Talk:Battle of Villers-Bocage

Recent Amendments

Erm, why are the dates back to front? Since this is an English story shouldn't they be 'day, month'?

One of the many things that are going to change in this article once Perch has been passed. Holding onto better source material now, and having a bunch already done, we should be able to get this one slapped into shape in no time. I may then decide to finally get around to finishing off Goodwood lol.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:36, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

I thought they were the right way round until recently?Keith-264 (talk) 21:07, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

Might have been, there has been quite a few changes to this one since i last had a punch at it.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:16, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

'German strategic success'? I thought it was an operational one? Keith-264 (talk) 16:17, 30 May 2009 (UTC)

Sources make out that this was a major setback and that further operations had to be launched to capture Caen implying more of a strategical setback. Do we have any other sources that downplay the actions at V-B?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:17, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

I assume a German strategic success would be the defeat of the invasion. Foiling the attempt at manoeuvre warfare then stopping any more by digging in made the Allies fight closer to the beaches than they expected and this creates the analogies with Kursk and Cassino but the Allied strategy worked with some operational variations (I would have thought). I bet that Moltke (the elder) would have been quite complimentary about the Allied achievement and rated the German effort at containment as adequate but doomed. Keith-264 (talk) 16:36, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

Actually that is a good point - a strategic success would have been something to the major benefit of the Germans; are we in agreement then that this should be changed to Operational victory for them?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:02, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

If the other punters agree. I'm rather curious as to what they think as I don't know how far my assumptions reflect the epistemology of the military trade in 1944. Consider that to me 'breakthrough' is synonymous with crossing the Seine and for others it means capturing Falaise.Keith-264 (talk) 19:45, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

Criticisms

'Missed opportunity'? Isn't this the complaint of every armchair corporal? For as long as the Germans had the means to fight they fought. Manoeuvring them out of Caen failed because they had the fighting power to thwart the attempt. Had it succeeded the Germans would have still had the fighting power to contest an advance beyond Caen (as it turned out after Charnwood and Goodwood anyway). Shouldn't a judgement like this be based on opportunity cost rather than win-lose?Keith-264 (talk) 15:12, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

I agree with you, i recently bought Beevor's new book, on Overlord, and he implies Monty and Dempsey missed a huge opporunity to capture Caen during the Epsom offensive. I was rather shocked at what i read he basically stated the 11th Armour should have been kept in the bridgehead and mauled by the II SS Panzer Corps! The Critiscism section will be one of the last to be looked at but it will mostly echo Perch since historians comments seem to be one and the same i.e. V-B settled Perch so the same comments apply mostly. Although i agree with you - the Germans were planning on holding the Ridge to the south of Caen and mid point through the campaign couldnt care less about the city. I have that comment sourced somewhere so i might throw it in to even it out a bit?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:21, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

I've read a few reviews of Beevor's book which have made my heart sink - the same old crap that writers rather than historians knock out to fluff the American lay reader. Mind you I haven't forgiven him for his book on Crete so I'm biased. Doesn't Badsey have some irascible comments on amateurs poking their noses in?Keith-264 (talk) 16:29, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

To me the book is a rehash of the 80s and ignores all the progress made of the last 2 decades i.e. Hart, Taylor etc etc--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:04, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

German Losses

For 101. SS-Pz.Abt. Zetterling gives 37 tanks operational, 8 u/s on 1 Jun 44 and 15 operational and 21 u/s (6 'long term') on 16 Jun 44. I think this is a more authoritative source than Reynolds. The number operational tanks never rose above 20 for the rest of the campaign. "The first action for the battalion was the well-known fight around Villers-Bocage. The casualties 13 - 16 June amounted to 16 killed in action and 22 wounded. Nine Tigers were lost until 16 June." Keith-264 (talk) 20:59, 13 June 2009 (UTC)

Does he give specific losses for the 13? As they did get there rears handed to them on the 14 and lost further tanks; unless you mean in regards to the comment about Reynolds calling the 14 June losses over the top?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 01:13, 14 June 2009 (UTC)

