Talk:Falsifiability

Typo / incorrect meaning

The Popperian criterion excludes from the domain of science not unfalsifiable statements but only whole theories that contain no falsifiable statements;

The last part doesn't make sense. I believe this is correct instead:

The Popperian criterion excludes from the domain of science not unfalsifiable statements but only whole theories that contain non-falsifiable statements;

Because the criterion excludes a "whole theory" if it contains any non-falsifiable statements.

Currently it says that a "whole" theory is excluded only if it doesn't contain any falsifiable statements. This is not correct; if a theory contains both falsifiable and non-falsifiable statements, it will be excluded.

NOTE: Whoever wrote this is mistaken. A theory is falsifiable if, and only if, it entails at least one falsifiable statement. It's irrelevant if it also entails unfalsifiable statements, e.g. all theories entail all tautologies, and tautologies exemplify unfalsifiable statements.

Lakatos Vs Popper

I am aware that we cannot make our own thesis in a Wikipedia article. Nevertheless, knowing what notable philosophers have written (as primary source) is important and can guide us in finding proper secondary sources that presented a view point on these writings. With this perspective in mind, here is a quote from Lakatos, which seems to misinterpret the very definition of falsifiability given by Popper.

"A theory is 'scientific' if one is prepared to specify in advance a crucial experiment (or observation) which can falsify it, and it is pseudoscientific if one refuses to specify such a 'potential falsifier'. But if so, we do not demarcate scientific theories from pseudoscientific ones, but rather scientific method from non-scientific method.

...

"Is, then, Popper's falsifiability criterion the solution to the problem of demarcating science from pseudoscience? No. For Popper's criterion ignores the remarkable tenacity of scientific theories. Scientists have thick skins. They do not abandon a theory merely because facts contradict it."

— Imre Lakatos, The methodology of scientific research programmes (1978), pp.3-4

We will see that this quote from Lakatos is very close to what Popper wrote about the scientific method. Popper has obviously written a lot of things to motivate the definition of falsifiability, things that were not his definition of falsifiability: we must distinguish between the motivation for a definition and the definition itself. It's the first time that I hear the thesis that Popper's falsifiability does not apply to a theory (or a statement), but to the overall scientific method. We don't even say that in our article. Here is a few quotes from Popper that show how Popper viewed his definition of falsifiability in the larger context of a scientific method. In this first quote, Popper stresses, as he has done in many occasions, that falsification is not possible and he even admits that it creates an issue regarding the applicability of a falsification criteria.

"It might be said that even if the asymmetry [between universal and existential statements] is admitted, it is still impossible, for various reasons, that any theoretical system should ever be conclusively falsified. For it is always possible to find some way of evading falsification, for example by introducing ad hoc an auxiliary hypothesis, or by changing ad hoc a definition. It is even possible without logical inconsistency to adopt the position of simply refusing to acknowledge any falsifying experience whatsoever. Admittedly, scientists do not usually proceed in this way, but logically such procedure is possible; and this fact, it might be claimed, makes the logical value of my proposed criterion of demarcation dubious, to say the least."

— Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), pp.19-20

Popper continues by responding to his imaginary critic that we might conceive (in principle) of a scientific method that would work, if only scientists would apply it.

"I must admit the justice of this criticism; but I need not therefore withdraw my proposal to adopt falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation. For I am going to propose (in sections 20 f.) that the empirical method shall be characterized as a method that excludes precisely those ways of evading falsification which, as my imaginary critic rightly insists, are logically possible. According to my proposal, what characterizes the empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested. Its aim is not to save the lives of untenable systems but, on the contrary, to select the one which is by comparison the fittest, by exposing them all to the fiercest struggle for survival."

— Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), p.20

To my knowledge, Popper was not very successful in describing what is the historical scientific method. The fact that his proposed scientific method has not been applied and would perhaps never be applied does not imply that his definition of falsifiability has no merit. In any case, it is important not to assume that this quote from Popper his a definition of falsifiability. It is only Popper's view on what the scientific method should be, ideally. He is only trying to motivate his definition of falsifiability, which comes later in the book and perhaps appears in simpler terms before. After about 45 pages of analysis, here is the definition of falsifiability given by Popper.

"A theory is to be called ‘empirical’ or ‘falsifiable’ if it divides the class of all possible basic statements unambiguously into the following two non-empty subclasses. First, the class of all those basic statements with which it is inconsistent (or which it rules out, or prohibits): we call this the class of the potential falsifiers of the theory; and secondly, the class of those basic statements which it does not contradict (or which it ‘permits’). We can put this more briefly by saying: a theory is falsifiable if the class of its potential falsifiers is not empty."

— Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), p.65

Here is one of many other quotes from Popper which explains that we should not confuse his technical notion of falsifiability as a proposed criteria of demarcation and a less technical notion of falsifiability, which only mean that it can be proven false. Popper stresses that falsifiability in this latter sense is impossible.

