November 1963 Iraqi coup d'état: Difference between revisions

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Arab Ba'ath	1940–1947
Arab Ba'ath Movement	1940–1947
Ba'ath Party	1947–1966
Baath Party (pro-Iraqi)	1968–2003
Baath Party (pro-Syrian)	1966–present

November 1963 Iraqi coup d'état
	Part of the Arab Cold War
Date	10–11 November 1963
Location	Republic of Iraq
Result	Overthrow of Ba'ath Party government; Establishment of pro-Nasserist government;
Belligerents
Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party; Ba'ath National Guard Militia;	Pro-Nasserists; Iraqi Armed Forces;
Commanders and leaders
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr	Abdul Salam Arif; Abdul Rahman Arif;
Strength
	34,000 National Guard milita
Casualties and losses
	250 killed

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The November 1963 Iraqi coup d'état took place on November 10–11, 1963 when, following internal party divisions, pro-Nasserist Iraqi officers led a military coup within the Ba'ath Party.

Although the coup itself was bloodless, 250 people were killed in related action.^[1]

Background

After seizing Iraqi state power in February 1963, divisions between pro and anti-Nasser Ba'ath leaders, as well as between right and left pan-Arab nationalist Ba'ath leaders led to the first Ba'ath government in Iraq's collapse in November 1963, while 7,000 Iraqi communists remained imprisoned.

Although the presidency was occupied by Abdul Salam Arif, a non-Ba'athist Arab nationalist and a member of the Homeland Officers' Organization, most of the ministries were divided among Ba'athists. The virtual ruler of the country was the prime minister Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr.

Ali Salih al-Sadi, Secretary General of the Regional Command of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, supported a union with Syria, while the more conservative military wing supported Qasim's "Iraq first policy". Factionalism, coupled with the ill-disciplined behaviour of the National Guard, led the military wing to initiate a coup against the party's leadership; al-Sadi was forced into exile in Spain. al-Bakr, in an attempt to save the party, called for a meeting of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party. The meeting exacerbated the Party's problems. Aflaq, who saw himself as the leader of the pan-Arab Ba'athist movement, declared his intent to take control of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. The "Iraq first" wing was outraged, President Arif lost patience with the Ba'ath, and the Party was ousted from government on 18 November 1963. The 12 Ba'ath members of government were forced to resign and the National Guard replaced by the Republican Guard.^[2]

Coup

On November 11, 1963, 15 armed Iraqi Army military officers burst into a Ba'ath Congress meeting, seized the Ba'ath left nationalist faction leaders at gun point and flew them to Madrid. Then, on November 18, 1963, Iraqi president Abdul Salam Arif, his brother, Brigade General Abdul Rahman Arif and their Iraqi Army supporters suppressed the Ba'ath National Guard Militia (which had increased in size from 5,000 to 34,000 between February and August 1963) and bombed the Ba'th National Guard Milita headquarters. As a result, the first Ba'th government was overthrown and a new, pro-Nasserist government was established with Abdul Salam Arif as Head of State.

Notes

^ ^a ^b Iraq (1932-present), Political Science Department, University of Central Arkansas.
^ Coughlin, Con (2005). Saddam: His Rise and Fall. Harper Perennial. pp. 44–46. ISBN 0-06-050543-5.

[ucairaq-1] Iraq (1932-present), Political Science Department, University of Central Arkansas.

[Coughlin_p.44-46-2] Coughlin, Con (2005). Saddam: His Rise and Fall. Harper Perennial. pp. 44–46. ISBN 0-06-050543-5.

[1]

[2]

