Hannibal's crossing of the Alps

Second Punic War
Part of the Punic Wars
Route of Hannibal's invasion of Italy Hannibal's route to Italy
Date 218 BC Location Italia, Hispania, Cisalpine Gaul, Transalpine Gaul, Result Hannibal arrives in Italy Territorial changes Hannibal is united with Gallic allies on the Po and establishes a base of operations on the peninsula
Belligerents
Roman Republic	Carthage
Commanders and leaders
Publius Cornelius Scipio, Tiberius Sempronius Longus	Hannibal, son of Hamilcar Barca, Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar Barca, Mago, son of Hamilcar Barca, Hasdrubal Gisco, Syphax, Hanno the Elder, Hasdrubal the Bald, Hampsicora, Maharbal,
Strength
	94,000+
Casualties and losses
	68,000+

Hannibal crossing the Alps, in 218 BC, was one of the major achievements of the Second Punic War, and one of the most celebrated achievements of any military force in ancient warfare.

Background

After the final Carthaginian naval defeat at the Aegates Islands the Carthaginians surrendered and accepted defeat in the First Punic War, Hamilcar Barca (meaning lightning) a leading member of the Patriotic party in Carthage and a general who operated with ability in the course of the first Punic War, sought to remedy the losses that Carthage had suffered in Sicily to the Romans. In addition to this, the Carthaginians (and Hamilcar personally) were embittered by the loss of Sardinia. After the loss of the war to the Romans; the Romans imposed terms upon the Carthaginians which were designed to make Carthage a tribute paying city to Rome and simultaneously strip her of her fleet. There had been a time when Carthage was the sole maritime power of the Western Meditaranean, and had contended with many powerful nations for control of the primary sea lanes of the Meditarenean. Concerning many of these, she was indeed the undisputed master. Eratosthenes relates how the Carthaginians would seize every ship found sailing towards the Straights of Gades or Sardinia and throw anyone on board into the ocean. In spite of these terms, the Romans did not by and large strip Carthage of her strength. She was the most prosperous maritime trading port of her day, and the tribute that was imposed upon her by the Romans was easily paid off on a yearly basis while simultaneously waging a war against Carthaginian mercenaries who were in revolt.

The Carthaginian patriot party was interested in conquering Iberia in order to make up for the lost tribute from Sicily, which was now flowing into the Roman coffers. There were a variety of natural resources that made Iberia a propitious place for Carthiginian conquest and to thereby fill up its coffers with revenue which would have otherwise been drawn from Sicily – a province that it lost as a function of the First Punic War. In addition, it was the ambition of the Barcas, one of the leading noble families of the patriotic party, to some day employ the Iberian peninsula for a base of operations. From this base of operations they desired to get revenge by making war upon the Roman symmachy in Italy and destroy it. Those two things went hand in hand; and in spite of conservative opposition to his expedition, Hamilcar set out in 238 BC to begin his conquest of the Iberian peninsula with all the said objectives in mind. Marching east from Carthage towards the Pillars of Hercules, he crossed his army there and proceeded to subdue the peninsula, in the course of nine years Hamilcar conquered the south eastern portion of the peninsula. However much Hamilcar may have spent this last portion of his life conquering the portion of the Iberian peninsula that he did, the Iberian conquests were not looked upon as merely a means to an end by the Carthaginian patriot, they were looked upon as an ends in and of themselves. His administration of the freshly conquered provinces led Cato the Elder during his life to remark of Hamilcar, "there was no king equal to Hamilcar Barca."

In 228 BC, Hamilcar was killed (Hannibal saw his father die) in a campaign against the Celtic natives of the peninsula. His son in law, and the commanding naval officer, also a member of the Patriotic party – Hasdrubal "The Handsome" – was rewarded by the officers of the Carthiginian Iberian army with the chief command. Now there were a number of Grecian colonies along the eastern coast of the Iberian peninsula - the most notable one being the trade emporium of Saguntum. Concern on the part of these colonies was expressed about the consolidation of Carthaginian power on the peninsula, which Hasdurbal's deft military leadership and diplomatic skill was placing upon a firm basis. Saguntum turned to Rome for protection, as the result of which she sent a garrison to that city and sent a diplomatic mission to Hasdurbal's camp, based out of Cartagena, and informed him that the Iberus river, must be the limit of the Carthaginian advance in Spain. These conclusion of the treaty and the embassy were sent to Hasdrubal's camp in 226 BC.

In 221 BC, Hasdrubal was killed at the hands of an assassin. It was in that year that the officers of the Iberian Carthaginian army expressed their high opinion of Hamilcar's 29 year old son, Hannibal, by electing him to the chief command of the army. Having assumed the command; which was retroactively confirmed by the Carthaginian Senate, of the army that his father had welded through nine years of hard mountain fighting, Hannibal declared that he was going to finish his father's project of conquering the Iberian peninsula – which had been the first objective in his father's plan to bring a war to Rome in Italy and defeat her there.

