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German–Polish declaration of non-aggression

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German–Polish declaration of non-aggression
German Ambassador Hans-Adolf von Moltke, Polish leader Józef Piłsudski, German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels and Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck meeting in Warsaw on 15 June 1934, five months after issuing the declaration.
Signed26 January 1934
LocationBerlin, Germany
Signatories
Parties
LanguagesPolish, German

The German–Polish declaration of non-aggression (German: Erklärung zwischen Deutschland und Polen über den Verzicht auf Gewaltanwendung, Template:Lang-pl),[1] also known as the German–Polish non-aggression pact, was a non-aggression agreement between Nazi Germany and the Second Polish Republic that was signed on 26 January 1934 in Berlin.[2] Both countries pledged to resolve their problems by bilateral negotiations and to forgo armed conflict for a period of 10 years. The agreement effectively normalised relations between Poland and Germany, which had been strained by border disputes arising from the territorial settlement in the Treaty of Versailles. Germany effectively recognised Poland's borders and moved to end an economically-damaging customs war between the two countries that had taken place over the previous decade.[3]

Background

Before 1933, Poland had worried that some sort of alliance would take place between German Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union to the detriment of Poland. Therefore, Poland made a military alliance with France in 1921. Because the Nazis and the Communists were bitter enemies, a hostile Soviet-German alliance after Hitler came to power in 1933 seemed very unlikely.[4]

In 1925, under the Locarno treaties, it was agreed that France would never send forces into Germany outside of its own occupation zone in the Rhineland and that both Britain and Italy would guarantee the Franco-German border against any attempt to change it from either side.[5] The purpose of the Locarno treaties was to make it impossible for France to occupy the Ruhr as had happened in 1923. From the Polish perspective, the Locarno treaties were a diplomatic disaster, as Britain and Italy refused to make the same guarantees for Germany's eastern border while theoretically both Britain and Italy would declare war on France if the French should move French Army troops into Germany beyond the Rhineland.[5][6] Under the terms of the Franco-Polish defensive alliance of 1921, France was supposed to start an offensive from the Rhineland occupation zone into the north German plain if Germany should invade Poland, but the Locarno treaties had effectively gutted the provisions of the Franco-Polish alliance.[5] The British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain had pushed for the Locarno treaties as a way for Germany to peacefully revise the Treaty of Versailles in eastern Europe.[6] Chamberlain believed that as long as the Poles had a great power like France as their ally, they would never hand over the areas that Germany was claiming such as the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia, but if Franco-German relations improved, then that would weaken the Franco-Polish alliance and force the Poles to yield to the force majeure of Germany's power.[6] From the early 1920s onward, British foreign policy aimed to revise aspects of the Treaty of Versailles in favor of the Reich, such as the eastern borders Versailles had imposed on Germany, in exchange for German acceptance of the other aspects of the Versailles settlement of which the British approved.[6] The way that the French largely yielded to British demands at the Locarno conference was seen as a betrayal in Poland.

One of the most noted of Józef Piłsudski's foreign policies was his rumoured proposal to France to declare war on Germany after Adolf Hitler had come to power, in January 1933. Some historians speculate that Piłsudski may have sounded out France on the possibility of joint military action against Germany, which had been openly rearming in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. France's refusal might have been one of the reasons that Poland signed the declaration.[7][8][9][10][11] However, the argument that the declaration had been forced on Piłsudski by French refusal to wage a "preventive war" has been disputed by historians, who point out that there is no evidence in French or Polish diplomatic archives that such a proposal was ever advanced. They state that when in late October 1933, rumours of a Polish "preventive-war" proposal were reported in Paris, their source was the Polish embassy, which had informed French reporters that Poland had proposed a "preventive war" to France and Belgium, but Poland and Germany had already been secretly negotiating. It has been argued that Piłsudski had the Polish embassy start rumours about a "preventive war" to pressure the Germans, who were demanding for Poland to abrogate its 1921 Franco-Polish alliance. The declaration would specifically exclude that alliance.[12]

It has been said that Piłsudski's reason for seeking the declaration with Germany was his concern over France's Maginot Line. Until 1929, French plans had called for a French offensive into the North German Plain, in conjunction with offensives from Poland and Czechoslovakia. The construction of the Maginot Line, which began in 1929, indicated the French Army's preference for a strictly-defensive stance, which would leave its eastern allies on their own. (That is exactly what happened in 1939 during the Phoney War.) From Piłsudski's viewpoint, in the light of France's military plans, a non-aggression agreement with Germany would be the best choice for Poland.

