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Empirical research in the past two decades has shown that catch share management of fisheries has a variety of ecological, economic and social benefits over traditional management of fishery inputs. However, when compared to other modern management methods that place limits on outputs, catch shares exhibit no long term ecological gains.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Essington|first=T.E.|title=Catch Shares Improve Consistency, not Health, of Fisheries|journal=Lenfest Ocean Program|year=2009}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Essington|first=Timothy|title=Catch shares, fisheries, and ecological stewardship: a comparative|journal=School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences|year=2012}}</ref>
Empirical research in the past two decades has shown that catch share management of fisheries has a variety of ecological, economic and social benefits over traditional management of fishery inputs. However, when compared to other modern management methods that place limits on outputs, catch shares exhibit no long term ecological gains.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Essington|first=T.E.|title=Catch Shares Improve Consistency, not Health, of Fisheries|journal=Lenfest Ocean Program|year=2009}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Essington|first=Timothy|title=Catch shares, fisheries, and ecological stewardship: a comparative|journal=School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences|year=2012}}</ref>


Studies examining the ecological impacts of catch shares show that they can reduce the likelihood of fishery depletion,<ref name=Costello2008 /> increase participants’ compliance with catch limits,<ref name=Branch2008 /> and stabilize landings and catch limits.<ref name= Essington2010 /> Additional research has also shown reduced bycatch and discards in catch share fisheries.<ref name=Branch2008 /><ref name= Essington2010 /> Yet, recent studies have indicated that catch share programs do not result in healthier fisheries,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.lenfestocean.org/press-release/new-study-finds-catch-shares-improve-consistency-not-health-fisheries}}</ref> and that the stabilization of landings is likely due to the slowing of the fishing rate. A study of all catch share programs in the US found that the health of a fishery goes unchanged after the implementation of catch shares and that the mean levels of most ecolgical indicator are unaffected.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Essington|first=T.E.|title=Ecological indicators display reduced variation in North American catch share fisheries|journal=School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences|year=2010}}</ref>
Studies examining the ecological impacts of catch shares show that they can reduce the likelihood of fishery depletion,<ref name=Costello2008 /> increase participants’ compliance with catch limits,<ref name=Branch2008 /> and stabilize landings and catch limits.<ref name= Essington2010 /> Additional research has also shown reduced bycatch and discards in catch share fisheries.<ref name=Branch2008 /><ref name= Essington2010 /> Yet, recent studies have indicated that catch share programs do not result in healthier fisheries,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.lenfestocean.org/press-release/new-study-finds-catch-shares-improve-consistency-not-health-fisheries}}</ref> and that the stabilization of landings is likely due to the slowing of the fishing rate. A study of all catch share programs in the US found that the health of a fishery goes unchanged after the implementation of catch shares and that the mean levels of most ecological indicator are unaffected.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Essington|first=T.E.|title=Ecological indicators display reduced variation in North American catch share fisheries|journal=School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences|year=2010}}</ref>


The economic impacts of catch shares are also well documented. Catch shares have been shown to stop the race for fish often experienced in traditionally managed fisheries.<ref name= Essington2010 /> Catch shares allow for the removal of season length aimed at limiting harvests, providing operators with a longer time period to harvest as well as the ability to coordinate fishing trips with market conditions. Empirical evidence has shown that fisheries become more profitable as costs of fishing are reduced and dockside prices for products increase.<ref name=Sanchirico2005 /><ref name = Grafton2000 />
The economic impacts of catch shares are also well documented. Catch shares have been shown to stop the race for fish often experienced in traditionally managed fisheries.<ref name= Essington2010 /> Catch shares allow for the removal of season length aimed at limiting harvests, providing operators with a longer time period to harvest as well as the ability to coordinate fishing trips with market conditions. Empirical evidence has shown that fisheries become more profitable as costs of fishing are reduced and dockside prices for products increase.<ref name=Sanchirico2005 /><ref name = Grafton2000 />

Revision as of 03:48, 17 March 2013

See also: individual fishing quota

Catch share is a term used for fishery management systems that dedicate a secure privilege to harvest a specific area or percentage of a fishery’s total allowable catch to individuals, communities or associations.[1] Types of programs that are considered catch shares include, but are not limited to, individual transferable quota (ITQs), individual fishing quota (IFQs), territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs), limited access privileges (LAPs), sectors, and dedicated access privileges (DAPs). Catch shares are different from traditional management as catch shares provide long-term secure privileges to participants, which has been credited as providing an incentive for efficient, sustainable use of fish stocks.[2]