Hannibal spent the first two years of his command in seeking to complete his father's ambition while simultaneously putting down several potential revolts that menaced the Carthaginian possessions already conquered thus far – a flaring resulting in part from the death of Hasdrubal. He attacked the tribe known as the Olcades, captured their chief town of Althaea. As a result of this a number of the neighboring tribes were astonished at the vigor and rapacity of this attack, as a result of which they submitted to the Carthaginians. He received tribute from al of these recently subjected tribes, and marched his army back to Cartagena. Here, he rewarded his troops with gifts and promised them future gifts later. During the next two years, Hannibal successfully reduced all of Iberia south of the Ebro to subjection, excepting the city of Saguntum, which, under the aegis of Rome, was outside of his current program, for the present.. So Catalonia and Saguntum were the only areas of the peninsula not in Hannibal's possession.

Roman Foreign Relations

Hannibal was informed of Roman politics, and saw that then was the opportune time to attack. He had gallic spies in every corner of the Roman symmachy, even within the inner circles of the Senate itself. The Romans had spent the years since the end of the First Punic War (264-241) tightening it's grip upon the peninsula by taking important geographical positions in the Peninsula in addition to extending it's grip to Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia. Sardinia was outrageously stolen from Carthage (Sardinia had not been apart of the terms of Carthage's surrender to the Romans, but was added) after a group of mercenaries she had stationed there declared in favor of mercenaries who had revolted against their Carthaginian paymasters who had not paid them. These mercenaries came to appreciate that they would not be able to hold themselves against the natives of the Island- and therefore invited the Romans to garrison the Island (238 BC). The Carthaginians prepared for war in order to take this possession back from the mercenaries, however the Roman Senate chose to interpret this as a declaration of war and in its turn declared war on Carthage. Carthage, completely exhausted from its' exertions with the Romans, chose to give in and allow the Romans this outrageous acquisition. In addition to this, the Roman Senate ordered the Carthaginians to pay 1200 talents besides. This was a major issue of contention between the Carthaginians and the Romans between the end of the First Punic War and the beginning of the Second Punic War.

The Latin Confederacy, which was one of the political alliances through which the Romans exerted influence over their subjects, extended from Arminum all the way to Massana the point in Sicily which was closest to Italy. The Constitution of the Roman Confederacy/Symmachy was a vast and complicated network of rules. One of those rules being that upon the conquest of new communities those communities would be stripped of half their possessions (unless otherwise stipulated, Sicily and Sardinia for example were left unchanged) and Roman and allied legionnaires would be able to divide that land between them. Previous claims to this property were null and void, and all of the provincials who were citizens of the conquered territories had no legal right to purchase land that was beyond the bounds of his communities delineated territory. This resulted in the dispossession of many locals.

However, these rules applied primarily to the Roman continental possessions. The Romans employed rules like these in order to Romanize their possessions, and they would employ either people from their city, Latins (who were culturally and linguistically cognate) and Italians. In any case, this was done in order to place a certain stamp upon the said area.

The diplomatic situation of Rome was haphazardly conducted, and Hannibal saw this. They acquired land in Illyria. The coastal cities of Corcyra,Epidamnus,Apollonia and the towns of the Atintanes and Parthini were incorporated into the symmachy. These were all clearly within the traditional sphere of influence of Macedonia. Beyond the mountain range of the Apennines Rome's influence was more pretended than real.

The Romans had been at war with the Padane Gauls off and on for over more than a century. There had been a peace imposed upon the Guals that lasted for 45 years which had been preserved due to the fearful outrages visited on the Gallic homeland in Italy by the Romans. During the consulship of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, a measure was introduced into the senate and passed that was to establish a colony in the region that the Senones had formerly possessed but had been systematically rounded up and expelled from after a war with them. Picenum was a colony introduced in a legislative programme by the "demogogue" Tribune Gaius Flaminius and it abutted the territory of the Boii. This programme was designed to empower the lower classes of the citizen-burgesses by increasing their property holdings and thereby increase their power in the voting process (voting was done according to property, the richest propertied class voting first, then the second, and each grouping counting for one vote. Each grouping was smaller or larger according to the wealth it possessed. When a majority of these groupings had been attained, voting ceased, the poorer classes rarely voted as long as there was even the most basic concord of political sentiment amongst the higher classes because the votes of their voting blocs could be excluded from the legislative process altogether). It is not specified in the sources what the Gauls knew of Roman politics, but clearly they did not know much. They interpreted this colony as the first of many blows aimed directly at them, not merely to establish Roman power over the Gauls, but to remove them from the land altogether, by forceful migration or outright extermination. They for whatever reason did not fully appreciate that this colony was part and parcel of Roman politics, a blow aimed at the ensconced oligarchy.

As a consequence of this Boii waged war upon the Romans in 238 BC, a war which lasted until 236 BC. In 225 BC, the natives of north Italy seeing that Rome was again moving aggressively to colonize their territory progressed to the attack. They hired the Gaesatae, a warlike tribe which lent out its prowess in a mercenary capacity. This was the same year that the Battle of Telamon took place, and in spite of a the Guals placing themselves between a consular army and an army of irregulars the Roman eventually won a victory was the result of that battle. The Gauls took up a formidable position, the Taurisci and the Boii were surrounded. Backing against each other and placing the chariots and wagons they used for logistical transportation on either flank, the fought a fierce battle in which the Romans were almost defeated. The Insubres and the Gastae were also present during this battle. During this battle the one of the consuls was killed and his head was brought to a Gallic king as a gift. 40,000 Gauls were slain during the course of this defeat and 10,000 of them were taken prisoner.

