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== Philosophical perspectives ==
== Philosophical perspectives ==
The term is patterned on, and often accompanied by, the terms "[[omniscience]]" and "[[omnipotence]]", typically to refer to conceptions of an "all-good, all-knowing, all-powerful" deity. Philosophers and theologians more commonly use phrases like "perfectly good", or simply the term "benevolenece". The word "omnibenevolence" may be interpreted to mean perfectly just, all-loving, fully merciful, or any number of other qualities, depending on precisely what "good" is understood as meaning. As such, there is little agreement over how an "omnibenevolent" being would behave.
The term is patterned on, and often accompanied by, the terms "[[omniscience]]" and "[[omnipotence]]", typically to refer to conceptions of an "all-good, all-knowing, all-powerful" deity. Philosophers and theologians more commonly use phrases like "perfectly good", or simply the term "benevolenece". The word "omnibenevolence" may be interpreted to mean perfectly just, all-loving, fully merciful, or any number of other qualities, depending on precisely how "good" is understood. As such, there is little agreement over how an "omnibenevolent" being would behave.


The notion of an omnibenevolent, infinitely compassionate deity, have raised certain [[atheism|atheological]] objections, such as the [[problem of evil]] and the [[problem of hell]]. Responses to such problems are called [[theodicy|theodicies]], these can be general by arguing for the coherence of the divine, such as [[Swinburne]]'s ''Providence and the Problem of Evil'', or address a specific problem, such as Charles Seymour's ''A Theodicy of Hell''.
The notion of an omnibenevolent, infinitely compassionate deity, have raised certain [[atheism|atheological]] objections, such as the [[problem of evil]] and the [[problem of hell]]. Responses to such problems are called [[theodicy|theodicies]], these can be general by arguing for the coherence of the divine, such as [[Swinburne]]'s ''Providence and the Problem of Evil'', or address a specific problem, such as Charles Seymour's ''A Theodicy of Hell''.

Revision as of 22:47, 24 February 2007

Omnibenevolence is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "unlimited or infinite benevolence". The word does not appear in any popular dictionary, but is a technical term used more in the academic literature on the philosophy of religion, often in the context of the problem of evil and in theodical responses.

Etymology

Omnibenevolence appears have a very casual usage among some Protestant Christian commentators. The earliest record for its use, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is in 1679. The Catholic Church does not appear to use the term omnibenevolent in the liturgy or Catechism.

Modern appearances of the term include George H. Smith, in June 1980, in his book Atheism: The Case Against God, where he argued that divine qualities are inconsistent. However, the term is also used by authors, who defend the coherence of divine attributes, including but not limited to, Richard M. Gale in On the Nature and Existence of God,[1] Jonathan Kvanvig in The Problem of Hell,[2] and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz in The Divine Attributes.[3]

Philosophical perspectives

The term is patterned on, and often accompanied by, the terms "omniscience" and "omnipotence", typically to refer to conceptions of an "all-good, all-knowing, all-powerful" deity. Philosophers and theologians more commonly use phrases like "perfectly good", or simply the term "benevolenece". The word "omnibenevolence" may be interpreted to mean perfectly just, all-loving, fully merciful, or any number of other qualities, depending on precisely how "good" is understood. As such, there is little agreement over how an "omnibenevolent" being would behave.

The notion of an omnibenevolent, infinitely compassionate deity, have raised certain atheological objections, such as the problem of evil and the problem of hell. Responses to such problems are called theodicies, these can be general by arguing for the coherence of the divine, such as Swinburne's Providence and the Problem of Evil, or address a specific problem, such as Charles Seymour's A Theodicy of Hell.

Religious perspectives

The idea of God's omnibenevolence in Christianity is based on Psalms 18:30, "As for God, his way is perfect: the word of the LORD is tried: he is a buckler to all those that trust in him." It is also supported by Ps.19:7, "The law of the LORD is perfect, converting the soul: the testimony of the LORD is sure, making wise the simple."

Omnibenevolence also plays a prominent role in Islam: the second of the 99 Names of God is Al Rahman, meaning "all beneficent" or "most compassionate".

Notes

  1. ^ Gale, Richard M. (1993). On the Nature and Existence of God. Cambridge University Press. pp. page 100. ISBN 0521457238. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
  2. ^ Kvanvig, Jonathan L. (1993). The Problem of Hell. Oxford University Press. pp. page 4. ISBN 019508487X. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
  3. ^ Hoffman, Joshua (2002). The Divine Attributes. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0631211543. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help) Used throughout the book.

See also

References

  • Oppy, Graham. "Ontological Arguments and Belief in God" (Cambridge University Press) (1995), pp. 171-2.
  • Smith, George H. "Atheism: The Case Against God'" (Skeptic's Bookshelf) Prometheus Books (June 1980).
  • Basinger, David. "In what sense must God be omnibenevolent?" International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 1983), pp. 3-15.
  • Bruch, George Bosworth. Early Medieval Philosophy, King's Crown, 1951. pp. 73-77.
  • Flemming, Arthur. "Omnibenevolence and evil." Ethics, Vol. 96, No. 2 (Jan. 1986) , pp. 261-281.
  • Wierenga, Edward. "Intrinsic maxima and omnibenevolence." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 1984), pp. 41-50.