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*'''Shakti VI:'''
*'''Shakti VI:'''


The tests allegedly included a sixth device that was either not detonated or failed to detonate.
The tests allegedly included a sixth device that was either not detonated or failed to detonate.


Three laboratories of the DRDO were involved in designing, testing and producing components like advanced detonators, the implosion systems, high-voltage trigger systems. They were also responsible for weaponization, systems engineering, aerodynamics, safety interlocks and flight trials.The nuclear devices were moved from their vaults at the BARC complex in the early hours of 1 May, around 3 a.m., by four Army trucks under the command of Col. Umang Kapur. They were transported to Mumbai airport and flown at dawn in Airforce AN-32 transport planes to the Jaisalmer military base. An Army convoy of four trucks transported the explosive devices to Pokhran. Three trips were required to complete the delivery of the devices and associated equipment. The devices were delivered directly to the device preparation building in the rane which was designated as the 'Prayer Hall'.

The tests were organized into two groups that were fired separately, with all of the devices in a group fired at the same time. The first group consisted of the thermonuclear device, the fission bomb, and a sub-kiloton device, and two more sub-kiloton devices made up the second group.The thermonuclear device was placed in a shaft code named 'White House' (over 200 m deep), while the 'Taj Mahal' shaft (over 150 m deep) was assigned to the fission bomb, and 'Kumbhkaran' to the first sub-kiloton shot. The other three shafts for the second test series were designated NT 1,2, and 3.The first three devices were placed in their respective shafts on 10th May, the day before the tests. The shafts were L-shaped, with a horizontal chamber for the test device. The first device to be placed was the sub-kiloton device in the 'Kumbhkaran' shaft. The Army engineers sealed the shaft at 8:30 p.m. Then the thermonuclear device was lowered into the 'White House' shaft, sealing this shaft took until 4 a.m. the next morning. By then the atomic bomb was being placed in the 'Taj Mahal' shaft. It was sealed at 7:30 a.m., just 90 minutes from the planned test time.

The actual timing of the tests depended on the local weather conditions. It was hot in the Thar Desert in early May, it reached 43 C on the day of the test. But the critical factor was the wind. Although the tests were underground, they were shallow tests and the sealing of the shaft could not be guaranteed to be leak-proof (a number of shaft seal failures had occurred in the U.S. despite being much deeper). Winds blowing toward inhabited areas, as occurred on the morning on 11 May were not acceptable. But by early afternoon the winds had died down and the scientists decided to go ahead with the tests. Dr.K. Santhanam of the DRDO, who was in charge of the test site preparations, gave the two keys that activated the test countdown to Dr.M.Vasudev, the range safety officer, who was responsible for verifying that all test indicators were normal. After checking the indicators, Vasudev handed one key each to a representative of BARC and the DRDO, who together unlocked the countdown system. At 3:45 p.m. the three devices were detonated.





Revision as of 15:20, 19 July 2007

File:ShaktiBomb566c20.jpg
The Hydrogen Bomb detonated by India during Operation Shakti

Pokharan-II refers to test explosions of five nuclear devices, three on 11 May and two on 13 May 1998, conducted by India at the Pokhran test range. The test was conducted when the BJP government was in power with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister. These nuclear tests resulted in a variety of sanctions against India by a number of major states. On 18th May 1974 India exploded its first nuclear device code named Smiling Buddha. After about a quarter century, on Buddha Jayanti, 11 May 1998, Operation Shakti was carried out. Shakti is a Sanskrit word meaning strength, and it is also the name of the Hindu Goddess of strength. Shakti was the codename for Pokhran-II.

The tests came at a time when the world was slowly moving out of the Cold War mentality. Treaties like LTBT, NPT, CTBT etc. ensured that the Non Proliferation regime remained strong and robust. The tests by India renewed debates about the necessities of nuclear weapons and the dangers associated with them.

Birth of India's Nuclear Weapons Program

The Indian nuclear weapons program was started in the year 1964. The 1962 Sino-Indian war was an unforgettable lesson to the Indian establishment. It underscored the need to have a strong military with a comprehensive capability to deter enemy forces. The Chinese Nuclear Test at Lop Nur in 1964 goaded the Indian government into action to kickstart India's indigenous program to develop nuclear weapons. Preliminary studies were carried out at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and plans were developed to produce Plutonium and other bomb components. The program was shelved after Jawahar Lal Nehru's death. It was revived in the year 1968 by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The program culminated in the nuclear test of 1974 at Pokhran codenamed Smiling Buddha.