After this near defeat, the Romans were determined to drive their borders right up to the Alps. In 224 BC, the Boii submitted to Roman hegemony, and the next year the Anari also submitted to the Romans. In 223 BC, the Romans engaged in another battle with the Guals, this time the Insubres. The Romans at first sustained significant losses against the Insubres while they were attempting to cross a ford near the junction of the Po and the Adda. After encamping in this country for some days without taking any decisive action, the Roman consul on the spot decided to negotiate a settlement with the Insubres. Under the terms of this freshly negotiated truce, the Romans marched out with full honors into the territory of their allies the Cenomari. However, once they were safe within the territory of the Cenomari the Romans again marched their army into the territory of the Insubres and started to burn their crops and pillage their country. There was a battle that took place which the commanding tribunes managed with skill, the Consul negligently. The Romans were victorious.

In 222 BC, the Celts sent an embassy to the Roman Senate, beseeching that they have peace with the Romans. The Consuls (Marcus Cladius and Gnaeus Cornelius) vigorously rejected the embassy, and the Gauls prepared for war with the Romans. They hired 30,000 mercenaries from beyond the Alps and awaited the arrival of the Romans. When the campaigning season began, the Consular legions were marched into the Insubres territory again. A vigorous combat that took place near Mediolanum resulted in the leaders of the Gaullic revolt turning themselves over to the Romans. With this victory the Padane gauls were unhappily subdued, and ripe for revolt.

Preparations

Knowing of all this, he sent a number of embassies to the Gallic tribes in the Po valley. In 220 BC, he had begun to communicate intimately with the Padane Gauls (called the "Padane Gauls" because the Po in this era was called the "Padus" by the Romans), and these embassies brought with them offers of money, food and guides to the Carthaginian.

This mission had the specific aim of establishing for Hannibal a place upon which to debouch from the alps into the Po valley. Hannibal did not know a great deal about the Alps, but he knew enough to know that it was going to be a difficult march. He had had some scouts give him reports concerning this mountain chain - and he received reports of the difficulties to be encountered there from the Gauls themselves. He did not desire to cross this rugged mountain chain and to descend into the Po valley with exhausted troops only to have to fight a battle.

Hannibal
File:HannibalTheCarthaginian.jpg A marble bust, reputedly of Hannibal.

The Romans had treated the Gauls they had conquered recently poorly, distributing their land to Roman colonists and taking other less than above board measures to ensure the fidelity of these freshly conquered tribes. The Insubres, whose tribal territory immediately abutted the Alps, and the Boii, farther down the Po, were particularly pleased with Hannibal's proposed invasion. In addition, much of the Iberian peninsula was populated by related Gaulic tribes - and those same Gauls were serving in Hannibal's army. It would be easy indeed to establish intimate relations with these disaffected tribes, especially once he had debouched from the Alps and was amongst them and the Insubres and Boii and other tribes could see and speak with this army for themselves. Polybius had this to say about Hannibal's plans,

Conducted his enterprise with consummate judgement; for he had accurately ascertained the excellent nature of the country in which he was to arrive, and the hostile disposition of its inhabitants towards the Romans; and he had for guides and conductors through the difficult passes which lay in the way of natives of the country, men who were to partake of the same hopes with himself

Siege of Saguntum

These preparations being completed, Hannibal sought to induce the Saguntines to come to arms with him and thereby declare war on Rome through her proxy. He did not have a desire to break the peace himself, and resorted to a variety of strategems in order to induce the Saguntines to attack. However, the Saguntines did nothing except send a diplomatic mission to the Romans to complain about the belligerence of the Carthaginians. The Senate, in its turn, sent a committee to Iberia to attempt to settle the issue diplomatically. Hannibal had no interest in treating with this commission, and treated it with contumely, hoping that it would drive the commission to declare war. However, the commission was not fooled and knew that war was in the air. The commission kept its peace, but brought news to Rome that Hannibal was prepared and was going to strike soon. The Senate took a number of measures in order to free up its hands for the coming conflict with the Carthaginian. The Illyrian revolt was put down with energy, and the Romans speeded the construction up of a number of fortresses in Cisalpine (Kis-al-pine) Gaul. Demetrius of Pharos had abandoned his previous alliance with Rome and was now attacking Illyrian cities that had been incorporated into the Roman Symmachy.

Hannibal could not achieve the ends that he hoped for, and in the end he sent news to Carthage (where the peace party, his political enemies, were in power) to the effect that the Saguntines were aggressively handling one of their subject tribes, the Torboletes, and encamped in front of Saguntum to besiege it without awaiting any reply from Carthage. Words were exchanged in the Carthaginian Senate to the effect that Hannibal should be handed over to the Romans and his actions disavowed. However, the multitude in Carthage was too much in support of the conflict in order to stop the war.

The Siege took place over the course of eight months, and it is notable that the Romans did not send any aid to the Saguntines in spite of this being apart of the terms of their alliance. The Romans allowed themselves to be tied up in a war that they had engaged in against the Illyrians, and did not treat the Carthaginian threat from Iberia with the attention that it deserved.

After the siege Hannibal sold all the inhabitants as slaves, and distributed the proceeds from those sales to his soldiers. In addition, all the booty from the sacking of the city was taken back to Carthage and distributed to the populace, in order to rally their support to his cause. The rest of the cities treasures were put into his war chest for his planned expedition.