Piłsudski used Hitler's rise to power and international isolation of Germany's new regime as an opportunity to reduce the risk that Poland would become the first victim of German aggression or of a great power especially the Four Power Pact. Germany's new rulers seemed to depart from the traditionally-Prussian orientation that was anti-Polish. Piłsudski regarded the new chancellor as less dangerous than his immediate predecessors, such as Gustav Stresemann, and since he saw the Soviet Union as the greater threat, he opposed French and Czechoslovak efforts to include the Soviet Union in a common front against Germany.

The Poles insisted on stating that it did not nullify any previous international agreements, particularly the one with France. Nevertheless, by easing Poland's disputes with Germany bilaterally, the treaty weakened France's diplomatic position against Germany.

Poland was able to maintain friendly relations with Germany for the next five years but also with France and Britain. However, that may have also led to inattentiveness in foreign policy about the activities of the crumbling League of Nations and ignoring the collective security schemes that had been proposed by French and Czechoslovakia in the early 1930s.

The declaration

Naming

The German foreign ministry insisted that the agreement be called a "declaration" rather than a "pact" as "pact" was seen as implying that there was no conflict of interest between the parties. Additionally, the Germans believed that the term "pact" might imply recognition of the German-Polish border.[13] Despite this the agreement is still referred to as a "pact" in some documents.[2]

Effect of the declaration

"The German Government and the Polish Government consider that the time has come to introduce a new phase in the political relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding between State and State. They have, therefore, decided to lay down the principles for the future development of these relations in the present declaration."

English translation of opening of declaration[14]

The two Governments base their action on the fact that the maintenance and guarantee of a lasting peace between their countries is an essential pre-condition for the general peace of Europe. Under the declaration, Poland and Germany agreed to normalise relations. Until the declaration Germany had withheld normalisation without first settling the question of the German-Polish border.[15] Instead the issue of the border, and particularly of the Danzig Corridor was put to one side and both sides agreed not to use force to settle their dispute.[2] The agreement also included clauses guarding Poland's relations with France under the Franco-Polish alliance,[16] and under their membership of the League of Nations.[17]

An additional benefit Poland received from the declaration was that it enabled the Polish foreign minister, Józef Beck, to have a line of direct communication with Berlin regarding developments in the Free City of Danzig. This allowed Beck to avoid having to communicate directly with the League of Nations regarding the city, which was then governed by the League of Nations high commissioner, Seán Lester.[18] Poland was also able to extract a promise by Germany to accept a quota of Polish coal during the negotiation of the agreement.[19]

For Germany, the agreement was the first major Concordat reached during the Nazi era, and gave Adolf Hitler an agreement that he could present domestically as a diplomatic success, and internationally as a sign of his pacific intent. It also helped signal a weakening in the French-led alliances surrounding Germany, particularly through the secrecy in which it had been negotiated.[17]

Aftermath

International reactions

The British government was generally pleased by the German-Polish declaration. They believed this removed a dangerous threat to peace.[20]

In Czechoslovakia the agreement angered the Czechoslovak political elite.[21] Announcement of the declaration came just four days after discussions between Jozef Beck and the Czech foreign minister, Edvard Beneš. Beneš, speaking to Joseph Addison (the British ambassador in Prague), claimed that the agreement was a "stab in the back" and went on to say that it showed that Poland was a "useless country" that deserved another partition.[22] At the time Beneš was particularly angered by reports in the Polish government-controlled and right-wing press accusing the Czechs of mistreating Poles in the Zaolzie region and perceived Polish encouragement of Slovak nationalists.[23]

