MS Mikhail Lermontov

Mikhail Lermontov at Tilbury in 1983
History
Name	Mikhail Lermontov
Namesake	Mikhail Lermontov
Owner	Baltic Shipping Company
Operator	Baltic Shipping Company
Port of registry	Soviet Union, Leningrad
Builder	VEB Mathias-Thesen Werft Wismar, East Germany
Yard number	129
Launched	31 December 1970
Acquired	18 March 1972
In service	21 April 1972
Identification	IMO number: 7042318
Fate	Sank 16 February 1986 near Marlborough Sounds 41.042087°S 174.219496°E / -41.042087; 174.219496
Notes
General characteristics
Class and type	Template:Sclass-
Tonnage	19,872 GRT
Displacement	4,956 t DWT
Length	175.77 m (576 ft 8 in)
Beam	23.60 m (77 ft 5 in)
Draught	7.80 m (25 ft 7 in)
Depth	13.50 m (44 ft 3 in)
Installed power	2×7-cylinder Sulzer-Cegielski diesels combined 15666 kW
Propulsion	Two propellers
Speed	20 kn (37.04 km/h; 23.02 mph) service speed
Range	8,000 mi (13,000 km)
Capacity	1334 passengers (maximum) 700 passengers (cruise service)
Crew	347
Notes

MS Mikhail Lermontov was an ocean liner owned by the Soviet Union's Baltic Shipping Company, built in 1972 by V.E.B. Mathias-Thesen Werft, Wismar, East Germany. It was later converted into a cruise ship. On 16 February 1986 it struck rocks near Port Gore in the Marlborough Sounds, New Zealand, and sank, resulting in the disappearance of one crew member.

MS Mikhail Lermontov

MS Mikhail Lermontov, launched in 1972, was the last of the five "poet" ships: Ivan Franko, Taras Shevchenko, Alexandr Pushkin (now Marco Polo), Shota Rustaveli and Mikhail Lermontov, named after famous Ukrainian, Georgian and Russian writers (Ivan Franko and Taras Shevchenko being Ukrainian, and Shota Rustaveli being Georgian), built to the same design at V.E.B. Mathias-Thesen Werft, Wismar, East Germany. Mikhail Lermontov, born 1814 and died 1841, was known as the "poet of Caucasus."

MS Mikhail Lermontov was originally used as an ocean liner on the Leningrad—New York run. However, the Soviet government realised that there was more money to be made by converting it to a cruise ship, and the accommodation and facilities on board were significantly upgraded in 1982 to meet the expectations of western customers.

Last voyage

Background

On 16 February 1986 Mikhail Lermontov was cruising in New Zealand for the CTC cruise company. On that day it left Picton for the Marlborough Sounds, carrying mostly elderly Australian passengers. The Picton pilot, Captain Don Jamison (who was also Picton harbourmaster), piloted the ship out of Picton. His presence, and his knowledge of the area, should have assured the safety of MS Mikhail Lermontov.

Jamison admitted consuming potentially significant quantities of alcohol both on the night before, and again at lunch time on the day of the sinking. He also claimed he was worn out from long working hours. Both points were revealed in his testimony before the preliminary inquiry held in Wellington and recorded in the inquiry transcripts, but neither was raised in the written inquiry report released to the public. The head of the inquiry was a close personal friend of Jamison, Capt SJ Ponsford. Ponsford later claimed that the consumption of alcohol by Captain Jamison had nothing to do with the accident but there has never been any indication that Ponsford attempted to quantify how much alcohol was involved, or any explanation as to why he ruled it out as a possible contributing factor.

In light of the fact that Ponsford was a close personal friend of Jamison and their relationship represented a potential conflict of interest in a process which could have led to a Judicial hearing (formal marine inquiry), it is disturbing to say the least that Ponsford saw fit to completely omit any mention of Jamison's consumption of alcohol in his report, or to fail to provide some explanation as to how he concluded that it had no bearing on the accident.

During a 2006 documentary the former CTC agent Les Goss who was at the same Luncheon in Picton on the fateful day graphically demonstrated the full glasses of straight Vodka Jamison had been served. Given that the Russian waiters were renowned for topping up glasses between main servings, it's possible Jamison had consumed the equivalent of between 2 and 3 glasses of vodka, well over half a bottle.

Jamison believed that the passage at Cape Jackson was clear of dangerous rocks or reefs in the southern end close to the Cape. He was aware that for many years coastal vessels of some size had used the passage. The bulk cement ship Milburn Carrier had for example been reported using almost the same course as the Mikhail Lermontov while steaming to assist about 3 hours after the Russian ship had struck rocks. Milburn Carrier was 2900 Tonnes and 5.7 meters in draught fully loaded and in that condition could certainly have been damaged by the same rock.

Further indication of Jamison's mind set may be contained in a 1982 cruising guide he contributed to that described the southern end of the passage as being "clear" of rocks.

