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Bucklin satisfies the [[majority criterion]], the [[mutual majority criterion|mutual majority criterion]] and the [[monotonicity criterion]].
Bucklin satisfies the [[majority criterion]], the [[mutual majority criterion|mutual majority criterion]] and the [[monotonicity criterion]].


It fails the [[Condorcet criterion]], [[strategic nomination|clone independence]], [[participation criterion|participation]], [[consistency criterion for voting systems|consistency]], [[reversal symmetry]], the [[Condorcet method|Condorcet loser criterion]] and the [[independence of irrelevant alternatives|independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion]].
It fails the [[Condorcet criterion]], [[independence of clones criterion]], [[participation criterion|participation]], [[consistency criterion for voting systems|consistency]], [[reversal symmetry]], the [[Condorcet method|Condorcet loser criterion]] and the [[independence of irrelevant alternatives|independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion]].


== An example ==
== An example ==

Revision as of 23:49, 1 September 2006

Bucklin is a voting system that can be used for single-member districts and also multi-member districts. It is also known as the Grand Junction system after Grand Junction, Colorado, where it was first proposed.

How does it work?

Voters are allowed rank preference ballots (first, second, third, etc.).

First choice votes are first counted. If one candidate has a majority, that candidate wins. Otherwise the second choices are added to the first choices. Again, if a candidate with a majority vote is found, the winner is the candidate with the most votes in that round. Lower rankings are added as needed.

A majority is defined as half the number of voters, similar to Absolute majority. Since after the first round there are more votes cast than voters, it is possible for more than one candidate to have majority support. This makes Bucklin a variation of approval voting.

For multi-member districts, voters mark as many first choices as there are seats to be filled. Voters mark the same number of second and further choices. In some localities, the voter was required to mark a full set of first choices for his or her ballot to be valid.

Where is it used?

This method was used in many political elections in the United States in the early 20th Century. In most states it was repealed and in a few states it was found to violate the state constitution.

Satisfied and failed criteria

Bucklin satisfies the majority criterion, the mutual majority criterion and the monotonicity criterion.

It fails the Condorcet criterion, independence of clones criterion, participation, consistency, reversal symmetry, the Condorcet loser criterion and the independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion.

An example

Tennessee and its four major cities: Memphis in the far west; Nashville in the center; Chattanooga in the east; and Knoxville in the far northeast

Suppose that Tennessee is holding an election on the location of its capital. The population is concentrated around four major cities. All voters want the capital to be as close to them as possible. The options are:

  • Memphis, the largest city, but far from the others (42% of voters)
  • Nashville, near the center of the state (26% of voters)
  • Chattanooga, somewhat east (15% of voters)
  • Knoxville, far to the northeast (17% of voters)

The preferences of each region's voters are:

42% of voters
Far-West
26% of voters
Center
15% of voters
Center-East
17% of voters
Far-East
  1. Memphis
  2. Nashville
  3. Chattanooga
  4. Knoxville
  1. Nashville
  2. Chattanooga
  3. Knoxville
  4. Memphis
  1. Chattanooga
  2. Knoxville
  3. Nashville
  4. Memphis
  1. Knoxville
  2. Chattanooga
  3. Nashville
  4. Memphis


City Round 1 Round 2
Memphis 42 42
Nashville 26 68
Chattanooga 15 58
Knoxville 17 32

The first round has no majority winner. Therefore the second rank votes are added. This moves Nashville and Chatanooga above 50%, so a winner can be determined. Since Nashville is supported by a higher majority (68% versus 58%), Nashville is the winner.

Voter strategy

Voters supporting a strong candidate have an advantage to "Bullet Vote" (Only offer one ranking), in hopes that other voters will add enough votes to help their candidate win. This strategy is most secure if the supported candidate appears likely to gain many second rank votes.

In the above example, Memphis voters have the most first place votes and might not offer a second preference in hopes of winning, but it fails because they are not a second favorite from competitors.

See also