After the 1974 test India decided to stop testing as a temporary measure. Various political parties, especially the right wing Jana Sangh pushed for further testing and weaponisation. Successive governments in India decided to observe this temporary moratorium for fear of inviting international criticism. In 1995, Prime Minister P.V.Narasimha Rao decided to carry out further tests. But the plans were halted after the American Ikonos satellite picked up signs of preparations for testing at Pokhran. The Americans under President Clinton exerted enormous pressure on Rao to stop the preparations.

Bharatiya Janata Party & Nuclear Weapons

File:Vaj.jpg
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee ordered the tests at Pokhran

The Bharatiya Janata Party or the BJP was an offspring of the Jana Sangh. One of its main policies was the development of nuclear weapons in India. By the 1980s, the BJP had become a potent force in Indian politics. Riding upon a wave of Hindu revivalism, it had won the support of the Indian people as an alternative to the Congress party. The capitulation of Prime Minister Rao under American pressure and suspension of India's missile development program angered the Indian public who were becoming increasingly disillusioned with the Congress party.

The BJP played on the mood of the public by calling for more tests and induction of nuclear weapons and missiles into the Indian arsenal. The party became instantly popular with the people for these policies and in 1996, the BJP was elected to power at the head of a coalition of parties with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the Prime Minister. Within days of assuming office, Vajpayee ordered the military and the scientific establishment to proceed with preparations for testing at the Pokhran range. But unfortunately, the BJP could not prove its majority in parliament and lost a no-confidence vote. Vajpayee tendered his resignation and his successors, Deve Gowda and Inder Kumar Gujral decided to observe the moratorium on testing.

In the 1998 parliamentary elections, tapping on popular public sentiments and a single minded devotion towards overt nuclear weaponisation the coalition headed by the BJP won an absolute majority in parliament. Vajpayee was put solidly back in power and test preparations were revived once again.

Preparations for the Test

File:Shaft-Shakti.jpg
A shaft for the tests being dug under a camouflage netting at the Pokhran range

The detection of the test preparations by American satellites in 1995, had taught a lesson to the Indian scientists. It was decided that preparations for the May 1998 tests should be undertaken under a cloud of secrecy so that foreign powers could not detect the preparations and try to pressure the government. Extensive measures were taken in order to deceive intelligence agencies around the world. The decision to test was not disclosed even to senior cabinet ministers. The preparations were managed by a closed group of scientists, military officers and politicians.

Among the senior leaders who knew about the test preparations were: Prime Minister Vajpayee, Home Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra. The Finance Minister and the Defence Minister were given 48 hours notice.

Dr.A.P.J.Abdul Kalam, the Scientific Adviser to the Prime Minister and Dr.R.Chidambaram, the head of the Department of Atomic Energy were the chief coordinators for the operation. They were assisted by the 58th Regiment of the Army Engineering Corps in preparing the test site. Scientists from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre(BARC) and the Defence Research and Development Organization(DRDO) were involved in assembling the weapons, moving them to Pokhran, placing them into shafts in the ground and laying a network of sensors to gather data during the explosions.

The Regiment 58 Engineers had learned a lot since the aborted 1995 test preparations about avoiding detection by American satellites. A lot of work was done at night, and heavy equipment was always returned to the same parking spot at dawn so that satellite image analysts would conclude that the equipments were never moved. Piles of dug-out sand were shaped to mimic the wind-aligned and shaped dune forms in the desert area. The shafts were dug under a netting of camouflage. When cables for sensors were laid they were carefully covered with sand and native vegetation replaced to conceal the digging.

The scientists involved in the operation took care to ensure that even their close friends and colleagues would not detect the work being undertaken at Pokhran. All scientists involved in the operation did not leave for Pokhran at once. They left in groups of two or three. One group would leave on the pretext of attending a seminar or a conference. They would tell their wives that they could not be contacted while they were away. Tickets were bought for some place other than Pokhran or any cities nearby under false names and after arriving at their destination, the group would secretly leave for the military base in Jaisalmer from where they would be taken by the army to Pokhran. After finishing their part of the work the group would go back retracing their path. Then another group would leave for the range employing similar means to do their part of the work for the bombs. In this way, information about the test was kept tightly under the wraps. All technical staff at the range wore military fatigues so that in satellite images, they would appear as military personnel charged with maintenance of the test range.