Operating visually and without direct reference to a chart, Jamison proceeded towards Cape Jackson. The only approved navigation chart of the area, NZ615, appeared to support Jamison's incorrect impression that the southern end of the channel was relatively safe. An 1895 soundings chart of the area on a larger scale revealed the true nature of the passage, and appears to accurately chart Hawea Rock (4.5 meters below low water) as the point where the ship struck, well over to the southern side of the passage, but this old chart was little known, not approved for navigation, and Jamison had not seen a copy of it until a few days after the accident.

Hugging the shoreline to give the Australian passengers a good view of the area, Jamison continued towards the cape. About one mile from the cape, Jamison made the decision to take MS Mikhail Lermontov through the passage. A Russian officer questioned the decision, but the harbour-master assured him it would be a safe course, and at the time the decision was made the ship was still within the harbour limits. It could therefore be argued that despite being outside the pilotage limit, Jamison's instructions to the helm represented harbour-master advice on a safe course to leave the harbour limits, one of the prime roles of a harbour-master.

Disaster

At 5.37 pm, travelling at 15 knots, Mikhail Lermontov struck rocks about 5.5 metres (18 feet) below the waterline on its port side. Water entered the fresh water tanks, and one dry watertight compartment. The moderately damaged ship limped towards Port Gore. Had the watertight bulkheads and doors operated as designed flooding should have been limited to one watertight compartment and the situation would have been controlled with no loss of power. At least one watertight door at either end of the single flooding compartment was later found open in the wreck by RNZN divers, meaning that at least three watertight compartments were slowly flooding.

(A figure that is often quoted for the initial rate of flooding is about 63 tonnes per second, but this claim is never supported by any figures showing how such a calculation was made, and given the limited scale of damage is almost certainly a massive exaggeration. It does however make for dramatic statements such as "fast enough to fill an average community swimming pool in the time it takes you to read this one sentence", typical journalistic licence that does not stand up to simple maths since at even half that rate the ship would have foundered in approximately five minutes, about half the length of time it took the crew to decide to close watertight doors).

The situation became critical as flooding slowly progressed to the point where the tops of the watertight bulkheads were just above the waterline and reserve buoyancy was almost zero. Captain Vorobyov hoped he could beach the ship to prevent it sinking.

At 6:01pm Jamison made a VHF radio call indicating that a "Mayday situation" existed, but this call was not made in the recognized format of a distress call. At 6:40 Jamison relayed a message from the Russian master indicating that "no assistance" was required. This was despite Captain Vorobyov apparently having determined that the ship was in danger of sinking by 6:30pm and needed to be beached urgently. This message was relayed to various vessels including the inter-island ferry Arahura, which could have been on scene hours earlier and in daylight. Instead the Arahura arrived in the dark and in rain, and could only standby to receive survivors as they abandoned ship in chaotic circumstances.

Jamison claimed that throughout the drama, the Russian crew showed no interest in monitoring the VHF and responding to incoming calls, and he therefore restricted himself to the area close to the radio so that there was some communication link with would be rescuers.

The Mikhail Lermontov was initially beached successfully in Port Gore at about 7:30pm, but lowering the anchors to secure the vessel in that position was not achieved before the ship drifted back into deeper waters. Water-tight doors reportedly failed soon after, and the Mikhail Lermontov which was already on the limit of reserve buoyancy was then doomed.

The passengers were transferred to several ships in the area, including the LPG tanker Tarihiko (Capt. Reedman) and the SeaRail road-rail ferry Arahura (Capt John Brew). By 8:30 pm, passengers began to abandon ship, with the aid of the Russian crew and local rescue vessels.

As darkness set in MS Mikhail Lermontov listed further to starboard. Within 20 minutes of the last passenger being rescued, the ship had disappeared completely, sinking at approximately 10:45pm. The body of crew member Pavel Zagladimov was never recovered. The coroner's report listed cause of death as unknown. 11 of those rescued had minor injuries.

Wreck

NIWA sonar image of the Mikhail Lermontov resting on the seafloor.

MS Mikhail Lermontov rests where it sank, lying on its starboard side in depths reaching up to a maximum of about 38 m. It is popular with Scuba divers and the site is served by local dive shops in Picton and Kaikoura. It is also one of the biggest, easily accessible, diveable ship wrecks in the world. The dives range from an easy 12m depth at the top of the wreck, through to deep penetration and decompression dives to depths of 36m. It is possible to enter the wreck, especially in the open public areas accessible from the port side windows near the top of the wreck, although care must be taken and guides familiar with the wreck are highly recommended, especially for enclosed overhead environments and where entanglement hazards may exist. Closed circuit diving is recommended to avoid causing reduced visibility when entering enclosed areas such as restaurants, crew messes, and shopping arcades. Three divers are known to have died while exploring the ship, including one diver whose body is still possibly trapped inside.

