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* ''Offensive military action.'' [[International Security Assistance Force|ISAF]], either with the support or in support of the developing Afghan security forces, must conduct Offensive military action against the insurgents who continue to pose a major threat to the legitimate Afghan Government until they are able to sustain themselves.<ref name=HCDDM16July09/>
* ''Offensive military action.'' [[International Security Assistance Force|ISAF]], either with the support or in support of the developing Afghan security forces, must conduct Offensive military action against the insurgents who continue to pose a major threat to the legitimate Afghan Government until they are able to sustain themselves.<ref name=HCDDM16July09/>


* ''Isolating the insurgents from the Afghan population.'' Isolated insurgents without the support of the Afghan population, undermining the insurgents capacity both to regenerate, which includes recruitment, and to adapt.<ref name=HC554-v15dec10/> it is the UK's position that an an Afghan lead is vital for both security operations and for building support.<ref name=HC554-v15dec10/>
* ''Isolating the insurgents from support of the Afghan population.'' Isolated insurgents without the support of the Afghan population, undermining the insurgents capacity both to regenerate, which includes recruitment, and to adapt.<ref name=HC554-v15dec10/> it is the UK's position that an an Afghan lead is vital for both security operations and for building support.<ref name=HC554-v15dec10/>


* ''Training, mentoring and development.'' Afghan security forces capable of managing [[Afghanistan|Afghanistan's]] own security<ref name=QS25may10/> and of planning and conducting<ref name=HC554-v15dec10>Corrected Transcript of Oral Evidence, House of Commons, Oral Evidence taken before the Defence Commitee, OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, 15 December 2010, DR LIAM FOX MP, SIR STUART PEACH and PETER WATKINS, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmdfence/c554-v/c55401.htm</ref> effective independent operations in order to defeat the Afghan insurgency<ref name=HCDDM16July09/> and prevent terrorists from using [[Afghanistan]] as a 'launch pad' to attack other countries<ref name=QS25may10>Queen’s Speech – Afghanistan and Pakistan, Tuesday 25 May 2010, http://www.number10.gov.uk/queens-speech/2010/05/queens-speech-afghanistan-and-pakistan-50704</ref>. The UK must support the training, mentoring and development of Afghan security forces.<ref name=HCDDM16July09/>
* ''Training, mentoring and development.'' Afghan security forces capable of managing [[Afghanistan|Afghanistan's]] own security<ref name=QS25may10/> and of planning and conducting<ref name=HC554-v15dec10>Corrected Transcript of Oral Evidence, House of Commons, Oral Evidence taken before the Defence Commitee, OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, 15 December 2010, DR LIAM FOX MP, SIR STUART PEACH and PETER WATKINS, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmdfence/c554-v/c55401.htm</ref> effective independent operations in order to defeat the Afghan insurgency<ref name=HCDDM16July09/> and prevent terrorists from using [[Afghanistan]] as a 'launch pad' to attack other countries<ref name=QS25may10>Queen’s Speech – Afghanistan and Pakistan, Tuesday 25 May 2010, http://www.number10.gov.uk/queens-speech/2010/05/queens-speech-afghanistan-and-pakistan-50704</ref>. The UK must support the training, mentoring and development of Afghan security forces.<ref name=HCDDM16July09/>

Revision as of 11:18, 16 February 2011

Operation Herrick is the codename for the British part of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign in Afghanistan.

Overview

It is the UK Governments position that the UK cannot disengage from Afghanistan and retains an active military presence (particularly Helmand province) because of the continued terrorist threat facing Britain and the world.[1][2] Building a strong Afghan state is a long and difficult task.[1][3] The Liberal-Conservative coalition government (May 2010 - Current) has declared that Afghanistan is the UK's top foreign policy priority.[2]

Strategic Threat

In 2001 the Taliban regime in Afghanistan enabled Al-Qaeda to plot terror around the world and this led to tragic consequences of 9/11.[1] As the Taliban were removed from power and Al-Qaeda, including their training camps,[2] was driven from Afghanistan by Coalition forces, Al-Qaeda has relocated to the remote mountains of Pakistan's northwest frontier province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).[1][4]

The main threat continues to originate from Al-Qaeda and the Pakistan part of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.[1] Al-Qaeda retains some contacts and provides limited support to the Afghan-Pakistan insurgency, principally through the provision of training for foreign fighters and military expertise; continues to view Afghanistan as fundamental in the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate; and therefore a peaceful and stable Afghanistan would be a severe propaganda blow and strategic failure for Al-Qaeda.[1]

If the Taliban are allowed to undermine legitimate government in either Afghanistan or Pakistan, that would enable Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to have greater freedom and a sanctuary from which to train, plan and launch terrorist attacks across the world - and would have longer term implications for the credibility of NATO and the international community - and for the stability of both this crucial region and globally.[1]

