User talk:D Hill

Welcome!

Hello, D Hill, and welcome to Wikipedia! Thank you for your contributions. I hope you like the place and decide to stay. Here are a few good links for newcomers:

I hope you enjoy editing here and being a Wikipedian! Please sign your name on talk pages using four tildes (~~~~); this will automatically produce your name and the date. If you need help, check out Wikipedia:Questions, ask me on my talk page, or place {{helpme}} on your talk page and someone will show up shortly to answer your questions. Again, welcome! --Ton e 20:57, 27 May 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Image copyright problem with Image:Michael_Blake.JPG[edit]

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Barnstars[edit]

Basically, every user can award another a barnstar (or a similar award), when he/she thinks one deserves it. There are no official criteria, it's just a recognition from fellow users. --Ton e 23:02, 1 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Materialism / Physicalism[edit]

I have answered your question.--Laplace's Demon 21:38, 2 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Token-Type Physicalism[edit]

Hmm, I think we should first tell what type and token physicalism state regardless of whether they entail supervenience. Also, I'm a bit confused about your definition of type physicalism. Namely, "for every mental particular F, there is a physical property G with which it is identical to?. This does entail supervenience, as because mental particulars require physical properties, then if a world were similar in all physical aspects, it would be perceived in the same way (I'm not sure what you mean by this.)."

Maybe we should define them in less formal terms. Or state the formal definitions and then go into an example of what type or token physicalism would imply. Perhaps something like,"If type physicalism is true then mental state M1 would be identical to brain state B1. This seems quite unlikely, as it would imply that the mental state of pain, for example, would perfectly correlate to a specific brain state in all organisms. Token physicalism states that for every particular or occurence, there is a physical particular with which it is identical. So while the mental state of pain or happiness is not type-identical to any specific brain state, it is still physical." The other thing that is bothering me is this, "Token physicalism provides one thing that supervenience does not; Token physicalism requires that everything have a physical explanation, while supervenience does not." How does supervenience physicalism allow for their not to be a physical explanation of occurences if mental, social, or moral states or concepts supervene upon the physical. That is, if you are equating 'explanation' with 'cause.' One last thing, why must their be a physical particular for every abstract object? And if so, couldn't the physical particular be the brain state that is associated with it?

Also, Priory of Sion? Heh..--Laplace's Demon 01:57, 3 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Token Physicalism[edit]

"This provides a problem with supervenience, as it requires that everything, including psychological and social elements, must have physical particulars that are identical with them. This however provides one problem; consider one refers to the Priory of Sion. The Priory of Sion exists, but according to token physicalism there is a physical object that is identical to the Priory of Sion, which does not necessarily exist."

Hmm, I've been trying to find another more information on this besides the Stanford Encyclopedia and haven't been able to locate anything that states this. Wouldn't the physical particulars that are identical with social, moral, psychological elements be the physical interactions that occur when social, moral, or psychological events occur? For instance, the physical particulars of the Priory of Sion would be the occurences that form the Priory, i.e. meeting places, members, rituals. I realize you just took this from the Stanford site, but doesn't it seem a bit off to you? Or perhaps I'm simply misunderstanding.

Anyway, the Type Physicalism section is fine, as long as stealing portions of other articles is allowed. Just need to fix up Token.--Laplace's Demon 22:12, 3 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Ok, perhaps you didn't 'steal' it, but it was copied directly from the type physicalism one. If that's okay, leave it in. I'll check out the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.--Laplace's Demon 23:01, 3 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Hmm, its a bit odd that 'living thing' is right above 'cell'. Even if that is a direct translation, how about 'concsious entity' or 'complex organism'? As a cell is obviously a living thing by itself. Other than that, looks good. I'm translating the intro in the german version into english, in case there is anything there that might be of use.--Laplace's Demon 02:27, 8 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Done with the intro translation, tell me what you think.--Laplace's Demon 02:53, 8 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Exclusion Principle[edit]

However many often accept epiphenomenalism, which states mental events are caused by physical events, but physical events are not caused by mental events.

Epiphenomanalism is a position held by a very small minority in philosophy of mind. Frank Jackson was most likely the last mainstream philosopher who identified as a epiphenomanalist. If you can find any cites state that modern analytic philosophers are uncomfortable with the idea of mental causation, please show me.--Laplace's Demon 21:19, 8 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Meh, it seems a bit misleading to say 'many'. What about, "However, some philosophers accept epiphenomenalism..."--Laplace's Demon 21:26, 8 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Hmm..I couldn't find anything. Most likely the philosopher who first characterized it has been lost to history. Oh, by the way, supervenience does not only apply to the relationship between the mental and physical. The concept applies to all fields of analytic philosophy. Supervenience is generally defined as the case where a set of properties A, cannot differ unless a set of properties B also differs. e.g. the solid phase of matter supervenes upon the arrangement of atoms that make it up, the painting supervenes upon the droplets of paint, and the moral claim that war is wrong supervenes upon the claim that killing is wrong.

Reductivism would have it so that consciousness could be explained by referring to the quantum states of electrons. Supervenience implies that the mental is brought about by the complex array of macroscopic events, that form the global properties of one's brain.

Also, I was reading some of those external links, specifically the one that thought mental causation did not have an adequete explanation. Under physicalism, are not those mental events merely 'special' types of physical events, and thus do not break the causal closure of the physical?