Court Case

The disaster was the subject of the celebrated Australian restitution case Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon (The Mikhail Lermontov) (1993) 176 CLR 344, in which Mrs Dillon, having already been awarded damages for loss to both her possessions and person, as well as a pro-rated refund on her cruise ticket, claimed restitution for the remaining value of her ticket on the basis of failure of consideration. Rejecting proposed analyses of the cruise as an entire obligation, and alternatively as a payment conditional on performance, the High Court re-affirmed the rule that failure of consideration must be total in order for a claim for restitution to be sustained. Simply put, Mrs Dillon could not deny the benefit she received during her first eight days on the cruise. Furthermore, the court, following earlier English authority, held that full damages and complete restitution will not be given for the same breach of contract. The now-abolished forms of action cast a long shadow: a claim for money had and received evolved from the writ of indebitatus assumpsit, a legal fiction that the parties had an implied agreement that upon discharge for breach or frustration that the subject matter of the original agreement would be returned. An alternative form of action lay in debt. In Holmes v Hall (1677) 2 Mod 260, it was recognised that where concurrent claims existed and a claim in assumpsit indebitatus was available, the claim in assumpsit operated to exclude other claims. In the 'modern' language of Dutch v Warren (1720) 1 Stra 406, '[the defendant] has given the plaintiff an option to disaffirm the contract, and recover the consideration he was paid for it in the same manner as if it had never existed....but then the contract must be totally rescinded...;since otherwise, the contract is affirmed by the plaintiff's having received part of that equivalent for which he has paid his consideration, and it is then reduced to a mere question of damages proportionate to the extent to which it remains unperformed.'

Among particulars of the alleged breach of contract were; Failure to Establish, maintain and operate any adequate system of watertight bulkheads or other form of watertight integrity to ensure the vessel would not sink when holed, and; Failure to anchor the vessel in Port Gore after the stranding. Those points were never to be fully explored in court but evidence exists to suggest that they would have been very difficult to defend as the visible damage to the ship was extremely limited, and there was ample evidence to corroborate the claim that the ship beached in shallow water in Port Gore and should have been secured there by use of the anchors.

Inquiry

This incident was controversial because the official inquiries in both countries appeared to make no attempt to establish the underlying causes of the accident, address deficiencies in practices or procedures, or make recommendations to prevent a recurrence. In New Zealand the usual practice in the case of a major maritime casualty was the convening of a formal independent marine inquiry, headed by a district or high court judge aided by marine advisers, and held in open court. This would normally have been a very robust and in-depth investigation taking as long as several months to complete, leaving no stone un-turned, and most importantly being independent and free of outside political interference. But in the case of the Mikhail Lermontov it appeared that political considerations over-ruled standard practice and past precedent as no such inquiry was called for. Instead the inquiry process was effectively quarantined under the control of government officials on both sides who appeared to have been working towards a pre-determined outcome.

Soon after the sinking adverse media coverage of the state of the life saving equipment appeared to provoke the Soviet embassy in Wellington into issuing a public statement demanding how the accident should be assessed. The then transport minister Richard Prebble admitted in 1996 and again in 2006 that the Soviets refused to take part in a formal inquiry, and that he felt this had to be hidden from the public in order to "avoid a diplomatic row". That explains his change in position from initially telling the media that he intended to order a full scale inquiry into what he described as a major sinking

Prebble's admission that the Soviet refusal to take part in a formal inquiry had to be covered up implies two logical conclusions, firstly that a formal inquiry was indeed justified by the circumstances of the sinking, and secondly that if a cover-up was to succeed the preliminary inquiry that was already underway must be forced to recommend that no formal inquiry should follow, even if the evidence demanded it.

Almost immediately there were other indications that a coordinated government cover-up was underway. The New Zealand Defence Force issued false statements denying that a RNZN officer had ever given a media interview regarding the poor state of the life saving equipment, but the officer in question, Lieutenant Peter Batcheler, commanding officer HMNZS Taupo, has always maintained he did make the statements and they were accurately reported. The denials from Defence also upset the Wellington Post newspaper who had originally reported Batcheler's comments, and editor Don Churchill conducted an investigation in which he established that the interview was carried out fairly and was accurately reported.

Unfortunately for the government not all its departments were coordinated in their denials. The Ministry of Transport not only publicly acknowledged receipt of Batcheler's report, but also dispatched an Inspector of Ships, Bernard Foley, to carry out a further inspection on dry land of the lifeboats and other emergency equipment landed in Picton. It was too late to cancel this inspection, but Foley confided to Peter McManaway in whose sheds the equipment was being stored that he was placed under pressure from above regarding the findings of his report, and was not free to write what he wanted to. His written report is certainly unusual in its wording. After listing a catalogue of serious deficiencies in lifeboats, pyrotechnics, life jackets and life rafts, he concluded that as long as the mechanical strains on the equipment was not great, it would do what life saving equipment would do. There was no attempt to objectively conclude whether the equipment was up to the required SOLAS standards, but clearly with the deficiencies listed it was not.

