space combat capabilities. When space combat threats developed, such as the Soviet fractional orbital bombardment system and the co-orbital ASAT, we did not respond with countermeasures or systems in kind. But the US deployment of ICBMs, experiments with ASATs since the 1960s, and the SDI program, all hint that the US has abandoned sanctuary doctrine. Both the US and the FSU pursued space combat power during the cold war. The US abandoned its capabilities, but the FSU is still thought to have some residual capabilities. Evidence indicates that other nations may be pursuing at least the basic technology needed to conduct space combat. The US disarmed itself for political reasons and the political debate about space combat continues. The US military needs to debate and explore the significance of space combat even if the political debate is not encouraging. Notes 1. This is a concern voiced after the war by the then commander of Air Force Space Command, Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman. He also argued “for an ASAT system to assure that just as US forces achieved control of the air and the battlefield, we can control space as well.” Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., “Space: A New Strategic Frontier,” Airpower Journal 6, no.1 (Spring 1992): 14–23. ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II 108 Page 11 2. Thomas G. Mahnken, “Why Third World Space Systems Matter,” Orbis, Fall 1991, 569–70. 3. France developed a satellite called Helios for joint use by France, Spain, and Belgium. 4. In December of 1989, Iraq launched a vehicle for the announced purpose of launching satellites. Mahnken, 567. 5. This is an inference based on the importance observers are putting on space. One source said about the Gulf War, “military experts are generally agreed that satellites helped to win the political battle, sustained command and control, shortened the war and saved lives. [Space’s] highly effective, economic and flexible capabilities will be needed even more in the increasingly volatile world of the future.” If space capabilities were, and will be, so useful, then denying the use of space would increase an adversary’s uncertainty on the ground. Sir Peter Anson, BT, and Dennis Cummings, “The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War,” RUSI Journal, Winter 1991, 53. 6. Iraq rebuilt its Saad research and development center near Mosul and built a new laboratory, Ibn al-Haytham, near Baghdad. Also, the Saudis intercepted a shipment of ammonium perchlorate, the oxidizer of choice for solid rocket boosters, from China. It was bound for Iraq via Lebanon. Thomas Sancton, “No Longer Fenced In,” Time, 23 May 1994, 37–38. 7. Withthe exception of a few on-orbit spares and a few extra satellites in storage on the ground, which might take months to launch, the US has no means to reconstitute our space order of battle if it came under attack. For an outstanding discussion of this strategic problem, see Maj Jeffrey L. Caton, Rapid Space Force Reconstitution: Mandate for United States Security, Research Report no. AU-ARI-94-4 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, December 1994). 8. For another scenario-based argument for space combat capability, see Lt Col Michael E. Baum, “Defiling the Altar: The Weaponization of Space,” Airpower Journal 8, no.1 (Spring 1994): 52–62. The term space combat is not used in Colonel Baum’s article. 9. These are nonstandard terms. Hopefully, the author’s terms are more complete. 10. This is the author’s definition and is a composite of official and unofficial definitions for the medium of space. It is surprising, but there is no official definition of combat in Joint Pub 1-02. There are multiple definitions using the word combat without defining it. Army Regulation 310-25 does not include the definition of combat. The USAF Dictionary and the Dictionary of Weapons and Military Terms contain definitions of combat. Col T. N. Dupuy’s book has a very comprehensive definition of military combat. Appendix A has all of these definitions. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT 109 Page 12 23 March 1984; AR 310-25, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 15 October 1983; Woodford A. Heflin, ed., The United States Air Force Dictionary (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1956); John Quick, Dictionary of Weapons and Military Terms (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1973); and Col T. N. Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987). 11. Space denial is an expanded form of offensive counterspace. Defensive counterspace includes both passive and active defensive operations or designs. 12. Space strike is an expanded form of force application, which includes attacks on other heavenly bodies besides the earth. 13. This definition excludes the active countermeasure of maneuver, but includes the use of electronic warfare to defend space systems. 14. Mary C. FitzGerald, The Impact of the Military-Technical Revolution on Russian Military Affairs, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, August 1993), 19. 15. Lowell Wood, “The US Air Force in 2020,” SPACECAST 2020 lecture, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 27 October 1993, 8. 16. Deputy for Development Planning, Space and Missile Systems Center, “An Evolving Focus for Military Missions in Space, 1995–2020,” vol. 1, Executive Summary, 50–51. 17. Rich Poturalski et al., Space Combat Panel Final Report: An Advocacy Plan for Future Space Combat Capabilities, National Security Industrial Association (NSIA) Space Study 1992 (Colorado Springs, Colo.: NSIA, February 1993), 15. 18. Mahnken, 565–66. 19. Ibid., 564, 573. 20. The Navy’s vision white paper, . . . From the Sea, states that “our surveillance efforts will continue to emphasize exploitation of space and electronic warfare systems to provide commanders with immediate information, while denying and/or managing the data available to our enemies.” The paper focuses on information collection, but is silent on communications and environmental monitoring applications in spite of the fact the Navy depends on space for these functions. Department of the Navy, . . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 8. 21. The white paper makes a quick reference to using “space-based assets to achieve dominance in space” as a part of battle space dominance, but does not elaborate on how this is to be achieved. . . . From the Sea, 9. 22. The US Marine Corps basic doctrinal manual, FMFM 1, Warfighting, 6 March 1989, is silent on space operations. The section on combined arms could be interpreted to include operations in space. A second manual, FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, does refer to space operations, but in support of combat operations. It lists space forces as one component of US military ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II 110 Page 13 posture for national defense. The focus of these forces is force enhancement. The section on projection forces is silent on space combat options. FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, 21 June 1991, 2-3 and 2-7. 23. FM 100-5, Operations, 14 June 1993, 2-3. 24. Quoted in “Space Primer,” Soldier, April 1987, 8. 25. Heike Hasenauer, “Army Takes the Lead in ASAT,” Soldier, August 1989, 13–20. 26. Quoted in Lt Col Charles D. Friedstein, “The Uniqueness of Space Doctrine,” Air University Review 37, no. 1 (November–December 1985): 15. 27. AFM 1-6, Aerospace Doctrine: Military Space Doctrine, 15 October 1982, 8. 28. First, no space role is suggested or discussed under force application. Spacelift is listed as force enhancement in an attempt to closer associate it with airlift. Launching satellites doesn’t seem to be in the same category as providing communication and navigation support. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992, 6–7. 29. Air Force Doctrine Directive (AFDD) 4, Air Force Operational Doctrine: Space Operations (draft), November 1993, 7, 11, 14, 19, 27–28. 30. Caton. 31. In spite of all these studies, only incremental improvements in respon- siveness, cost reductions, and increased throw weight have been identified. Real improvements may require revolutionary approaches. See Lt Col John R. London III, LEO on the Cheap: Methods for Achieving Drastic Reductions in Space Launch Costs, (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, June 1993). 32. An argument can be made that SDI was a technologically driven program, not an operationally driven one. Lots of good ideas and science came out of it, but no systems. 33. Dunbar Lockwood, “Administration Backs ‘Narrow’ Interpretation of ABM Treaty,” Arms Control Today, September 1993, 22. 34. Pat Towell, “Nunn Assails Bush’s Request for Space-Based Weapons,” Congressional Quarterly, 11 April 1992, 962. See also Pat Towell, “Bush Carries on Fight for SDI, but Space Weapons in Doubt,” Congressional Quarterly, 6 July 1991, 1836–44. 35. Elizabeth A. Palmer, “Clinton Hews to Narrow View on ABM Treaty,” Congressional Quarterly, 17 July 1993, 1894. THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT 111

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