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'''Neo-Nazism in Croatia''', also known as '''Neo-Ustashism''', is a post-[[World War II]] political movement influenced by the [[Ustaše|Ustaša]], a [[Croatia|Croatian]] [[fascism|fascist]] organization supported by the [[Nazism|Nazis]] during the war.
'''Neo-Nazism in Croatia''', also known as '''Neo-Ustashism'''{{fact}}, is a post-[[World War II]] political movement influenced by the [[Ustaše|Ustaša]], a [[Croatia|Croatian]] [[fascism|fascist]] organization supported by the [[Nazism|Nazis]] during the war.


The movement has included people who were either involved with the [[Independent State of Croatia]] (NDH) during World War II; sympathizers; and people who utilise their [[symbolism]]. The movement mainly arose from a combination of the residual hatred from the [[Yugoslav wars]] and [[Croatian nationalism]], and is considered the [[far-right]] of the Croatian political spectrum. It differs from neo-fascist movements in other parts of Europe, because it is related to a recent military conflict; the [[Yugoslav wars]].
The movement has included people who were either involved with the [[Independent State of Croatia]] (NDH) during World War II; sympathizers; and people who utilise their [[symbolism]]. The movement mainly arose from a combination of the residual hatred from the [[Yugoslav wars]] and [[Croatian nationalism]], and is considered the [[far-right]] of the Croatian political spectrum. It differs from neo-fascist movements in other parts of Europe, because it is related to a recent military conflict; the [[Yugoslav wars]]{{fact}}.


Pro-Ustaša sentiments, symbols and actions have been restricted by law in Croatia since 2003. The most common venue for expressing these beliefs is [[graffiti]], which mostly targets ethnic [[Serbs]].
Pro-Ustaša sentiments, symbols and actions have been restricted by law in Croatia since 2003. The most common venue for expressing these beliefs is [[graffiti]], which mostly targets ethnic [[Serbs]].


==De-Ustashification ==
==De-Ustashification ==
At the end of World War II, the Communist authorities pursued a strict set of policies which could be deemed as a form of [[denazification]], only more similar to the Soviet style than to the American style. People who collaborated with the Ustaša were often court-martialled at the end of the war, the [[Bleiburg massacre]] was committed, and after the war was over, there were also trials against suspected collaborators, secret service control over citizens with links to the Ustaša etc.
At the end of World War II, the Communist authorities pursued a strict set of policies which could be deemed as a form of [[denazification]], only more similar to the Soviet style than to the American style. People who collaborated with the Ustaša were often court-martialled at the end of the war, the [[Bleiburg massacre]] was committed, and after the war was over, there were also trials against suspected collaborators, secret service control over citizens with links to the Ustaša etc{{fact}}.


The modern Croatia was formed long after [[World War II]] was over, and aside from occasional exceptions, there was no desire whatsoever by the Croatian political elite to associate the new country with the former [[Independent State of Croatia]] or to revisit the status of Croatia as a member of the winning side of that war. While significantly more courtesy was shown to the Ustaša for their desire to make Croatia independent, they were neither rehabilitated nor explicitly banned - most people, in politics and otherwise, simply wished to leave that part of the past behind. Subsequently, no laws were ever passed that specifically targeted the issues of Nazism and/or fascism.
The modern Croatia was formed long after [[World War II]] was over, and aside from occasional exceptions, there was no desire whatsoever by the Croatian political elite to associate the new country with the former [[Independent State of Croatia]] or to revisit the status of Croatia as a member of the winning side of that war. While significantly more courtesy was shown to the Ustaša for their desire to make Croatia independent, they were neither rehabilitated nor explicitly banned - most people, in politics and otherwise, simply wished to leave that part of the past behind. Subsequently, no laws were ever passed that specifically targeted the issues of Nazism and/or fascism.
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said that "antifascism was a commitment weaved into the foundations of independent, democratic Croatia". [http://www.vlada.hr/default.asp?gl=200606200000016]
said that "antifascism was a commitment weaved into the foundations of independent, democratic Croatia". [http://www.vlada.hr/default.asp?gl=200606200000016]