The UK's position, both under the Labour Government (Apr 2009 - May 2010) and the Liberal-Conservative coalition government[2] (May 2010 - current), is that the prevention of terrorism on the streets of the UK, America and other countries depends on providing stability in the region spanning the Afghanistan-Pakistan border through strengthening the authorities in both Pakistan and Afghanistan to defeat Al-Qaeda, and also the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban.[1]

In July 2009 the Director-General of the UK Security Service estimated that three quarters of the most serious plots against the UK have links into this region.[4] As of Jun 2010, the Prime Minister stated that the threat to the UK from Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and Pakistan has reduced, primarily due to the current strategy, although this was assessed as not yet irreversible.[2]

UK end state

The UK, under both the Labour (April 2009 - May 2010)[4][5] and Liberal Democrat-Conservative coalition[2] (May 2010 - current) Governments, considered that ISAF will have succeeded when it achieves the long term denial of both Afghanistan and Pakistan as a base for Al-Qaeda under Taliban authority.

Unlike the previous Labour Government, that did not state a definitive time schedule for achieving objectives within their overall strategy,[1] the current coalition government (May 2010-current) have declared that the lead responsibility for security will begin to transfer from the UK to the Afghan government in early 2011.[6] With the intention for full transfer to be completed by the end of 2014.[6] This will allow British combat troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan by 2015, which was described as a "firm deadline".[7] However, once the lead responsibility for security has transitioned to Afghan control by the end of 2014, the UK will continue via its long-term partnership plan to offer economic, political and military support for Afghanistan.[6]

Tactical Threat

In 2006, the UK deployed (approx) 3000 troops in Helmand province, Southern Afghanistan[2]. During 2006-2009 the UK forces were stretched[8] and ISAF did not possess sufficient manpower to clear, hold and thereby extend security and governance[5][2] to the wider Regional Command South. Further, other NATO members were unable to provide additional forces[8] and Afghan Security Forces were in their infancy. The US surge of additional troops of 2009/10 into Southern Afghanistan, increased the ISAF presence within Helmand to 20,000 US Marines, with approx 8,000 UK forces[2]. Hence, up until the US surge, its focus on more highly populated and urbanised areas in Helmand province[1]. The surge and continued growth of the Afghan Security Forces have during 2010/2011 enabled a rebalancing of the ISAF presence in the main populated areas in Helmand[2].

During 2006-2009 the Taliban did not possess the means to defeat ISAF through conventional means,[1] and ISAF did not possess sufficient soldiers per population for an effective counter-insurgency strategy[2] this enabled a stalemate situation in which the Taliban, to a greater extent than ISAF, through operating as a guerrilla force, has tactical freedom of manoeuvre and safe-havens from which to operate in central Helmand[4].

The Taliban having failed in 2006 and 2007 to defeat international forces by conventional means, have more than doubled their Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks over the past year and this remains the greatest challenge.[1] International casualties for Sep 2009 were almost double Sep 2008, and three quarters of these were due to IEDs[1]. Helmand is where the insurgency is concentrating its efforts, with over a third of the violence in the whole of Afghanistan (figures as of July 2009)[4][5].

The stalemate situation resulted in Southern Afghanistan in July 2009 being largely ungoverned by legitimate elected authority, it was instead governed by a shadow Taliban government[5]. In July 2009 the Afghan army and police could not yet maintain control of Afghanistan without direct assistance from ISAF[4]. Whilst the 1,600 mile (2,600 km) Afghan-Pakistan border (the Durand line) is porous in many places and allows the free flow of militants[5].

By June 2010 the Afghan Police were assessed to be ineffective or barely able to operate in 6 of the 13 key provinces in General McChrystal’s plan[2]. By February 2011, Afghan Government control has increased from six provinces to 12 out of a total of 14 within Helmand; this progress was attributed to the troop surge and increased Afghan security forces.[9]

Strategy

The UK's strategy, under both the Labour (Apr 2009 - May 2010) and Liberal-Conservative coalition (May 2010 - Current) governments, is part of a wider coordinated and integrated military-civilian counter-insurgency strategy with its international coalition allies and Afghan authorities.[1][2] This involves global co-operation as well as joint and complementary action on both sides of the border region separating Afghanistan and Pakistan.[1][2] It is based on the tenets of the Comprehensive approach[5] (or Interagency approach in US parlance), whereby success will require a combination of military, economic and political solutions pursued together[10]. The UK's position under the Labour government (Apr 2009 - May 2010) was to continually adapt and improve its strategy for Central Helmand to achieve the end state and did not seek to prematurely disengage from the region.[1]

Long-term stability depends on the Government of Afghanistan being able to sustain its own security, offering representative government at all levels, improving economic prospects for its people, and playing a constructive role in the region.[10] In the near term the UK seeks to provide the underpinning stability and security to create space for the development of the Afghan authorities to a point where they have the capability to defeat the insurgency, the terrorists and to continue to deny the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base.[1][2] Over time there will be greater Afghan autonomy and responsibility.[1][2] Once the Afghan authorities are capable, the UK will focus its efforts on supporting the elected Afghan government via its developing long term partnership plan militarily, politically and economically.[2]