He says V-B was the first time they engaged. I assume that the losses were recorded on the 16th as they were a bit busy getting monstered beforehand. 16+22=38 (7 crews' worth). http://w1.183.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/ has the OB's and tables of changes over the course of the campaign. From what I can see he demonstrates that claims of losses inflicted on German tank units were exaggerated if 'loss' means 'write-off' but not if it is taken to mean u/s. The tables for the units which engaged in the first fortnight show that servicability fell out of bed and in most units never recovered much after the Germans changed to static defence. I think that Zet is more reliable than Reynolds but the nomenclature seems to obscure the issue somewhat. If the number of Tigers available for action on 1 June was 37 and was 15 on the 16th, then 22 were u/s that day and only a maximum of another five were ever added to the number of serviceable Tigers in the campaign. For PzLehr he gives (for 1 Jun) 97 operational PzIV, 86 Panther and 40 JgdpzIV+StuG. By the 18th it is 29 PzIV, 23 Panther and ? JgdpzIV+StuG. Clearly in the first fortnight the German tank force declined rapidly and after that further losses were roughly balanced by the return of tanks from repair. Evidently the nature of the fighting must have changed for the Germans to have kept any tanks serviceable at all. Curious that Monty gets blamed for expecting a mobile armoured battle, then doing so well so quickly that the Germans had to stop engaging in one and go to ground instead and hardly any writer notices! I suppose that's the difference between a writer and a historian.Keith-264 (talk) 11:58, 14 June 2009 (UTC)

I completly agree with you in regards to the last points (you may want to check out Raising Churchill's Army, David French spends most of his introduction pointing out that farce!) however in regards to the number of runners Zet reports i dont think we can use that information in the article because we are told by mulptiple sources that the battalion had lost a huge number of their tanks to mechanical failures etc on the road march i.e. 3rd Coy was down to one tank! but Zet's table doesnt breakdown the info in regards to mechanical problems and combat damage i think we would be speculating; although we could throw in the info that by 16 June there was only 15 runners in the battalion, 21 in repair and nine tigers destroyed. I think the latter is a good idea, ill see where it can be fitted in.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:12, 14 June 2009 (UTC)

I have added in the piece of information in regards to the 101st losses and damaged tanks to the article in section 14 June.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:39, 14 June 2009 (UTC)

The thing I get from Zet is that the number of tanks available for action falls dramatically from 1st (i.e. 6th) Jun to 16th. Falls of serviceable tanks of 50, 67 and 75% must have had something to do with the start of the Allies' European tour. A loss in action from damage or destruction is a loss (from the point of view of serviceability), just as a breakdown en route (since it was the landings which led to the units being sent to Normandy and thus breaking down - isn't there mention of a report from Italy that the best way to get a Tiger is to make it move so it breaks down?). I had a look at that history forum and there's a debate about the validity of Zet's figures, which seems to be a matter of some people underplaying tank losses by confusing loss (destroyed) and lost temporarily for operations (damaged so u/s). His figures of serviceable tanks seem unambiguous - in ten days, the tank units which engaged the Anglo-Canadians lost at least half of their serviceable tanks to all causes and that it was this which led to a change in tactics from attack to defence and that this enabled those tank units to keep their remaining number of serviceable tanks fairly constant, until mobile warfare began again in early August, when they pretty much lost the lot. I expect that the same picture emerges with the IISSPzK when it engaged in Operation Epsom. Is the farce you mention the one where French points out that the Germans got shot to bits when they attacked even more comprehensively than the Anglo-Canadians?Keith-264 (talk) 13:52, 14 June 2009 (UTC)

Weasels

I was somewhat surprised that a comment of mine attracted the 'weasel' label. Rather than reverting the reversion I have added a rider. Stephen Badsey, Terry Copp and S A Hart I'd nominate as sceptics of the poor show school; Buckley not.Keith-264 (talk) 15:32, 16 June 2009 (UTC)

The form "Some X believe Y" is classic weasel wording.

I agree with Enigma that we are making too much of a brief point in an introductory section. I thought the original phrasing generally along the lines of "Historians believe the significance of the battle lies in the lost opportunity to take Caen early in the campaign" was good enough for the intro and could be explained and referenced more fully later in the article. No need to get too deep into it at this point.