Croatia also has no laws against [[historical revisionism]] or [[holocaust denial]]. This can mainly be attributed to the change of political system and indeed the entire system of values as the country became independent. Revisionism was not frowned upon because priority was placed on the re-evaluation of history as recorded during the Communist era, which was therefore deemed almost implicitly tainted. The re-examination of the number of victims of the [[Independent State of Croatia]] and particularly the [[Jasenovac concentration camp]] was fairly common, as well as fairly controversial. See also [[#The Bleiburg controversy|the Bleiburg controversy]] below.
Croatia also has no laws against [[historical revisionism]] or [[holocaust denial]]. This can mainly be attributed to the change of political system and indeed the entire system of values as the country became independent. Revisionism was not frowned upon because priority was placed on the re-evaluation of history as recorded during the Communist era, which was therefore deemed almost implicitly tainted.{{fact}} The re-examination of the number of victims of the [[Independent State of Croatia]] and particularly the [[Jasenovac concentration camp]] was fairly common, as well as fairly controversial. See also [[#The Bleiburg controversy|the Bleiburg controversy]] below.{{fact}}


==History of alleged expressions of neo-Ustashism==
==History of alleged expressions of neo-Ustashism==
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The primary reason for the disregard of the past fascism has been a lack of priority and care taken by the Croatian public and the mainstream politics towards the issue, because numerous other issues plagued the country at the time (see: [[Croatian War of Independence]], [[history of modern Croatia]]). The late [[President of Croatia|president]] [[Franjo Tuđman]] was a champion of the ''reconciliation'' (Croatian ''pomirenje''), whereby Croats of all political views should unite, facing the grave threat during the [[Yugoslav wars]]. This had the side-effect of also bringing back the extreme right-wing Croats into the fray, no longer considering pro-fascist and pro-Ustasha ideas taboo, all in an effort to win the war.
The primary reason for the disregard of the past fascism has been a lack of priority and care taken by the Croatian public and the mainstream politics towards the issue, because numerous other issues plagued the country at the time (see: [[Croatian War of Independence]], [[history of modern Croatia]]). The late [[President of Croatia|president]] [[Franjo Tuđman]] was a champion of the ''reconciliation'' (Croatian ''pomirenje''), whereby Croats of all political views should unite, facing the grave threat during the [[Yugoslav wars]]. This had the side-effect of also bringing back the extreme right-wing Croats into the fray, no longer considering pro-fascist and pro-Ustasha ideas taboo, all in an effort to win the war.


After the war, as time passed, the strength of this ideology gradually subsided, and the more anti-fascist-inclined people were no longer willing to set aside political differences with the more fascist-inclined. In recent times, the mainstream politicians, notably the second [[President of Croatia|president]] [[Stjepan Mesić]], brought more focus to anti-fascist stances and veteran groups, although given the estimated small number of neo-Ustaša sympathisers, the President's focus has at times resemble the creating of a straw opponent in the course of [[Partisan (political)|partisan]] politics. The remembrance ceremonies at the site of former Ustaša camp [[Jasenovac concentration camp|Jasenovac]] resumed, with support from the highest levels of government.
After the war, as time passed, the strength of this ideology gradually subsided, and the more anti-fascist-inclined people were no longer willing to set aside political differences with the more fascist-inclined.{{fact}} In recent times, the mainstream politicians, notably the second [[President of Croatia|president]] [[Stjepan Mesić]], brought more focus to anti-fascist stances and veteran groups, although given the estimated small number of neo-Ustaša sympathisers, the President's focus has at times resemble the creating of a straw opponent in the course of [[Partisan (political)|partisan]] politics. The remembrance ceremonies at the site of former Ustaša camp [[Jasenovac concentration camp|Jasenovac]] resumed, with support from the highest levels of government.


===Emigration===
===Emigration===
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As Croatia emerged from Communism in [[SFR Yugoslavia]], and a multi-party system was being established, the [[Croatian Democratic Union]] (''Hrvatska demokratska zajednica'', HDZ) emerged as the dominant party. Their politicians, including its president [[Franjo Tuđman]], actively lobbied for the financial support of the [[Croatian diaspora]] during the late 1980s and 1990s. Some of the most prominent members of the party were previously emigrants, notably [[Gojko Šušak]].
As Croatia emerged from Communism in [[SFR Yugoslavia]], and a multi-party system was being established, the [[Croatian Democratic Union]] (''Hrvatska demokratska zajednica'', HDZ) emerged as the dominant party. Their politicians, including its president [[Franjo Tuđman]], actively lobbied for the financial support of the [[Croatian diaspora]] during the late 1980s and 1990s. Some of the most prominent members of the party were previously emigrants, notably [[Gojko Šušak]].