On the diplomatic front, India pursued a policy of ambiguity about deciding to go nuclear. Indian politicians and diplomats gave an impression to the world that India was not yet decided about its nuclear status. Deliberate steps were taken to ensure that the world community would not take the BJP's campaign promises seriously. In seperate meetings with American officials, Foreign secretary K.Raghunath and Defence Minister George Fernandes stated that India had not yet decided about going nuclear and the National Security Council would be meeting soon to discuss the matter threadbare and decide about the nuclear option. The council was to meet on the 26th of May. Moreover both the Indian officials had categorically told the Americans that "there would be no surprise testings". All this led the Americans and the world community to believe that India was not going to pursue the nuclear option in the near future. They did not take the BJP's campaign promises seriously and hence did not expect an Indian nuclear test.

The Test Team

File:People-Shakti.jpg
The senior scientists involved in the tests at the Pokhran range wearing army fatigues to avoid detection by satellites

The main technical personnel involved in the operation were:

Project Chief Coordinators:

  • Dr.A.P.J.Abdul Kalam, Scientific Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the DRDO.
  • Dr.R.Chidambaram, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Atomic energy


Development and Test Teams:


Bhabha Atomic Research Centre(BARC):

  • Dr.Anil Kakodkar, Director of BARC
  • Dr.Satinder Kumar Sikka, Dirctor; Thermonuclear Weapon Development
  • Dr.M.S. Ramkumar, Director of Nuclear Fuel and Automation Manufacturing Group; Director, Nuclear Component Manufacture
  • Dr.D.D. Sood, Director of Radiochemistry and Isotope Group; Director, Nuclear Materials Acquisition
  • Dr. S.K. Gupta, Solid State Physics and Spectroscopy Group; Director, Device Design & Assessment
  • Dr.G. Govindraj, Associate Director of Electronic and Instrumentation Group; Director, Field Instrumentation


Defence Research & Development Organization(DRDO):

  • Dr.K. Santhanam; Director, Test Site Preparations
  • Dr.M.Vasudev; Range Safety Officer

The Devices

A total of five nuclear weapons were detonated at Pokhran during Operation Shakti. They are:

  • Shakti I:

A two stage thermonuclear device with a boosted fission primary, its yield was degraded from 200 KT(theoretical) to 45 KT for test purposes. The thermonuclear device tested at Pokhran was not an actual warhead. It was a device that was designed mainly to produce data to analyze the performance of India's Hydrogen bomb technology for future computer simulations and actual weaponisation.

  • Shakti II:

A pure fission device using the Plutonium implosion design with an yield of 15 KT. The device tested was an actual nuclear warhead that can be delivered by bombers or fighters and also mounted on a missile. The warhead was an improved,lightweight and miniaturized version of the device tested in 1974. Scientists at BARC had been working to improve the 1974 design for many years. Data from the 1974 test was used to carry out computer simulations using the indigenous Param supercomputer to improve the design. The 1998 test was intended to prove the validity of the improved designs.

  • Shakti III:

An experimental boosted fission device that used reactor grade Plutonium for its primary with an yield of 0.3 KT. This test device was used to test only the primary stage. It did not contain any tritium required to boost the fission. This test was designed to study the possibility of using reactor grade plutonium in warheads. India's possesses large quantities of reactor grade plutonium whose primary use is in nuclear reactors. The yield of the design was downgraded in order to collect requisite data about the explosion.

  • Shakti IV:

A 0.5 KT experimental device. The test's only purpose was to collect data about the explosion process.

  • Shakti V:

A 0.2 KT experimental device. This device too was used to collect data.

  • Shakti VI:

The tests allegedly included a sixth device that was either not detonated or failed to detonate.


