Precommitment

For the concept in cryptography, see commitment scheme.

For a discussion of the campaign by an Australian politician to reduce the harm done to themselves by problem gamblers, see Andrew Wilkie.

Precommitment is a strategy first discussed by Thomas Schelling that a party to a conflict can strengthen its position by cutting off some of its options to make its threats more credible (e.g., an army that burns its bridge behind it making retreat impossible). A famous example of this tactic is when Hernán Cortés had his men scuttle the ships in order to eliminate any means of desertion.

This is important in deterrence theory because a threat must be credible to have deterrent power. Strategies such as burning bridges and tripwire forces will eliminate possibilities thus increasing the chance of military conflict. The ideal would be to force your opponent into a clear last chance to avoid war.

SEE ALSO: Commitment Device

External links

• Law review article on precommitment
• Interesting article about precommitment
• Precommitment strategies for problem gambling

References

• Schelling, Thomas C. (1966). Arms and Influence. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press. 
• Connolly T, Arkes HR, Hammond KR. Judgment and decision making: an interdisciplinary reader.