The people in the diaspora who supported them also included those with a pro-Ustasha orientation (see ''reconciliation'' above). Some emigrants who advocated Ustaša ideas were able to freely return to Croatia in the 1990s, although after 45 years, few actual living Ustaše were still among the active population (most were rather elderly). Attempts to restore the Ustaše ideology and iconography were generally unsuccessful.
The people in the diaspora who supported them also included those with a pro-Ustasha orientation (see ''reconciliation'' above). Some emigrants who advocated Ustaša ideas were able to freely return to Croatia in the 1990s, although after 45 years, few actual living Ustaše were still among the active population (most were rather elderly). Attempts to restore the Ustaše ideology and iconography were generally unsuccessful.{{fact}}


===Defacement of monuments===
===Defacement of monuments===
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In the early 1990s, during the [[Croatian War of Independence]], numerous [[anti-fascist]] monuments (erected in honour of the [[Partisans (Yugoslavia)|Partisans]]) have been damaged or destroyed throughout the country, and these incidents were generally not censured by the authorities at all. Furthermore, the devastation of WWII partisan monuments also often extended to those erected in honour of civilian victims of war, also with little or no intervention from the police.
In the early 1990s, during the [[Croatian War of Independence]], numerous [[anti-fascist]] monuments (erected in honour of the [[Partisans (Yugoslavia)|Partisans]]) have been damaged or destroyed throughout the country, and these incidents were generally not censured by the authorities at all. Furthermore, the devastation of WWII partisan monuments also often extended to those erected in honour of civilian victims of war, also with little or no intervention from the police.


It is not readily apparent if these criminal acts reflect just anti-communist sentiments, or neo-Ustaša ones. The defacements occurred during a period when communist parties lost power in much of Eastern Europe.
It is not readily apparent if these criminal acts reflect just anti-communist sentiments, or neo-Ustaša ones.{{fact}} The defacements occurred during a period when communist parties lost power in much of Eastern Europe.{{fact}}


===National symbols===
===National symbols===
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There were some objections to the name of the internationally accepted currency of Croatia - [[Croatian kuna|kuna]], introduced in 1994, which was also flagged for use in 1939 [[Banovina of Croatia]] established within the [[Kingdom of Yugoslavia]], and subsequently used in the [[Independent State of Croatia|NDH]] (1941-1945). Using the same logic, a sizeable portion of Croatian cultural heritage would also be tainted because the Ustaša misappropriated numerous national symbols.
There were some objections to the name of the internationally accepted currency of Croatia - [[Croatian kuna|kuna]], introduced in 1994, which was also flagged for use in 1939 [[Banovina of Croatia]] established within the [[Kingdom of Yugoslavia]], and subsequently used in the [[Independent State of Croatia|NDH]] (1941-1945). Using the same logic, a sizeable portion of Croatian cultural heritage would also be tainted because the Ustaša misappropriated numerous national symbols.


The Croatian government points to the historical continuity of the use of the kuna (marten in Croatian) on the territory of Croatia, from the use of marten skins during Roman times, the use by Croatian [[ban (title)|bans]] (viceroys) of a marten-adorned silver coin between 1260 and 1380, to its reappearance in 1939 for the proposed currency of the [[Banovina of Croatia]].
The Croatian government points to the historical continuity of the use of the kuna (marten in Croatian) on the territory of Croatia, from the use of marten skins during Roman times, the use by Croatian [[ban (title)|bans]] (viceroys) of a marten-adorned silver coin between 1260 and 1380, to its reappearance in 1939 for the proposed currency of the [[Banovina of Croatia]].{{fact}}