"We must distinguish two meanings of the expressions falsifiable and falsifiability:

"1) Falsifiable as a logical-technical term, in the sense of the demarcation criterion of falsifiability. This purely logical concept — falsifiable in principle, one might say — rests on a logical relation between the theory in question and the class of basic statements (or the potential falsifiers described by them).
"2) Falsifiable in the sense that the theory in question can definitively or conclusively or demonstrably be falsified ("demonstrably falsifiable").
"I have always stressed that even a theory which is obviously falsifiable in the first sense is never falsifiable in this second sense. (For this reason I have used the expression falsifiable as a rule only in the first, technical sense. In the second sense, I have as a rule spoken not of falsifiability but rather of falsification and of its problems)"

— Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), pp=82-85

To my knowledge, critics of Popper's falsifiability fall in three categories. Those who critic the consistency of the definition itself, those who critic the usefulness of the definition within any scientific method, those who critic the specific scientific methods advanced by Popper to motivate the definition. Lakatos, in the above quote, did not critic the definition itself, but only a specific view avanced by Popper on the scientific method. Indeed, Popper failed at few occasions to apply his falsifiability criteria within a method to choose between scientific theories (see Popper 1979, pp. 58–59 for what Popper said about this), but we should not confuse the process of choosing between different scientific theories and the process of demarcating between scientific theories and other forms of knowledge. The falsifiability criteria works well for the latter. Nevertheless, it's a complex situation, because it's natural to view that Popper's definition failed, if we cannot find a way to apply it to pick a theory among many. On the other hand, as explained in Talk:Falsifiability#Refocusing on falsifiability and using more of Lakatos, even Lakatos reused the definition of falsifiability in his more holistic approach.

Reference

Popper, Karl (1979). Objective Knowledge: An evolutionary Approach. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-875024-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)

Re-write needed

Respectfully, a subject expert needs to reorganize the text to eliminate run-on sentences and grab bag paragraphs. Incrementally added text makes the article hard to understand.

The article sounds like a college term paper being padded for length. For example, the names of Karl Popper and other authorities are repeatedly inserted into the text unnecessarily. Please use footnotes to refer to authorities.

Also, some paragraphs now contain multiple ideas, which overcomplicate the text. Please break paragraphs into groups of ideas.

The issue is not accuracy. The goal is organization and clarity. Tdk408 (talk) 04:26, 28 December 2019 (UTC)

The awkward tag

The awkward tag out of context at the start of the article is confusing. Such a tag makes sense when used after a sentence such as explained in its usage: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Awkward . The first step if a reorganization is needed, is to propose changes in this discussion page, at the least point at specific sentences or paragraphs so that we have some context to discuss it. Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:05, 30 December 2019 (UTC)

I written my thoughts about why we need a plan to proceed Dominic Mayers (talk) 23:18, 2 January 2020 (UTC)

Clearer lead

The article currently starts:

A statement, hypothesis, or theory is falsifiable if its assertion contradicts data (more precisely, a basic statement) that is otherwise possible.

This wording is trying hard to be technically correct, but at the expense of being understandable by the ordinary reader, for several reasons:

• "its assertion" seems to be used to mean "whether it is true"
• it is unclear what it means for its assertion to contradict data
• mentioning the technicality of "basic statement" is premature here; for one thing, "basic statement" isn't defined
• "data" is unclear
• "that is otherwise possible" is unclear.

It also doesn't give enough context.

Let me propose something simpler:

In philosophy, a claim is falsifiable if there could in principle exist an observation which shows it to be false. Many theories in the philosophy of science use falsifiability as a crucial criterion separating science and non-science; making this precise has occupied many philosophers.

It would also be nice to have a vivid, concrete example somewhere in the lead, e.g.:

The claim "all ducks are white" is falsifiable—and indeed false—because observing one black duck contradicts it. The claim "all ducks weigh less than a ton" is falsifiable but has never been falsified, and is indeed surely true. "All ducks are mortal" cannot be falsified in principle—even though it is doubtless true—because there is no way of knowing whether any of the currently living ducks will ever die.

I'm sure that the definition and the examples above can be improved... but my point is simply that the article needs to start with a general, understandable statement. Later on, of course, the article can go into necessary details, technicalities, and caveats. After all, the lead can't possibly summarize all the work on the topic! --Macrakis (talk) 18:11, 9 January 2020 (UTC)

Small Note

By the way, falsifiability is NOT a criteria that directly separates science from non science. If you want to write that, then you are biased with an agenda, which might be honorable, but still this bias would prevent you from presenting falsifiability for what it is. Falsifiability only applies to theories, not to scientific methods that accept or reject these theories. What can be said is that a method that would accept unfalsifiable theories can hardly be scientific, but this is a meta criterion that uses falsifiability. It's not falsifiability. There is a nuance and it is important.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 22:58, 9 January 2020 (UTC)

Agreed. "Naive falsifiability" is problematic in all sorts of ways, and using it as a blunt instrument to separate science from non-science doesn't really work in any sort of straightforward way, as a whole series of philosophers have pointed out over the past 60+ years.

