Draft:List of nuclear coercion attempts

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  • Comment: because the list was previously published in in ref 1, this isn’t synth. but the prose isn’t encyclopedic. has to be written as a collection of facts and not an essay. microbiologyMarcus (petri dish·growths) 00:44, 29 December 2023 (UTC)
  • Comment: Whereas the individual incidents are referenced, the conclusion appears to be a result of WP:SYNTH. AntientNestor (talk) 16:34, 16 November 2023 (UTC)


For decades leaders hoped acquiring nuclear weapons would gain their nations dominance in international political affairs but have been consistently disappointed.[1]:258 Leaders attempted to use nuclear weapons for coercion more often than many people realize. Nineteen different episodes are analyzed.[1]:247

History[edit]

During the Korean War, on February 11, 1953, Eisenhower suggested using nuclear weapons to attack Kaesong if truce negotiations broke down. Negotiations continued until a final armistice deal was reached June 8.[1]:175-8

In the First Indochina War, Eisenhower worried about a Viet Minh victory over France in Indochina would spread Communism. In 1954 with Operation Vulture , the United States proposed to use up to 3 tactical nuclear weapons at Dien Bien Phu. The French Garrison was not saved but an anticommunist state was established in South Vietnam. Dulles believed a Vietnam partition was synonymous with defeat.[1]:182-188

During the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1955, the United States issued several nuclear threats against China to stop attacks against Quemoy. Dulles indicated tactical weapons would be used in a general war in Asia. Eisenhower implied that nuclear weapons could be used "as you would use a bullet or anything else," indicating this was meant to signal resolve to China. Nixon warned "tactical atomic weapons are now conventional and will be used against the targets of any aggressive force." Chinese spokesmen referred to American nuclear blackmail.[2] US nuclear threats may have deterred China from further attacks against Taiwan, but there are doubts China intended an invasion in the first place.[1]:190-3

After Nassar nationalized the Suez Canal, British, French, and Israeli forces invaded the canal region. In 1956 during the Suez Crisis, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin demanded British and French troops halt their intervention. He asked rhetorically, "In what situation would Britain find herself if she was attacked by stronger states, possessing all types of modern destructive weapons?" France and Britain accepted a cease fire within days.[1]:225 A nuclear threat's credibility depends on capability and an adversary's perception.[3]

During the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued "in the event of an assault or an interdiction, effective U.S. intervention would necessitate nuclear bombing of mainland bases in China." After the Communist air force lost air superiority and could not stop American escorted convoys, the status quo ante returned.[1]:195-200

In the Berlin Crisis of 1958–1959, Khrushchev issued an ultimatum that the West withdraw from Berlin within six months and make it a free, demilitarised city. He said "a few Russian missiles could destroy all of Europe. One bomb was sufficient for Bonn and three to five would knock out France, England, Spain, and Italy." In Operation Atom, Moscow deployed medium range ballistic missiles north of Berlin, operational in May 1959. Information on nuclear missile deployments may not have reached US policymakers until after Khruschev lifted his ultimatum.[1]:134-6

The Soviet Union reissued the ultimatum in the Berlin Crisis of 1961. The United States deployed the Davy Crockett (nuclear device). Khruschev warned "if nuclear war came, six hydrogen bombs would be quite enough for Britain and nine would do for France." Kennedy dismissed Khruschev's threats, possibly because of relatively low stakes in Berlin and high costs of implementing.[1]:139 Nuclear threats are not credible if it invites massive retaliation.[4]

In 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States demanded the Soviet Union remove missiles from Cuba. The US declared a quarantine around Cuba and raised the readiness level of Strategic Air Command (SAC) forces to DEFCON 2 for the only confirmed time in US history. The Soviets removed the missiles from Cuba. The US publicly pledged not to invade and privately agreed to remove missiles from Turkey.[1]:202-3

With the 1968 Pueblo incident, US president Johnson demanded Pyongyang return the ship and its crew. The United States tried to use nuclear forces for coercion, including unsuccessfully in the Pueblo incident.[5] The US deployed a naval task force including the Enterprise, on which journalist Jack Cheevers noted "two jets bearing nuclear bombs sat ready for instant takeoff." Washington considered using nuclear weapons if North Korea escalated by invading South Korea. The Pueblo remains in North Korea.[1]:166-7

During the Sino-Soviet border conflict in late 1960s Soviets deployed tactical nuclear missiles and nuclear-capable cruise missiles along the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviets' central goal was to secure territory. A Soviet military official in Tehran stated the Soviets "would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons against the Chinese if they attacked with major forces." Shortly after Zhou agreed to Soviet proposals for full-scale negotiations. China agreeing to Soviet demands preceded the credibility of the threat, and additional concessions were not added.[1]:211-7