In an interview for ''[[Slobodna Dalmacija]]''[http://iportal.net.hr/vijesti/page/2004/09/13/0140006.html], the leader of the Dubrovnik branch of the Croatian [[Helsinki Committee for Human Rights]], Dr. Zdravko Bazdan proposed renaming the currency as a "final phase of de-ustashafication". He described it as an act of urgent need for the "spiritual health of the Croatian people".
In an interview for ''[[Slobodna Dalmacija]]''[http://iportal.net.hr/vijesti/page/2004/09/13/0140006.html], the leader of the Dubrovnik branch of the Croatian [[Helsinki Committee for Human Rights]], Dr. Zdravko Bazdan proposed renaming the currency as a "final phase of de-ustashafication". He described it as an act of urgent need for the "spiritual health of the Croatian people".
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===Views of Franjo Tuđman===
===Views of Franjo Tuđman===


President [[Franjo Tuđman|Tuđman]], himself a [[Yugoslav partisans|Partisan]] general that had fought the Ustaša, had controversial views on the topic of World War II, claiming that the Ustaša state was indeed an expression of the desire of the Croats to regain their independence after centuries. Such a notion could be considered true in view of Croatia's long historical struggle for independence, but does not give enough consideration to the [[puppet-state|puppet]] status of the NDH.
President [[Franjo Tuđman|Tuđman]], himself a [[Yugoslav partisans|Partisan]] general that had fought the Ustaša, had controversial views on the topic of World War II, claiming that the Ustaša state was indeed an expression of the desire of the Croats to regain their independence after centuries. Such a notion could be considered true in view of Croatia's long historical struggle for independence, but does not give enough consideration to the [[puppet-state|puppet]] status of the NDH.{{fact}}


He also published a controversial book "Horrors of War - historical reality and philosophy" (''Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti'') in which he "debunked the black myth of Jasenovac", making the case that Jasenovac victim figures were amplified manyfold in order to create the myth of the genocidal nature of Croatdom and thus by virtue of this "historical guilt" the Croats abdicated any right to a [[nation-state]], in deference to a [[Greater Serbia]]. It should be noted that he also states that the victim figures as they are, are in themselves a tragedy.
He also published a controversial book "Horrors of War - historical reality and philosophy" (''Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti'') in which he "debunked the black myth of Jasenovac", making the case that Jasenovac victim figures were amplified manyfold in order to create the myth of the genocidal nature of Croatdom and thus by virtue of this "historical guilt" the Croats abdicated any right to a [[nation-state]], in deference to a [[Greater Serbia]]. It should be noted that he also states that the victim figures as they are, are in themselves a tragedy.{{fact}}


Franjo Tuđman also proposed to inter soldiers of the World War II Croatian Fascist regime alongside with their Serb, Jewish, Roma, and Croat victims, buried at the site of a former [[Jasenovac concentration camp]] as a sign of "national reconciliation" [http://www.cpj.org/awards97/ivancic.html], [http://www.cpj.org/attacks96/sreports/croatia.html], [http://balkansnet.org/other.html] - although it should be noted that Croatian partisans were only a very small proportion of casualties at Jasenovac. Croatian Serbs, whose relatives died in Jasenovac and other concentration camps in Croatia, found the proposal greatly insulting.
Franjo Tuđman also proposed to inter soldiers of the World War II Croatian Fascist regime alongside with their Serb, Jewish, Roma, and Croat victims, buried at the site of a former [[Jasenovac concentration camp]] as a sign of "national reconciliation" [http://www.cpj.org/awards97/ivancic.html], [http://www.cpj.org/attacks96/sreports/croatia.html], [http://balkansnet.org/other.html] - although it should be noted that Croatian partisans were only a very small proportion of casualties at Jasenovac. Croatian Serbs, whose relatives died in Jasenovac and other concentration camps in Croatia, found the proposal greatly insulting.
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When Croatia started the dissociation from [[SFRY]] in the [[1990s]], there was widespread and growing antagonism between the [[Croats]] and the [[Serbs]]. The disruption of decent relations towards the victims of WWII, particularly to the victims of Ustaša genocide, was offensive to the Serbs. While in normal circumstances these incidents would have been immediately sanctioned, in an atmosphere of fear built up by nationalist propaganda, the existing memory of WWII was easily exaggerated to make the Serbs frightened of the new developments.
When Croatia started the dissociation from [[SFRY]] in the [[1990s]], there was widespread and growing antagonism between the [[Croats]] and the [[Serbs]]. The disruption of decent relations towards the victims of WWII, particularly to the victims of Ustaša genocide, was offensive to the Serbs. While in normal circumstances these incidents would have been immediately sanctioned, in an atmosphere of fear built up by nationalist propaganda, the existing memory of WWII was easily exaggerated to make the Serbs frightened of the new developments.