My point was that the lead to the article needs to present the basic idea of falsifiability in a simple, comprehensible way. The basic idea is along the lines of: if your theory can't be contradicted by observation, it's not saying much. I really do prefer the term "observation" to "data", because "data" can mean many things -- not just observational data, but also any information at all. A book of random numbers is data in the latter sense. Maybe it suffices to rename it "observational data".

The current wording is difficult to understand, even for someone (like me) who has actually read Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, et al. What does it mean for data to be "possible"? Why talk about the "assertion of a statement"?

The core idea of falsifiability is not that hard, and the introduction to the WP article should be understandable by an intelligent 10th grader (or 10th grade teacher!).

It also seems important to mention the role of falsifiability as a demarcation criterion in the lead. --Macrakis (talk) 23:26, 9 January 2020 (UTC)

My motivation for "data" was to refer to a common concept in practical science and data is such a concept. In particular, it includes the outcomes of complex processes and computations such as in magnetic resonance imaging, etc., but maybe you are right that it was too general. Observational data is better. We agree on this. I am thinking more about the other points that you made.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 05:58, 10 January 2020 (UTC)

Not much can be said based on the naive definition, only confusion.

The problem is that we naively think that it is sufficient to have a definition that we know how to use to demarcate falsifiable theories from others.

• All swans are white is falsifiable, because we can conceive the observation of a black swan (in fact they exist).
• All swans weigh less than one ton is falsifiable, because we can conceive the observation of a swan that weigh two tons.
• All swans are mortal is not falsifiable, because we cannot know if the swan is immortal. It's not an observation.

Simple definition: A statement is falsifiable if we can conceive an observation that contradicts it. That seems perfect and at the level of Wikipedia. This is wrong. The definition was not introduced to be used in this naive manner. This is a complete misconception. It was introduced to exhibit the logic of scientific discovery. In accordance with Popper, science is a complex process that use hypotheses (theories that are proposed) and refutations. The generation of hypotheses cannot be explained by logic, because induction is not logical. The only part that use logic is the refutations. The purpose of falsifiability is to show the purely logic content behind the refutations. The naive definition does not work for this purpose, because it does not has the key ingredient. The illusion that is created by the naive definition is misleading. Worst, this propaganda for the naive definition has contributed to many unfair criticisms toward falsifiability. So, if we give the naive the definition in the lead, we need to provide the proper context in the lead as well. I know, this definition is given in a few sources, but rarely out of context. Most sources avoid this naive definition.

What is missing? The link between the logical statements and the actual observations is missing. Given that the role of falsifiability is to exhibit the purely logical refutations that correspond to the actual refutations, this link is crucial. The whole discussion depends on it. This link requires the notion of basic statements, which are built using a background theory or a background knowledge. Popper discusses in details the issues of the empirical basis and what are the basic statements before he gives the definition.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 11:42, 16 January 2020 (UTC)

Does Wikipedia need this article?

Is Falsifiability a thing?

It is apparent that the logic of falsification, posited as an answer to the problem of induction, is not presented at all clearly in thie article. Instead the push seems to be for an article describing falsification as the principle demarcation between science and non-science. That is, the article is now partisan.

Neither Stanford nor IEP have articles on falsifiability. The topic is subsumed into the articles on Popper and on Scientific Method.

What do folk think of moving the bulk of this material into a new article on Falsificationism, which would be an historical account of Popper, Lakatos, Feyerabend and the relevant controversies, with this article becoming a mere redirection? Banno (talk) 21:42, 16 January 2020 (UTC)

You raised two independent questions. Is the article biased regarding the problem of demarcation vs the problem of induction? Does falsifiability deserves an article in Wikipedia? These two questions are to a large degree unrelated. I will first answer the second question. The definition of falsifiability contains a lot of subtleties and it is considered the core of Popper's epistemology. It is a part of critical rationalism. My answer is that we should look for a better integration between falsifiability and critical rationalism. These two articles should support each other and it's not the case now. We cannot decide if falsifiability should be a separate article before we worked on how these two subjects can support each other. Falsifiability should be a tool used in critical rationalism and critical rationalism should provide an extension of falsifiability, a larger context.

Regarding the bias, it's not like there is an agenda being pushed here, not at all. Every author, I am sure, is interested in covering all facets of falsifiability. There is no issue here. Yes, maybe a facet could be covered more. Great, let's do it. It's not an issue. By the way, the original motivation for falsifiability was the demarcation of science vs non science. But it is true that the problem of induction is very much related to this problem, because the previous solution (in the Vienna Circle, Berlin Circle, etc.) to the problem of demarcation was based on an attempt to describe science as some form of induction (we start from the truth of observation statements and we build from there to have more complex laws, etc.). This is the way falsifiability addresses the problem of induction. It does not make induction possible. It does not solve the problem that way. It solves it because the context at the time was that some form induction was considered essential to separate science from non science and this lead us no where. Falsifiability solves the problem, because now, Popper says, it is not necessary. What do you expect as a solution to the problem of induction? What exactly you feel is missing?

Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:21, 17 January 2020 (UTC)

I'm not making a philosophical point, and agee with much of what you say. I'm asking wha thte best arrangement for an encyclopaedia might be. Given that other encyclopedias do not include an entry such as this, it seems to me that we ought at least take pause and think about it being included here. Banno (talk) 01:50, 17 January 2020 (UTC)

Perfect ! I like that. I asked the same question to myself some time ago. There is an advantage in merging it in critical rationalism: it is naturally introduced by the larger article. It would naturally be integrated with critical rationalism. Yes, but it remains that it is important enough to be a separate article. It is natural to expand on falsifiability in its own article. By the way, some encyclopedia of science covers falsifiability. I think I have two on my bookshelf that covers falsifiability. One of them has an article by Alain Boyer. So, on that respect, we are perfectly fine. But, sincerely, I like very much that you asked the question. My proposal is that we work toward a better integration with critical rationalism. This is a challenge that must first be addressed. It will make it easier to see if we should merge them and how we would do that, if we should. Dominic Mayers (talk) 02:21, 17 January 2020 (UTC)

Excellent. I guess we proceed by working out what belongs here, and what belongs in critical rationalism. I think this is the place for a discussion of the logic of falsifiability, and a place to contrast it with verificationism. Overall, I agree that this article ought be a brief jump-off point to a wider understanding of the topic. Banno (talk) 09:54, 25 January 2020 (UTC)

OK, I'm going to take this point as moot, and instead sugest working on the article in such a way that it would not be a concern if it's title were so changed. Banno (talk) 02:31, 18 January 2020 (UTC)

Misplaced discussion about basic logic in the overview

The following paragraphs explain basic logic at the wrong place. Just before, the problem of induction is raised in relation to observations (empirical data). This issue goes way beyond formal logic. It is deeply related to empirical issues, the method, etc. Falsifiability in itself does not have these issues, because it is purely logical, but once this simple point is understood, what must be discussed is how falsifiability, which is purely logical, can be useful to address empirical issues such as the problem of induction? Explaining basic logic in this context is confusing. Thus, I propose to remove the three following paragraphs:

In its simple form, the point here is that although a singular existential statement such as 'there is a white swan in Europe' cannot be used to affirm a universal statement, it can be used to show that one is false: the statement 'there is a non white swan in Australia' implies that the universal statement 'all swans are white' is false. Moreover, this singular existential statement is empirical: it is impractical to observe all the swans in the world to verify that they are all white, but one can observe one swan that is not white.  This shows the fundamental difference between verifiability and falsifiability. Also, in the logical form of the theory, there is no notion of future experiments, but only a (formal) class of basic statements that contradict it.

Such a simple contradiction with a basic statement is not what Popper calls a falsification. A falsification usually entails a derivation from a system of statements, which include the universal statement and initial conditions, to a singular statement, which is contradicted by a falsifying hypothesis, but the argument can be generalized. Popper explains 

"... it is possible by means of purely deductive inferences (with the help of the modus tollens of classical logic) to argue from the truth of singular statements to the falsity of universal statements. Such an argument to the falsity of universal statements is the only strictly deductive kind of inference that proceeds, as it were, in the ‘inductive direction’; that is, from singular to universal statements." --- Karl Popper Popper 1959, p. 19

Notes

Dominic Mayers (talk) 19:05, 17 January 2020 (UTC)

Unsourced debate about the subject of critical rationalism

This paragraph raises the question whether critical rationalism is about scientific theories only or about other things as well, but the only source provided is not convincing at all and I could not find any source that refer to Criticizability explicitly.

In contrast to Positivism, which held that statements are meaningless if they cannot be verified or falsified, Popper claimed that falsifiability is merely a special case of the more general notion of critical rationalism, even though he admitted that empirical refutation is one of the most effective methods by which theories can be criticized. Criticizability, in contrast to falsifiability, and thus rationality, may be comprehensive (i.e., have no logical limits), though this claim is controversial, even among proponents of Popper's philosophy and critical rationalism.

In the reference provided, Popper does not say that "falsifiability is merely a special case of the more general notion of critical rationalism". First, it's not a special case, because critical rationalism is about the method whereas falsifiability is about the logical structure of the theory. Second, it's not clear that when Popper wrote "theories or guesses" that he meant that we should apply the methods of critical rationalism to other things than theories.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:01, 17 January 2020 (UTC)

A very deep point, perhaps too deep, missing the big picture in the overview.