The conclusion of the declaration led to accusations from France that the French government had not been kept fully advised of the progress of negotiations between Poland and Germany. The French government had been kept informed of progress during the preliminary phase of the talks in late 1933, but this had not been kept up during the later part of the talks, though the French were given a detailed explanation of the agreement and its motives by the Polish government soon after it being signed. French public opinion about the agreement was negative.[24] French critics of the deal believed it indicated that Poland might be an unreliable ally.[20]

The signing of the treaty came as a surprise to the US government despite the US administration's previous advocacy of a Polish-German agreement. Some sections of US public opinion also saw the agreement as signalling Polish support for Germany.[25]

Similarly the signing of the agreement caused concern in the USSR, with commentary in Izvestia questioning whether the agreement represented a concession by Germany or was simply a German manoeuvre, and expressing the belief that the agreement was merely temporary.[26] To allay any fears of a war against the Soviet Union, on 5 May 1934, Poland renewed the Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact, which had been first signed on 25 July 1932. It was extended until 31 December 1945 despite Hitler’s repeated suggestion to form a German-Polish alliance against the Soviets. A report on the declaration by the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw, Vladimir Osvieyenko, pointed out that the agreement contained no secret terms.[27]

German denunciation

German policy changed drastically in late 1938, after the annexation of Sudetenland sealed the fate of Czechoslovakia, and Poland became Hitler's next target. In October 1938, German Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop presented Poland with the proposition of renewing the agreement in exchange for allowing the Free City of Danzig to be annexed by Germany and the construction of an extraterritorial motorway and railway through the Polish Corridor, with Germany accepting Poland's postwar borders.[28] Since Poland refused, Hitler denounced the declaration unilaterally on 28 April 1939[29] during an address before the Reichstag while Germany renewed its territorial claims in Poland. A note to Poland from the German government on 28 April 1939 expressed the view that their denunciation was justified by the signing of the Anglo-Polish alliance.[30] After another few months of rising tension and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, which contained a secret protocol by which Hitler and Stalin agreed to divide Poland between them, Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939 which initiated World War II, with the Soviets invading Poland shortly after on 17 September 1939.[citation needed]

Legacy

Historiography

The historical significance of the agreement has been a matter of controversy.[31] The British historian Hugh Seton-Watson, writing in 1945, stated that the 1934 declaration “marked the beginning of German-Polish active cooperation in an aggressive policy in Eastern Europe.”[32] The American historian Anna Cienciala wrote in 1975 that the agreement, together with the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact, formed a "policy of equilibrium" whereby Poland's leadership sought to preserve Poland's independence by balancing Poland's relations with Germany and the Soviet Union and thus avoid coming under the control of either, and pointed to Pilsudski's refusal on multiple occasions to ally with Germany against the Soviet Union as evidence of this.[15]

Piłsudski distrusted German intentions on the whole but perceived Hitler's origins as an Austrian, rather than a Prussian, as a mitigating factor and stated that Hitler should stay in power as long as possible.[33]

The declaration has been seen as an instance of political weakness brought on by Piłsudski's illness, and it was likened to the interwar lack of leadership that was displayed by Neville Chamberlain and Paul von Hindenburg.[34]

Russia

On 1 September 2009, on the 70th anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War, Russia's foreign intelligence agency, the SVR, declassified documents it said were gathered by undercover agents between 1935 and 1945 allegedly showing that Poland secretly conspired with Germany against the Soviet Union. The SVR claimed that Poland had pursued an anti-Soviet foreign policy from the mid-1930s. The documents were compiled by a former senior KGB officer who cited a report from an unidentified Soviet agent purporting that in 1934, Poland and Germany had agreed a secret protocol whereby Poland would remain neutral if Germany attacked the Soviet Union. In response, Polish historians said that there was no evidence that this protocol existed. Mariusz Wolos, an academic at the Polish Academy of Sciences stated that "Nothing similar has ever turned up in archives in Germany. Just because some agent wrote it doesn't mean it's true. There isn't much new here. The documents [released by the SVR] simply confirm what British, German and Russian historians already know".[35]