The Croatian-Serbian animosity during the [[Yugoslav wars]] is sometimes mislabelled in an unsophisticated way as an Ustaša-[[Chetnik]] rivalry. To some extent, it is a consequence of wartime [[propaganda]], in the course of which such moralistic debasement is common. There was a widespread notion that the extremists, under the umbrella term of ''Ustaša'', committed war crimes against the Serb population; and vice versa for the ''Chetniks''.
The Croatian-Serbian animosity during the [[Yugoslav wars]] is sometimes mislabelled in an unsophisticated way as an Ustaša-[[Chetnik]] rivalry.{{fact}} To some extent, it is a consequence of wartime [[propaganda]], in the course of which such moralistic debasement is common. There was a widespread notion that the extremists, under the umbrella term of ''Ustaša'', committed war crimes against the Serb population; and vice versa for the ''Chetniks''.{{fact}}


Among the organizations formed during wartime which were most commonly associated with neo-Ustashism was the [[Croatian Defence Forces]] (''Hrvatske Obrambene Snage'', HOS), which emerged as the de facto paramilitary wing of the [[Croatian Party of Rights]]. Their symbols included dressing in black (reminiscent of [[blackshirts]]) and using the phrase ''[[Ustaše#Symbols|Za dom spremni]]'' (reminiscent of Ustaša, but used in the past already by the Croatian soldiers, e.g. [[Nikola Subic Zrinski]]). Regardless of their actual actions, these symbols alienated many people.
Among the organizations formed during wartime which were most commonly associated with neo-Ustashism was the [[Croatian Defence Forces]] (''Hrvatske Obrambene Snage'', HOS), which emerged as the de facto paramilitary wing of the [[Croatian Party of Rights]]. Their symbols included dressing in black (reminiscent of [[blackshirts]]) and using the phrase ''[[Ustaše#Symbols|Za dom spremni]]'' (reminiscent of Ustaša, but used in the past already by the Croatian soldiers, e.g. [[Nikola Subic Zrinski]]). Regardless of their actual actions, these symbols alienated many people.

Revision as of 18:30, 10 March 2007

Template:Totallydisputed Neo-Nazism in Croatia, also known as Neo-Ustashism[citation needed], is a post-World War II political movement influenced by the Ustaša, a Croatian fascist organization supported by the Nazis during the war.

The movement has included people who were either involved with the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) during World War II; sympathizers; and people who utilise their symbolism. The movement mainly arose from a combination of the residual hatred from the Yugoslav wars and Croatian nationalism, and is considered the far-right of the Croatian political spectrum. It differs from neo-fascist movements in other parts of Europe, because it is related to a recent military conflict; the Yugoslav wars[citation needed].

Pro-Ustaša sentiments, symbols and actions have been restricted by law in Croatia since 2003. The most common venue for expressing these beliefs is graffiti, which mostly targets ethnic Serbs.

De-Ustashification

At the end of World War II, the Communist authorities pursued a strict set of policies which could be deemed as a form of denazification, only more similar to the Soviet style than to the American style. People who collaborated with the Ustaša were often court-martialled at the end of the war, the Bleiburg massacre was committed, and after the war was over, there were also trials against suspected collaborators, secret service control over citizens with links to the Ustaša etc[citation needed].

The modern Croatia was formed long after World War II was over, and aside from occasional exceptions, there was no desire whatsoever by the Croatian political elite to associate the new country with the former Independent State of Croatia or to revisit the status of Croatia as a member of the winning side of that war. While significantly more courtesy was shown to the Ustaša for their desire to make Croatia independent, they were neither rehabilitated nor explicitly banned - most people, in politics and otherwise, simply wished to leave that part of the past behind. Subsequently, no laws were ever passed that specifically targeted the issues of Nazism and/or fascism.

