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Frank J. Yurco wrote in 1990: "When you talk about Egypt, it's just not right to talk about black or white, ... That's all just American terminology and it serves American purposes. I can understand and sympathize with the desires of Afro-Americans to affiliate themselves with Egypt. But it isn't that simple [..] To take the terminology here {in the United States} and graft it onto Africa is anthropologically inaccurate".[note 1]


The race of Cleopatra

A number of scientific papers have reported, based on both maternal and paternal genetic evidence, that a substantial back-flow of people took place from Eurasia into North-east Africa, including Egypt, long before the start of the Dynastic period.[4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16] Some authors have offered a competing theory which holds that the M haplogroup may have developed in Africa before the 'Out of Africa' event around 50,000 years ago.[17]: 85–88  [18][19][20]


Desert War[edit]

The Desert War (Western Desert campaign) took place in the deserts of Egypt and Libya and was the main theatre in the North African campaign of the Second World War. Military operations began in June 1940 with the Italian declaration of war and the Italian invasion of Egypt in September.

In Operation Torch (November 1942) an Anglo-American force invaded Morocco and Algeria, threatening the Axis armies in North Africa from the west. The Axis forces surrendered in Tunisia on 13 May 1943, ending The Desert War.


Notice of Neutral point of view noticeboard discussion[edit]

Rello, Jordi; Afessa, Bekele; Anzueto, Antonio; Arroliga, Alejandro C.; Olson, Merle E.; Restrepo, Marcos I.; Talsma, Silke S.; Bracken, Ronald L.; Kollef, Marin H. (2010). "Activity of a silver-coated endotracheal tube in preclinical models of ventilator-associated pneumonia and a study after extubation". Critical Care Medicine. 38 (4): 1135–1140. doi:10.1097/CCM.0b013e3181cd12b8. PMID 20081533. S2CID 205539044.

Rello, Jordi; Afessa, Bekele; Anzueto, Antonio; Arroliga, Alejandro C.; Olson, Merle E.; Restrepo, Marcos I.; Talsma, Silke S.; Bracken, Ronald L.; Kollef, Marin H. (2010). "Activity of a silver-coated endotracheal tube in preclinical models of ventilator-associated pneumonia and a study after extubation". Critical Care Medicine. 38 (4): 1135–1140. doi:10.1097/CCM.0b013e3181cd12b8. PMID 20081533. S2CID 205539044.

"Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews". 1996. doi:10.1002/14651858. hdl:2328/35732. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help) [21]

Information icon There is currently a discussion at Wikipedia:Neutral point of view/Noticeboard regarding an issue with which you may have been involved. Thank you.

We have a serious situation at Battle for Caen where certain editors (one of them an SPA) are blatantly ignoring WP:NPOV, and repeatedly deleting relevant material that has been sourced from multiple reliable sources. WP:NPOV says that articles must represent fairly, proportionately, and, as far as possible, without editorial bias, all of the significant views that have been published by reliable sources on a topic. WP:NPOV also says that the principles upon which this policy is based cannot be superseded by other policies or guidelines, nor by editor consensus. However WP:NPOV is being completely ignored here, and material which contradicts their POV is being reverted at will. Their excuses range from WP:UNDUE (for single sentences with multiple citations) up to claiming that they are reverting vandalism. Other well-cited facts are buried in footnotes, and the editors refuse to allow these facts to be actual sentences in the text. I have been debating this on the talk page since May, to no avail. Discussions on the talk page are promptly derailed as soon as I present reliable sources to support my edits, and when all else fails they resort to accusations and insults. An attempt at DRN failed due to lack of consensus. Third party inputs from uninvolved editors which go against their POV have been simply ignored. Talk page comments and edit summaries are replete with accusations of vandalism, and various other crimes, but no supporting evidence is ever presented.