References

  1. ^ Kuberski, Hubert. "Hubert Kuberski: Polsko-niemiecka deklaracja o niestosowaniu przemocy". INSTYTUT PAMIĘCI NARODOWEJHUBERT KUBERSKI: POLSKO-NIEMIECKA DEKLARACJA O NIESTOSOWANIU PRZEMOCY - HISTORIA Z IPN -. Retrieved 16 March 2021.
  2. ^ a b c Cienciala, Anna M. (1 March 1967). "The Significance of the Declaration of Non-Aggression of January 26, 1934, in Polish-German and International Relations: A Reappraisal". East European Quarterly. 1 (1). ProQuest 1297351025. Retrieved 13 February 2021.
  3. ^ Anna M. Cienciala, "The Foreign Policy of Józef Piłsudski and Józef Beck, 1926–1939: Misconceptions and Interpretations," The Polish Review (2011) 56#1 pp. 111–151 online
  4. ^ Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany (1970) pp. 57–74.
  5. ^ a b c Cienciala 1999, p. 54.
  6. ^ a b c d Schuker 1999, pp. 48–49.
  7. ^ Torbus, Tomasz (1999). Poland. Nelles Guide: Explore the world. Hunter. p. 25. ISBN 3-88618-088-3.
  8. ^ Quester, George H. (2000). Nuclear Monopoly. Transaction Publishers. p. 27. ISBN 0-7658-0022-5. Citing: Watt, Richard M. (1998) [1979]. Bitter Glory: Poland and Its Fate, 1918-1939. Hippocrene Books. pp. 321–2. ISBN 978-0781806732.
  9. ^ Urbankowski, Bohdan (1997). Józef Piłsudski: Marzyciel i strateg [Józef Piłsudski: Dreamer and Strategist] (in Polish). Vol. 1. Warsaw: Alfa. pp. 539–40. ISBN 978-83-7001-914-3.
  10. ^ Rothwell, Victor (2001). Origins of the Second World War. Manchester University Press. p. 92. ISBN 0-7190-5958-5.
  11. ^ Smogorzewski, Kazimierz Maciej. "Józef Piłsudski". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 3 March 2018.
  12. ^ (in Polish) Dariusz Baliszewski, Ostatnia wojna marszałka, Tygodnik "Wprost", Nr 1148 (28 November 2004), Polish, retrieved on 24 March 2005
  13. ^ Cienciala, Anna M. (2011). "The Foreign Policy of Józef Piłsudski and Józef Beck, 1926–1939: Misconceptions and Interpretations" (PDF). The Polish Review. LVI (1–2): 115. Retrieved 13 February 2021.
  14. ^ The British War Bluebook
  15. ^ a b Cienciała, Anna M. (1975). "Polish Foreign Policy, 1926–1939. "Equilibrium": Stereotype and Reality". The Polish Review. 20 (1): 48–49. JSTOR 27920631. Retrieved 14 February 2021 – via JSTOR.
  16. ^ Jędrzejewicz, Wacław (Winter 1966). "The Polish Plan for a "Preventative War" against Germany in 1933". The Polish Review. 11 (1): 90. JSTOR 25776646. Retrieved 14 February 2021.
  17. ^ a b Weinberg, Gerhard L. (2010). Hitler's Foreign Policy, 1933–1939 The Road to World War II. Enigma Books. pp. 59–60. ISBN 9781929631919. Retrieved 16 February 2021.
  18. ^ McNamara, Paul (May–June 2009). "Could This Irishman Have Stopped Hitler?". History Ireland. 17 (3). Wordwell Ltd.: 34–35. JSTOR 27726010. Retrieved 14 February 2021.
  19. ^ Weinberg, Gerhard L. (2010). Hitler's Foreign Policy, 1933–1939 The Road to World War II. Enigma Books. p. 58. ISBN 9781929631919. Retrieved 16 February 2021.
  20. ^ a b Weinberg, Gerhard L. (2010). Hitler's Foreign Policy, 1933–1939 The Road to World War II. Enigma Books. p. 142. ISBN 9781929631919. Retrieved 16 February 2021.
  21. ^ Lukes, Igor (1996). Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler The Diplomacy of Edvard Benes in the 1930s. Oxford University Press. p. 136. ISBN 9780199880256. Retrieved 2 March 2021.
