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Main article: Battle of Kursk

Denial air operations over the Kursk Bulge refers to Red Air Force and Luftwaffe offensive operations during the Battle of Kursk until 23 July 1943.

Battle of Kursk

Air operations; 5–7 July (north)

The real operation opened on 5 July 1943. The Soviet Air Force, now aware even of the exact time of the planned German offensive, launched a massive attack on the Luftwaffe airbases in the area, in an attempt to counter the classic German tactic of eliminating local air support within the first hours of an operation. The next few hours turned into possibly the largest air battle ever fought. However, Soviet co-ordination was lacking: the fighters were dispatched too soon and had to withdraw due to a shortage of fuel before their bombers arrived. The German fighters had no trouble taking off and engaging the approaching attackers; the Red Air Force lost 120 aircraft.

The Luftwaffe directed an all-out effort against Red Army positions on the northern flank during the first day of the operation, while Soviet deployment errors granted the Luftwaffe initial air superiority. General-Leytenant Rudenko, unsure whether this was the major German attack, ordered only one-third of his fighter strength to engage the masses of German aircraft, while the rest stood down. The outnumbered Red Army units were engaged over their own rear areas and suffered heavily. The German fighters had flown ahead of the bomber and Stuka units to prevent Red Army intervention. The unprotected Stuka and Kampfgruppen then began their assault on the Red Army positions unhindered. The Soviets fed in their aerial strength piecemeal and suffered heavy losses.

On 6 July, huge air battles raged over the northern sector. However, there was a lack of Soviet air-to-ground liaison officers, and effectiveness suffered. Counter-attacking Red Army units often took ground very quickly, and there was no effective system in place to inform the Soviet air fleets in time; as a result Soviet bombers attacked areas now occupied by Soviet forces, inflicting casualties. The initial air battles enabled the Luftwaffe to at least maintain a balance in numbers, if not air superiority, over the area held by 47 PanzerKorps. The Luftwaffe concentrated most of its I. Fliegerkorps units to this sector. The Soviet 17th Guards Rifle Corps reported "Appearing in formations of 20–30 or even 60–100 aircraft at a time, the enemy air force played a vital role in the battle". The Soviets suffered heavily on the first day, 16 VA losing 91 aircraft (including 22 Sturmoviks, nine A-20 Havocs, and 60 fighters). The air support the Germans gave their army was crucial. The War Diary of the Soviet 19th Independent Tank Corps noted:

The enemy met our attacking tanks with fire from artillery and heavy tanks located in shelters as well as with air attack in which up to 100 aircraft took part. Consequently, and owing also to the losses they suffered, the brigades were withdrawn from combat and received orders to occupy a defense... along the line

However, the Soviets did gain a notable success on 6 July. The 299 ShAD of the 16 VA, equipped with the Sturmovik, arrived over the front when the German fighters had returned to base. The 47 Panzerkorps had broken cover and attacked the 17th Guards Rifle Corps and the 16th Tank Corps, and were out in the open and vulnerable to air attack. The Soviet attack was devastating to the tanks of 47 Panzerkorps. Flying as low as six metres the Soviets destroyed as many as 20 in this action, and 40 damaged, for the loss of one IL-2. The Luftwaffe was also experiencing fuel shortages, and as a result, the number of Stuka and bomber sorties were declining from as early as 6 July. On 5 July, these groups had flown 647 and 582 sorties; by 6 July, this had dropped to 289 and 164 missions. Most of the German combat missions were flown by fighters; although they continued to heavily outscore the Soviets, the continual pressure of Soviet aviation began to take its toll on the Luftwaffe and the Heer.

On 7 July, the Soviet 16 VA flew fewer sorties than the German 1. Fliegerdivision (1,687 to 1,185), but the Soviets, with a few exceptions, were able to prevent further heavy losses, and inflicted serious damage to German ground formations. Units of the 16 VA, including IL-2s, destroyed 60 German tanks and 34 motor vehicles without loss. General der Flieger Friedrich Kless noted that the Soviet attacks against supply lines and direct interdiction or ground attack missions were not effective due to the poor skill levels of Soviet airmen, and the Soviets always met with heavy losses. However, while the lack of Soviet skill was true, Soviet aviation was effective at a heavy cost. Soviet losses in the air of bombers and ground attack aircraft on 7 July were light, 30 aircraft, for six German Fw 190s in the northern sector.

The Luftwaffe also conducted effective operations at low cost, claiming to destroy 14 Soviet tanks, 60 motorised vehicles, 22 artillery pieces and eight ammunition stores. A further 22 tanks were claimed damaged and 25 artillery guns "silenced". In the first three days of fighting over the northern flank, Luftflotte 6 lost a total of 39 aircraft against Soviet losses of 386.