This behaviour has been consistent for months, but some recent diffs include the following: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5][6]


They also repeatedly revert my attempts to add a neutrality tag to the article, for example: [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]



Controversy still lingers over Montgomery’s original intentions during the Battle for Caen, compared to what he subsequently claimed his intentions to have been,[22][23][24][23][25][26] and this has been the source of an immense historiographical dispute with sometimes-bitter national overtones.[27] In his memoirs, as well as in other post-war talks and publications, Montgomery claimed that the battle of Normandy had gone exactly according to his pre-invasion "master plan",[28][29] which he claimed was purely for the Anglo-Canadian operations around Caen to be a "holding operation" intended to attract the bulk of the German forces towards the Caen sector, so as to facilitate an American "break out operation" at the western end of the lodgement.[30] This assertion is accepted by the so-called "British school", which includes historians such as Keegan, Lamb and Hamilton. The assertion was also supported by figures such as General Bradley, and Brigadier David Belchem, who was part of Montgomery's Operations and Planning Staff.

The so-called "American school" argues that Montgomery's initial "master plan" was actually for the Second British Army to take Caen on D-Day, then advance rapidly inland to capture the Caen-Falaise Plain for the construction of airfields, and then to stage a break-out further inland (as far south as Alencon). They state that it was only after failing in this objective that Montgomery "evolved" a new "master plan" of having the Second British Army hold the bulk of the German forces in the east, thus allowing the Americans to achieve the break out in the west.[31][32] This view is supported by historians such as Powers, Axelrod, D'Este, Carafano, Weigley and Blumenson. The assertion was also supported by figures such as General Eisenhower, the British Air Chief Marshall Tedder (Deputy Supreme Commander), General Walter Bedell Smith (Eisenhower's Chief of Staff), Sir James Grigg (British Secretary of State for War) and Brigadier Bill Williams, Montgomery’s own chief of intelligence.[33][34][35][36]

Re the Original Plan[edit]

From The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, First Edition, The World Publishing Company - Cleveland And New York; Copyright 1958, pg 229 "There was never at any time any intention of making the break-out from the bridgehead on the eastern flank. Misunderstandings about this simple and basic conception were responsible for much trouble between British and American personalities." (page 229 in my edition) "All through the fierce fighting which took place in Normandy, there was never any intention of breaking out on the eastern flank towards the Seine; reference to all the orders and instructions which I issued makes that abundantly clear. This false conception existed only at Supreme Headquarters, and none of the senior officers responsible for the conduct of the actual fighting in Normandy, Bradley included, had any doubt about the true plan. The misconception led to much controversy and those at Supreme Headquarters who were not very fond of me took advantage of it to create trouble as the campaign developed.

Closing the Ring, By Winston Churchill, pg 524: "It was hoped to reach the line Falaise-Avranches three weeks after the landing, and, with the strong reinforcements by that time ashore, to break out eastwards toward Paris, north-eastwards towards the Seine, and westwards to capture the Brittany ports." [12]

Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D Eisenhower, pg 266: "In his more detailed presentation of April 7, Montgomery stated that the second great phase of the operation, estimated to begin shortly after D plus 20, would require the British Army to pivot on its left at Falaise, to "swing with its right towards Argentan-Alencon". This meant that Falaise would be in our possession before the great wheel began. The line that we actually held when the breakout began on D plus 50 was approximately that planned for D plus 5." [13]

Victory in the West: The Battle of Normandy, by Ellis, Major L. F.; with Allen, Captain G. R. G.; Warhurst, Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. & Robb, Air Chief-Marshal Sir James (2004) pg 81: - "The Overlord plan called for the Second Army (Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey) to secure the city and then form a front line from Caumont-l'Éventé to the south-east of Caen, acquiring airfields and protecting the left flank of the US First Army while it moved on Cherbourg. Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give the Second Army a suitable staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could be used as the pivot for a swing left of the Allied front to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River." [14])

Bradley: A Biography, by Alan Axelrod, pg 126: "Tasked with taking Caen, Monty had airily promised that he would do so very rapidly; then would hold the town as the centre of a great eastward wheeling movement by the rest of the invasion force. Pivoting on Caen, the First Canadian Army was to turn sharply east-northeast to the Seine, near Rouen. At the same time, the Second British Army would sweep south-southwest of this, through the German strongpoints of Falaise and Argentan, also driving towards the Seine. First US Army was to provide the major momentum for the breakout, wheeling south past Avranches, …." [15].