The following paragraphs are hard to follow. The critic of McGinn is indeed representative of the usual critics against falsifiability, which is that disguised behind the method there is a need for the inductive methodology. This part is good, but it should be made more clearly. Also, what is presented as Popper response is indeed a point made by Popper in response to this general class of critics, but, without the context, it's not clear how it answers this general class of critics, especially not the specific critic that is presented.

Objections can be raised against falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation similar to those which can be raised against verifiability.  For example, as pointed out by many and reformulated by Colin McGinn, 

Consider, too, that falsifying experiments have to be repeatable so that other researchers can duplicate the alleged finding. We have to be able to infer that if a falsifying result has been found in a given experiment it will be found in future experiments; ... But this is clearly an inductive inference

— Colin McGinn, McGinn 2002, sec. 3

Very early, in anticipation of this specific objection Popper wrote,  

This attack would not disturb me. My proposal is based upon an asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability; an asymmetry which results from the logical form of universal statements. For these are never derivable from singular statements, but can be contradicted by singular statements.

— Karl Popper, Popper 1959. p 19

Contemporary philosopher David Miller mentions that other similar objections have been anticipated and answered by Popper.

So, it's not something to remove from the article, but we have to make it easier to follow. Miller is a good reference for the subject.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 02:41, 18 January 2020 (UTC)

Extended content

==Why we should mention background knowledge or basic statements in the lead== I am trying to figure out why from times to times, I see people finding complicated and unnecessary to mention the background knowledge or basic statements while explaining falsifiability in the lead. I cannot know. I can only guess. What I know is that the key effect of these concepts is to make the basis for falsification more like a swamp, instead of a solid floor. Some might feel that it is inappropriate to refer to that swamp in the lead, where we explain things in terms of our common knowledge. I disagree. If the lead must contain the important points, it should be there, even in terms of common knowledge. Popper mentions this point at many occasions. Here is one example: The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. — Karl Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 93-94 Dominic Mayers (talk) 15:48, 18 January 2020 (UTC) Here is a quote from Einstein that is very much loved by Popper: The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction. There is no logical path to these laws; only intuition, resting on sympathetic understanding of experience, can reach them. — Albert Einstein, “Prinzipien der Forschung: Rede zum 60. Geburtstag von Max Planck” In case one might think that the swamp is only about the proposed theories, the guesses that are based on intuition, here is a quote from Popper that shows that the basic statements are also from that swamp: Before using the terms 'basic' and 'basic statement', I made use of the term 'empirical basis', meaning by it the class of all those statements which may function as tests of empirical theories (that is, as potential falsifiers). In introducing the term 'empirical basis' my intention was, partly, to give an ironical emphasis to my thesis that the empirical basis of our theories is far from firm; that it should be compared to a swamp rather than to solid ground. Empiricists usually believed that the empirical basis consisted of absolutely 'given' perceptions or observations, of 'data', and that science could build on these data as if on rock. In opposition, I pointed out that the apparent 'data' of experience were always interpretations in the light of theories, and therefore affected by the hypothetical or conjectural character of all theories. — Karl Popper, Conjectures and refutations, p. 387 Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:05, 18 January 2020 (UTC) The current article is hard to follow, because most fundamental concepts can only be understood if we understand how we manage that swamp in the method. In particular, just above in #A very deep point, perhaps too deep, missing the big picture in the overview. I point out that a key point in the overview (not from me by the way) is hard to follow. McGinn's critic is clearly due to a complete confusion regarding how the swamp is managed. I intend to explain it better in the article using sources such as David Miller. So, it's perhaps the most important concept in the article. So, it makes sense that we refer to it in the lead. Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:16, 18 January 2020 (UTC) Brief account that should be considered in the lead Falsifiability is the core ingredient of an answer to the problem of induction, the problem of the empirical basis and the demarcation problem. First, we need to understand that there is a swamp. The problem of induction is how valid laws emerge from that swamp. The problem of the empirical basis is how reliable observations emerge from that swamp. The problem of demarcation is to separate what can be done scientifically to manage that swamp, from other practices. Popper's answer is that we take laws as they emerge from that swamp and we use falsification to discard those that do not work. Falsification is done using observations that comes from that swamp. His key observation is that, if falsification is to be possible at all, then we should only consider statements from that swamp that are falsifiable. He claims that he solved these three problems because he explained that they were not problems for the epistemologists. We only need some reasonable assumptions on the swamp to see that it works. That's it. Now, one can immediately see why many critics were not happy, because he still did not explain logically the emergence of laws and observations. In particular, the critic of McGinn is that we need to assume some regularity in the swamp to be able to apply Popper's method. But Popper never denied that. He explained (but to be honest Miller did a better job) that we should not confuse what the scientists must do in the method with what must go on in the swamp. The method is the logical part that scientists do above the swamp. It's only if we ask how the scientists succeed to progress that we must make assumptions about the swamp. The scientists are interested in physics, biology, etc. they are not studying how they do science and why it works. So, it's perfectly correct to say that Popper's method is not at all inductive. Dominic Mayers (talk) 19:51, 18 January 2020 (UTC)