In the absence of a specific policy or laws against it, instances of pro-Ustasha sentiment and hate speech were rarely sanctioned, much to the dismay of liberal media and the left-leaning public, as well the Serbs of Croatia which were the most common targets.

Eventually, on July 11, 2003 the Račan coalition government passed amendments to the Penal Code which outlawed this kind of hate speech in a new section titled Praising fascist, Nazi and other totalitarian states and ideologies or promotion of racism and xenophobia. On June 20, 2006 Croatian prime minister Ivo Sanader issued a message ahead of the Antifascist Struggle Day, official holiday in Croatia, in which he rejected "every extremism and radicalism" and said that "antifascism was a commitment weaved into the foundations of independent, democratic Croatia". [1]

Croatia also has no laws against historical revisionism or holocaust denial. This can mainly be attributed to the change of political system and indeed the entire system of values as the country became independent. Revisionism was not frowned upon because priority was placed on the re-evaluation of history as recorded during the Communist era, which was therefore deemed almost implicitly tainted.[citation needed] The re-examination of the number of victims of the Independent State of Croatia and particularly the Jasenovac concentration camp was fairly common, as well as fairly controversial. See also the Bleiburg controversy below.[citation needed]

History of alleged expressions of neo-Ustashism

Since gaining independence in 1991, Croatia has often been accused of ignoring the crimes committed by World War II fascist Ustaša regime, and tolerating the symbols or the activities of individuals sympathetic to such a regime. This has been known to provoke criticism of Croatia in the West, particularly among the Serbs.

General ignorance about neo-Ustašism

The primary reason for the disregard of the past fascism has been a lack of priority and care taken by the Croatian public and the mainstream politics towards the issue, because numerous other issues plagued the country at the time (see: Croatian War of Independence, history of modern Croatia). The late president Franjo Tuđman was a champion of the reconciliation (Croatian pomirenje), whereby Croats of all political views should unite, facing the grave threat during the Yugoslav wars. This had the side-effect of also bringing back the extreme right-wing Croats into the fray, no longer considering pro-fascist and pro-Ustasha ideas taboo, all in an effort to win the war.

After the war, as time passed, the strength of this ideology gradually subsided, and the more anti-fascist-inclined people were no longer willing to set aside political differences with the more fascist-inclined.[citation needed] In recent times, the mainstream politicians, notably the second president Stjepan Mesić, brought more focus to anti-fascist stances and veteran groups, although given the estimated small number of neo-Ustaša sympathisers, the President's focus has at times resemble the creating of a straw opponent in the course of partisan politics. The remembrance ceremonies at the site of former Ustaša camp Jasenovac resumed, with support from the highest levels of government.

Emigration

As Croatia emerged from Communism in SFR Yugoslavia, and a multi-party system was being established, the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) emerged as the dominant party. Their politicians, including its president Franjo Tuđman, actively lobbied for the financial support of the Croatian diaspora during the late 1980s and 1990s. Some of the most prominent members of the party were previously emigrants, notably Gojko Šušak.

The people in the diaspora who supported them also included those with a pro-Ustasha orientation (see reconciliation above). Some emigrants who advocated Ustaša ideas were able to freely return to Croatia in the 1990s, although after 45 years, few actual living Ustaše were still among the active population (most were rather elderly). Attempts to restore the Ustaše ideology and iconography were generally unsuccessful.[citation needed]

Defacement of monuments

In the early 1990s, during the Croatian War of Independence, numerous anti-fascist monuments (erected in honour of the Partisans) have been damaged or destroyed throughout the country, and these incidents were generally not censured by the authorities at all. Furthermore, the devastation of WWII partisan monuments also often extended to those erected in honour of civilian victims of war, also with little or no intervention from the police.

It is not readily apparent if these criminal acts reflect just anti-communist sentiments, or neo-Ustaša ones.[citation needed] The defacements occurred during a period when communist parties lost power in much of Eastern Europe.[citation needed]

National symbols

There were some objections to the name of the internationally accepted currency of Croatia - kuna, introduced in 1994, which was also flagged for use in 1939 Banovina of Croatia established within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and subsequently used in the NDH (1941-1945). Using the same logic, a sizeable portion of Croatian cultural heritage would also be tainted because the Ustaša misappropriated numerous national symbols.