Background

The term “catch share” has been coined recently, but similar management systems providing secure and exclusive access to fishery resources have existed much longer. Community-based management in Japan's near shore fisheries began in feudal times,[3] while modern individually allocated catch share programs were first implemented by the state of Wisconsin in the early 1970s for important fish stocks in the Great Lakes.[4] Additionally, Iceland and the Netherlands implemented catch shares for important stocks in the late 1970s.[5]

The use of catch share programs worldwide has been expanding since the earliest implementations in the 1970s.[6] Some countries, such as Iceland, New Zealand and Australia, have made catch share programs the default management system. Some of the most recently implemented catch shares have been in the United States. In 2010, catch shares were implemented in the United States Northeast Multispecies fishery and in the United States Atlantic Sea Scallop fishery.[7]

Worldwide there are over 275 catch share programs used in 35 countries to manage a wide variety of marine and freshwater species including finfish, sharks and crustaceans. Catch shares are used in developing and industrialized nations; artisanal and industrial fleets; and in high and low value fisheries.[8]

Theory

Fisheries have historically been treated as a common property resource. The number of participants is often limited, but without individually defined shares the fishery resource retains its common property nature. The dangers of managing fisheries as a common property resource were included in the development of modern theory of fishery economics, first introduced in 1954 by H. Scott Gordon. The theoretical framework showed that the common property nature of fisheries results in competition between individual operators to increase their share of the catch, which can ultimately lead to excessive capital, such as fishing vessels and gear, overfishing and resource wastage.[9] In common property fisheries, individual operators face an incentive to harvest as many fish as quickly as possible in order to preempt the activities by other operators.[9]

Catch shares remove the common property nature of the fishery by providing security and exclusivity to the resource through individual (often tradable) quotas, cooperatives or area-based harvest rights, known as territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs).[6] By providing a defined portion of the fishery to individuals or groups, operators can plan for the long-term use of the resource, which often involves maintaining a larger fish stock so as to increase the growth of stock and decrease the costs associated with fishing. With catch shares, the value of the share is tied to the health of fish stocks and the ecosystem.[6]

Catch share programs often allow for voluntary trading, both temporary and permanent, a process that allows operators with higher returns from fishing to purchase shares from those with lower returns.[10] Transfers ensure that operators have the opportunity to increase harvests, but that in doing so the fishery wide sustainable harvest level is not exceeded. Transfers are considered an important component of catch shares because they promote the most efficient use of the resource.[11]

Outcomes

Empirical research in the past two decades has shown that catch share management of fisheries has a variety of ecological, economic and social benefits over traditional management of fishery inputs. However, when compared to other modern management methods that place limits on outputs, catch shares exhibit no long term ecological gains.[12][13]

Studies examining the ecological impacts of catch shares show that they can reduce the likelihood of fishery depletion,[6] increase participants’ compliance with catch limits,[14] and stabilize landings and catch limits.[15] Additional research has also shown reduced bycatch and discards in catch share fisheries.[14][15] Yet, recent studies have indicated that catch share programs do not result in healthier fisheries,[16] and that the stabilization of landings is likely due to the slowing of the fishing rate. A study of all catch share programs in the US found that the health of a fishery goes unchanged after the implementation of catch shares and that the mean levels of most ecological indicator are unaffected.[17]

The economic impacts of catch shares are also well documented. Catch shares have been shown to stop the race for fish often experienced in traditionally managed fisheries.[15] Catch shares allow for the removal of season length aimed at limiting harvests, providing operators with a longer time period to harvest as well as the ability to coordinate fishing trips with market conditions. Empirical evidence has shown that fisheries become more profitable as costs of fishing are reduced and dockside prices for products increase.[11][18]

Many fisheries transitioning to catch share programs have the goal of reducing overcapitalization, often resulting in a reduction in the number of vessels and a transition from many temporary fishing jobs to fewer, stable, full-time jobs.[19] These changes often improve the economics of the fishery, but are sometimes considered undesirable from a community perspective. New institutions are being developed to improve communities’ access to shares, allow new entrants into the fishery, and/or keep quota within the community. These include the development and use of permit banks, community license banks and Community Fishing Associations. Program design features, including concentration caps, owner-on-board regulations, and trading restrictions, can be used help alleviate potential unwanted social outcomes.