Foley's reluctance to objectively assess the standard of the lifesaving equipment was matched by the Director of the Marine Division of the Ministry of Transport, Hugh Jones. Jones had the job of writing the public statements for the minister. Minister Prebble's initial press statement was quite remarkable in that it read in part; "allegations made subsequently regarding deficiencies in the lifesaving equipment have not been borne out by the evidence presented to the inquiry." Since the evidence presented included Foley's written report which did in fact identify serious deficiencies, the minister's press statement was misleading. He was questioned about the lifesaving equipment more closely in parliament and again Jones supplied the minister's answer. This time the answer was technically correct, though still misleading and possibly designed to be so. The lifesaving equipment was described as being in a condition "consistent with its age". For a vessel in off-shore survey, such a description was meaningless and completely inappropriate. The equipment had to be up to a minimum standard regardless of its age. Some of it showed signs of having received very little maintenance, for example bilge pumps rusted solid and handles missing in the older lifeboats. This type of deficiency could be described as being consistent with the age of the appliances in question, but only if they had not been maintained, and therefore had been allowed to deteriorate to an unacceptable condition. Clearly the New Zealand government was doing all it could to avoid making openly critical statements regarding any aspect of the Soviet operation.

The brief New Zealand preliminary inquiry held behind closed doors was headed by S.J. Ponsford, a close personal friend of the person who had been most responsible for the accident, Don Jamison. Its concluding report, the only record of the proceedings initially released to the public, featured a series of errors and omissions which could easily have been avoided with the information at hand. Those mistakes fell into one of two categories; those that covered up potential deficiencies in the Soviet operation, such as life saving equipment, emergency communications, emergency procedures, and maintenance of emergency systems including bulkheads and watertight doors. And those that ignored any other aspect of the accident that would normally have caused a formal inquiry to follow, such as problems with the charts, the harbourmaster's consumption of alcohol, his working hours, and the common local practice of taking sizable coastal vessels through the Cape Jackson passage without knowing exactly where the rocks were located.

The New Zealand inquiry delivered exactly what the Soviet embassy had publicly demanded, a conclusion that found no fault with the Russian ship, and a recommendation that no further investigation take place. The Soviet embassy was very happy with this outcome, and in further public comments stated that the New Zealand preliminary inquiry was very professionally and well done, and they did not want Captain Jamison to make any further comment because they were 100% happy with all the findings. The only context in which their disinterest in an explanation from Jamison makes any sense is a desire on their part to avoid further investigation of the accident. His actions had resulted in the loss of their ship, and other Soviet ships would be visiting these waters in the future and would be subject to compulsory pilotage and harbourmaster instructions. It would normally be expected that they would have demanded a thorough investigation of the causes from New Zealand authorities.

Don Jamison was never subject to any detailed questioning on his navigational error, and has never publicly commented on it since the 1986 inquiry. Marine Division Director Hugh Jones admitted that Jamison had not been questioned regarding the cause of the accident because he claimed that Jamison's right to make no comment had to be respected above even a desire to determine the cause. Mr Jones invoked the TAIC mission statement to justify this position, that the purpose of accident investigation was not to apportion blame, but rather to prevent future accidents, even though the TAIC did not exist in 1986. Jones' interpretation of the TAIC mission statement seemed to be an extreme and distorted one, a fact confirmed by TAIC chief investigator Tim Burfoot, who said that not only would the TAIC have questioned Jamison had they investigated the accident, but it would have been remiss of them not to do so. Jones also failed to explain how the primary purpose of an accident investigation, that of determining the cause to prevent a recurrence, could possibly be satisfied if the person responsible was not subject to any questioning at all.

The admission by Jones that Jamison was not even questioned on the reasons for his decision also makes a mockery of claims by Prebble and Ponsford that the cause of the accident was a complete mystery, and that a formal inquiry would have added no more to what the preliminary inquiry had uncovered. How could the cause of Jamison's decision be labelled a mystery when he hadn't even been questioned on it? A formal inquiry would most certainly have explored the reasons why Jamison made his decision.

Effectively the whole matter was swept under the carpet, however with the eventual public release of the entire inquiry transcript, navy dive reports, and other evidence it has become obvious that the accident was completely understandable.

Jamison and other coastal masters believed the Cape Jackson passage was navigable in large vessels, and were unaware of the presence of rocks in the southern half of the channel that were not marked on NZ615. Jamison had been overworked and drinking prior to the accident and its possible he allowed the ship's track to drift much closer to the Cape than he would normally intend, striking Hawea Rock only 100 meters off shore. The damage was no where near as severe as is usually claimed. Only one dry watertight compartment was initially open to the sea. This was in marked contrast to statements issued by both the New Zealand and Soviet governments that the ship had been opened across four adjacent watertight compartments and was therefore doomed to sink and could not be saved. The New Zealand government was in possession of navy dive reports estimating the damage to be far less extensive, and confirming the open state of watertight doors in crucial positions in the wreck, but this information appears to have been completely ignored when official statements were being prepared.

The failure of watertight doors and bulkheads allowed progressive flooding, while the failure to deploy the anchor when the ship was successfully beached in Port Gore marked the last chance to save the ship. Almost all of this detail was omitted from the preliminary inquiry report, which then claimed it had established all the facts beyond all reasonable doubt and recommended no formal inquiry follow. Transport minister Richard Prebble accepted that recommendation despite public calls for a credible inquiry.