Later in the article, by all means we should give names of those authors in each of the several camps. This is a controversial battle (which is partially why it gets edited so often) and deserves that treatment. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 16:49, 16 June 2009 (UTC)

"Historians generally agree that because of failures at the British divisional and corps command levels an early opportunity to capture Caen was squandered." I thought that the 'X generally agree' phrase was pov pushing which is why I changed it. the word 'squandered' also seemed a bit one-sided. I've had my two penn'orth though so you can change it back if you like.Keith-264 (talk) 17:46, 16 June 2009 (UTC) Copp, 'Fields of Fire' p.76, 'The humiliation of the Desert Rats, who lost more than a score of tanks to a single German Tiger, [ahem!] marked the postponement of further attempts to penetrate defences with armoured spearheads. A bridgehead had been established but different methods would be required to fight an enemy employing Panzer divisions to hold ground defensively.' Keith-264 (talk) 18:40, 16 June 2009 (UTC)

Results

The results references cited in the infobox seem to all be concerned with losses of tanks etc. This makes some sense at the tactical level although it would be incomplete even at that level. But there are no references to the operational loss the Allies suffered. Surely that is the significance of this battle, not the loss of a few tanks and the tragic loss of people. If there were no larger operational or strategic significance, this would just be one more skirmish. But of course it was highly significant. DMorpheus (talk) 13:24, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

There's no consensus beyond the tactical result (and not all that much there) in the literature. Much of the 'squandered' conclusion seems to either be based on the questionable assumption that a success at V-B would have had more than tactical ramifications, such as the capture of Caen (although that also requires a belief in the 'eastern breakout thesis') or that a sharp defeat would have made the Germans retreat, when it appears that Normandy was the only place that the Germans could fight the Allies without being quickly annihilated. Much of the writing by proper historians over the last twenty years or so note that the Germans lacked the numbers, fuel, transport and air support to fight a mobile battle, something which V-B would have demonstrated to the 'easterners' in the German command structure. To my mind V-B was the moment when the Germans generally had to change their methods to avoid being crushed by Allied superiority. PzLehr and the other surviving divisions in Normandy were digging in to protect themselves before V-B, which was a tacit admission of defeat. Many would disagree but I think Bucknall was probably right to cut his losses, having inflicted a substantial amount of attrition on the forces in front of him.

DMorpheus am not sure what you expect to find in the infobox casualty section other than casualties; the citations used give a good indication of the tank losses on both sides but only provide information in regards to British personnel losses. German ones, as the note states, are not available.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:12, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

What I expected was some reference that contained statements about the tactical and operational outcomes of the battle. Instead there are references regarding tank (mostly) and personnel losses. My point is that losses are not a measure of anything except...losses. They are not a proxy for tactical win/loss nor a proxy for operational win/loss. History is full of examples of strategic victories won by the side that also took heavier losses - Kursk, Coral Sea, Jutland to name a few......so losses do not measure anything else.

If there is no consensus beyond tactical (and I agree completely with you that there isn't - thus the controversy) then let us not claim in the infobox anything beyond the tactical. Put "disputed" as the result and describe it in an aftermath/outcome-type section, with a full description of the controversy.

Just an aside, but the Germans were fighting the Allies in Italy at the time and were not being "quickly annihilated". They managed a fighting withdrawal from Sep 43 to April 45 quite nicely. "Digging in" is no admission of defeat, it is the first thing you do when you're ordered to defend.

Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 14:29, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

Just to clarify my remarks, I am concerned about the "Result" section of the infobox, not the casualties section. DMorpheus (talk) 14:32, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

If you are concerned about the results section of the infobox why are you brining up personel and tank losses? The inline citations back up the statements made - Taylor confirms there was no tactical victory and the others make the point that the Germans stopped the operation and the possbility of capturing Caen. Why does that not seem suitable?

The main anyalsis section has gone much further into discussing the outcome of the battle, although there are still extra bits to add in there and maybe reorganise somewhat.

What controversy are you refering to?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:45, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

Italy doesn't have much open ground between Foggia and Bologna, the terrain is Normandy plus. Consider Western Russia and the Polish plain Sep 43 to April 45 - the Germans made the best of river lines which when pierced led to them being routed like in Normandy.