The UK's stated objectives from Apr 2009 - May 2010 have developed under the Liberal-Conservative coalition government (May 2010 - Current), the following reflect the position:

Afghan Security

End State Objective: Provide security in order to protect the Afghan Government and civilian population from the insurgents.[2]

Timescale: - Firm Deadline - The UK will begin to transfer the lead responsibility for security from the UK to the Afghan government in early 2011 with the intention for the full transfer to be completed by the end of 2014.[6] Within this overall timescale though, the transfer of security responsibility for districts and provinces to Afghan control will happen as soon as they are ready based on the conditions on the ground and not timetables.[2]

  • Offensive military action. ISAF, either with the support or in support of the developing Afghan security forces, must conduct Offensive military action against the insurgents who continue to pose a major threat to the legitimate Afghan Government until they are able to sustain themselves.[5]
  • Isolating the insurgents from support of the Afghan population. Isolated insurgents without the support of the Afghan population, undermining the insurgents capacity both to regenerate, which includes recruitment, and to adapt.[11] it is the UK's position that an an Afghan lead is vital for both security operations and for building support.[11]
  • Training, mentoring and development. Afghan security forces capable of managing Afghanistan's own security[10] and of planning and conducting[11] effective independent operations in order to defeat the Afghan insurgency[5] and prevent terrorists from using Afghanistan as a 'launch pad' to attack other countries[10]. The UK must support the training, mentoring and development of Afghan security forces.[5]

Afghan Governance

End State Objective: Effective, legitimate Afghan governance at every level,[2] working with the confidence of local communities, to help them to shape their own future by providing a political voice for all Afghans, with consistency, not corruption, at its heart.[5]

  • Justice and dispute resolution. Development, by Afghans, of systems of justice and dispute resolution that respond to the desire for predictable and non-corrupt justice.[5]
  • Reintegration or reconciliation. Led by the Afghan Government and supported by the UK of those Afghans, including many of the Pashtuns, who are currently fighting with the Taliban for protection or political power but who are not ideologically committed to Al-Qaeda[5] to renounce violence and reintegrate into Afghan society[2].
  • Political Stability - wider reconciliation process. The realisation of a long term political stability in Afghanistan achieved through a political settlement, and not through military means alone, that enables the population to 'feel that it’s their government, their country and that they have a role to play'.[2] The UK considers the key conditions to be described as: separating the Taliban from Al-Qaeda, rejecting violence and accepting the basic tenets of the Afghan constitution.[9]

Afghan Development

End State Objective: An Afghan Government able to maintain the support of the Afghan population by being responsive to its needs and delivering meaningful economic and social progress.[5]

  • Essential services and Quality of Life. The UK must support the development of education, health care, electricity, clean water, jobs and economic development, alongside fair justice.[5]

Afghan-Pakistan co-operation

End State Objective: Extending the writ of the Pakistani authorities over the Northwest frontier province and FATA.[5]

  • Comprehensive approach. Complementary strategies and co-operation between ISAF, and Afghan and Pakistani forces on either side of the border region involving a comprehensive approach based on security, governance and development.[5]

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r The Prime Minister Gordon Brown speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies on Afghanistan - National Security and Regional Stability, 4 Sep 2009, accessed: 16 Oct 2009, http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page20515
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v Mr David Cameron, Prime Minister's Statement on Afghanistan, 14 June 2010, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/statements-and-articles/2010/06/pm-statement-on-afghanistan-51813
  3. ^ Operations in Afghanistan: Our Strategy, Ministry of Defence, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsInAfghanistanOurStrategy.htm
  4. ^ a b c d e f Letter to Rt Hon Alan Williams MP, Chairman of the Committee, from the Prime Minister, dated 11 July 2009, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmliaisn/257/9071602.htm
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (David Miliband), House of Commons Debates, 16 July 2009, Volume No. 496, Part No. 113, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090716/debtext/90716-0010.htm
  6. ^ a b c d Prime Minister Mr David Cameron and President Karzai Press conference, 8 December 2010, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2010/12/press-conference-with-president-karzai-57937
  7. ^ Mr David Cameron, Prime Minister, Press conference at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 20 November 2010
  8. ^ a b Readiness and recuperation of the Armed Forces: looking towards the Strategic Defence Review, House of Commons Defence Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2009–10, 2 February 2010, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/53/53.pdf
  9. ^ a b Prime Minister David Cameron, House of Commons Debate Transcript: Column 853, 2 Feb 2011, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110202/debtext/110202-0001.htm#11020248000010
  10. ^ a b c d Queen’s Speech – Afghanistan and Pakistan, Tuesday 25 May 2010, http://www.number10.gov.uk/queens-speech/2010/05/queens-speech-afghanistan-and-pakistan-50704
  11. ^ a b c Corrected Transcript of Oral Evidence, House of Commons, Oral Evidence taken before the Defence Commitee, OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, 15 December 2010, DR LIAM FOX MP, SIR STUART PEACH and PETER WATKINS, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmdfence/c554-v/c55401.htm
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