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→Background: they aren't studying gain of function, the are implementing gain of function in order to study.
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== Background ==
== Background ==


Scientists have performed [[Gain of function research|gain of function studies]] as an experimentation tool for decades, such as "passaging" a virus in a host that it wouldn't usually infect in order to generate attenuated strains for use in vaccines. This was done for the [[Polio virus]].
Scientists have performed [[Gain of function research|gain of function experiments]] as an research tool for decades, such as "passaging" a virus in a host that it wouldn't usually infect in order to generate attenuated strains for use in vaccines. This was done for the [[Polio virus]].


The Cambridge Working Group is not concerned so much with "gain of function" studies in general, but with applying the tool to creating variants with increased transmissibility and virulence among mammals that could also affect humans in the case of a deliberate or accidental lab release.
The Cambridge Working Group is not concerned so much with "gain of function" studies in general, but with applying the tool to creating variants with increased transmissibility and virulence among mammals that could also affect humans in the case of a deliberate or accidental lab release.

Revision as of 08:39, 12 May 2021

The Cambridge Working Group is a group of medical research scientists and bioethics experts concerned with the biosafety and biosecurity risks of gain of function research.[1][2][3][4][5] The group has engaged in public advocacy, influencing the US Government's decision in Dec 2015 to issue a moratorium on funding research creating certain types of novel potential pandemic pathogens.[6][7] In December 2017, the three-year moratorium expired.[8]

The group was formed by Harvard epidemiologist Marc Lipsitch at a meeting held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, following a "trifecta" of biosecurity incidents involving the CDC, including the accidental exposure of viable anthrax to personnel at CDC's Roybal Campus, the discovery of six vials containing viable smallpox from the 1950s mislabeled as Variola at the FDA's White Oak campus, and the accidental shipping of H9N2 vials contaminated with H5N1 from the CDC lab to a USDA lab.[9][10][11][12][13] On July 14, 2014, the group published a Consensus Statement with 18 original signatories and founding members. Within the first two months of publishing the Consensus Statement, 50 more Charter Members signed, and has since been signed by over 200 scientists.

The group advocates for devising alternative research methods that would meet the same research objectives.[14]

Background

Scientists have performed gain of function experiments as an research tool for decades, such as "passaging" a virus in a host that it wouldn't usually infect in order to generate attenuated strains for use in vaccines. This was done for the Polio virus.

The Cambridge Working Group is not concerned so much with "gain of function" studies in general, but with applying the tool to creating variants with increased transmissibility and virulence among mammals that could also affect humans in the case of a deliberate or accidental lab release.

Dr. Arturo Casadevall founding editor-in-chief of the mBio, a scientific journal published by the American Society for Microbiology and Michael Imperiale, another editor of the journal, both of who signed the Consensus Statement, said gain of function experiments can yield important information, particularly about flu viruses, but that the research poses risks.[15] As an example, they cited the strong circumstantial evidence indicating that H1N1 flu subtype in 1977 resulted from a lab accident. Other lapses they noted involved anthrax and H5N1 from CDC labs, and infections of lab workers with Yersinia pestis and Brucella species.[16][17]

In an interview with the New York Times, Richard H. Ebright, a molecular biologist and laboratory director at Rutgers University, who also signed the Consensus Statement said he had “no confidence” in the safety of the many labs that have sprung up since 2001, citing the need for increased oversight over their management.[18]

Opposing position

Shortly after the Cambridge Working Group released its position statement, Scientists for Science was formed by 37 signatories taking an opposing position.[19] The group's founder, Paul Duprex, said that studies on risky germs are already subject to extensive regulations saying that it would be better to focus more on lab safety, not limiting the types of experiments that can be done.[20] Notable signatories are Constance Cepko, Dickson Despommier, Erica Ollmann Saphire, Geoffrey Smith[disambiguation needed], Karla Kirkegaard, Sean Whelan, Vincent Racaniello and Yoshihiro Kawaoka. Columbia University virologist Ian Lipkin, who signed both statements, said "there has to be a coming together of what should be done".[21]

Members

Founding members

The original founding members from 2014 are:[22]