Restructure and edit

So I've re-written a few slabs, reducing length, removing waffle and reinstating a structure in the lead that is reflected in the article.Banno (talk) 23:20, 18 January 2020 (UTC)

Thank you. This is a good cleaning and a better organization. There are many things that you removed that I did not have the courage to remove. I intend to reinsert some important and well sourced points that you removed, but it's ok that you removed them, because we need to think about where they fit. My guess is that they can be reinserted in the current structure, perhaps with an extra section for the definition, but maybe not. We will see. Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:31, 19 January 2020 (UTC)

Cheers. I'd encourage the reintroduction of some of that material. My aim was not to remove it but to restructure. Banno (talk) 23:22, 22 January 2020 (UTC)

Unverifiable and unclear paragraph

The paragraph that starts with "In place of naive falsificationism, ..." is not sourced. The first sentence suggests that the previously mentioned issues are the defining characteristics of naive falsificationism. Who is the well known philosopher that used "naive falsificatism" in this manner? Certainly not Lakatos who has popularized the concept and first carefully analyzed it. The remainder of the paragraph "Popper envisioned science as ... " is essentially weak propaganda for Popper methodological and sophisticated falsificationism, because even a dogmatic falsificationist (see Lakatos 1978, p. 13-14) can envision the series of falsifications described in the paragraph. The overall section is problematic. It contains only one citation and it seems incorrectly used. Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:52, 20 January 2020 (UTC)

Naive Falsification was introduced as a structural element, long ago. The intent, at least on my part, was that the article show issues with the verifictionism of the Viena Circle, mention how verificationism seems to rely on confirming the consequent and explain how Popper's use of Modus Tolens overcomes this. I'd intended to lead on to a discussion of the stats of falsification. but eventually moved on without finishing. Character drift more than removed its usefulness.

I suspect the term is from SSR, but am not in a position to verify. It is certainly used.

I now wonder if it might be better to keep this article relatively brief; a jump of point to the more detailed content that exists elsewhere on Wikipedia. Banno (talk) 23:56, 22 January 2020 (UTC)

To my knowledge naive falsificationism is not used in SSR. The term is often attributed to Lakatos, even if Lakatos attributes it to Khun. Perhaps Lakatos meant that Khun only considered naive falsificationism. What is clear is that Lakatos clearly defined the term and the term is strongly attached to Lakatos. Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:01, 23 January 2020 (UTC)

citations for naive falsification

Naive Falsification is a term used by Lakatos in "Criticism and the methodology of scientific research programs": Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 69 (1968 - 1969), pp. 149-186 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian Society

"For (Popper) the idea that on 'refutation' one can demand the rejection, the elimination of a theory, is 'naive' falsificationism" (p.150)

and then, explaining why the term is significant,

"In this paper I shall first show that in Popper's philosophy two different positions are conflated. Kuhn understands only Popper, the naive falsificationist (I shall call him Popper,),and his criticism of Popper1 is correct. I shall even strengthen it. But Kuhn does not understand a more sophisticated Popper-Popper2- whose rationality goes beyond naive falsificationism. I shall try to explain Popper2's position and strengthen it, mainly by stripping it of naive falsificationism. This improved Popperian position may escape Kuhn's strictures and provide a rational explanation of scientific revolution." (p. 151)

This paragraph has a pivotal place in the story of falsification, and ought either be included or summarised. Banno (talk) 06:26, 25 January 2020 (UTC)

What I did to improve the section Problem of induction

I removed the long paragraph that used "naive falsificationism" in a confusing way and then only listed a sequence of scientific theories, as if it was a proof of something. I placed the criticisms in their proper context. As a bonus, we have the explanation for the correct non dogmatic definition of falsifiability. The most important point though is that this is now very easy to source. I will be happy to add any citation needed. Dominic Mayers (talk) 23:20, 20 January 2020 (UTC)

Confusing section: Demarcation problem

We have to rethink this section. We could rewrite the second paragraph as a critic of naive falsificationism. We would swap the first and third paragraphs, because the third paragraph leads to naive falsificationism, because it is about rejection, whereas the first paragraph explains the usefulness of the criterion in a way that works in sophisticated falsificationism, where we only assess a theory with falsifications, but the final decision to reject is more complex and depends on failed falsifications (corroborations) as well. The section will then be a description of the demarcation problem to introduce the criterion, which should be provided somewhere. Any other idea? Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:21, 21 January 2020 (UTC)

I don't see how a reader would understand demarcation before naive falsification; and that this should be in the problem of induction. Go ahead with your edits, so I can see where you are going. Banno (talk) 00:01, 23 January 2020 (UTC)