March through the Pyrenees

Iberian warrior from bas-relief c. 200 BC. The warrior is armed with a falcata and an oval shield. Iberian tribes fought for both sides in the 2nd Punic War, but in reality most wanted to be rid of all foreign domination. National Archaeological Museum of Spain, Madrid

Hannibal had spent the winter after the siege of Saguntum in Cartagana, during which time he dismissed his troops to their own localities. He did this with the hope of cultivating the best possible morale in his army for the upcoming campaign, which he knew was going to be difficult. He left his brother, Hasdurbal in charge of the administration of Carthaginian Iberia. As well as its' defense against the Romans. In addition to this, he swapped the native troops of Iberia to Africa, and the native troops of Africa to Iberia. This was done in order to minimize desertion and assure the loyalty of the troops while he was himself busy with the destruction of the Roman Symmachy.He also left his brother a number of ships also.

Hannibal foresaw problems if he left Catalonia as a bridgehead for the Romans. They had a number of allies in this country, and he could not allow the Romans a place to land in his base unopposed. As he was relying upon contingents of forces coming to him in Italy via the land route he was about to head out upon, he must take and conquer this country. He had no intention of leaving Iberia to its fate once he was in Italy. Hannibal opted to take the region in a swift campaign, and to that effect he divided his army into three columns, in order to subdue the entirety of the region at the same time.

Hannibal's route through Catalonia

After receiving news of the route he was about to take from his scouts and messages from the Celtic tribes that resided around the Alps, the Carthaginians set out. He set out with 90,000 units of infantry from various African and Iberian nations, and 12,000 units of cavalry. From the Ebro to the Pyrenees the Carthaginians confronted four tribes, the Illergetes, the Bargusii, the Aeronosii and the Andosini. There were a number of cities here that Hannibal took, which Polybius does not specify. This campaign was conducted with speed in order to take as little time as possible in the reduction of this region. Polybius reports severe losses on Hannibal's part. Having reduced this area, he left his brother Hanno in command of this area, specifically over the Bargusii, whom he had reason to distrust due to their affiliation with the Romans. He left his brother in control of this country with 10,000 units of infantry and 1,000 units of Cavalry.

At this early juncture in the campaign, he opted to send home another 10,000 units of infantry and 1,000 units of Cavalry. This was done to serve two purposes; he wanted to leave a force of men behind who would retain positive sentiments towards Hannibal himself; and he wanted the rest of the Iberians (in his army, as well as out) to believe that the chances of success in the expedition were good, and as a result of which they would be more inclined to join the contingents of reinforcements that he anticipated calling up during the course of his expedition. The force that was left over consisted of 50,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry.

The principal column was the right column, and with it was the treasure chest, the cavalry, with baggage, all the other necessities of war and Hannibal himself. This was the critical column, and it was no coincidence that Hannibal was with this column. As long as Hannibal had no ships to keep himself abreast of the exact movements of the Romans, as to whose exact location he was unaware of, he wanted to be present in person in case the Romans should make a landing in an attempt to attack his army on its ascent or descent through the Pyrenees. This column crossed the Ebro at the town of Edeba, and proceeded directly along the coast through Tarraco, Barcino, Gerunda, Emporiae and Illiberis. Each of those oppidums was taken and garrisoned in turn.

The second, or central column crossed the Ebro at the oppidum of Mora and from there information is fairly sparse. It proceeded through a number of valleys in this country, and had orders to subdue any tribes that resisted their advance. It eventually rejoined the principal column when it had completed its task.

The third, or left column crossed the Ebro where it touches with the Sicoris River and proceeded along the river valley and into the mountain countries. It performed the same task as the second and the first columns did. When planning each of these marches, Hannibal ensured that the Rubrucatus river was athwart each of the columns' paths, so if any of the columns should be placed in a disadvantageous situation the other columns could march up and down the support of each other column, should one be placed in a perilous position by the Barbarians.

The campaign was conducted over the course of two months, and was incredibly costly. Over the course of the two-month campaign, Hannibal lost 13,000 men.

March to the Rhone

The most conspicuous detail concerning the march to the Rhone from the descent through the Pyrenees is that there is nothing at all conspicuous about it. This march must have been a pleasant change of pace for the Carthaginians, who had just spent the previous July and August subduing numerous fierce peoples living in the Pyrenees. The history of Catalonia is littered with numerous examples of the fierce resistance that native people of this area have put up against invading armies. The Peninsular war being just one example amongst many, the broken topography of this region affords resistance movements many advantages that they might not otherwise have in flatter more even terrain. The countries through which he passed were of different opinions concerning the Carthaginians, the Romans and the passage of Hannibal's army through their land. Some of these tribes were friendly to his cause, others were opposed to him. Hannibal's skill in dealing with these people is made manifest to us through his march in this country, no reports are made of any fighting taking place in this country, in spite of the lack of homogeneity in political leadership amongst the peoples of this area. He dealt with each tribe as he marched through their territory. Employing only the means of persuasion at his disposal; his personal magnetism and his war chest.

As was often the case with the Romans, they constructed their roads on top of the existing roads. No doubt, they would have constructed the road they later built in this area along the same road that Hannibal's army employed in its march. Once descending through the Pyrenees, the army marched through modern Perpignan, Narbonne, Beziers and from there to Nimes. From Nimes the army made for Roquemaure - which is located on the Rhone itself.

