Talk:Mark W. Clark

Actually the book I got the quote from was Hometown Heros: Dubuque Remembers WW II. I got it mixed up with a similar book the Dubuque Telegraph Herald published that had Our Country Called in its title that delt with Korean and Vietnam Veterans.

I removed this quote, as the personal opinions of a single person who served under Clark, while colorful, are not terribly relevant and are inappropriate for an encyclopedia article. They might be re-inserted if given some context and support with additional material about the attitudes of the men who Clark commanded, but as presented they stuck out like a sore thumb. unfutz 03:10, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

This sentence could be construed as quite disparaging and really needs a citation if it is going to stay in: "Mark Clark's quick rise from field officer through general officer ranks has been attributed[citation needed] to his relationship with Generals George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower." —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.63.88.111 (talk) 16:48, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

I agree, even with the citation it could be misleading. I am no fan of Clark's but surely the article needs to recognize that promotions were quite rare in the inter-war period, when the Army was tiny. When growth happened, it was fast, and everyone got promoted rapidly. Eisenhower was a LTC in 1939 if I'm not mistaken.

DMorpheus (talk) 20:37, 20 January 2009 (UTC)

WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Tag & Assess 2008

Article reassessed and graded as start class. --dashiellx (talk) 11:14, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

Clark, a notable hero

I think that Clark is recognized as being one of the greatest generals, if not the greatest of WW2. He was reponsible for the defeat of Italy, one of the three major powers. This should be researched further. Wallie (talk) 15:25, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

By all accounts, Clark was a decidely average commander, especially for his foul-ups around Rome (and possibly Anzio, I'll have to research further). Calling him one of the greatest generals is taking it rather far, I think. Skinny87 (talk) 16:03, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

Nope, meant Salerno; I always get them confused. Skinny87 (talk) 16:05, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

I agree with Skinny87, besides criticism of Salerno and Anzio, some historical analysis I've seen is very critical of his (headline grabbing) taking of Rome instead of moving his army to further pummel the retreating Germans which allowed them time to regroup and continue the fight north of Rome. Hardnfast (talk) 01:22, 1 April 2009 (UTC)

I also agree with Skinny87: I'm not a historian, but I have read the war diaries of both Spike Milligan and Alan Whicker, both of whom saw action in Italy. Both men firmly believed that Clark's action in taking Rome was specifically against orders, and far from defeating the Axis in Italy, his choices lengthened the war in that theatre and cost many Allied lives. Shinydan —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.150.143.251 (talk) 21:38, 5 August 2009 (UTC)

By all accounts, it seems to be biased one way or the other on whether they are British or American. The bottom line was that the British were annoyed, as Clark had the brains to go in and quickly seize Rome, catching the Germans napping. The British were wanting a triumphal entry into Rome themselves, but Clark and the Americans trumped them. The Pope and Catholic adherents were always grateful to Clark and the GIs, as they saved Rome and the Church. Wallie (talk) 02:59, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

Wallie, even Mark's biographer doesn't make such a biased claim. The dash for Rome was one of Clark's greatest mistakes; while he paraded through Rome in triumph, he let a large number of German troops go free from an encircling movement that could have captured or destroyed the majority of them, and made the Allied advance much more difficult. Add to that the poor decisions made at Salerno and during the general Italian advance, as well as a toxic personality that made even Alexander frustrated at times, and you get a decidedly average commander. And before you say anything about supposed British bias, please note that I've been similarly critical of most, if not all, of the 'big' Allied commanders who served during the conflict. There are only a few who I can think deserving of praise; mostly Ridgway and Gavin, O'Connor is a good one, as is Slim. Skinny87 (talk) 07:27, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

I'm going to document the following after going through my library: 1) Clark's conduct during the Salerno campaign was widely criticized for being haphazard and timid. 2) The landing at Anzio was a near-complete disaster because the troops were not allowed to proceed and had nowhere to retreat to out of reach of the German big guns. 3) The bombardment of Monte Cassino was predicted to be a disaster because a ruins is easier to defend than a building intact, and the direct assault up the hill by various mountain units resulted in some losses greater than 90%.

As to his promotion up the ranks, this has always been something of a mystery, according to everything I have read. Let me see what I can find out about that.Uniquerman (talk) 20:08, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

I have not been readily able to get at my source material that is in storage. I'll start with Liddell Hart's History of the Secone World War, Paragon Books, First American Edition 1971, First Printing 1979, G.P. Putnam, New York NY. Liddell Hart says little that would indicate Clark's brilliance and much more on his caution and excess interest in secrecy. 1) During negotiations with the French General Mast, Clark withheld information and exaggerated the size of a landing force in Algeria, which Hart characterizes as "lacking in frankness" and having an "excess of secrecy...[that]...was unwise" given the Allied forces need for Mast's cooperation. 2) As to Salerno, he noted Clark's refusal to authorize preliminary bombardment owing to his demand for secrecy for an operation that was hardly a secret to the Germans. As a result, he prepared to evacuate shortly thereafter because of the stiff German resistance that was prepared for the landing and unimpeded by an preliminary softening up by air and artillery attacks. Following the impoundment of Salerno, advance northward was extremely cautious, on the order of three miles a day, leading to a high percentage of casualties. 3)Most of the vacillating and ineffective action at and after the Anzio landing can be laid at the feet of John P. Lucas, although Clark was his superior and allowed it. 4) Clark had little to with Monte Cassino. There it was Lucas again, and the exhausted and demoralized American troops quit the field on 11 February. 5) As other commentators have noted, the other operation that puts Clark's competence in question was drive on Rome, allowing Kesselring's 10th Army to escape through the Appenines.

It must be said that Liddell Hart finds the whole Italian campaign ill-conceived and all its commanders suspect, because of the Allied dictum that operations proceed on the "cautious banker's" principle of no advance and security. Penetration and breakout was never accomplished because of this philosophy.Uniquerman (talk) 17:14, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

Correction: principle of no advance 'without' security.Uniquerman (talk) 17:16, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

Cousin of George C. Marshall

Nope. Marshall's mother was Laura Bradford Marshall. Refer George C. Marshall. Wallie (talk) 15:46, 18 March 2009 (UTC)