The Croatian government points to the historical continuity of the use of the kuna (marten in Croatian) on the territory of Croatia, from the use of marten skins during Roman times, the use by Croatian bans (viceroys) of a marten-adorned silver coin between 1260 and 1380, to its reappearance in 1939 for the proposed currency of the Banovina of Croatia.[citation needed]

In an interview for Slobodna Dalmacija[2], the leader of the Dubrovnik branch of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Dr. Zdravko Bazdan proposed renaming the currency as a "final phase of de-ustashafication". He described it as an act of urgent need for the "spiritual health of the Croatian people".

Names of squares and streets

A square in the central part of Zagreb which was named the "Square of the victims of fascism" (Trg žrtava fašizma) because during WWII over sixteen thousand people were deported via the square to concentration camps, was during the early 1990s renamed to "Square of great Croats" (Trg hrvatskih velikana). This decision was later reverted in December 2000 during Bandić's mayorship of Zagreb.

In several Croatian cities, streets were renamed after Mile Budak, a prominent Ustaša ideologist, on the basis that he was otherwise a poet. The moves to hail Budak this way, were supported by 120 university professors, scholars, and other public figures[3]. Conversely, the leftist newspaper Feral Tribune regularly satirized the Mile Budak streets, and its journalists explicitly criticized this trend.

The renaming of streets and squares after Budak (and other Ustaša-related people) has mostly been reversed by recent governments. In 2003, Ivo Sanader's government decided to finally deal with the issue which resulted in renaming all the streets bearing Budak's name. In 2004, a plaque commemorating Budak's birth in the village of Sveti Rok was removed by the same authorities.

Views of Franjo Tuđman

President Tuđman, himself a Partisan general that had fought the Ustaša, had controversial views on the topic of World War II, claiming that the Ustaša state was indeed an expression of the desire of the Croats to regain their independence after centuries. Such a notion could be considered true in view of Croatia's long historical struggle for independence, but does not give enough consideration to the puppet status of the NDH.[citation needed]

He also published a controversial book "Horrors of War - historical reality and philosophy" (Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti) in which he "debunked the black myth of Jasenovac", making the case that Jasenovac victim figures were amplified manyfold in order to create the myth of the genocidal nature of Croatdom and thus by virtue of this "historical guilt" the Croats abdicated any right to a nation-state, in deference to a Greater Serbia. It should be noted that he also states that the victim figures as they are, are in themselves a tragedy.[citation needed]

Franjo Tuđman also proposed to inter soldiers of the World War II Croatian Fascist regime alongside with their Serb, Jewish, Roma, and Croat victims, buried at the site of a former Jasenovac concentration camp as a sign of "national reconciliation" [4], [5], [6] - although it should be noted that Croatian partisans were only a very small proportion of casualties at Jasenovac. Croatian Serbs, whose relatives died in Jasenovac and other concentration camps in Croatia, found the proposal greatly insulting.

In the world of popular culture, the pop/folk/rock singer Marko Perković and his band Thompson made a career for himself by singing patriotic tunes. Yet this has sometimes also included the singing of fascist lyrics which praise WWII criminals, most notably in the song Jasenovac i Gradiška Stara, which developed into a scandal when the media obtained a copy of the song apparently sung by them. The reason why Thompson was not prosecuted for this was uncertainty as to whether it was really him who sang that.

Thompson has appeared on public television, and can still sometimes be seen on it, even though the mainstream TV stations do tend to avoid him in order to avoid controversy. He has had at least a few concerts that have attracted tens of thousands of people, particularly in areas that were most impacted by the Yugoslav wars. It has been widely alleged that he achieved such large attendances with the support of right-wing political organizations who helped rally people to the concerts. Later he was banned from performing in Netherlands and other states that do not allow display of Nazi symbols and celebration of the Holocaust.

The newest medium that is frequently used by people to openly express their neo-Nazi attitude is the Internet. There are a number of Internet forums and blogs where people post various neo-fascist statements, pictures and other items, generally anonymously. Relatively few of them get an online ban, and there are no recorded cases of anyone being prosecuted by law for doing such a thing. A list of these blogs is given on the Talk page.