Massilia (modern Marseille), a successful Greek trade emporium had for some time been under the influence of the Romans, and the Romans had even settled colonists there. Massilia feared the arriving Carthaginian army, and to this effect had sought to influence the native tribes on the left bank of the Rhone (The Eastern Bank) to take up the cause of the Romans. This they were able to do, as the barbarians in this country were to make his crossing of the Rhone problematical.

The Consul for 218 BC was Publius Scipio. This Consul had received orders from the Senate to the effect that he was to confront Hannibal in the theatre of the Ebro or the Pyrenees. The Senate delegated to him 60 ships for this purpose. However, he did not move with the speed that the issue required of him. When he arrived in the Po area, there was an uprising amongst the freshly conquered Guals. More colonies were being established in the Po region, and this caused the Boii and Insubres to arise afresh who were now aware that Hannibal was heading to them. Instead of employing the legions that were on hand for their intended Iberian expedition the Senate ordered that they should be sent to the Po under the command of a Praetor and new legions should be levied by the Consul.

Finally, having got these new legions together - in a much more leisurely fashion than the urgency of the situation demanded of him - he set sail from Ostia. In this day there were no compasses, and it was the habit of navigators to sail their ships along coasts and to stop at night for victual. So after sailing North along the peninsula's (the Italian) coast and then turning west towards the Iberian peninsula, the Consul ordered the consular armada to stop in Massilia. The time from Ostia to Massilia was 5 days. When he arrived there, to his surprise he learned from the Massiliots that instead of Hannibal still being in Catalonia, as he had anticipated, Hannibal was about 4 days march north of their city on the far side of the Rhone.

Crossing the Rhone

Much of Hannibal's marches are shrouded in debate, especially the debate concerning the path he opted to employ over the Alps. However, it is absolutely clear where Hannibal encamped his army on the western bank on the Rhone, and this subject is no longer disputed by historians. This river crossing is celebrated in its own right as being one that was clearly conceived and crisply executed. A close comparison of it and Alexander III of Macedon's crossing of the Hydaspes river in this midst of Porus' army reveals that Hannibal's crossing of the Rhone has an ideological predecessor - and there can be no doubt where Hannibal's idea for this operation germinated.

While Rome had been idle and leaving her allies in Catalonia to their fate at the hands of the Carthiginians, the Massiliots, the Allies of the Romans, were busy rousing the tribes on the left (eastern) bank of the Rhone against the Carthaginians. Upon arriving at Massilia, the full impact of the Consuls negligence must have born itself out in the minds of the Consular army. Upon the arrival of the intelligence of the Carthaginians in the neighborhood of Massilia, the Consul threw up his proposed Iberian expedition and in its stead thought to do the next logical thing, to prevent Hannibal's crossing of the Rhone as best he could. To this effect he sent a column of 300 horse up the left (east) bank of the Rhone with orders to ascertain the exact location of Hannibal's army. Hannibal received similar news to the effect that the Romans had just arrived with one of their Consular armies (22,000 Legionaires and 2000 horse)

Hannibal took advantage of the pre-existing hatred the celts had for the Romans on the right (west) bank, and persuaded them to aid him in his crossing of this formidable obstacle. He secured from them a number of boats that were capable of making trips at sea, and a numerous collection of canoes of all sorts that must have been employed by the natives of that country. In addition to purchasing these, he was able to acquire their aid in building still other boats. This process of preparing to cross the Rhone took two days.

Awaiting the Carthaginian army on the left bank of the Rhone was a tribe of Gauls called the Cavares. This tribe had fortified a camp on the far side of the river, and was awaiting Hannibal's army to cross - as to attack them during the process of crossing. Knowing of previous river crossings, like the one that took place in India, Hannibal ordered one of his lieutenants; Hanno, Son of Bomilcar to make a northern circuit, to cross the Rhone at a location that he deemed to be suitable for the purpose, and then by forced marches, march south and to take the Barbarian army in flank while he was crossing the river.

The day and the night after all of the boats had been built and gathered, Hanno was ordered up the bank and guided by native Gauls, approximately 25 miles upriver at Pont St. Esprit there was an island that was dividing the Rhone into two small streams. It was here that Hanno decided to cross, and ordered that boats and rafts should be constructed from materials that were at hand. The Carthaginian detachment resorted to such measures as chopping down trees, lashing the logs together with reliable ropes they had brought with them from the armies stores. By employing these devices Hanno's corp crossed the river and immediately proceeded south to the Barbarian location.

During this time Hannibal had been completing his preparations to cross the Rhone. At this, the Carthaginian preparations had been particularly obvious and loud. Hannibal had ordered the preparations to be made without concern for secrecy knowing full well that the corp was marching down the left (eastern) bank of the Rhone to attack the Cavares. His preparations were designed to draw their attention away from their northern flank and focus their attention on his own preparations.

Hanno arrived behind an affluent of the Rhone three days after setting out, and gave the previously agreed upon signal in order to signal to Hannibal that they had arrived. Hannibal immediately ordered the boats to cross. The small corp was observing the principal army closely, and upon seeing it start its crossing, prepared to descend upon the Cavares while the army was crossing.