On October 10, 1969 during the Vietnam War, United States President Nixon initiated a worldwide nuclear alert. He hoped to force Soviets to apply pressure on North Vietnamese and end the war on terms US found acceptable. While Johnson had largely abstained, Nixon was more willing to use nuclear coercion.[6] The Soviets apparently did not take the nuclear threat seriously and it was unclear it was related to Vietnam rather than the Sino-Soviet border conflict.[1]:142-6

In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the United States feared India would mount an offensive against West Pakistan. The US deployed the Enterprise with 75 nuclear armed bombers and a nuclear attack submarine. The next day Indira Gandhi agreed to an unconditional cease-fire.[1]:227 Superpower conflict and the unreliability of nuclear guarantees provided motivation for non-nuclear countries to get nuclear weapons.[7]

During the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel sought supplies from the US. Israel increased the readiness of its Jericho missile batteries. After its implicit nuclear threat, Israel got a large scale airlift resupply, though other factors may have been more influential. When Brezhnev threatened to reintroduce Soviet troops to Egypt, Kissinger placed US forces at DEFCON 3 on October 24.[1]:218-223

In 1982 during the Falklands War, Britain wanted Argentina to withdraw from the islands. Avro Vulcan bombers were associated in the public mind with their longstanding nuclear role. Sir Michael Qunlan, a top official in Ministry of Defense said if a carrier were sunk, Margaret Thatcher "would have been willing to face up to the real eventuality of [nuclear] use." Argentina discounted Britain using its nuclear weapons.[1]:168-9

During the Kashmir conflict in 1990, Pakistan sought US intervention to prevent India from launching an attack. Journalist Seymour Hersh argues Pakistani general Aslam Beg authorized technicians at Kahuta to assemble nuclear weapons. The US sent Robert Gates to the region. Shortly thereafter India announced it would withdraw some forces.[1]:228-9

In 1995 during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, China sought to curtail US support for Taiwan. In exercise "Strait 961" China test fired nuclear-capable M-9 missiles and detonated a nuclear explosive device underground at Lop Nur. The US refused a demand for an official communique on one-China policy, not changing its policy.[1]:170-1

During the Kargil War in 1999, Pakistan sought territory from India. On May 27, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said Pakistan could meet an armed attack from India on "equal terms," widely viewed as a reference to nuclear forces. Information Minister Mushahid Hussain declared: "Kashmir has been the natural flash point, and now it has the potential to become a nuclear flash point as well." Raja Zafar ul Haq, Minister of Religious Affairs asserted Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if it would bolster its security. Pakistan did not appear to coerce India in 1999 but nuclear threats may have deterred India from escalating.[1]:147-51

In the 2001–2002 India–Pakistan standoff, India demanded Pakistan end all cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in India and hand over 20 suspected militants. In December 2001, Defense Minister George Fernandes announced India's missiles were "in position". Prime Minster Vajpayee proclaimed "no weapon would be spared in self-defence. Whatever weapon was available, it would be used no matter how it wounded the enemy." India tested nuclear-capable Agni missiles on Jan 25. Pakistan also conducted missile tests, issued verbal nuclear threats, and deployed missiles along the border. Threats did not compel Pakistan to meet India's demands.[1]:157-61

In 2013 in North Korea, North Korea sought to end UN-backed sanctions and US-South Korean military exercises. It also desired international recognition as a legitimate nuclear power. On 2/12/2013 Pyongyang conducted a nuclear test. Kim threatened to hit South Korea and the United States with "lighter and smaller nukes." After the Security Council reprimanded North Korea, North Korea unilaterally voided the 1953 armistice and threatened to exercise "the right to a pre-emptive nuclear attack to destroy the strongholds of the aggressors." North Korea threatened kamikaze nuclear strikes against US but did not obtain its objectives.[1]:162-4

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u Sechser, Todd (2017). Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge University Press.
  2. ^ Betts, Richard K. (2010-12-01). Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-1708-9.
  3. ^ Alagappa, Muthiah (2008). The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-6086-7.
  4. ^ Avey, Paul C. (2023-04-20). "Just Like Yesterday? New Critiques of the Nuclear Revolution". Texas National Security Review. Retrieved 2023-10-08.
  5. ^ Art, Robert J.; Crawford, Timothy W.; Jervis, Robert (2023-02-06). International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1-5381-7693-1.
  6. ^ Kim, Myung Chul (2016). Nuclear Learning: Nuclear Coercion and the Proliferation Dilemma (Thesis). UCLA.
  7. ^ The Age. The Age.

Category:Nuclear technology-related lists Category:History-related lists