  22. ^ Goldstein, Erik; Lukes, Igor (2012). The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II. Routledge. p. 54. ISBN 9781136328398. Retrieved 2 March 2021.
  23. ^ Steiner, Zara (2011). The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933–1939. Oxford University Press. pp. 65–66. ISBN 9780199212002. Retrieved 2 March 2021.
  24. ^ Bicki, Roman D. (Autumn 1969). "The Remilitarization of the Rhineland and Its Impact on the French-Polish Alliance". The Polish Review. 14 (4): 48. JSTOR 25776873. Retrieved 15 February 2021.
  25. ^ Wandycz, Piotr S. (2009). "The Second Republic, 1921–1939". The Polish Review. 54 (2): 168. JSTOR 25779809. Retrieved 15 February 2021.
  26. ^ Kulski, W. W. (1978). "The Soviet Union, Germany And Poland". The Polish Review. 23 (1): 54. JSTOR 25777543. Retrieved 15 February 2021.
  27. ^ Kornat, Marek (December 2009). "Choosing Not to Choose in 1939: Poland's Assessment of the Nazi-Soviet Pact". The International History Review. 31 (4): 774. doi:10.1080/07075332.2009.9641172. JSTOR 40647041. S2CID 155068339. Retrieved 15 February 2021.
  28. ^ von Wegener, Alfred (September 2017). "The Origins of This War: a German View". Foreign Affairs (July 1940).
  29. ^ Brown, Robert J. (2004). Manipulating the Ether: The Power of Broadcast Radio in Thirties America. p. 173. ISBN 978-078642066-7.
  30. ^ "The German Note to Poland". Bulletin of International News. 16 (9): 13–15. 1939. JSTOR 25642470. Retrieved 15 February 2021.
  31. ^ "Józef Piłsudski's policy of maintaining the European status quo". The Warsaw Institute Review. 31 October 2019. Retrieved 4 March 2021.
  32. ^ Seton-Watson, Hugh (1945). Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918–1941. The University Press. p. 388. ISBN 9781001284781. Retrieved 4 March 2021.
  33. ^ A Low Dishonest Decade. Paul N. Hehn, 2005.
  34. ^ David Owen, "Diseased, demented, depressed: serious illness in Heads of State", QJM: An International Journal of Medicine 96 (2003), 325–336.
  35. ^ Harding, Luke (1 September 2009). "Fury as Russia presents 'evidence' Poland sided with Nazis before war". The Guardian. Retrieved 2 March 2021.

Sources

  • Wandycz, Piotr Stean (2001) [1988]. The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances. 1926–1936. French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations from Locarno to the remilitarization of the Rheinland. Princeton University Press. ISBN 1-59740-055-6..
  • Anna M. Cienciala, "The Foreign Policy of Józef Piłsudski and Józef Beck, 1926-1939: Misconceptions and Interpretations," The Polish Review (2011) 56#1 pp. 111–151 in JSTOR
  • Cienciala, Anna (1999). "The Munich Crisis, 1938". In Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein (ed.). The Munich crisis of 1938: Plans and Strategy in Warsaw in the context of Wester appeasement of Germany. London: Frank Cass.
  • Schuker, Stephan (1999). "The End of Versailles". In Gordon Martel (ed.). The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered A.J.P. Taylor And The Historians. London: Routledge.
  • "Text of German-Polish Agreement of January 26, 1934", The British War Bluebook – via Avalon Project
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