I will go ahead, but before I would like to better understand what you are saying here. Can you expand a bit and be more specific about what aspect, if any, of my edits in the article or ideas in the above paragraph you are referring to? Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:50, 23 January 2020 (UTC)

Sokal and Bricmont

I'm questioning noteworthiness; but when investigating, I found that the quote provided is wrong. Specifically, the sentence " ... [but] the history of science teaches us that scientific theories come to be accepted above all because of their successes." was not found in the book. Nor could I locate support for "They further argue that falsifiability cannot distinguish between astrology and astronomy, as both make technical predictions that are sometimes incorrect." in the book. Hence, my edits. Banno (talk) 20:34, 24 January 2020 (UTC)

Lead

See Wikipedia:Manual of Style/Lead section. Specifically: the lead should be reduced to a few short sentences; the lead should stand on its own as a concise overview of the article's topic; The lead should establish context; it should summarise the most important points, including any prominent controversies. So here are the key points it should contain...

• Falsifiability is an answer to both the problem of induction and the demarcation problem
• It was introduced and developed by Karl Popper
• It is now a common, if not uncontroversial definition of what is scientific an what is not
• As such it has had a prominent role in various controversies and legal cases.

Thoughts? Elsewise I will edit as above. Banno (talk) 02:53, 18 January 2020 (UTC)

I agree that these points should be included. I think you will raise controversy to say that it is uncontroversial. Do you intend to remove entirely the definition and only says these things? I would not object, but this a bold decision and some will be tempted to add the naive definition. What I would not agree with is to only have the naive definition in the lead, as if it contained the essential idea. Better not have the definition at all in the lead. I suggest that you add these points, but keep the definition together with the necessary explanation of what "can conceive an observation" means. We could remove the second example "All men are mortal". This will make it shorter. Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:52, 18 January 2020 (UTC)

Most things interesting about falsifiability depends on its dependence on the background knowledge. One example is this statement by Thornton:

"For Popper, however, to assert that a theory is unscientific, is not necessarily to hold that it is unenlightening, still less that it is meaningless, for it sometimes happens that a theory which is unscientific (because it is unfalsifiable) at a given time may become falsifiable, and thus scientific, with the development of technology, or with the further articulation and refinement of the theory. Further, even purely mythogenic explanations have performed a valuable function in the past in expediting our understanding of the nature of reality."

— Thornton, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/popper/

This makes no sense if falsibiality does not depend on the background knowledge, because it says that when the technology changes (thus the background knowledge changes), falsifiability changes. Dominic Mayers (talk) 05:50, 18 January 2020 (UTC)

To sum up, I am not opposed to an article that first gives the naive definition and then later the correct definition, which refers to the background knowledge or to basic statements. My objection is only that the lead cannot just have the naive definition and give the impression that it is the definition. This would be misleading. Dominic Mayers (talk) 12:49, 18 January 2020 (UTC)

To this: [1] I'd said that I would edit, but anything added reduces the clarity of the intro or is my own work. What needs to be said is something more verbose...

Suppose we find a new creature, a zwan. The zwans we have seen have all been white. We can formulate the hypothesis that all swans are white. The opening sentence of the article is exactly true: some observation might show it to be false, but that observation has not yet been made, and hence the hypothesis is [falsifiable], but at this stage it is not falsified.

So instead I will leave things as they are, and ask if anyone else shares (User talk:Dominic Mayers) misgivings.Banno (talk) 00:47, 24 January 2020 (UTC)

I think you might confuse two things: reducing clarity and making clear an existing issue. When you make the issue apparent, people are getting confused for a good reason: they thought it was clear and simple and they realize that they cannot explain it in concrete terms. There is no other way to explain it than referring to the abstract notion of a language that allows to conceive events that are not real. It is also very obvious that it's the way Popper sees it, explains it and also insists that we do the same. He always insisted that we distinguish between the logical criterion, which is only at the abstract level of statements, and the methodological rules. Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:26, 24 January 2020 (UTC)

Your attempt to explain it in terms of an observation that has not yet been made does not work. If the contradicting observation can possibly be made tomorrow, the law is false (because it is implicit in the concept of a law that, if it is not true tomorrow, then it is false.) One way that would work is to look for a contradiction by going back at a time where the law was completely ignored and then we ask what is possible in accordance with the background knowledge at the time. It works, but this background knowledge is the samething as the underlying logic + its physical interpretation. Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:45, 24 January 2020 (UTC)

I've no clear understanding of what your point is. So, in order to proceed, what is your sugested replacement?Banno (talk) 11:13, 24 January 2020 (UTC)