Air operations; 5–7 July (south)

The German advance in the South

The offensive opened, as in the north, with a mass of air activity. German air attacks helped badly maul the Soviet 57th and 67th Guard Divisions. As the Luftwaffe shifted its attention against the 6th Tank Corps, it left the skies empty over the 4. Panzerarmee. As a result of Soviet superiority in the air, reinforced Soviet defences, and a lack of heavy air support, the Großdeutschland Division had around 80 of its 350 tanks operational. Later, the 2nd Soviet Guards Tank Corps attacked the flank of the 1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. In desperation, the Germans launched waves of Fw 190 Fs of 4.(Pz)/Schlachtgeschwader 1 and Hs 129s of I./Jagdgeschwader 51's Panzerjägerstaffel to halt the attack. Using SD-2 anti-personnel bombs, the Luftwaffe was able to inflict heavy losses to Soviet soldiers and "soft" vehicles. The Luftwaffe attacked the Soviet 2nd Tank Corps from dawn to dusk, and Hauptmann Bruno Meyer, Staffelkapitain of I./Sch.G 1 noted: "It was impossible for us to count how many tanks we knocked out". As a result of the losses sustained by the Soviet 2nd Tank Corp, the 5th Guards Tank Corps began their offensive against the II.SS Panzerkorps alone, and failed, with heavy losses. By the end of the day, 2 VA lost 45 aircraft (including 22 Sturmoviks), 17 VA lost 37 Sturmoviks alone. The Soviets lost approximately 90 machines on this date, while the Luftwaffe suffered 11 losses, mostly Ju 87s. The Soviets began attacking German rear areas at night, with the 2 and 17 VA flying 269 sorties in 24 hours.

Air operations; 16–31 July

After a week of heavy fighting, the Wehrmacht had advanced only 12 km. On 12 July, the Soviets launched their own offensive against the 2nd Panzer Army and the German 9th Army at Orel. The situation became critical for the German forces: the Soviet 11th Guards Army could cut off both German armies.

The Luftwaffe was called upon to halt the offensive, and its actions proved decisive to saving the German armies from encirclement. The Luftwaffe organised a massive aerial offensive to blunt the threat. On 16 July, it flew 1,595 sorties, double that of the previous days. In daylight hours the Sturzkampfgeschwader and Schlachtgeschwader attacked Red Army armoured units while the Kampfgruppen targeted the rear supply lines.

On 17 July, further attempts to intervene on the battlefield were hindered by the arrival of an overwhelming Soviet aviation force. This forced German bombers to operate from higher altitudes, and bombing accuracy suffered. The Soviet 16 VA had greatly improved its organisation and ground control methods, and its pilots were now improving their tactics. The Soviets took advantage of their superior strength to initiate a series of huge aerial offensives against German positions, using waves of up to 350 aircraft per strike. The offensive resulted in large-scale air battles. The limited engagement of the German bomber and ground attack units resulted in only 24 Soviet tanks and 31 lorries being destroyed. However the German fighter units destroyed 90 Soviet aircraft on that date, for 12 losses. 1. Fliegerdivision had carried out 1,693 sorties that day.

Another 1,100 sorties were flown on 18 July, and the Junkers Ju 87 units took a heavy toll of Red Army tank forces; Ju 87s of StG 3 destroyed at least 50 tanks.

On 19 July, the Luftwaffe initiated the aerial operation that, alone, would stop a Soviet breakthrough at Khotynets, which would have taken out a vital rail link, and severed the connection between the two German armies. Some Stuka pilots flew up to six missions on this date. The Fw 190 equipped SchG 1 also contributed to the attacks with 250 kg bombs. Mixed formations of Hs 129s and Ju 87s attacked the Soviet tank formations in three days of "relentless" action against the Is Tank Corps and 70th Tank Brigade. Oberfeldwebel Hans Hans Krohn, a radio operator of a II./StG 3 Ju 87 recalled:

Our "cannon aircraft" took a terrible toll of Soviet armour. We attacked at very low altitude... and my pilot opened fire at a distance of only 50 metres. Most of our attacks were made against the side of the tanks, because in that way they offered the largest targets. I know that some pilots attacked from behind because that was where the armour was weakest, but that also meant the target was so small that it was difficult to hit. By this time Soviet tank crews appeared to be well aware of the potency of our "cannon planes". Whenever we appeared, the tanks would start wild evasive manoeuvres. Occasionally we could see tank crews jump out of the hatches and abandon their tanks when we dived to attack them.

The Soviet losses were so heavy that they were forced to retreat. Tanks that had managed to reach German positions had been quickly routed. 1.Fliegerdivision had claimed 135 tanks put out of action on 19 July, with a total of 66 destroyed. The 1st Tank Corps had only 33 tanks remaining on 20 July. Realising the German armies were about to escape the trap, the Stavka ordered the 3rd Tank Army to pursue the encirclement, and at least catch and destroy the German 35. Army Corps. Once again the Luftwaffe contributed decisively. The Soviet fighter units in the area were disorganised due to constant redirections along the front, and as a result were overwhelmed by a concentrated attack by Luftwaffe forces throughout the day. Over 1,500 sorties were flown, and 38 Soviet tanks, 85 vehicles, eight tank transporters and ten pontoon bridges were destroyed for 13 losses. Model sent a message to von Greim thanking him: "the Luftwaffe's intervention was absolutely decisive to prevent a second, more disastrous Stalingrad".

References

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