The crossing itself was carefully designed to be as smooth as possible. Every detail was well thought out. The heavy horsemen were put across the farthest upstream in the largest boats, in order that the boats that Hannibal had less confidence in could be rowed to the left (eastern) bank in the lee of the larger and more sturdy crafts. As for the horses themselves, most of them were swam across the river. These at the side and stern of each boat. However, there were some that here put on boats fully saddled and ready for immediate use, so that once they debouched from the river they could cover the infantry and the rest of the army while it formed up to attack the barbarians.

Seeing that the Carthaginians were finally crossing, the Cavares rose from their entrenchments and prepared their army on the shore near the Carthaginian landing point. The armies started to shout and jeer at each other while the Carthaginian army was in the midst of crossing. These sort of exchanges consisted primarily of encouraging their own men and challenging the other army to battle. Often in antiquity, to intimidate their enemy, armies would be ordered to pound their shields with their weapons and raise loud cries at exactly the same moment to create the greatest amount of noise all at once.

Carthaginian Army and the corp which made the circuit. Barbarian army compromised as the result of circuit

It was at precisely this moment, while the Carthiginian army was in the middle of the stream jeering at the enemy from the boats and the Cavares were challenging them to come on from the left bank that Hanno's corp revealed itself and charged down upon the rear and flanks of the Cavares. A small detachment of Hanno's force was assigned to set the Cavares camp on fire, but the majority of this force reeled in on the stunned Cavares. Some of the Cavares rushed to the defense of their camp, but the majority of them remained at the location where they had been awaiting the arrival of what they had thought was all of Hannibal's army. They were divided, and Hannibal; who was on one of the first boats, landed his men on the left bank of the Rhone amidst the dazed and confused Cavares and with a will lead his men in upon the Cavares. There was barely even a semblance of resistance, surrounded as they were pandemonium took control of their ranks, and each man looked to his own safety as they retreated pell mell away from the carefully arrayed Carthaginian phalanx.

Hannibal had spent 5 days preparing this operation from every angle, ensuring that it was ready at all points. Nothing was left to chance. What was a dangerous and risky operation was made into a safe and quickly conducted operation due to the careful preparations of the Carthaginians. Although it took 5 days for this course of operations to fully develop, the actual conflict was only a matter of minutes.

From the Rhone to the Alps

Having crossed the Rhone in the face of a by no means contemptible enemy, Hannibal knew that he must make all speed for the Alps in order to beat the season. Hannibal had previously ascertained that the Consular armada was at the Mouth of the Rhone. At this point, he sent 500 of his finest cavalry men, the Numidians down the left (east) bank of the Rhone in order to ascertain more exact intelligence concerning the consular army. These Numidians ran into the 300 Roman horse that had been sent up the river along the left bank for the same purpose. The Numidians were defeated, and 240 of them were killed in this conflict between scouting parties; in addition to 140 Roman losses. The Numidians were followed up all the way back to the Carthaginian camp - which was almost empty at this point minus the elephants who Hannibal was to dedicate some time getting across. The scouts seeing the Hannibal had not crossed with the whole of his force raced back to the coast to alert the Consul. The Consul upon learning this information marched his army up the river and in the boats, but it was too late. Upon arriving, Hannibal had long left the camp and crossed the Elephants across the river.

Rhone Region to the Alps

In the face of hostile tribes, the Consul opted to return to Italy and await the arrival of Hannibal as he debouched from the Alps. However, in pursuance of the Senates orders the Consul ordered his brother, Gnaeus Scipio to take a majority of the army to Spain. The Consul was proposing menacing Hannibal's ever extending and vulnerable lines of communications and cut them near their very source. However - in spite of the sound strategic end purpose this movement was achieving it is clear that the Romans were not aware of the concept of strategy on a theoretical basis. In spite of their wonderful tactical system; formations and troop evolutions etc., the Romans were used to fighting (albeit very aggressively) by merely marching their troops to their enemies army, forming their army up and attacking the enemy. They did not know how to force an enemy to battle by cutting off their communications, they were not aware of which flank was the strategic flank of an enemy in a battle. In addition they were negligent about their order of march and early Roman history is littered with massacres of Consular armies by other nations because of their lack of proper precaution against these evils. Hannibal by and by taught the Romans a healthy respect for what some military critics have labelled, "the divine" aspect of the art of war.

The Numidians were some of the best Cavalry of all antiquity, and it is surprising that in spite of their numerical superiority they should have been defeated by the vastly inferior Roman cavalry. Some military critics believe that Hannibal ordered the Numidians to lead the Roman scouts back to the camp on the Rhone in order to entice the Consul to march in that direction while he should make his escape. It is indeed an incredible thing that the Numidians were defeated by the Roman cavalry. The Romans have been justly criticized by military historians for their lack of a competent cavalry arm. They would later resort to auxileries for this arm in order to bring it up to standard, they never had a native Roman corp of cavalry which was a fine fighting force.