The results were the losses and the relative effects they had on the contenders. Not much ground was gained, not much ground was lost. The British didn't lever PzLehr out of its positions and promenade into Caen and the Germans didn't push them into the sea. the qualitiative effects are matters of opinion which tend to follow the 'chronic caution' line or the 'skillful attrition' one. On top of that there is the politicking among the Allied management (Tedder et al) and the slightly more lethal manoeuvres around Hitler. Keith-264 (talk) 14:54, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

"If you are concerned about the results section of the infobox why are you brining up personel and tank losses? " Because that is what the references to that section show. That's my point - the references do not support the statements made in the infobox, to put it bluntly. They merely document losses. Losses are one aspect, but only one, of the outcome. DMorpheus (talk) 15:22, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

"Italy doesn't have much open ground...." Yes, thank you, I am well aware of that having walked much of it uphill both ways ;) . My point was a simple side remark; the claim was made "that Normandy was the only place that the Germans could fight the Allies without being quickly annihilated". That's just obviously not true so it cannot back any other claim. But let us avoid sidetracks. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 15:25, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

Really? Hitler didn't think so. Where did the new front line form after the rout in Normandy? The Siegfried Line (i.e. a physical obstacle like the one the terrain in Normandy presented).Keith-264 (talk) 15:55, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

"The results were the losses and the relative effects they had on the contenders. Not much ground was gained, not much ground was lost. The British didn't lever PzLehr out of its positions and promenade into Caen and the Germans didn't push them into the sea. the qualitiative effects are matters of opinion which tend to follow the 'chronic caution' line or the 'skillful attrition' one. On top of that there is the politicking among the Allied management (Tedder et al) and the slightly more lethal manoeuvres around Hitler."

The results can be assessed at many levels: tactical, operational, strategic, political. I believe as it stands we are ignoring the operational and strategic levels or at least not treating them with the attention they deserve. Let's not fall into false dichotomies. There is much real analysis of this battle that need not have any political content. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 15:29, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

It's not a dichotomy, it's a paradox:-)Keith-264 (talk) 15:55, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

I will check the 4 citations when i get home but am pretty confident as it is now that they support a tactically inconclusive battle and that the Germans put a stop to an early attempt to capture Caen.

But again the infobox is for simple statements for quick reference the main body of the article has to deal with the meat of the situation, while there may be some extra things to add, it pretty much deals with both sides from the tactical side upwards.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:35, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

"Really? Hitler didn't think so. Where did the new front line form after the rout in Normandy? The Siegfried Line (i.e. a physical obstacle like the one the terrain in Normandy presented).Keith-264 (talk) 15:55, 23 June 2009 (UTC)"

Nonsense. We're getting sidetracked into irrelevant conversations but this is nonsense. The Germans fought in Italy and were not "quickly annihilated". They fought in the Hurtgen forest and were not "quickly annihilated". They fought in the Netherlands and were not "quickly annihilated". They stood at the west wall also. In some places it was an obstacle; in others it wasn't. It was pierced with very little effort by the US 5th Armored Division and other units even before Market-Garden was launched. Physical obstacles are force multipliers, not magic bullets. The Rhine was bounced at least twice too. In Normandy, some of the terrain was excellent for defense (the low-lying pays-bocage and the Orne river / Caen canal area) and other areas favored the attacker. This has little to do with the article point we're on. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 16:24, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

Try to mind your manners Morphy, you're not at home. The Germans made defensive stands (1943-1945) where terrain was conducive for defence - the mountains of Italy, the bocage of Normandy (which let them split their forces) and river lines in Eastern Europe and the western approaches to Germany. Where could the Germans fight in France outside Normandy where the front line would be that short, where the Allies were cramped for room and their advantage in numbers and mobility could be frustrated? What areas of Normandy favoured the attacker? As I wrote, 'Hitler didn't think so'. Keith-264 (talk) 17:39, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

Ok in regards to the citations:

Tactically inconclusive, both pages Taylor makes that claim. Will check the rest later.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:54, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

Mind my manners???? Your entire line of discussion here is (at best) peripheral to the point we are discussing and relies on an incorrect generalization. Of course the Germans defended where the terrain favored defense. What else would you expect them, or any army, to do? Who cares what Hitler thought?