Richard Prebble has refused to engage serious and informed researchers on any issue regarding the Mikhail Lermontov, even though he claims to have answered every question ever raised on the subject, a claim that is quite false. In fact his standard response is to refuse to answer specific detailed questions, and then to withdraw under protest claiming that anyone disagreeing with him is a conspiracy theorist. He has kept numerous files locked away in the national archives and refused public access to them, and these files probably contain the only known copies of some official documents pertaining to the sinking. He side-stepped the provisions of the Official Information Act by the simple expedient of having the files transferred to the National Archives under the guise of being his own private papers, thus completely defeating the intention of the OIA to ensure freedom of information to the NZ public. Numerous requests for access have always been denied.

Preliminary Inquiry Errors and Omissions

The NZ preliminary inquiry report described itself as having “established beyond any reasonable doubt the facts leading to the grounding and subsequent loss of the Mikhail Lermontov”. That wording was quite unusual for an accident investigation preliminary inquiry report, and appeared designed to discourage any questioning of the accuracy of its findings.

Interviews and media statements of inquiry head Steve Ponsford are all remarkable in that he always appears to try and convey the impression his findings were "exactly" correct, definitive, and beyond any dispute. Time and time again when checked against the documented facts however the claims he makes are found to be completely incorrect.

1986 Transport Minister Richard Prebble has been similarly intransigent, describing the inquiry as “absolutely accurate, and I’ve never seen anything to make me change my mind”.

The following is a list of easily verifiable errors and omissions the report featured, most of which could have been confirmed on the basis of the very evidence before the minister and his officials at the time.

The same list was put to Hugh Jones, the Director of the Marine Division of the ministry of transport, and the man charged with the oversight of the inquiry process. He did not dispute that any of the following errors had been made, but argued that the inquiry was only intended to determine that the ship had hit rocks and sunk. It had done that and so in his opinion could be described as "absolutely accurate". That kind of response indicates the disingenuous mind set and use of language employed by the people responsible. It's doubtful anyone else would have taken the description "absolutely accurate" with regards to the inquiry to mean it could contain the following types of errors. The fact that the ship had hit rocks and sunk was something that could have been gleaned from the monday morning papers. It did not need an inquiry to confirm. The purpose of the inquiry was to find out how and why the accident occurred, a requirement very clearly spelled out in some detail by its official written guidelines, guidelines which in this case appear to have been completely ignored.

1. The tide state. No tide tables are referred to by Ponsford and Cape Jackson is not a location listed in the nautical almanac. The only reference to the tide state is when Jamison was questioned on what he “estimated” the tide state was. This was a question of some importance because it helps to establish whether the rock the ship struck should have been on the charts, and there is reason to believe the actual tide state was closer to mid tide. In addition if the depth of impact was about 5.5 meters and the mid tide water depth would add 0.7 meters, then the depth of the damage matches almost perfectly with the depth of Hawea Rock, measured at 4.5 meters below low water level, helping to confirm that rock as the point of grounding and eliminating Perham Rock in mid channel as a possible candidate.

2. Ponsford claimed in the media he knew exactly where the ship hit, then gave the coordinates for the position of the only rock charted in the channel, clearly in the northern half of the channel. But the witnesses agreed the ship passed through the southern half of the channel, and Ponsford states this himself elsewhere in his report. He had therefore moved the position of the grounding on to the only charted rock. Not only is this an error in the position, but it covers up the fact that the ship hit an uncharted rock. To check his figures, the 1986 pre WGS84 version of NZ615 must be used.

3. Ponsford claims the "consensus" of opinion was that the ship struck on the starboard side. A "consensus" however indicates an overall agreement, whereas witness opinion was split almost evenly as to which side struck. The most reliable witnesses including the helmsman indicated the grounding was on the port side, which was correct. Navy divers were on the wreck three days before Ponsford wrote his report and apparently briefed MoT officials in Wellington 2 days before he signed it off. The information was therefore clearly available as to which side of the ship had been damaged, but this information was ignored.

4. Ponsford fails to question the cracked bulkhead claim from the Russians that supposedly explained the loss of main engine power when their own damage control inspections reported no sign of structural damage much further forward than this point and closer to the point of impact. How could a 3 meter long "crack" appear across a major watertight reinforced bulkhead especially when the impact at Cape Jackson was a glancing blow and not reported as being particularly severe? If such a crack had been noticed by the crew 15 minutes before power was cut as was claimed, why couldn't some kind of screen between the bulkhead and the back of the main switchboard have been rigged in the service passage between them to deflect the spray? Ian Lockley who helped manage the salvage of the oil from inside the ship later claimed that his divers noticed that the main electrical cables running through the bulkhead had no sealing glands around them. This was amidships in the exact location needed to affect both sides of the switchboard. While this information was not available to Ponsford, he should certainly not have accepted the Russian claim at face value. The loss of power was thus probably due to poor maintenance rather than damage sustained during the grounding.

5. Ponsford fails to make any attempt to assess the extent of the damage suffered by the ship during the casualty, a requirement specifically called for in the inquiry guidelines. This was all the remarkable considering that his department had already called for the navy dive inspection, duly carried out at considerable tax-payer expense. Ponsford had this information available and had he considered it would have known that the damaged suffered by the ship at Cape Jackson was quite limited and should never have resulted in the vessel sinking.