United States Army in WWII - Europe - Cross-Channel Attack: 2014, by Gordon A. Harrison : In both the original COSSAC plan and the "Montgomery" plan, the securing of the Caen country for airfield development was a critical early objective for the assaulting forces. British troops were to take Bayeux and Caen on D Day, and push the bridgehead gradually south and southeast. They would then secure airfield sites and protect the east flank of U.S. forces whose primary mission, in both plans, was the capture of Cherbourg. … In all the planning the vital importance of the "capture and retention" of Caen and neighboring open country was underlined. On the other land no pre-D-Day plans called for exploiting the favorable tank terrain at any phase of the operation for a direct thrust southeast toward Paris. Instead, the British army would push gradually south and east of Caen until its left rested approximately on the Touques River and its right, pivoting on Falaise, swung toward Argentan-Alençon. at and at [16] and at [17]

Montgomery: Lessons in Leadership from the Soldier's General, by Trevor Royle - pg 113-114, "In Montgomery's view the battle would run through three phases lasting up to 80 days. The first would run for 20 days and would see the US First Army capturing it's objectives in the Cotentin Peninsula, while the British Second Army (led by Lieutenant-General Sir Miles Dempsey) assaulted west of the Orne River, pivoting on Caen to shield the US offensive. Phase Two would be the beginning of the breakout, with the British forces pushing south through Falaise toward Argentan, while the Americans moved toward the Loire and Quiberon Bay. Phase Three would take the Allies to the Seine, with the US First Army heading to Paris, while the British and Canadians would operate to the north between Rouen and the Channel." [18]


Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944, By Max Hastings, (2015), pg 26: The Second British Army was to "assault to the west of the River Orne and to develop operations to the south and south-east, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of the US First Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg. In its subsequent operations the Second Army will pivot on its left (Caen) and offer a strong front against enemy movement towards the lodgement area from the east". At [19]


