User:Phlsph7/Mind - Definition
Definition
[edit]The mind is the totality of psychological phenomena and capacities, encompassing consciousness, thought, perception, sensation, feeling, mood, motivation, behavior, memory, and learning.[1] The term is sometimes used in a more narrow sense to refer only to higher or more abstract cognitive functions associated with reasoning and awareness.[2] Minds were traditionally conceived as immaterial substances or independent entities and contrasted with matter and body. In the contemporary discourse, they are more commonly seen as features of other entities and are often understood as capacities of material brains.[3] The precise definition of mind is disputed and while it is generally accepted that some non-human animals also have mind, there is no agreement on where exactly the boundary lies.[4] Despite these disputes, there is wide agreement that mind plays a central role in most aspects of human life as the seat of consciousness, emotions, thoughts, and sense of personal identity.[5] Various fields of inquiry study the mind; the main ones include psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and philosophy.[6]
The words psyche and mentality are usually used as synonyms of mind.[7] They are often employed in overlapping ways with the terms soul, spirit, cognition, intellect, intelligence, and brain but their meanings are not exactly the same. Some religions understand the soul as an independent entity that constitutes the immaterial essence of human beings, is of divine origin, survives bodily death, and is immortal.[8] The word spirit has various additional meanings not directly associated with mind, such as a vital principle animating living beings or a supernatural being inhabiting objects or places.[9] Cognition encompasses certain types of mental processes in which knowledge is acquired and information processed.[10] The intellect is one mental capacity responsible for thought, reasoning, and understanding[11] and is closely related to intelligence as the ability to acquire, understand, and apply knowledge.[12] The brain is the physical organ responsible for most or all mental functions.[13]
The modern English word mind originates from the Old English word gemynd, meaning "memory". This term gave rise to the Middle English words mind(e), münd(e), and mend(e), resulting in a slow expansion of meaning to also cover other mental capacities. The original meaning is preserved in expressions like call to mind and keep in mind. Cognates include the Old High German gimunt, the Gothic gamunds, the ancient Greek μένος, the Latin mens , and the Sanskrit manas.[14]
Theories of the nature of mind
[edit]Theories of the nature of mind aim to determine what all mental states have in common. They seek to discover the "mark of the mental", that is, the criteria that distinguish mental from non-mental phenomena.[15] Epistemic criteria say that the unique feature of mental states is how people know about them. For example, if a person has a toothache, they have direct or non-inferential knowledge that they are in pain. But they do not have this kind of knowledge of the physical causes of the pain and may have to consult external evidence through visual inspection or a visit to the dentist. Another feature commonly ascribed to mental states is that they are private, meaning that others do not have this kind of direct access to a person's mental state and have to infer it from other observations, like the pain behavior of the person with the toothache. Some philosophers claim that knowledge of some or all mental states is infallible, for instance, that a person cannot be mistaken about whether they are in pain.[16]
A related view states that all mental states are either conscious or accessible to consciousness. According to this view, when a person actively remembers the fact that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris then this state is mental because it is part of consciousness; when the person does not think about it, this belief is still a mental state because the person could bring it to consciousness by thinking about it. This view denies the existence of a "deep unconsciousness", that is, unconscious mental states that cannot in principle become conscious.[17]
A historically influential theory says that intentionality[a] is the mark of the mental. A state is intentional if it refers to or represents something. For example, if a person perceives a piano or thinks about it then the mental state is intentional because it refers to a piano. This view distinguishes between original and derivative intentionality. Mental states have original intentionality while some non-mental phenomena have derivative intentionality. For instance, the word piano and a picture of a piano are intentional in a derivative sense: they do not directly refer to a piano but if a person looks at them, they may evoke in this person a mental state that refers to a piano. It is controversial whether all mental states are intentional; possible exceptions include itches, tickles, and pain.[19]
According to behaviorism, mental states are dispositions to engage in certain publicly observable behavior as a reaction to particular external stimuli. This view implies that mental phenomena are not private internal states but are accessible to empirical observation like regular physical phenomena.[20] Functionalism agrees that mental states do not depend on the exact internal constitution of the mind and characterizes them instead in regard to their functional role. Unlike behaviorism, this role is not limited to behavioral patterns but includes other factors as well. For example, part of the functional role of pain is given by its relation to bodily injury and its tendency to cause behavioral patterns like moaning and other mental states, like a desire to stop the pain.[21] Computationalism, a similar theory prominent in cognitive science, defines minds in terms of cognitions and computations as information processors.[22]
Theories under the umbrella of externalism emphasize the mind's dependency on the environment. According to this view, mental states and their contents are at least partially by external circumstances.[23] For example, some forms of content externalism hold that it can depend on external circumstances whether a belief refers to one object or another.[24] The extended mind thesis states that external circumstances not only affect the mind but are part of it, like a diary or a calculator extend the mind's capacity to store and process information.[25] The closely related view of enactivism holds that mental processes involve an interaction between organism and environment.[26]
Notes
[edit]- ^ Intentionality is to be distinguished from intention in the sense of having a plan to perform a certain action.[18]
Sources
[edit]- Jacob, Pierre (2023). "Intentionality". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 11 May 2024.