Upon getting the whole of his army on the left bank of the Rhone, Hannibal introduced his army to Magilus, and some other less notable Gallic chiefs of the Po valley. Hannibal's purpose was to inspire his men with confidence in the planned expedition by showing them padane gallic chieftans who offered them their aid. Speaking through an interpreter, Magilus spoke to them about the conditions of the Po valley (which in that day played host to some of the most thrifty people on Earth). He spoke of the smiling valleys of the Po and their fruitfulness, the fertility of the Po valley and the support that the recently conquered Padane Gauls had for the Carthaginians and their mission of destroying the Roman symmachy. Hannibal then addressed the officers himself. The troops enthusiasm was uplifted by Hannibal's inspiring address so we are informed.

This boost in morale having been effected, Hannibal ordered his men to proceed. Upon crossing the river, he had ordered his infantry to start their march the day after the assembly. This was followed up by the supply train. Not knowing that the Romans were eventually going to set out for Italy, when his cavalry was all gotten across he ordered his cavalry to curtain his march on his southern flank, towards the sea. His cavalry would have formed a screen which would have been employed to protect him from the Romans were they to advance upon him from that direction. The cavalry would skirmish with the Roman scouts while giving the rest of the army time to form up. This contingency did not occur. Hannibal, was in the rear guard with the Elephants. This was the direction that he assumed that the Romans would be most likely to advance upon (that is from the west) him as he had some idea that they were behind him. The rear guard was well manned to ensure that it could skirmish with the Roman scouts and the main army while the main body of infantry and his cavalry could form up for battle against the Romans if they should attack from that quarter. This contingency however, also did not occur.

While assuming this order of march, Hannibal marched towards the Insula. He had ordered his infantry to get a head start, and it marched to the Isere in 6 days. This is a march of 12 and one half miles a day. The cavalry and rear guard only took 4 days, a march of 19 miles a day. In this period the body as a whole had marched 75 miles.

When Hannibal's army made contact with the Insula, he arrived in a gallic chiefdom that was in the midst of a civil conflict. For whatever particular reason, Hannibal chose the cause of the elder of the two combatants, Brancus. After putting away the cause of the younger and less popularly supported one, he formed an alliance with Brancus. From this tribe he received supplies that were required for the expedition across the alps.f In addition to this, he received Brancus' diplomatic protection up until the Alps proper, he did not have to fend off any tribes.

Ascent of the Alps

Hannibal marched in the direction of Mt. Du Chat towards the village of Aquste and from there to Chevelu, to the pass by Mt. Du Chat. There he found that the passes were fortified by the Allobroges. He sent out spies to ascertain if there was any weakness in their disposition. These spies found that the barbarians only maintained their position at the camp during the day time, and left their fortified position at night time. In order to make the barbarians believe that he did not deem a night assault prudent, he ordered that as many camp-fires be lit as possible, in order to induce them into believing that he was settling down before their encampment along the mountains. However, once they left their fortifications, he led his best troops up to their fortifications and seized control of the pass.

Hiding his men in the mountain brush on a cliff that arose immediately above and to the right off Hannibal's route of march, about 100 feet or so above the path, Hannibal stationed his slingers and archers there. This overhang was an excellent place from which to attack an enemy while it was marching in column through the pass. The descent from this pass was steep, and the Carthaginians were having a hard time marching down this side of the pass, especially the baggage animals. The Barbarians, seeing this, attacked anyways, in spite of their disadvantageous position. More baggage animals were lost in the confusion of the Barbarian attack, and they rolled off of the precipices to their deaths. The situation put Hannibal in a difficult situation. However, Hannibal at the head of the same elite corp that he led to take the overhang, led them against these determined barbarians. Virtually all of these barbarians died in the ensuing combat, as they were fighting with their backs to a steep precipice, trying to throw their arrows and darts uphill at the advancing Carthaginians. After this contest of arms, the baggage was held together in good order and the Carthaginian army followed the road down to the plain that begins roughly at modern Bourget.

This plain was 4–6 miles wide at most places, and was almost entirely stripped of defenders since they were all stationed at the Mt. Du Chat pass. Hannibal marched his army to modern Chambery and took their city easily and stripped it of all its horses, captives, beasts of burden and corn. In addition to that, there was enough supplies for three days' rations for the army. This must have been welcome considering that no small portion of their supplies had been lost when the pack animals had fallen over the precipice in the course of the previous action. He then ordered this town to be destroyed, in order to demonstrate to the Barbarians of this country what would happen if they opposed him in the same fashion as this tribe had.

He encamped there in order to give his men time to rest who were exhausted after their work, and to collect further rations. Hannibal there addressed his army, and we are informed that they were made to appreciate the extent of the effort they were about to undergo and were raised to good spirits in spite of the difficult nature of their undertaking.

The Carthaginians continued their march after this. At modern Albertville they came across the Centrones, who brought gifts and cattle for the troops. In addition, they brought hostages in order to convince Hannibal of their commitment to his cause. However, Hannibal we are led to believe, was concerned and suspicious of these kind natives. However, for whatever reason he concealed his suspicion of them. He marched with the guides they offered to him, in addition to his Insubrian guides. However, in spite of their kind gestures, Hannibal found that his suspicions of the barbarians was correct, as the Barbarians attacked near where the pass of the Little St. Bernard tightens near the village of Seez. However, the military critics of esteem challenge that this was the place where the actual ambush took place. Napoleon, notably believes that it could not have taken place at this spot. In spite of this, the valley through which the Carthaginians were marching was the only one that could sustain a population that was capable of attacking the Carthaginian army and simultaneously sustaining the Carthaginians on their march.