  • Churchill: Closing the Ring, By Winston Churchill, pg 524: "It was hoped to reach the line Falaise-Avranches three weeks after the landing, and, with the strong reinforcements by that time ashore, to break out eastwards toward Paris, north-eastwards towards the Seine, and westwards to capture the Brittany ports." [20]
  • Eisenhower: from Crusade in Europe, pg 266: "In his more detailed presentation of April 7, Montgomery stated that the second great phase of the operation, estimated to begin shortly after D plus 20, would require the British Army to pivot on its left at Falaise, to "swing with its right towards Argentan-Alencon". This meant that Falaise would be in our possession before the great wheel began. The line that we actually held when the breakout began on D plus 50 was approximately that planned for D plus 5." [21]
  • Ellis: pg 81: - "The Overlord plan called for the Second Army (Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey) to secure the city and then form a front line from Caumont-l'Éventé to the south-east of Caen, acquiring airfields and protecting the left flank of the US First Army while it moved on Cherbourg. Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give the Second Army a suitable staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could be used as the pivot for a swing left of the Allied front to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River." (can be viewed in Friedrich at [22])
  • Axelrod Bradley: A Biography. Alan Axelrod states at pg 126: "Tasked with taking Caen, Monty had airily promised that he would do so very rapidly; then would hold the town as the centre of a great eastward wheeling movement by the rest of the invasion force. Pivoting on Caen, the First Canadian Army was to turn sharply east-northeast to the Seine, near Rouen. At the same time, the Second British Army would sweep south-southwest of this, through the German strongpoints of Falaise and Argentan, also driving towards the Seine. First US Army was to provide the major momentum for the breakout, wheeling south past Avranches, …." at [23].
  • In all the planning the vital importance of the "capture and retention" of Caen and neighboring open country was underlined. On the other hand no pre-D-Day plans called for exploiting the favorable tank terrain at any phase of the operation for a direct thrust southeast toward Paris. Instead, the British army would push gradually south and east of Caen until its left rested approximately on the Touques River and its right, pivoting on Falaise, swung toward Argentan-Alençon. Cross Channel Attack Chap.5
  • The D-Day objectives for the 3rd Infantry Division of the British 1st Corps, which landed on Sword Beach, specifically included "The capture of the city of Caen by means of rapid advance, and the establishment of a bridgehead south of the city."[37][38]
  • Bradley: A General's life, p.274-275: "...Some historians have seized on these pronouncements, and others, to suggest that at this point there was a radical change in Allied strategy. That owing to lack of faith in the GI and the difficulty of the terrain facing my forces—the hedgerows and marshes—Monty had decided that he, not I, would mount the real breakout in good tank country and that Ike approved this change in strategy. This is not true. Monty's order to Dempsey's Second Army, dated July 15, clearly defines a limited offensive in which "a victory on the eastern flank will help us gain what we want on the Western Front." The aide he sent to the War Office also said, "All the activities on the eastern flank are designed to help the [American forces] in the west while ensuring that a firm bastion is kept in the east." What happened, I think, is that Monty promoted Goodwood to such a degree that Ike allowed himself to believe that it could develop into something larger than designed. At this point, Ike desperately wanted Monty to get moving. Goodwood was the first solid indication that Monty might really get moving. In his eagerness to buttress Monty's apparent resolve, Ike got a little carried away himself. Nor had Monty misled Ike into believing that he, Monty, had made a fundamental change in strategy—as some historians also suggest. Ike knew full well that the original Overlord strategy was still the guiding policy, that Goodwood was designed to support Cobra, the main breakout effort, and not the other way around." Per my reading, this clearly indicates that Bradley is referring to the "evolved" strategy, which came into place in mid-June. Cobra did not exist in the original plans.
  • This also gels with what Eisenhower wrote soon after the invasion began, as quoted by Carafano (pg 22) "and that when this plan failed, Eisenhower wrote that Monty had "evolved" the original plan to one which required greater American initiative in unhinging the German defenses."
  • Baxter pg 72 – Quoting Grigg (Secretary of State for War): "Of course" Montgomery's original idea was to breakout around Caen into the open in the first few days after D-Day … "it would be idle to deny that". [24]
  • Trevor Royle - Montgomery: Lessons in Leadership from the Soldier's General, pg 114, Phase One would run for 20 days.. , Phase Two would be the beginning of the breakout, with the British forces pushing south through Falaise toward Argentan, while the Americans moved toward the Loire and Quiberon Bay. [25]
  • Hastings, pg 26: The Second British Army was to "assault to the west of the River Orne and to develop operations to the south and south-east, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of the US First Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg. In its subsequent operations the Second Army will pivot on its left (Caen) and offer a strong front against enemy movement towards the lodgement area from the east". At [26]
  • Gordon A. Harrison : United States Army in WWII - Europe - Cross-Channel Attack: 2014, In both the original COSSAC plan and the "Montgomery" plan, the securing of the Caen country for airfield development was a critical early objective for the assaulting forces. British troops were to take Bayeux and Caen on D Day, and push the bridgehead gradually south and southeast. They would then secure airfield sites and protect the east flank of U.S. forces whose primary mission, in both plans, was the capture of Cherbourg. COSSAC allotted only two British divisions to the initial tasks of taking Bayeux and Caen. For the same tasks the Montgomery plan would land three divisions by sea and in addition put an airborne division (less one brigade) east of the beachheads to secure crossings of the Orne River. In all the planning the vital importance of the "capture and retention" of Caen and neighboring open country was underlined.85 On the other land no pre-D-Day plans called for exploiting the favorable tank terrain at any phase of the operation for a direct thrust southeast toward Paris. Instead, the British army would push gradually south and east of Caen until its left rested approximately on the Touques River and its right, pivoting on Falaise, swung toward Argentan-Alençon. at [27] and at [28]

Re the Controversy[edit]