Controversies

Catch shares almost universally result in fishing fleet consolidation, leading to job loss, coastal depression, and aggregation of fishing rights.[20] [21] [22] [23] For example, the Bering Sea crab catch share programs in the United States have resulted in a 70% reduction in participants and rapid consolidation resulting in approximately 1000 lost jobs.[24] In these same fisheries, further aggregation of shares, and leasing practices has resulted in substantially lower percentage of revenue paid to the participating fishermen.

References

  1. ^ "NOAA Catch Share Policy" (PDF). National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2010.
  2. ^ Beddington, J.; Agnew, D.; Clark, C. (June 22, 2007). "Current Problems in the Management of Marine Fisheries". Science. 316 (5832): 1713–1716. doi:10.1126/science.1137362. PMID 17588923. {{cite journal}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help); Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  3. ^ Uchida, H.; Makino, M. (2008). "The Japanese Coastal Fishery Co-management: An Overview". Case Studies in Fisheries Self-governance. Retrieved November, 2010. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  4. ^ Anderson, T.; Leal, D. (1993). "Fishing for Property Rights to Fish". Taking the Environment Seriously. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
  5. ^ Arnason, R. (2007). "Advances in Property Rights Based Fisheries Management: An Introduction" (PDF). Marine Resource Economics. 22: 335–346.
  6. ^ a b c d Costello, C.; Gaines, Steven D.; Lynham, J. (September 19, 2008). "Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?". Science. 321 (5896): 1678–1681. doi:10.1126/science.1159478. PMID 18801999. Retrieved November, 2010. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  7. ^ "Catch Share Spotlight No. 16: Northeast Multispecies Sectors" (PDF). National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2010.
  8. ^ Bonzon, K.; McIlwain, K.; Strauss, C. K.; Van Leuvan, T. (2010). Catch Shares Design Manual: A Guide for Managers and Fishermen. Environmental Defense Fund.
  9. ^ a b Gordon, H. S. (1954). "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery". Bulletin of Mathematical Biology. 53 (1/2): 231–252.
  10. ^ Grafton, R. Q. (1996). "ITQs: Theory and Practice". 6. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries: 5–20. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  11. ^ a b Newell, R. G.; Sanchirico, J. N.; Kerr, S. (2005). "Fishing quota markets". 49 (3). Journal of Environmental Economics and Management: 437–462. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  12. ^ Essington, T.E. (2009). "Catch Shares Improve Consistency, not Health, of Fisheries". Lenfest Ocean Program.
  13. ^ Essington, Timothy (2012). "Catch shares, fisheries, and ecological stewardship: a comparative". School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences.
  14. ^ a b Branch, T. A. (2008). "How do individual transferable quotas affect marine ecosystems?". Fish and Fisheries. 9: 1–19.
  15. ^ a b c Essington, T. E. (2010). "Ecological indicators display reduced variation in North American catch share fisheries". Proceedings of the National Academies of Science. 107 (2): 754–759. doi:10.1073/pnas.0907252107.
  16. ^ http://www.lenfestocean.org/press-release/new-study-finds-catch-shares-improve-consistency-not-health-fisheries. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  17. ^ Essington, T.E. (2010). "Ecological indicators display reduced variation in North American catch share fisheries". School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences.
  18. ^ Grafton, R. Q.; Squires, Dale; Fox, Kevin J. (2000). "Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource". The Journal of Law and Economics. 43 (2): 679. doi:10.1086/467469. {{cite journal}}: no-break space character in |first3= at position 6 (help)
  19. ^ McCay, B. J. (1995). "Social and Ecological Implications of ITQs: An Overview". Oceans and Coastal Management. 28 (1–3): 3–22. doi:10.1016/0964-5691(96)00002-6.
  20. ^ Eythórsson, Einar (2000). "A decade of ITQ-management in Icelandic fi sheries: consolidation without consensus". Marine Policy. 24 (6). {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help); line feed character in |title= at position 43 (help)
  21. ^ [Individual Transferable Quotas in Fishery Management "Individual Transferable Quotas in Fishery Management"]. {{cite web}}: Check |url= value (help)
  22. ^ Yandle, Tracy (2008). "Consolidation in Individual Transferable Quota Regime: Lessons from New Zealand 1986-1999". Environmental Management. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  23. ^ McCay, Bonnie J. (1995). "Social and Ecological Implication of ITQ's: an Overview". Ocean and Coastal Management. 28.
  24. ^ "Leasing practices in North Pacific fisheries Bering Sea and Aleutian Island crab fisheries". North Pacific Fishery Management Council. 2009. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)

Further reading

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