6. Ponsford fails to consider whether the Russian damage control procedures were adequate or even reasonable, again a consideration that fell within the guidelines of a preliminary inquiry. Given the limited damage suffered by the ship as shown by the navy dive inspection the extent of the flooding could have been due to the failure of watertight doors and bulkheads and this should have been investigated further. He also failed to question Russian testimony that all 28 doors had closed and been physically checked as not leaking, a remarkable claim considering that the doors were not ordered closed until 10 minutes after the grounding during which time the ship had been rapidly flooding. If this was the case, how could the doors on the lower decks in the area of the worst flooding be accessible for such checks to be carried out? At least one side of each door would have to be accessible for them to have been physically checked for leakage, yet damage control teams inspecting one deck above the lower deck reported they were unable to progress against the flow of water at that level.

7. Despite the evidence establishing that the ship did in fact ground a second time in Port Gore on a sandy beach at about 7:45, Ponsford ignores all such evidence which includes charts, radio logs, independent eye-witnesses and photographic evidence, and instead accepts the word of two senior Russian witnesses with possible motives for giving false evidence, that the ship lost all way some 8 cables (1.4 km) from shore, a claim completely at odds with all the reliable evidence.

8. Ponsford made no record at all regarding the consumption of alcohol by Jamison just hours before the accident. Jamison was quite open about his drinking the night before and then at the luncheon in Picton before the ship sailed. Ponsford subsequently claimed that in his opinion alcohol had nothing to do with the grounding, but has never explained on what basis he reached such a conclusion, and why it escaped all mention in his report.

9. Jamison also told Ponsford that he was over-worked and suffering from fatigue. How could this also escape mention in the concluding report, especially when combined with his consumption of alcohol? Both were potential contributing factors to the accident.

10. Ponsford and Jamison had an exchange about the two charts in question, NZ615 the main navigation chart, and also a little known but detailed 1895 Soundings chart of the Cape Jackson channel that Jamison had not seen until after the accident. The contrasts between the two were stunning and disturbing. The old 1895 chart clearly showed the dangerous rocks right across the channel, whereas the main navigation chart NZ615 appeared to show a single rock in the northern end only, with the southern end apparently clear. The main navigation chart was potentially misleading yet this fact escapes all mention by Ponsford. Furthermore Ponsford effectively hides this fact from the casual reader of his report by his errant Lat Long coordinates as noted in #2 above.

11. Ponsford heard evidence that the use of the southern end of the Cape Jackson passage was a common local practice even though none of the mariners involved seemed to know the depth and location of rocks in the channel. John Brew the master of the Arahura admitted taking a 4.5 meter draught vessel through the channel, while Lt Batcheler reported that just over 3 hours after the Mikhail Lermonotv struck rocks the Milburn Carrier (2900 Tons and 5.7 meters draught fully loaded) was seen following virtually the same line while rushing to assist. It appeared that Jamison was merely following the established local practice of coastal mariners, some in quite large vessels. This was the type of practice such inquiries were set up to highlight, yet in this case it was completely ignored.

12. The Coordinates Ponsford gave for the final sinking were about 0.5 NM in error, another mistake easily avoided had he referred to the navy dive report which was available and listed the correct coordinates.

13. Ponsford failed to comment on the appalling communications procedures of the Russians, including the decision of the master not to send a distress message at all to local authorities, and the sending of messages indicating that "no assistance was required" when they knew the ship was in danger of sinking. This type of detail was certainly within the terms of reference of the inquiry, its written guidelines instructing him to "properly cover" any procedures that could have been improved upon. Instead of coordinating with local rescue authorities, the Russian radio operators established contact with stations in the USSR, and even made satellite phone calls to the Soviet officials in Wellington. This demonstrated that they were well equipped with communication equipment, but failed to use it to assist in saving life.

14. The decision to load passengers into lifeboats from the ships lower embarkation doors, forcing them to go back inside a listing, darkened, and flooding ship. A number of passengers found themselves in the terrifying position of being trapped for a time behind locked doors on ever steepening stairways with flood waters rising behind them, and some injuries were sustained. With the capacity of lifeboats on one side alone sufficient to take all the passengers there seems no reason not to have loaded lifeboats at Boat Deck level in the conventional manner which should have been far safer and quicker.

15. Failing to provide an objective assessment of the state of the life saving equipment when it clearly did not meet off-shore survey requirements under SOLAS regulations. The evidence of this was available from both Batcheler's initial report and Foley's follow-up report. Local Picton boat builder Peter McManaway has also gone on record as criticizing the standard of this equipment. His comments are included in the 1986 salvage documentary accompanied with video footage of the actual deficiencies found.