I edited a bit my answer above to make it easier to understand. There is a part of me that feels ok with A claim is falsifiable if some observation might show it to be false. There is another part of me that explains why this sentence does not work. I also remember my first experience with a similar sentence when I read for the first time this article many years ago. I was confused. It made no sense. You have tried to explain it with : some observation might show it to be false, but that observation has not yet been made,... Do you understand why this cannot be how falsifiability works? Think about the fact that falsifiability is for laws of science that do not change in time. If falsifiability meant that the law can be shown to be false tomorrow, then it would mean that the law is false now. It has to be non ambiguous that the contradicting event is purely formal. If the contradicting event is not formal, but real, no matter if it is only possible and not actually observed yet, the law is false. I understand how one might feel, because we refer to an abstract space of formal observations to define falsifiability. I understand the feeling. One might feel "we make it hard to understand, not clear", but at the same time, it's the only way that it makes sense. We must take into account that Popper always insisted that we separate the logical criterion from the methodological rules. Dominic Mayers (talk) 14:31, 24 January 2020 (UTC)

Seems to me you are overthinking it; but I am content to go with "claim" since it also avoids a pending a/an edit war. Banno (talk) 18:25, 24 January 2020 (UTC)

My point has nothing to do with claim vs hypothesis. It's the same concept whether we use claim, hypothesis, statement, theory, etc. My opinion is "theory" is the best, but I don't really care. I am not overthinking it. You tried to address the problem that I explained by referring to an observation that has not yet been made. You did not answer my question. Do you understand my explanation why this cannot work? Dominic Mayers (talk) 02:49, 25 January 2020 (UTC)

I'm not interested in a philosophical debate; there are forums for that.

Modality is not to do with time, but logical status. A statement that has been falsified is falsifiable. A statement that has not been falsified but will be, in the future, is falsifiable. A statement that never was, and never will be, falsified, might never the less be falsifiable. And if you do not understand and agree with that, you should not be editing the article.

And I still have no idea if you have an objection to the opening sentence, yet alone what that objection might be. As I asked before, what woudl you like to see there? And if you do not have an alternative, then there is no point to this conversation. Banno (talk) 03:06, 25 January 2020 (UTC)

Unfortunately, you have not written anything that shows that you understand the problem when we refer to a falsifying observation, whether it is in the future or in the past. You wrote A statement that never was, and never will be, falsified, might never the less be falsifiable., but it does not say the key point, which is that a statement that cannot in anyway be falsified (in the future or whatever) by an actual observation might nevertheless be falsifiable. You see the apparent non sense: we say that it cannot be falsified (which is more than only saying that it will never be falsified) and yet it might be falsifiable. That's the key point. The "falsified" corresponds to one meaning of falsifiable. The "falsifiable" corresponds to a second meaning, the technical meaning.

My objection is still the same. The first sentence says that it is falsifiable if there might be an observation that shows it to be false. If we don't explain that the falsifying observation is taken from an abstract space of observational statements, this makes no sense. An intelligent 10th grader will be very confused by that. Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:28, 25 January 2020 (UTC)

Also, this first sentence in the lead is not at all represented in the body of the article. The current article is about falsificationism and written in a way that avoid the definition of falsifiability. So, to respect the body, the lead should only be about falsificationism. Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:28, 25 January 2020 (UTC)

We can work together toward a lead that makes sense. Why do say that it had to be me that write the solution? Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:28, 25 January 2020 (UTC)

So, third time, what's your suggested alternative? Banno (talk) 04:30, 25 January 2020 (UTC)

For anyone who does not see the first sentence in the lead as a serious issue, the abstract nature of the correct definition will not be acceptable. It would feel like "less clear", but only because we confuse "less clear" with "making apparent an issue that we think should not be raised". There is no rule that says that someone that mentions a valid issue must provide the solution. So, please do suggest a solution, if you understand the issue. If you don't understand the issue, then the role of a talk page is to discuss issues like that, which are important in the article. Dominic Mayers (talk)

I've been watching this for a while without wanting to get involved, but I really think there's no serious problem with the current first sentence and your attempts to say what is wrong with it are much less clear than that sentence itself.

Falsifiability is the ability to be shown to be false.

Maybe "Falsifiability is the ability of a claim to be shown to be false."?

Or "Falsifiability is the ability of a claim to be shown by observation to be false."?

Or "Falsifiability is the ability in principle of a claim to be shown by observation to be false."?

Or "Falsifiability is the ability in principle of a claim to be shown by observation to be false if it is false."?

I feel like this is becoming an unwieldy sentence the more clarifying clauses I add to it. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:31, 25 January 2020 (UTC)

I know it's clear. It's clear, but it's not what Popper meant. It's non sense as a demarcation criteria. If your only criteria is clarity and it does not matter that it is wrong, then here is the problem. By the way, I agree that adding "in principle" or playing with words in a similar manner is not the way to go. It makes it worst in a way. Yes, what I explain is not as clear, because it's a concept that relies on a lot of background. It is to be expected that it subjectively appears less clear than the wrong naive but "clear" definition. Dominic Mayers (talk) 07:45, 25 January 2020 (UTC)