@@ Line 11: / Line 11: @@
 | combatant1 = {{ublist|class=nowrap |{{flagicon image|Flag of the Ba'ath Party.svg}} [[Ba'ath Party|Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party]] |{{flagicon image|Flag of the Ba'ath Party.svg}} [[Ba'ath Party|Ba'ath National Guard Militia]]}}
 | combatant2 = {{ublist|class=nowrap |{{flag icon|Iraq|1963}} Pro-Nasserists |{{flag icon|Iraq|1963}} [[Iraqi Armed Forces]]}}
-'''Supported by:'''<br>
-{{flag|United States}}
-* {{flagicon image|Flag of the United States Central Intelligence Agency.svg}} [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]
-{{flag|United Kingdom}}
-* [[File:Secret Intelligence Service logo.svg|35px]] [[Secret Intelligence Service|SIS]]
 | commander1 = {{nowrap|{{flagicon image|Flag of the Ba'ath Party.svg}} [[Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr]]}}
 | commander2 = {{ublist|class=nowrap |{{flag icon|Iraq|1963}} [[Abdul Salam Arif]] |{{flag icon|Iraq|1963}} [[Abdul Rahman Arif]]}}
@@ Line 37: / Line 32: @@
 Although the presidency was occupied by [[Abdul Salam Arif]], a non-Ba'athist Arab nationalist and a member of the [[Homeland Officers' Organization]], most of the ministries were divided among Ba'athists. The virtual ruler of the country was the prime minister [[Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr]].
-[[Ali Salih al-Sadi]], Secretary General of the Regional Command of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, supported a union with Syria, while the more conservative military wing supported Qasim's "Iraq first policy". Factionalism, coupled with the ill-disciplined behaviour of the National Guard, led the military wing to initiate a coup against the party's leadership; al-Sadi was forced into exile in Spain. al-Bakr, in an attempt to save the party, called for a meeting of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party. The meeting exacerbated the Party's problems. Aflaq, who saw himself as the leader of the pan-Arab Ba'athist movement, declared his intent to take control of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. The "Iraq first" wing was outraged, President Arif lost patience with the Ba'ath, and the Party was ousted from government on 18 November 1963. The 12 Ba'ath members of government were forced to resign and the National Guard replaced by the [[Republican Guard (Iraq)|Republican Guard]].<ref name="Coughlin p.44-46">{{cite book |author=[[Con Coughlin|Coughlin, Con]] |pages=44–46 |title=Saddam: His Rise and Fall |location= |publisher=[[Harper Perennial]] |year=2005 |isbn=0-06-050543-5}}</ref>
+[[Ali Salih al-Sadi]], Secretary General of the Regional Command of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, supported a union with Syria, while the more conservative military wing supported Qasim's "Iraq first policy". Factionalism, coupled with the ill-disciplined behaviour of the National Guard, led the military wing to initiate a coup against the party's leadership; al-Sadi was forced into exile in Spain. al-Bakr, in an attempt to save the party, called for a meeting of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party. The meeting exacerbated the Party's problems. Aflaq, who saw himself as the leader of the pan-Arab Ba'athist movement, declared his intent to take control of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. The "Iraq first" wing was outraged, President Arif lost patience with the Ba'ath, and the Party was ousted from government on 18 November 1963. The 12 Ba'ath members of government were forced to resign and the National Guard replaced by the [[Republican Guard (Iraq)|Republican Guard]].<ref name="Coughlin p.44-46">{{cite book |author=[[Con Coughlin|Coughlin, Con]] |pages=44-46 |title=Saddam: His Rise and Fall |location= |publisher=[[Harper Perennial]] |year=2005 |isbn=0-06-050543-5}}</ref>
 == Coup ==
 On November 11, 1963, 15 armed Iraqi Army military officers burst into a Ba'ath Congress meeting, seized the Ba'ath left nationalist faction leaders at gun point and flew them to Madrid. Then, on November 18, 1963, Iraqi president [[Abdul Salam Arif]], his brother, Brigade General [[Abdul Rahman Arif]] and their Iraqi Army supporters suppressed the Ba'ath National Guard Militia (which had increased in size from 5,000 to 34,000 between February and August 1963) and bombed the Ba'th National Guard Milita headquarters. As a result, the first Ba'th government was overthrown and a new, pro-Nasserist government was established with Abdul Salam Arif as Head of State.
-== American involvement ==
-In February 1960, the United States planned a coup against the government of [[Iraq]] headed by Prime Minister [[Abd al-Karim Qasim]], who two years earlier had deposed the Western-allied Iraqi monarchy.  Qasim's rule has been described as authoritarian and dictatorial.  The U.S. was concerned about the growing influence of [[Iraqi Communist Party]] government officials under his administration, as well as his threats to invade [[Kuwait]], which almost caused a war between Iraq and Britain.