- Cunningham, Suzanne (2000). What is a Mind?: An Integrative Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Hackett Publishing. ISBN 978-0-87220-518-5.
- Graham, George (2023). "Behaviorism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 11 May 2024.
- Polger, Thomas W. "Functionalism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 11 May 2024.
- Audi, Robert (1993). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-44612-9.
- Bayne, Tim (2022). Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. Routledge. ISBN 0415669847.
- Morton, Adam (2005). "Mind". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford companion to philosophy (2 ed.). Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-926479-1.
- Kiverstein, Julian; Farina, Mirko; Clark, Andy (2013). "The Extended Mind Thesis". Oxford Bibliographies. Retrieved 11 May 2024.
- Rescorla, Michael (2020). "The Computational Theory of Mind". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 11 May 2024.
- Gillett, Eric (1996). "Searle and the "Deep Unconscious"". Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology. 3 (3). doi:10.1353/ppp.1996.0027.
- Searle, John R. (1991). "Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality". Philosophical Issues. 1. doi:10.2307/1522923.
- Crane, Tim (1998). "Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental". In O'Hear, Anthony (ed.). Current issues in philosophy of mind. Cambridge university press. ISBN 0-521-63927-1.
- Kriegel, Uriah (2014). "Intentionality". In Bayne, Tim; Cleeremans, Axel; Wilken, Patrick (eds.). The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-102103-9.
- O’Madagain, Cathal. "Intentionality". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 10 May 2024.
- Kriegel, Uriah (2015). The Varieties of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-984612-2.
- Olson, Eric T. (2013). "There Is No Problem of the Self". In Gallagher, Shaun; Shear, Jonathan (eds.). Models of the Self. Andrews UK Limited. ISBN 978-1-84540-723-0.
- Giannopulu, Irini (2019). Neuroscience, Robotics and Virtual Reality: Internalised vs Externalised Mind/Brain. Springer. ISBN 978-3-319-95558-2.
- Sansonese, J. Nigro (1994). The Body of Myth: Mythology, Shamanic Trance, and the Sacred Geography of the Body. Inner Traditions / Bear & Co. ISBN 978-0-89281-409-1.
- Cresswell, Julia (2010). Oxford Dictionary of Word Origins. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-954793-7.
- Smith, Jeremy J. (1996). An Historical Study of English: Function, Form and Change. Psychology Press. ISBN 978-0-415-13273-2.
- Hoad, T. F. (1993). The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-283098-8.
- McQueen, Hilary; McQueen (2010). Key Concepts in Philosophy. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-137-09339-4.
- Uttal, William R. (2020). Neural Theories of Mind: Why the Mind-Brain Problem May Never Be Solved. Psychology Press. ISBN 978-1-000-14940-1.
- Merriam-Webster (2024b). "Definition of Intellect". Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Merriam-Webster.
- Merriam-Webster (2024c). "Definition of Intelligence". Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Merriam-Webster.
- Merriam-Webster (2024a). "Definition of Spirit". Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Merriam-Webster.