Condition of life saving equipment

The condition of the life saving equipment and the standard of maintenance evident in this equipment was consistent with evidence of other failings in watertight doors, bulkheads, and anchor lowering systems that could have contributed to the eventual loss of the vessel. While no formal inquiry or indepth investigation was ever convened to address in detail the possible failings in these other systems, the life saving equipment was subject to close examination on the night and in the days after the sinking. Despite an apparent attempt to suppress much of this information by New Zealand Ministry of Transport and Defence officials, a number of reports and comments remain publicly available, and therefore a list of what was observed is very interesting as it lends weight to the suggestion that Mikhail Lermontov should never have sunk due to the limited damage she received at Cape Jackson, and that the overall standard of maintenance was probably of a similar low standard, despite outward appearances. This appears to be the main aspect of the accident the Soviet authorities wanted covered-up, something they appear to have been actively assisted in by the New Zealand government, after initial leaks of adverse reports to the media.

To be completed, with citations:

Summary of faults identified by Lt P. Batcheler, RNZN.

Many of the lifeboats were so rotten that people were putting their feet through them (comment: probably refers to wooden seats and grating), many life-rafts would not open, or leaking so badly they were sinking by morning, lights on half the life jackets were not working, the motors on some of the lifeboats did not work.

"If the sinking was out at sea they would not have got back alive with that equipment, I am quite convinced of that."

A more detailed written report of HMNZS Taupo's involvement in the rescue operation including the deficiencies he witnessed was raised by Lieutenant Batcheler and forwarded to the Chief of Naval Staff. No copy of this report can now be found, presumably it disappeared about the same time that Commander Gerry Power began issuing his false statements claiming that Batcheler had never made any comments critical of the life saving equipment.

Summary of faults identified by B. Foley, MoT.

Lifeboats 3-8, open aluminium, bench and grating steel fastenings rusted away, some batons broken, exposure cover fastenings rotten and rusted, impossible to use, only one bilge pump in 6 boats would work, the rest rusted solid, control gear for variable pitch propeller rusted solid, due to their neglected condition hard to believe regular lifeboat drills were carried out in these boats, lifeboat number 2 motor exhaust disconnected to hull side, and having fuel problems. Boats 9-10 same criticism as for 3-8, one had hole in hull probably caused by leaking battery acid.

Water containers nearly all holed or cracked.

Life jackets poorly made without reinforcing, would not pass the usual routine inspection in NZ. Pyrotechnics, where the expiry date could be read, was no later than 1986 (comment; this is open to interpretation, and could mean many were expired).

Fire extinguishers rusted, bulging, and appeared close to rupture.

Life rafts poorly packed and one would not inflate, poorly glued canopy and attachments that could be pulled off. Fiber glass canopy support rods frayed at ends and capable of causing pin holes in buoyancy chambers. Not of the quality expected in NZ.

Summary of faults identified by David Gibbs, engineering officer, HMNZS Taupo.

Arctic lifeboat taking on water, boat with wireless room forward taking on water, water containers, engines hard to start.

Summary of faults identified by P. McManaway

Summary of fault identified by D. Jamison

I did not see any of the life-rafts operate once they had been launched, there were about 6 canisters in the water unopened.

Summary of fault identified by L. Shatilova

For some reason many of the life-rafts were not operating when they hit the water.

Summary of faults identified by D. Fishburn

An unopened life-raft canister was towed back to Dryden Bay to help clear floating debris after the fishing vessel Nimrod had taken part in the rescue operation. When checking to see why it hadn't opened, Fishburn found that the gas cylinder inside intended to inflate the life-raft had completely rusted away. The emergency rations were marked with dates from the 1950s. This indicated that the life-raft had not been serviced for many years. The life-raft was collected by Ministry of Transport officials.

Comparison of comments made by R. Prebble and H. Jones

Both Hugh Jones (Marine Division Director) and Richard Prebble (Transport Minister) have either ignored or dismissed all such criticism of the life saving equipment. They adopted the approach of glossing over or minimizing any deficiencies, in this case because all the passengers and crew who were able to evacuate had done so successfully. According to them the life saving equipment had therefore supposedly performed its intended role and must have been adequate for that purpose. This approach ignores the fact that the equipment's intended role was to cover situations other than just a sinking close inshore in a sheltered bay with numerous other vessels of all sizes standing by ready to assist. Richard Prebble in a 2006 article was quoted as dismissing any criticism of the equipment simply because the number of lifeboats was more than enough. This was irrelevant however as the criticism of the equipment was never aimed at the total number of appliances, just the number that were in acceptable condition.

Hugh Jones dismissed Lt Batchelers report on the equipment because he said it had been made by a young naval officer only used to the pristine standards of the navy and not familiar with the more pragmatic standards of the merchant marine. At the time Batcheler had been checking foreign fishing vessels since at least 1978, and had seen some of the worst examples of unseaworthy vessels, in particular the Taiwanese fishing fleet. He also noted that at that time conditions and serviceability aboard RNZN vessels were far from ideal, with numerous defects, rust problems, and even pest infestations, and that RNZN ships often went to sea with problems that his colleagues in merchant vessels would not have tolerated.

Neither Prebble or Jones have ever been recorded making an objective assessment of the life saving equipment as being acceptable in terms of SOLAS offshore survey standards, the only standards that mattered. Their approach appeared to be one of excusing the obvious defects in the Mikhail Lermontov's lifesaving equipment using whatever convenient justification they could invent.