The question under discussion is how the results are described and referenced, not on the history of german defensive doctrine. DMorpheus (talk) 18:17, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

Sulky wulky. I don't have a line of discussion, I'm trying to help you catch up with twenty years of scholarshipKeith-264 (talk) 18:51, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

The Wilmot ref is fine, the D'Este ref is fine and likewise for Reynolds none talk about "tanks and people". The pages cited all talk about the operational setback the Germans had inflicted on the British so whats the problem?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:55, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

Sulky wulky. I don't have a line of discussion, I'm trying to help you catch up with twenty years of scholarshipKeith-264 (talk) 18:51, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

Thanks for the attack; let's stick to the issues shall we? Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 15:35, 24 June 2009 (UTC)

Stop having a go and I will stop retorting.Keith-264 (talk) 18:02, 24 June 2009 (UTC)

The issue being? Please see my above post, i am failing to see what the issue is.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:08, 24 June 2009 (UTC)

Copyedit notes

Usual form; questions etc below. EyeSerene^talk 11:27, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

Lead

• I normally leave this until last (and will come back to it later), but given the battle's controversial nature I thought any objections might be worth dealing with now rather than while the article's at FAC :) I've made a tweak to the final paragraph re historical views of the battle... Comments?

  Would it be better to write 'part' of 7th Armd Div was sent on the flanking move?Keith-264 (talk) 12:28, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

  I think so, though I'll get to that when I ce the lead later (unless you fancy making the tweak?) EyeSerene^talk 12:07, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

  Have altered a few words for clarity but feel free to change if you think it hasn't helped.Keith-264 (talk) 12:15, 12 September 2009 (UTC)

  Looks good :) EyeSerene^talk 07:53, 14 September 2009 (UTC)

Background

• I've trimmed much of the Perch stuff from the start of this section - I think due to its complexity, it's difficult to summarise adequately and we've got the link to the main article anyway. However, please rv if you disagree ;)

  Looks alright so far.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:08, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

Morning fighting

• The note re the three Stuarts has a reference - After the Battle magazine - that doesn't seem to be properly listed in the refs section or anywhere else.

  Ill add that in a mo.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:13, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

  Just noted that the magazine is already listed: "After the Battle Magazine (2006). Issue 132. After the Battle Magazine. After the Battle."; with no editorial name i have just used the magazine's name so it does display a little funky. So we have "authors surename", the year, title, series title and the publisher displayed.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:25, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

  Cool, that should be enough EyeSerene^talk 13:32, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

• Not really part of this section, but while I'm thinking of refs, is http://w1.183.telia.com a WP:RS?

  I would argue it is; it appears to be copyrighted by a reliable historian, Zetterling, who has had a number of books released plus all sources used on the website are mentioned.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:13, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

  OK, np. I wondered if it was the Zetterling ;) EyeSerene^talk 13:25, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

  I think it is.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:47, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

• What rank was Dyas?

  Am gonner have a busy weekend studying and writing an assingment but when i get a moment i will add it in.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:13, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

  It's ok, I ran across it while looking up something else. EyeSerene^talk 13:25, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

  Nice one.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:47, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

• Who was Charles Pearce? A rank or position would be helpful. Also, is this the same person as the Charles Pierce mentioned later in this section?

  Likewise, also i dont believe their was another guy out there with a similar name who was so high profile so i think ive made a typo. I will check the spelling too to find out which variant is correct.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:13, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

  They seem to be the same Pearce, according to the newsletter, so I'll save you some time and fix it myself.

  Chers

• I'm not convinced about the Sharpshooter newsletter as a source - wouldn't the recollections of the troopers qualify as primary source material? It may be ok, as long as we're careful about how we attribute.

  Yes i believe it would qualify as primary source material due to it being letters/comments etc sent into the regiments newsletter. I think this usage should fall within the guidelines; it has been published (the guidelines not a reliable source i.e. uni press or mainstream newspapers however i think this regmental newsletter should be covered by this too) and has on the whole been used mostly for descriptive purposes - i dont believe it has stepped outside the guidelines and to be used in an analytic, synthetic, interpretive, explanatory, or evaluative manner etc (if i have understood the guidelines correctly).--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:47, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

  I believe that's right. Since we're using it to cite what the troopers recollect, I think it should be fine - just wanted to double-check with you ;) EyeSerene^talk 14:27, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

Aftermath

• I have a feeling that the Propoganda section might sit better at the start of the Analysis section. Can I give this a try?
  • Done this - hopefully it works better, but please feel free to change as necessary. EyeSerene^talk 17:03, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

Analysis

• Major point: the lead claims that recent historiography has looked at the change in German tactics as the reason for the offensive's failure. However, this isn't mentioned anywhere else in the article. I'd have thought it belongs in this section, so until we get something in here about that, I'll comment it out in the lead.

