Liberum veto

The liberum veto (Latin for "the free veto") was a parliamentary device in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. It allowed any member of the Sejm (legislature) to force an immediate end to the current session and nullify any legislation that had already been passed at the session by shouting Nie pozwalam! (Polish: "I do not allow!").

From the mid-16th to the late 18th century, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth had the liberum veto, a form of unanimity voting rule, in its parliamentary deliberations. The "principle of liberum veto played an important role in [the] emergence of the unique Polish form of constitutionalism." This constraint on the powers of the monarch were significant in making the "rule of law, religious tolerance and limited constitutional government ... the norm in Poland in times when the rest of Europe was being devastated by religious hatred and despotism."

But the liberum veto has also been held responsible for the deterioration of the Commonwealth political system, particularly in the 18th century, when foreign powers bribed Sejm members to paralyze its proceedings. Piotr Stefan Wandycz wrote that the "liberum veto had become the sinister symbol of old Polish anarchy."

History

This rule evolved from the principle of unanimous consent, which derived from the federative character of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was essentially a federation of countries. Each deputy to a Sejm was elected at a sejmik (the local sejm for a region) and represented the entire region. He thus assumed responsibility to his sejmik for all decisions taken at the Sejm. A decision taken by a majority against the will of a minority (even if only a single sejmik) was considered a violation of the principle of political equality.

In its early manifestation, the rule was used to strike down only parts of some resolution taken by the Sejm, not the entire Sejm. For example, as Czapliński describes in the Sejm of 1611 context, some resolutions were struck down, but others passed.

It is commonly, and erroneously, believed that a Sejm was first disrupted by means of liberum veto by a Trakai deputy, Władysław Siciński, in 1652. In reality, however, he only vetoed the continuation of the Sejm's deliberations beyond the statutory time limit. He had, however, set up a dangerous precedent. It was fewer than 20 years later, in 1669, in Kraków, that a Sejm was prematurely disrupted on the strength of the liberum veto before it had finished its deliberations. This was done by the Kiev deputy, Adam Olizar. The practice spiraled out of control, and in 1688 the Sejm was dissolved before the proceedings had begun or the Marshal of the Sejm was elected. During the reign of John III Sobieski, half of Sejm preceedings were scuttled by the veto. The practice also spread from the national Sejm to local sejmik precedings.

In the first half of the 18th century, it became increasingly common for Sejm sessions to be broken up by liberum veto, as the Commonwealth's neighbours — chiefly Russia and Prussia — found this a useful tool to frustrate attempts at reforming and strengthening the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth deteriorated from a European power into a state of anarchy.

Many historians hold that a major cause of the Commonwealth's downfall was the principle of liberum veto. Thus deputies bribed by magnates or foreign powers, or simply content to believe they were living in some kind of "Golden Age", for over a century paralysed the Commonwealth's government, stemming any attempts at reform.^{[citation needed]} Other historians, primarily Norman Davies, argue that the effective end of the veto, in 1764, allowed for a rebirth of proper governance. Davies argued that the country had ascended from the veto's anarchy and had organically developed the desire for a new course in politics. He further argues that the anarchy of the veto fed a rebirth of culture that led to the development of the 1791 constitution.^{[citation needed]} In all, these historians argue that the liberum veto did not bring about the end of the nation but did bring acceptance of the need for a new, modern, constitution.

1764

After 1764 the liberum veto practically went out of use: the principle of unanimity did not bind "confederated sejms," and so deputies formed a "confederation" (Polish: konfederacja) at the beginning of a session in order to prevent its disruption by liberum veto.^{[citation needed]}

The liberum veto was abolished by the Constitution of May 3, 1791 (adopted by a confederated sejm), which permanently established the principle of majority rule.

The achievements of that constitution, however — which Davies called "the first constitution of its kind in Europe" — were undone by another confederated sejm, meeting at Grodno in 1793. That Sejm, under duress from Russia and Prussia, ratified the Second Partition of Poland, anticipating the final disappearance of the Polish-Lithuanian state two years later.

Modern parallels

Up until early 1990s IBM had a decision-making process called "non-concur" in which any department head could veto a company-wide strategy if it didn't fit in with his department's outlook. This effectively turned IBM into several independent fiefdoms. "Non-concur" was eliminated by CEO Louis Gerstner who was brought in to revive the declining company

See also

• Consensus decision-making
• Filibuster
• Minoritarianism