Three laboratories of the DRDO were involved in designing, testing and producing components like advanced detonators, the implosion systems, high-voltage trigger systems. They were also responsible for weaponization, systems engineering, aerodynamics, safety interlocks and flight trials.The nuclear devices were moved from their vaults at the BARC complex in the early hours of 1 May, around 3 a.m., by four Army trucks under the command of Col. Umang Kapur. They were transported to Mumbai airport and flown at dawn in Airforce AN-32 transport planes to the Jaisalmer military base. An Army convoy of four trucks transported the explosive devices to Pokhran. Three trips were required to complete the delivery of the devices and associated equipment. The devices were delivered directly to the device preparation building in the rane which was designated as the 'Prayer Hall'.

The tests were organized into two groups that were fired separately, with all of the devices in a group fired at the same time. The first group consisted of the thermonuclear device, the fission bomb, and a sub-kiloton device, and two more sub-kiloton devices made up the second group.The thermonuclear device was placed in a shaft code named 'White House' (over 200 m deep), while the 'Taj Mahal' shaft (over 150 m deep) was assigned to the fission bomb, and 'Kumbhkaran' to the first sub-kiloton shot. The other three shafts for the second test series were designated NT 1,2, and 3.The first three devices were placed in their respective shafts on 10th May, the day before the tests. The shafts were L-shaped, with a horizontal chamber for the test device. The first device to be placed was the sub-kiloton device in the 'Kumbhkaran' shaft. The Army engineers sealed the shaft at 8:30 p.m. Then the thermonuclear device was lowered into the 'White House' shaft, sealing this shaft took until 4 a.m. the next morning. By then the atomic bomb was being placed in the 'Taj Mahal' shaft. It was sealed at 7:30 a.m., just 90 minutes from the planned test time.

The actual timing of the tests depended on the local weather conditions. It was hot in the Thar Desert in early May, it reached 43 C on the day of the test. But the critical factor was the wind. Although the tests were underground, they were shallow tests and the sealing of the shaft could not be guaranteed to be leak-proof (a number of shaft seal failures had occurred in the U.S. despite being much deeper). Winds blowing toward inhabited areas, as occurred on the morning on 11 May were not acceptable. But by early afternoon the winds had died down and the scientists decided to go ahead with the tests. Dr.K. Santhanam of the DRDO, who was in charge of the test site preparations, gave the two keys that activated the test countdown to Dr.M.Vasudev, the range safety officer, who was responsible for verifying that all test indicators were normal. After checking the indicators, Vasudev handed one key each to a representative of BARC and the DRDO, who together unlocked the countdown system. At 3:45 p.m. the three devices were detonated.



Detonations

On 11th May 1998, three simultaneous detonations were conducted, which consisted of a 15 kiloton fission device (atom bomb), a 45 kiloton device and a 0.2 kiloton device. The detonations of 13 May 1998 were in sub-kiloton range of 0.5 kiloton and 0.3 kiloton. India claimed that the 45 kt device was a thermonuclear weapon but probably a boosted fission device.

File:Shaktidust640c20.jpg
Moments after the simultaneous detonation of the atom bombs

Pokhran-II resulted in an international debate regarding the yield of the hydrogen bomb, and some circles were skeptical about India’s capability of having “tested” a hydrogen bomb, but further research showed that India possessed the technology to develop a hydrogen bomb as well. Their misgivings were actively dispelled by India and in October 1998, India clarified that the explosions had resulted in a perfect match between the calculated and the measured yields. This was confirmed by Roger Clarke, a seismologist at the University of Leeds [1], as reported in the June 1998 issue of the New Scientist. However many outside experts remained doubtful that the fusion secondary stage detonated correctly.[2]

Sanctions

India's decision to detonate nuclear devices (Pokhran-II) resulted in severe and comprehensive economic and technology related sanctions by a number of states. Over a period of time, these sanctions had only marginal effects on India’s economy and technological progress. Most of the sanctions were lifted within five years of the tests.

India's stand

After Pokhran-II Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared India to be a Nuclear Weapon State. This official declaration ended years of ambiguity about India’s nuclear infrastructures and capabilities. The Prime Minister further imposed a self-declared moratorium on further nuclear fission by India. At the same time, India declared the policy of no first use.

This was in conformity with India’s sovereign desire to maintain a level of independent status in the international comity of nations. Brajesh Mishra, former Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and National Security Advisor articulated this desire in these words: "I have always felt that you cannot in today's world be counted for something without going nuclear."

Images

References

Books

See also