  I have reviewed all changes made thus far and am very happy with what has occured, sorry i havent been around the last few days but life got in the way. I will consult my sources and with Keith on this issue.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:29, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

  No problem :) Other than the lead and this issue, I'm about done anyway. I'll keep checking back. EyeSerene^talk 18:41, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

Conclusion

The effect that the German foiling of the British attempt to lever Panzerlehr out of Tilly by doing the V-B gig is decribed in the conclusion but I'm curious about a forestalling of any German opportunity to counter-attack at Tilly with the forces that ended up at V-B. Does anyone know of sources which discuss British defensive arrangements in the area?Keith-264 (talk) 12:28, 12 September 2009 (UTC)

I don't recall reading anything specifically about that. I'm certain (given the offensively-minded nature of the German strategy at that time) that the redeployment of German forces caused by the thrust at Villers-Bocage forestalled something, but what I've no idea. I'll recheck my sources though. EyeSerene^talk 07:53, 14 September 2009 (UTC)

Considering the strength of Panzerlehr and the reinforcements approaching I doubt they'd have been content to hold ground if there was an alternative. I like the revisions to the article, particularly the historiographical analysis of the Wittmann propaganda and its exploitation since by both sides. I found it reminiscent of the way the story of the Battle of Jutland was told by the Admiralty soon after it, compared to the use the Germans made of it. That said it shows how far gone the Germans were in the days after D-Day that they could only muster a propaganda victory.Keith-264 (talk) 08:49, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

I dont recall seeing anything in my sources about this sort of thing however one should look to be aware of this battle as being part of the larger operation. On top of which to me it seems that the Germans did not hold the initative they were reacting to the advances made by the British and Americans; any notion of counterattack came when II SS PanzerCorps arrvied.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:03, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

...and then it remained a notion ;) There was 21st Panzer's post-D-Day attempt to split the British and Canadians, and 12th SS Panzer had a good go when they arrived, but thanks to the Allied pressure I can't recall any 'proper' German offensives that actually went off even remotely as planned between those local efforts and Mortain. The succession of German commanders in Normandy certainly seemed to arrive at a realistic assessment of their position rapidly enough, so who can say how much of the constant planning for counterattacks that never took place was just to appease Berlin? EyeSerene^talk 11:38, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

I was thinking about it more from the British pont of view - the importance to Monty of not allowing the Germans a sniff of an opportunity. I get the impression from the British deployment at Tilly that this was the 'schwehrpunkt' and that the move of part of 7th Armd Div round the flank was not intended to compromise the effort elsewhere, that it was more of an attempt to trigger a German retreat than to bulldoze them. Closing the gap made by the 1st Inf Div also guarded against the Germans going the other way. As it was the fighting around V-B consumed German resources and engaged German reinforcements. As we know (being groovy through hindsight) the encounter battle at V-B and the Brigade Box depleted one of the Germans' most powerful armoured formations (101HSSPzA) as well as distracting some of the 2nd PzDiv and parts of the PZL Div. I also wonder if we underestimate the weather as a factor - it pops up like a deus ex machina rather than being a permanent presence. All that said, with what we know now, could a Brigade Group have done any better?Keith-264 (talk) 13:00, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

I think when we look back on the information available on this battle we can see how the fighting was downplayed and the defeat of the 7th Armoured Division being overplayed. Only recently have we managed to gain new books detailing the battle in a more accurate light (although not perfect) but it seems there has yet to be a look at the battle within the bigger picture, i.e. 7th Armoured Division’s actual objective and how that figured in Perch, what the objective of the German reinforcements was, where the Germans planning a counterattack or was their attitude purely defensive, how much of an impact did this battle really have on both sides and the campaign?