  1. Amir Attaran of the University of Ottawa
  2. Barry Bloom of Harvard University
  3. Arturo Casadevall of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine
  4. Richard H. Ebright or Rutgers University
  5. Nicholas Evans of the University of Pennsylvania
  6. David Fisman of the University of Toronto
  7. Alison Galvani of Yale School of Public Health
  8. Peter Hale of the Foundation for Vaccine Research
  9. Edward Hammond of Third World Network
  10. Michael Imperiale of the University of Michigan
  11. Thomas Inglesby of the UPMC Center for Health Security
  12. Marc Lipsitch, Harvard School of Public Health
  13. Michael Osterholm of the University of Minnesota/CIDRAP
  14. David Relman of Stanford University
  15. Richard Roberts (Nobel Laureate '93) of New England Biolabs
  16. Marcel Salathé of the Pennsylvania State University
  17. Lone Simonsen of the George Washington University
  18. Silja Vöneky of the University of Freiburg Institute of Public Law

Additional members

Some additional members include:

See also

References

  1. ^ "Scientists call for limit on creating dangerous pathogens". Science | AAAS. July 15, 2014.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  2. ^ "La Maison Blanche fait volte-face sur les " Frankenvirus "". Le Monde.fr (in French). 2014-10-20. Retrieved 2021-05-07.
  3. ^ "Cientistas pedem limite à criação de vírus mortais em laboratório". O Globo (in Brazilian Portuguese). 2014-07-16. Retrieved 2021-05-07.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  4. ^ "Making viruses in the lab deadlier and more able to spread: an accident waiting to happen". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2014-08-14. Retrieved 2021-05-07.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  5. ^ Langan, Eduardo Baptista, Linda Lew, Simone McCarthy, Peter (September 12, 2020). "The labs where monsters live". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 2021-05-07.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  6. ^ Lipsitch, Marc; Inglesby, Thomas V. (December 12, 2014). "Moratorium on Research Intended To Create Novel Potential Pandemic Pathogens". mBio. 5 (6). doi:10.1128/mBio.02366-14. PMC 4271556. PMID 25505122.
  7. ^ "U.S. halts funding for new risky virus studies, calls for voluntary moratorium". Science | AAAS. October 17, 2014.
  8. ^ Begley, Sharon, STAT (December 19, 2017). "U.S. Lifts Moratorium on Funding Controversial, High-Risk Virus Research". Scientific American.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  9. ^ Branswell, Helen. "Bio- Un safety Level 3: Could the Next Lab Accident Result in a Pandemic?". Scientific American. Retrieved 2021-05-07.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  10. ^ "From anthrax to bird flu – the dangers of lax security in disease-control labs". The Guardian. 2014-07-18. Retrieved 2021-05-07.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  11. ^ "EDITORIAL | Summit is needed on troubling research". Star Tribune. Retrieved 2021-05-07.
  12. ^ "CDC Lab Errors and Their Implications: Congressional Hearing Today". Wired. ISSN 1059-1028. Retrieved 2021-05-07.
  13. ^ Reardon, Sara (2014). "Safety lapses in US government labs spark debate". Nature News. doi:10.1038/nature.2014.15570. S2CID 155282530.
  14. ^ Lipsitch, Marc; Galvani, Alison P. (2014). "Ethical Alternatives to Experiments with Novel Potential Pandemic Pathogens". PLOS Medicine. 11 (5): e1001646. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001646. PMC 4028196. PMID 24844931.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (link)
  15. ^ https://mbio.asm.org/content/mbio/5/4/e01730-14.full.pdf
  16. ^ https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2014/08/experts-urge-gain-function-sides-seek-common-ground
  17. ^ https://www.vox.com/2014/7/21/5913267/the-cdc-left-anthrax-vials-in-a-fridge-heres-why-that-could-be-good/in/5686836
  18. ^ Grady, Denise (2014-07-19). "Pathogen Mishaps Rise as Regulators Stay Clear". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2021-05-07.
  19. ^ Edelmann, Achim; Moody, James; Light, Ryan (2017-05-24). "Disparate foundations of scientists' policy positions on contentious biomedical research". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 114 (24): 6262–6267. doi:10.1073/pnas.1613580114. ISSN 0027-8424. PMC 5474814. PMID 28559310.
  20. ^ "Biologists Choose Sides In Safety Debate Over Lab-Made Pathogens". NPR.org. Retrieved 2021-05-07.
  21. ^ "Science Magazine - 05 September 2014 - page20". www.sciencemagazinedigital.org. Retrieved 2021-05-07.
  22. ^ Cambridge Working Group Consensus Statement on the Creation of Potential Pandemic Pathogens (PPPs)
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