Hannibal's concern led him to prepare for the possibility of an attack. To ameliorate any potential evils that could arise, Hannibal arranged his army in the following order. Elephants were in the front with the cavalry and the baggage, while the heavily armed troops were placed in the rear. While they were marching through a defile that had a White Rock near its center (near modern St. Germain,) the barbarians attacked. This attack took place after giving the Carthaginian army some time to start passing through the defile. This was done in order to ensure that the army was divided and could not concentrate in order to drive the Barbarians back. Also, the Barbarians lobbed rocks at the Carthaginian army from above the pass. Many more pack animals were killed, in addition to the confusion that this introduced into the ranks. However, Hannibal had made sure not to order his rear guard through. Most of the Barbarians descended upon his rear guard which had not yet attempted to move through the pass and had been held in hand in battle order in case just such a contingency arose. The rear guard was able to hold the Barbarian attack back, and Hannibal saw that if he could keep the Barbarians away from the entrance of the defile, he would be able to get his army through the defile.

This fierce action took place along the Reclus River, which goes through a defile that had a large white rock by it. This rock was three hundred feet high. Among the natives of the Alps in latter days, a tradition existed in which large bones were dug out of the river bed. Regardless of whether or not this is true, many of the elephants died in this action. On either side of the defile the Barbarians had placed troops in order to entrap the Carthaginians and massacre them while they were marching through. The majority of the Barbarians were concentrated below, and charged up once the Carthaginian marching column had made significant progress through the gap. This was done because once the Carthaginian marching column was stretched out because of the actual width of the defile, it would be more difficult for the Carthaginians to reconcentrate in time and drive back the Barbarians. However, backing the rear guard against the defile, as the Barbarians would only be able to place a small front against the Carthaginian front, as it was backed against the defile which, prior to the actual ravine itself becomes progressively tighter Hannibal planned to use his rear-guard to fight off as many as necessary for as long as necessary while the army passed through.

Hannibal left the rear guard to complete its work during the evening and sped ahead of the troops as to lead the army to the summit. There was a valley here that was a couple of miles long. On the sides of the valley were steep slopes that protected the Carthaginian army. The army was enclosed in them. This valley slopes in a North Easterly direction. It accords completely with Polybius. In latter days, there was an enclosure built from stone that was constructed along the lines of druidic traditions.

The Valley of the Little St. Bernard

The army rested in this valley for two days. There was snow at this point, it was the end of October. The conditions of the weather of the Alps in this day were more severe than they are in the present. The Army was dejected and seriously lacking in morale; many of their comrades had slipped and fallen or had been killed by Barbarians. They had been marching for over five months (from their outset in Iberia) and the army was seriously reduced in its size. The army consisted of men from nations that did not experience such extreme cold, mostly from Africa and Iberia. Hannibal therefore assembled his men, and is alleged by Polybius to have indicated to them that the end of their labors was near and that soon they would be in the Po Valley. He is said to have gestured to Italy, showing his soldiers where the Po was and the plains near it. Reminding them of Magilus, who had assured him of Gallic friendship and aid. He is said to have gestured in the direction of Rome. Their spirits were said to have been raised by this. However, from the Little Saint Bernard, there is absolutely no way to see the Po. Hannibal's speech, as depicted, could never have occurred. Regardless; after this address occurred, in whatever form it did, if at all, after two days of resting, Hannibal ordered that the descent should be begun the next day.

Descent to Italy

The snow on the Southern side of the Alps melts and thaws to a more or lesser extent during the course of the day, and then refreezes at night. In addition to this, the character of the Alps on Italian side is much steeper than the Alps that face the rest of the continent. The army would lose many men who lost their footing down this side of the Alps.

At this early point in their descent, the army came upon a section in the existing path (however humble it may have been) that as the result of a landslide was completely removed. This section of the path was broken for about 300 yards. Hannibal attempted to make a circuit, by marching through a place where there was a great deal of snow. The Alps are so high at this height that the snow from previous years does not even melt. They made some headway, at the cost of no small portion of the baggage animals that were left, before Hannibal came to appreciate that this route was impossible for an army. Hannibal marched his men back to the point in their path prior to their circuit, near the broken stretch of the path and set up camp.

From here Hannibal ordered his men to set about fixing the mule path. In the course of relays, the army was set to this task under the eyes of Hannibal, who was constantly encouraging them through this labor intensive task. Both the sick men, and the men in health were put to this. The next day the road was in such a condition as to allow the cavalry and pack animals to cross the broken stretch of road. Hannibal ordered that these should be instantly raced down below the folliage line (2 miles below the summit of the alps) and should be allowed access to the pastures there. Hannibal still had the Elephants that were left with him, and these creatures were completely famished. Hannibal kept his Numidian cavalry at the task of fixing the road, and it took them three days to complete this task to such a degree as to allow the Elephants to cross.

Getting these creatures across this stretch of road, Hannibal raced ahead of the reargaurd to the part of the army which was below the pasturage line. It took the army three days to march from this place into "the plains which are near the Po" according to Polybius. Hannibal then focused on, according to Polybius, "[the] best means of reviving the spirits of his troops and restoring the men and horses to their former vigor and condition" Hannibal ordered his men to encamp, at a point which is near modern Ivrea.

External links

• Debate on Alps Crossing