To be honest I think the battle is overrated; we have, for example, accounts from Kurt Meyer detailing how he ambushed and destroyed numerous tanks soon after D-Day etc It appears these sort of things happened on a fairly regular basis so in the end what is really so important about this battle? A loss opportunity to capture Caen? I think this last premise is completely unfounded, the operations goal was to encircle the city and with I Corps advance halted could have a strung out XXX Corps really have achieved that objective when we consider it would be encircling three armoured divisions who were still combat effective?

I think so too. The quick capture of Caen still appeals to many writers as the way to advance in the east without a great attritional battle or as a demonstration of Anglo-Canadian feebleness. Perhaps there's also been a bit of jealousy of the 7th Armd Div as well. Considering that it was equipped with Cromwells I would have thought that it would not be seen as a battering-ram, rather a latter-day cavalry force to exploit a success rather than make one.Keith-264 (talk) 14:28, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

This is wandering off-topic, but it's an interesting question as to whether or not 7th Armoured (or any Allied armoured division for that matter) was actually equipped to a standard that would let it be used as a battering-ram. I know historians have plenty to say about the relative qualities of German vs Allied tanks, and maybe if something as well-armoured as a Tiger had been available to the Allies they could have pressed home that type of offensive, but I have to confess I'm sceptical. The Soviet heavies were undoubtedly effective, but didn't prevent huge losses (of a type the Brits particularly couldn't have sustained) when attacking on the Eastern front. EyeSerene^talk 17:20, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

The organisation of westender armies does rather look like they were built to erode German fighting power with artillery while the tanks and infantry manoeuvred under its cover rather than by armoured duelling. The big German tanks look to me to be the 1944 version of the line of 88's that thwarted the Anglo-French attack at Arras in 1940. On the whole the fighting in Europe after 1941 looks more and more like 1916 with knobs on.Keith-264 (talk) 19:40, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

FA review

Moved the following here for now in an attempt to tighten up and trim the background section. EyeSerene^talk 18:26, 2 December 2009 (UTC)

The pincer's eastern arm would consist of I Corps's 51st (Highland) Infantry Division and the 4th Armoured Brigade. These formations would strike out of the Orne bridgehead—the ground gained east of the Orne by the 6th Airborne Division during Operation Tonga—towards Cagny, 6 miles (9.7 km) to the southeast of Caen. XXX Corps would form the pincer's western arm; the 7th Armoured Division would swing east, crossing the Odon River to take Évrecy and the high ground, Hill 112, near the town.

Agte info

Wittmann's 2nd Company consisted of three platoons. I. Zug (1st platoon) made up of Tigers 211 (Ostuf. Jürgen Wessel), 212 (Uscha. Balthasar Woll), 213 (Hscha. Hans Höflinger) and 214 (Uscha. Karl-Heinz Warmbrunn). II. Zug (2nd platoon) made up of Tigers 221 (Ustuf. Georg Hantusch), 222 (Uscha. Kurt Sowa)), 223 (Oscha. Jürgen Brandt) and 224 (Uscha. Ewald Mölly). III. Zug (3rd platoon) made up of Tigers 231 (St.O.Jk. Heinz Belbe), 232 (Uscha. Kurt Kleber) 233 (Oscha. Georg Lötsch) and 234 (Uscha. Herbert Stief),[68][10] although Lieutenant Wessel in Tiger 211 was sent off to establish contact with the Panzerlehrdivision, and Tiger 233 was suffering from track damage and 234 from mechanical failure.[17]

Two questions; all other sources point to most of the entire battalion being non-functional and Wittmann having 6 tanks with him at V-B- one of which was sent off to make contact with the panzerlehr; where does these other 6 tanks come from? Edit: to clarify Tigers 212, 213, 214, 224, 231, and 232. No other source places them at V-B; does Agte?

Additionally what do all the abbreivations mean?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:23, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

No Agte does not contradict your sources. What triggered me to start expanding this section is the sentence "Wittmann's 2nd Company consisted of..." and that the article stated that two other Tigers were either unserviceable or not present. I felt that the section should state what his authorized strength was, listing all the Tigers and all unserviceable tanks. MisterBee1966 (talk) 20:48, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

Ostuf= oberscharführer uscha unterscharfüher hascha = hauptscharführer all SS ranks —Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.192.121.123 (talk) 21:50, 9 December 2009 (UTC)