It's certain that no New Zealand vessel would have been granted a certificate of survey with the type of deficiencies present on the Mikhail Lermontov, some of which appear to have been there for many years.

Media coverage

Since 1986 there have been two books, at least four television documentaries, and numerous magazine and newspaper articles dedicated to the Mikhail Lermontov sinking.

BOOKS:

Mikhail Lermontov Enigma, Michael Guerin, 1996:

Not the most readable account, but asks all the pertinent questions. Includes very good appendices, including preliminary inquiry concluding report, and several other reports.

Death of a Cruise Ship, Tom O'Connor, 1999:

Style is highly readable. Deliberately avoids controversial subjects. Interesting first person accounts but should be read with caution. Makes a number of factual errors. Does not provide the full story or ask the necessary questions. Nice colour photo section.

TELEVISION DOCUMENTARIES

Close-Up, TVNZ, 1986

Details unknown. No known copy publicly available to view.

Mikhail Lermontov Salvage Video, Lynton Diggle, NZ, 1986

This documentary deals mainly with the salvage of oil and other valuables from the wreck. It is a fascinating record of divers working in near zero visibility deep inside the wreck. Of further interest in this documentary is Peter McManaway's criticism of the life saving equipment stored in his sheds after the sinking, including video footage of many of the deficiencies. And Commander Gerry Power, RNZN, making his false denials that a navy officer had ever been critical of the life saving equipment.

Destination Disaster, Ninox Films, NZ, 2000

An award winning documentary, however not for its standard of journalism which was sadly lacking. The Russian crew members were permitted to take part in this production, and give their version of events, but as in Tom O'Connors book, the most controversial subjects were avoided. Features an award winning score, and dramatic narrative. Features remarkable interviews with the inquiry head the late SJ Ponsford who looks ill at ease, and gives some highly questionable answers. Of particular note is his description of Jamison's decision to take the short-cut through the passage as "not illogical", and to portray it with a sideways glance as a spur of the moment decision made as Jamison was taken by surprise by the channel suddenly opening up on the port side. This was quite inaccurate as the channel was clearly visible for some distance from the bridge of the ship at an angle that was far from acute, and Jamison was well acquainted with those waters, he knew what was ahead of him.

Also of note are comments by the Russian master Vorobyov, particularly when he claims he directed Jamison to send a distress signal and not to cancel it. This is completely at odds with the evidence he gave at the NZ preliminary inquiry when he clearly admits to not ordering any such signals. The documentary narrative does not point this out. Jamison was asked to take part but refused.

A casual viewer might think this slick production is very informative but in fact it omits a great deal, and a lot of reading between the lines and independent research is required to get anything like the full picture.

TVNZ Sunday Programme, 2006

Only part one was produced, which covered the sinking. The second part, which was to have covered the inquiry was never screened, and its unclear whether it was ever made. Some interesting interviews but as usual only a partial addressing of the relevant issues. The TVNZ researchers were able to locate the second navy dive report, which had previously not been available.

OTHER ARTICLES:

The Last Cruise of the Mikhail Lermontov, Derek Grzelewski, New Zealand Geographic, April–June 1999

A 22 page full colour illustrated article, a kind of Readers Digest version of Tom O'Connor's book. No new or revealing information is contained in this article, but an interesting account of diving the wreck is given. Some very good illustrations included.

The Loss of the Mikhail Lermontov, Captain Ian Bradley, RNZN(Retd), NZ Listener, August 1986.

A scathing article by a former navy Captain, critical of the government decision not to hold a formal marine inquiry.  

The most revealing thing about this article is just how little accurate information the public had received about the accident at this time, as shown by the numerous factual errors contained in the article.

Shipwreck; The Loss of the Mikhail Lermontov, Inspector Owen Dance, Australian Police Journal, Apr-Jun 1987

One of the best contemporary articles on the sinking written, even though it was intended to deal mainly with the evacuation and subsequent police processing of passengers and crew. One fascinating revelation from the author was that in the process of researching the article he was told quite confidently that the use of the Cape Jackson passage by large coastal vessels was still continuing, even after the sinking.

The Mikhail Lermontov Saga, Rosemary McLeod, North and South Magazine

A largely political commentary on events behind the scenes in the background to the sinking, particularly in the Marlborough Harbour Board.

See also

• MS Sea Diamond
• Costa Concordia, Italian cruise ship which ran aground off Italy in 2012, in roughly similar circumstances
• Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344

External links

• New Zealand Disasters - Shipwreck: Mikhail Lermontov
• The Last Cruise of the Mikhail Lermontov at NZ Maritime Record
• A full length documentary made in 2000, "Destination Disaster: The Sinking of the Mikhail Lermontov". Free to view on NZ On Screen.
• A full length documentary, featuring dive footage, made in 1986, "Mikhail Lermontov". Free to view on NZ On Screen.
• Day/night Lermontov Wreck Dive Tours Go Dive Marlborough, Picton, New Zealand

Further reading

• O'Connor, Tom (1999). Death of a Cruise Ship. Whatamango Bay, Queen Charlotte Sound, NZ: Cape Catley Ltd.