War of Independence

When Croatia started the dissociation from SFRY in the 1990s, there was widespread and growing antagonism between the Croats and the Serbs. The disruption of decent relations towards the victims of WWII, particularly to the victims of Ustaša genocide, was offensive to the Serbs. While in normal circumstances these incidents would have been immediately sanctioned, in an atmosphere of fear built up by nationalist propaganda, the existing memory of WWII was easily exaggerated to make the Serbs frightened of the new developments.

The Croatian-Serbian animosity during the Yugoslav wars is sometimes mislabelled in an unsophisticated way as an Ustaša-Chetnik rivalry.[citation needed] To some extent, it is a consequence of wartime propaganda, in the course of which such moralistic debasement is common. There was a widespread notion that the extremists, under the umbrella term of Ustaša, committed war crimes against the Serb population; and vice versa for the Chetniks.[citation needed]

Among the organizations formed during wartime which were most commonly associated with neo-Ustashism was the Croatian Defence Forces (Hrvatske Obrambene Snage, HOS), which emerged as the de facto paramilitary wing of the Croatian Party of Rights. Their symbols included dressing in black (reminiscent of blackshirts) and using the phrase Za dom spremni (reminiscent of Ustaša, but used in the past already by the Croatian soldiers, e.g. Nikola Subic Zrinski). Regardless of their actual actions, these symbols alienated many people.

With respect to processing war crimes, both in WWII and in the Croatian war of independence, the Croatian Government has had a rather spotty record for processing those committed by Croats. The pressure from the European Union, given that Croatia aims to join the EU, has helped rectify this in recent times. In 1999, Croatia had Argentina extradite Dinko Šakić, one of the commanders of the Jasenovac concentration camp, and he was subsequently tried and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Croatia has been cooperating with the ICTY in the legal prosecution of all war criminals, which has included Croatian officers.

The wartime use of the term Ustaša still continues to plague relations between the Serbs and the Croats.

Nationalism and neo-Ustashism in mainstream politics

The conservative parties such as the Croatian Party of Rights and the Croatian Democratic Union permeated in their support for heightened nationalism; particularly in the latter, which had a large membership and voter base, it was unclear whether actions of party members were part of actual party policy or result of factioning.

The neo-Ustaša politicians, whether alleged or outspoken, have never had grass roots support among the Croatian people. The parties like the Croatian Party of Rights which are most commonly associated with Ustašism generally aren't able to attract support from more than a few percent of the population. In recent times, the Party's image of "pro-Ustaša" was repetitively shunned by its leaders in an attempt to sway more votes.

As a rightist political notion, the neo-fascist symbols are by and large paired with nationalist ones. In recent protests, supporters of Ante Gotovina and other suspected war criminals often carried nationalist symbols together with pictures of Ante Pavelić.

Graffiti on a wall in Croatia, which says "We'll give everything, but won't give Bobetko!", as well as the logo of the Ustaše and the acronym for the Independent State of Croatia. (see text)

This kind of conflation sometimes produces bizarre inconsistencies, as shown at picture on the right: at the time when the ICTY wanted Croatian general Janko Bobetko, the right-wing part of the public was adamant in its demands to prevent that, and some extremist painted graffiti saying so, together with neo-fascist symbols. At the same time, Bobetko was quite clearly not a neo-fascist himself, because his family was killed by the Ustaše, and he fought against them as part of an anti-fascist unit.

Graffiti

Neo-Nazi symbols and slogans often deface walls in Croatia. The serif letter U representing Ustaše is the most common, and it is sometimes embellished with a cross (referring to Christianity), and/or letters NDH (meaning Nezavisna Država Hrvatska). There are also instances of much more explicit hate speech: the phrase Srbe na vrbe! (meaning "hang Serbs on the willow trees!") also appears in graffiti and as slogans of Croatian football hooligans.

Serbian property, even Orthodox churches, continue to be occasionally vandalized with various Ustaša-related graffiti. The authorities — while opposed to it — are fairly unsuccessful as well as mostly indifferent about catching spraypainters of any graffiti in general. Pro-Ustaša grafitti predominates in areas that are economic backwaters, or were hit hard by the Yugoslav wars.