Well, I'm going to spend most of tomorrow starting work on supervenience. Ah, and when you finally do post everything you've done so far, you won't mind me editing grammar and such, will you? One last thing, you've had the word 'collaboration' mispelled since you began this project. Heh..--Laplace's Demon 04:33, 10 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Ontologically, Token physicalism is reductionist, in the fact that it reduces a token (i.e. and object, event or process) into its fundamental components

Uh..what? I don't think I would call Token physicalism 'reductionist'. Simply because a token physicalist would examine a particular to find its physical components does not mean they reduce mental states to quarks and leptons. Once again, you would not ignore its global properties and focus on the miniscule. A type physicalist could however, be considered a reductionist as they state that every mental event is identical with a corresponding neurological event. e.g. Pain is c-fibre activation in all species at all times.

Also, I'm changing some things in your article. I'll post the edited one on my userpage when I'm done.--Laplace's Demon 15:50, 10 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Yeah, I found the same source, however, it seems that he's saying that token physicalism is reductionist so far as it relates the mental to the physical, but does not attempt to relate the mental to elementary particles as you said.--71.224.4.251 21:04, 10 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

No thanks, I would rather focus on moral error theory. If you really want to though, I'll help out.--Laplace's Demon 21:18, 10 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Hmm, ok. I was checking out the subjective idealism article, and I have to say, it needs a major overhaul. Okay with you?--Laplace's Demon 20:15, 11 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Subjective Idealism[edit]

Odd, it seems that George Berkeley was partly responsible for the development of limits in calculus. Anyway, I've also been reading a bit on his subjective idealism, and I'm reminded of philosophical skepticism. Basically, due to the barrier of perception one cannot know of a thing unto itself, but merely what one perceives. Of course, this could be refuted with a coherentist approach to epistemology. I'm also reminded strongly of Kant's Transcendental Idealism. Heh, and wow, reading the intro to Transcendental Idealism they seem almost identical, save the need for a pantheistic all-observing god in Berkeley's approach.

Kant, the plagarist...? (/shock + awe) Meh, I doubt it. It seems like a common enough philosophical development.--Laplace's Demon 20:55, 12 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Nature article[edit]

Here's that article comparing wikipedia to britannica.

World article[edit]

Hi D Hill, good to see the additions you made to the new structure I proposed for the article! Looks like the article is now becoming more of a sort of portal site to the world. Br, Brz7 11:43, 26 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Helpme[edit]

How can I help? Martinp23 12:49, 13 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Ah - the helpme template was left on your talk page by an IP - if you don't need help, then just ignore all this, but if you do, just leave a messsage here or on my talk page and I'll get back to you Martinp23 12:55, 13 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

OK - I've just got your message on my talk. For help, you'd probably need to get in contact with a developer. I'll just try to find a dev for you now on IRC and others. I'll get back to you soon. Martinp23 12:57, 13 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

The only users with sufficient access to the database to set your password (if this is even possible) are developers. Seehere for more info on how to contact them. Martinp23 13:13, 13 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Heidegger[edit]

"We still have scholars today who busy themselves with philosophy and who consider freedom-from-every-standpoint not to be a standpoint, as though such freedom did not depend upon those very standpoints. These curious attempts to flee from one's own shadow we may leave to themselves, since discussion of them yields no tangible results. Yet we must heed one thing: this standpoint of freedom-from-standpoints is of the opinion that it has overcome the one-sidedness and bias of prior philosophy, which always was, and is, defined by its standpoints. However, the standpoint of standpointlessness represents no overcoming. In truth it is the extreme consequence, affirmation, and final stage of that opinion concerning philosophy which locates all philosophy extrinsically in standpoints that are ultimately right in front of us, standpoints whose one-sidedness we can try to bring into equilibrium. We do not alleviate the ostensible damage and danger which we fear in the fact that philosopohy is located in a particular place--such location being the essential and indispenable legacy of every philosopohy--by denying and repudiating the fact; we alleviate the danger only by thinking through and grasping the indigenous character of philosophy in terms of its original essence and its necessity, that is to say, by posing anew the question concerning the essence of truth and the essence of human Dasein, and by elaborating a radically new response to that question." See Perspectivism.

Thoughts?-Laplace's Demon 18:49, 16 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Image:Penrose_Interpretation.jpg[edit]

Do you have a better quality version of this image? I am going to remove it from the Penrose interpretation article because it is too blurry to get anything out of it, but I would be more than happy to replace it with a decent resolution version. Remy B 12:28, 17 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Image:Kandinsky white.jpg[edit]

Hello, D Hill. An automated process has found and removed an image or media file tagged as nonfree media, and thus is being used under fair use that was in your userspace. The image (Image:Kandinsky white.jpg) was found at the following location: User:D Hill/Gallery. This image or media was attempted to be removed per criterion number 9 of our non-free content policy. The image or media was replaced with Image:NonFreeImageRemoved.svg , so your formatting of your userpage should be fine. Please find a free image or media to replace it with, and or remove the image from your userspace. User:Gnome (Bot)-talk 15:58, 16 May 2007 (UTC)[reply]

File source problem with File:Penrose_Interpretation.jpg[edit]

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