  • Carafano: After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout, By James Jay Carafano, pg 22, see [29]  : "The controversy centers on Montgomery's intentions for the city of Caen …" … "Montgomery's advocates argue that the general meant for the British and Canadian forces to tie down the preponderance of the German armoured forces around Caen. This would mean less pressure on the Americans. While the British Second Army ground down the Germans in the east, General Montgomery planned for the Americans to push through the less formidable defences in the west, clear the way to the vital Brittany ports, and peel back the German front like a giant door swinging open around Caen". … "General Montgomery's critics insist that the general's pre-invasion master plan is a fiction. In fact, General Montgomery envisioned quickly seizing the city of Caen with British and Canadian forces and then rapidly expanding the lodgement area. When that manoeuvre failed the Allied offensive bogged down. The rest of the campaign, critics argue, was a makeshift attempt to make up for Montgomery's failure to take Caen".
  • Copp and Vogel; Maple Leaf Route: Caen – 1983; pg 86: "Montgomery drew what was the indisputably correct conclusion from these events. If the British and Canadians could continue to hold the bulk of the German armoured divisions on their front through a series of limited attacks, they could wear down the Germans and create the conditions for an American breakout on the right. This is what Montgomery proposed in his Directive of June 30th and, if he and his admirers had let the record speak for itself, there would be little debate about his conduct of the first stages of the Normandy campaign. Instead, Montgomery insisted that this Directive was a consistent part of a master plan that he had devised long before the invasion. Curiously, this view does a great disservice to 'Monty' for any rigid planning of operations before the German response was known would had been bad generalship indeed!" [26]
  • Powers, cited in The American Experience in World War II: The United States in the European Theater, edited by Walter L. Hixson, pg 147, see here [30] : "The salient point, so far as the post-war controversies are concerned, is that General Montgomery's carefully formulated master plan for the ensuing battle began to unravel on D-Day itself, when the 3rd British Infantry Division failed to take Caen, key to the exploitation of the more open country to the south. Nor was this failure rectified in the following weeks … . "
  • Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, By Carlo D'Este, pg 579, see here [31] : "A great deal of the criticism levelled at Montgomery was provoked by his ill-conceived, single-minded assertion, both at the time and after the war, that "I never once had cause or reason to alter my master plan .." "
  • See also D’Este at pg 546: "However, what Montgomery’s concept of the battle for Normandy never included was a protracted battle of attrition for Caen. Later he sought to deflect criticisms of his generalship by suggesting that his enemies at SHAEF took advantage of the controversy to discredit him".
  • D'Este, cited in Baxter pg 81 – "D'Este argues convincingly that between Monty's actual plans and later boasting, "a great gulf lay". … Only after the failure to take Caen, in D'Este's view, did Monty emphasise 2nd Army's defensive role in acting as a magnet for German armour. Failure to take Caen soon after D-Day, in D'Este's view, was not just a "local setback", but a major failure. … D'Este is a strong advocate of the view that Monty changed his plans to meet the new circumstances." [32]
  • Blumenson, writing in United States Army in World War II; The European Theater Of Operations; Breakout And Pursuit; By Martin Blumenson; Center Of Military History - United States Army; First Printed 1961 - Pg 15-16: "Debate had already arisen over General Montgomery's intentions, a debate that was to grow as time passed. Did Montgomery, from the beginning of the invasion, plan to attract and contain the bulk of the German power to facilitate an American advance on the right? Or did he develop the plan later as a rationalization for his failure to advance through Caen? Was he more concerned with conserving the limited British manpower and was his containment of the enemy therefore a brilliant expedient that emerged from the tactical situation in June? The questions were interesting but irrelevant, for the Germans had massed their power opposite the British without regard for General Montgomery's original intentions. Whatever Montgomery's intent, which was obviously not clear to other Allied commanders at the time-the British seemed to be stalled before Caen. Denied access to the desirable terrain east of Caen and to the main approaches to the Seine and Paris, the Allies looked to General Bradley's U.S. First Army for operational progress. Thus it came about that, although the British sector offered terrain more favorable for offensive operations, American troops in July were to undertake the unenviable task of launching a major attack in the Cotentin through terrain ideally suited for defense."
  • Hastings, pg 26: "Montgomery's subsequent attempts to pretend that the Normandy battle developed entirely in accordance with his own plans have distorted what was essentially a clear and simple issue." Pg 27: "Where Montgomery distorted his intentions after the event, and made possible the bitter controversy that has persisted for so many years, was by pretending that the British and Canadians fulfilled their purpose by holding a line north of Caen." [33]
  • General Bradley, in A General's life, p.234. "...In later years, some confusion would arise in the minds of military historians over the exact role Monty assigned his own forces in Overlord."
  • Hart (2007) states, on pg 77, that: "However, this is far removed from Montgomery's totally specious claim that the Normandy campaign went "exactly as planned"." See [34]
  • Robin Neillands, The Battle of Normandy 1944; When the original master plan – the strategy – does not seem to be working or has to be changed, the superiors are entitled to an explanation. This Montgomery not only declined to provide at the time, he later claimed that the original plan had worked out in every detail, a claim which even the most objective observers find hard to accept. [35].

