User:Nelkarhili/sandbox

Refugee (interested in adding more in the sections under "Issues - Security Threats").

Security threats

Very rarely, refugees have been used and recruited as refugee warriors, and the humanitarian aid directed at refugee relief has very rarely been utilized to fund the acquisition of arms. Support from a refugee-receiving state has rarely been used to enable refugees to mobilize militarily, enabling conflict to spread across borders.

Historically, refugee populations have often been portrayed as a security threat. In the U.S and Europe , there has been much focus on the narrative that terrorists maintain networks amongst transnational, refugee, and migrant populations. This fear has been exaggerated into a modern-day Islamist terrorism Trojan Horse in which terrorists hide among refugees and penetrate host countries (Schmid 2016). Populist political rhetoric claims that large refugee inflows challenge a country’s national security fueled by the spread of ISIS inspired and orchestrated terror attacks in the West.

The ‘Muslim-as-an-enemy-within’ rhetoric is relatively new, but the underlying scapegoating of out-groups for domestic societal problems, fears and ethno-nationalist sentiment is not new (Coser 1956). In the 1890s, the influx of Eastern European Jewish refugees to London coupled with the rise of anarchism in the city led to a confluence of threat-perception and fear of the refugee out-group (Collyer 2005). Populist rhetoric then too propelled debate over migration control and protecting national security (Collyer 2005).

But, cross-national empirical verification, or rejection, of populist suspicion and fear of refugees’ threat to national security and terror-related activities is relatively scarce (Milton et al. 2013). Case studies suggest that the threat of an Islamist refugee Trojan House is highly exaggerated (Messari and van der Klaaum 2010). Of the 800,000 refugees vetted through the resettlement program in the United States between 2001 and 2016, only five were subsequently arrested on terrorism charges; and 17 of the 600,000 Iraqis and Syrians who arrived in Germany in 2015 were investigated for terrorism (Schmid 2016). And, one study found that European jihadists tend to be ‘homegrown’ over 90% were residents of a European country and 60% had European citizenship (Wilner and Dubouloz 2010).

While the statistics do not support the rhetoric, a PEW Research Center survey of ten European countries1 released on July 11, 2016, finds that the majority (ranges from 52% to 76%) of respondents in eight countries2 think refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country (Wike, et al. 2016). And, since 1975, in the U.S., the risk of dying in a terror attack by a refugee is 1 in 3.6 billion per year (Nowrasteh 2016); whereas, the odds of dying in a motor vehicle crash are 1 in 113, by state sanctioned execution 1 in 111,439, or by dog attack 1 in 114,622 (National Safety Council, 2016).

Despite the reality of the “scale” in which refugees destabilize regions, there is evidence that the increase of refugee populations can and do increase violence. A population on-the-move can aid the transportation of resources, weapons, knowledge and human-power utilized for terrorism. And, once in a host country, the conditions in which refugees are integrated into or isolated from society can enable a path to radicalization. The populist rhetoric that paints refugees as a threat can spur radicalization and mobilization. 

In Europe, fear of immigration, Islamification and job and welfare benefits competition has fueled an increase in violence (McGowan 2014). Immigrants are perceived as a threat to ethno-nationalist identity and increase concerns over criminality and insecurity (Wiggen 2012). Energetic xenophobia against growing foreign-born and refugee out-group populations – which marginalizes some to protect their interests and political preferences – is a crucial cause of increased violence and terror attacks. 

In the PEW survey previously referenced, 50% of respondents believe that refugees are a burden due to job and social benefit competition (Wike, et al. 2016). And when Sweden received over 160,000 asylum seekers in 2015, it was accompanied by 50 attacks against asylum-seekers, which was more than four times the number of attacks that occurred in the previous four years (Schmid 2016, 40). At the incident level, the 2011 Utøya Norway terror attack by Breivik demonstrates the impact of this threat perception on a country’s risk from domestic terrorism, in particular ethno-nationalist extremism. Breivik portrayed himself as a protector of Norwegian ethnic identity and national security fighting against immigrant criminality, competition and welfare abuse and an Islamic takeover (Wiggen 2012).

Variation in terrorism is the result of a complex interwoven web of causation. To help untangle this web, I describe and analyze two mechanisms by which refugee populations increase terrorism and challenge national security in host countries. Refugee flows can increase the size of disgruntled segments of out-group refugee populations in the host-country as well as camouflage terrorists slipping across international borders for attacks. And, refugee flows can motivate anti-refugee scapegoating from native-born citizens who fear or perceive competition from the newest, or increasingly large, out- group.