- Swinburne, Richard (1998). "Soul, Nature and Immortality of the". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-K096-1.
- HarperCollins (2022e). "Intellect". The American Heritage Dictionary. HarperCollins. Retrieved 9 May 2024.
- HarperCollins (2022d). "Cognition". The American Heritage Dictionary. HarperCollins. Retrieved 9 May 2024.
- HarperCollins (2022c). "Spirit". The American Heritage Dictionary. HarperCollins. Retrieved 9 May 2024.
- HarperCollins (2022b). "Soul". The American Heritage Dictionary. HarperCollins. Retrieved 9 May 2024.
- Merriam-Webster (2024). "Definition of Mentality". Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Merriam-Webster.
- American Psychological Association (2018j). "Psyche". APA Dictionary of Psychology. American Psychological Association.
- HarperCollins (2022a). "Mind". The American Heritage Dictionary. HarperCollins. Retrieved 9 May 2024.
- American Psychological Association (2018i). "Mind". APA Dictionary of Psychology. American Psychological Association.
- Kim, Jaegwon (2011). Philosophy of mind (3rd ed.). Westview Press. ISBN 978-0-8133-4458-4.
- ^
- ^
- ^
- Kim 2011, pp. 2–3, 5–6
- Jaworski 2011, pp. 5–8, 68–69
- McQueen & McQueen 2010, p. 135
- Morton 2005, p. 603
- ^
- Sharov 2012, pp. 343–344
- Carruthers 2019, pp. ix, 29–30
- Griffin 1998, pp. 53–55
- ^ Stich & Warfield 2008, pp. ix–x
- ^
- Pashler 2013, pp. xxix–xxx
- Friedenberg, Silverman & Spivey 2022, pp. 14–17
- ^
- ^
- HarperCollins 2022b
- Kim 2011, pp. 5, 31
- Swinburne 1998, Lead Section
- ^
- ^
- ^
- ^
- Bernstein & Nash 2006, pp. 273–274
- Nairne 2011, p. 312
- Merriam-Webster 2024c
- ^
- ^
- Hoad 1993, p. 294
- Smith 1996, p. 105
- Cresswell 2010, p. 275
- Sansonese 1994, p. 116
- Giannopulu 2019, p. 6
- ^
- Olson 2013, pp. 111–112
- Kim 2011, pp. 17–18
- O’Madagain, Lead Section
- Bayne 2022, pp. 8–9
- ^
- Kim 2011, pp. 18–20
- Bayne 2022, pp. 8–10
- Audi 1993, pp. 167–168
- ^
- Kriegel 2014, p. 384
- Searle 1991, pp. 45–47, 50
- Gillett 1996, pp. 191–192
- ^ Jacob 2023, § 1. Why is intentionality so-called?
- ^
- O’Madagain, Lead Section
- Kriegel 2015, pp. 141
- Kim 2011, pp. 23–25
- Kriegel 2014, p. 383–384
- Crane 1998, pp. 229–230
- ^
- Levin 2023, § 2.3 Behaviorism
- Graham 2023, § 1. What is Behaviorism?, § 5. Why be a Behaviorist
- Cunningham 2000, p. 40
- ^
- Levin 2023, Lead Section, § 1. What is Functionalism?
- Polger, Lead Section
- Cunningham 2000, p. 40
- ^
- Rescorla 2020, Lead Section, § 3. The classical computational theory of mind
- Friedenberg, Silverman & Spivey 2022, p. 2–3
- Bermúdez 2014, pp. 3, 85
- ^
- Rowlands, Lau & Deutsch 2020, Lead Section, § 1. Introduction
- Smith, Lead Section
- ^
- Rowlands, Lau & Deutsch 2020, § 1. Introduction, § 3. Content Externalism
- Smith, § 1. Hilary Putnam and Natural Kind Externalism
- ^
- Rowlands, Lau & Deutsch 2020, § 1. Introduction, § 5. Extended Mind
- Greif 2017, pp. 4311–4312
- Kiverstein, Farina & Clark 2013
- ^
- Rowlands, Lau & Deutsch 2020, § 7. Extended Mind and the 4E Mind
- Rowlands 2009, pp. 53–56