Re Operation Goodwood[edit]

  • Biddle: Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, pg 120: Re Goodwood: "Goodwood was a breakthrough attempt and not a limited aims attack." pg 130: Re Goodwood: "This position proved highly controversial, in part due to the highly ambiguous nature of Montgomery's own communications prior to the battle. … As such, Goodwood can be judged on its own merits as a failed breakthrough attempt;" [36]
  • Hamilton. Cited in Baxter pg 80 – "Hamilton agreed with Monty's own chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Sir Edgar T. "Bill" Williams, that to say that everything went according to plan – as Monty insisted – was absolute nonsense. Things did not go according to plan: Caen was not taken on the first day, and the deep armored thrusts – "staking out claims" – did not occur."
  • Baxter (pg 75) cites Stacey: "Colonel Stacey observed that the misunderstandings regarding Montgomery's plans (for Operation Goodwood) were understandable given his communications to Eisenhower before the battle, which indicated that Goodwood was a breakthrough operation".
  • Hart pg 72: In order to receive greater air support from SHAEF for Operation Goodwood, VIII Corps armoured thrust that sought to outflank Caen from the east, Montgomery deliberately exaggerated to Eisenhower his expectation that the operation would achieve a decisive breakthrough. At [37]
  • Hixon, citing Lamb: pg 161: [Montgomery] only hinted at the breakout possibility to convince SHAEF's airmen to lend the support of their heavy bombers. Goodwood's failure and the subsequent postponement of Operation Cobra nearly brought about Monty's downfall. Only Eisenhower's caution and political savvy saved Montgomery; Ike realised that the furor caused by his dismissal would be difficult to justify at this critical juncture. [38]
  • Terry Brighton - Masters of Battle: Monty, Patton and Rommel at War; pg cxivi It was common knowledge at Tac HQ that Churchill had come to sack Monty. He came in his blue coat and in his pocket he had the order. There was quite an atmosphere. at [39] Also Hamilton - Monty: the battles of Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery - Page 336
  • Blumenson, has a whole section headed "In Search of a Breakthrough: GOODWOOD". To cite some excerpts, from page 188 onward: "The Second Army launched a strong attack (GOODWOOD) that promised the Allies an excellent chance of achieving a breakthrough. Had it succeeded, COBRA would probably have been unnecessary." … "He alerted Dempsey to hold a corps of three armored divisions in reserve for a "massive stroke" east of the Orne River from Caen to Falaise." … "Whether the primary intention of GOODWOOD was to aid COBRA by forcing the Germans to engage their mobile reserves and the secondary intention to achieve a breakthrough, or whether the reverse was true - though perhaps unimportant in the final analysis and perhaps even unknown to General Montgomery at the time – later became a matter of doubt and controversy." … "Promising General Eisenhower that his "whole eastern flank" would "burst into flames," General Montgomery requested the "whole weight of air power" to bring about a "decisive" victory." … And page 194: "To those in the Allied camp who had expected a decisive breakthrough and exploitation, expressions of satisfaction seemed hollow."
  • Buckley in Monty's Men (pg 97) states that Belchem claimed that Monty deliberately withheld from Ike the fact that he had reduced the Goodwood plan, so as to maintain the support of SHEAF and the bombers etc.
  • Bradley "...A key assumption in the Overlord plan was that after we had achieved overwhelming strength in Normandy the German armies facing us would make a gradual withdrawal to the Seine River, a natural defensive barrier. We also assumed that by that time the Germans would have awakened to the fact that Fortitude had been a deception, and the German Fifteenth Army would be shifted from Pas de Calais to the Seine for an all-out defense, the showdown battle for Germany. These were the prescribed textbook solutions to the German military battle in Normandy. But the Germans were not following the textbook. ... Hitler had made the decision to fight the showdown battle for Germany not at the Seine, as we had anticipated, but in Normandy. It was the worst possible military strategy, one of the great mistakes of World War II..."[ A General's life, p.289 ].

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  23. ^ a b Carafano 2008, pp. 22–23.
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  32. ^ Powers 1992, pp. 458, 471.
  33. ^ Carafano 2008, p. 22.
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  37. ^ Winter 2014, pp. 179.
  38. ^ Anderson 2009, p. 43.

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