-According to the [[Church Committee]], the CIA planned a "special operation" to "incapacitate" an Iraqi Colonel believed to be "promoting Soviet bloc political interests in Iraq."  The aim was to send Qasim a poisoned handkerchief, "which, while not likely to result in total disablement, would be certain to prevent the target from pursuing his usual activities for a minimum of three months."  During the course of the Committee's investigation, the CIA stated that the handkerchief was "in fact never received (if, indeed, sent)." It added that the colonel: "Suffered a terminal illness before a firing squad in Baghdad (an event we had nothing to do with) after our handkerchief proposal was considered."
-Qasim was killed on 8 February 1963 by a firing squad of the [[Ba'ath]] party in collaboration with Iraqi nationalists and members of the [[Arab Socialist Union (Iraq)|Arab Socialist Union]], in what came to be known as the [[Ramadan Revolution]].  Of the 16 members of Qasim's cabinet, 12 of them were Ba'ath Party members; however, the party turned against Qasim due to his refusal to join [[Gamel Abdel Nasser]]'s United Arab Republic.<ref name="iraqfirst">{{cite book | author = [[Con Coughlin|Coughlin, Con]] |  pages = 24–25 | title = Saddam: His Rise and Fall | location = | publisher = [[Harper Perennial]] | year = 2005 | isbn = 0-06-050543-5}}</ref>  Washington immediately befriended the successor regime.  "Almost certainly a gain for our side," [[Robert Komer]], a National Security Council aide, wrote to President Kennedy on the day of the takeover.<ref>{{citation
- | chapter = C. Institutionalizing Assassination: the "Executive Action" capability
- | title = Alleged Assassination Plots involving Foreign Leaders
- | author = Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
- | date = 20 November 1975
- | url = http://history-matters.com/archive/church/reports/ir/contents.htm
- | page = 181
-}}</ref>  The Ba'ath Party was subsequently purged from the government in the November 1963 Iraqi coup d'état after the Ba'athist Prime Minister, [[Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr]], attempted to seize power from the U.S.-backed President, [[Abdul Salam Arif]].
-Writing in his memoirs of the 1963 coup, long time OSS and CIA intelligence analyst Harry Rositzke presented it as an example of one on which they had good intelligence in contrast to others that caught the agency by surprise. The overthrow "was forecast in exact detail by CIA agents."  "Agents in the Ba’th Party headquarters in Baghdad had for years kept Washington au courant on the party’s personnel and organization, its secret communications and sources of funds, and its penetrations of military and civilian hierarchies in several countries.... CIA sources were in a perfect position to follow each step of Ba’th preparations for the Iraqi coup, which focused on making contacts with military and civilian leaders in Baghdad. The CIA’s major source, in an ideal catbird seat, reported the exact time of the coup and provided a list of the new cabinet members.... To call an upcoming coup requires the CIA to have sources within the group of plotters. Yet, from a diplomatic point of view, having secret contacts with plotters implies at least unofficial complicity in the plot."<ref>Harry Rositzke, The CIA’s Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action (Boulder, CO: 1977), 109–110.</ref>
-Qasim was aware of U.S. complicity in the plot and continually denounced the U.S. in public. The [[U.S. Department of State]] was worried that Qasim would harass US diplomats in Iraq because of this.  The CIA was aware of many plots in Iraq in 1962, not just the one that succeeded.<ref>Kennedy Library, "Telegram from Department of State to Embassy Baghdad of February 5, 1963," National Security Files, Countries, Box 117, Iraq 1/63-2/63.</ref>
-The best direct evidence that the U.S. was complicit is the memo from Komer to President Kennedy on February 8, 1963. The last paragraph reads:
-"We will make informal friendly noises as soon as we can find out whom to talk with, and ought to recognize as soon as we’re sure these guys are firmly in the saddle. CIA had excellent reports on the plotting, but I doubt either they or UK should claim much credit for it."<ref>JFK Library, Memorandum for The President from Robert W. Komer, February 8, 1963 (JFK, NSF, Countries, Iraq, Box 117, "Iraq 1/63-2/63", document 18), p. 1.</ref>
 == See also ==
@@ Line 71: / Line 44: @@
 == Notes ==
 {{reflist|30em}}
+{{DEFAULTSORT:November 1963 Iraqi coup d'etat}}
 <!--More specific to more general:-->
-{{DEFAULTSORT:November 1963 Iraqi coup d'etat}}
 [[Category:1960s coups d'état and coup attempts|Iraq]]
 [[Category:1963 in Iraq]]