Talk:Exhaustive ballot

Both of the external links/refs for this article are broken. Does anyone have any others? Ron Duvall (talk) 00:24, 19 February 2008 (UTC)

I fixed the DFL call link that I added, although such a weird name, perhaps no hope it'll stay active. I mainly linked it for an explicit example of elimination rules. Tom Ruen (talk) 00:52, 19 February 2008 (UTC)

"Exhaustive ballot" election

Copied from Talk:Instant-runoff voting

The article says, "The term 'instant runoff' is used because IRV is said to simulate a series of run-off elections tallied in rounds, as in an exhaustive ballot election." Most of the references I see to "exhaustive ballot" are Wikipedia mirrors, and "exhaustive balloting" brings up mostly references to the circa 1998 Australia constitutional convention, which picked between competing reforms; see http://www.suncoast.com.au/republic/convention/proc/hansard_1002_9.html . In reference to Australia, it is also mentioned at http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/pubs/odgers/chap1108.htm . It was also used to pick Papua New Guinea's new governor-general: http://www.pacificmagazine.net/issue/2004/06/01/regional-briefs-1 . Exhaustive balloting sometimes refers to the technique described in Robert's Rules (see p. 426-427, where it is described, although it is not termed "exhaustive balloting"). I think sometimes people use it to mean that you had to take a heck of a lot of successive ballots to elect someone. See, for instance, Japan from War to Peace: The Coaldrake Records 1939-1956, page 457, which describes a process that took 28 ballots to elect someone. Supposedly, the leaders of National and Labour in New Zealand are elected by exhaustive balloting; see http://keithrankin.com/rf_shorts_1998_06juna.html . See also http://www.national-renewal.org.au/ConCon/proc/hansard_1002_10.shtml for some interesting comments on exhaustive balloting.

Ah, here are some good refs: http://www.securevote.com.au/gloss_of_terms.html and http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmproced/40/4005.htm and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1171438.stm . I'll include one of those. Some of these other refs may go the exhaustive ballot article, which only has dead links at present. Ron Duvall (talk) 00:58, 19 February 2008 (UTC)

I was surprised to see a reference to eliminating candidates at the end of each round. My understanding of exhaustive balloting is that candidates are never eliminated except by the fact people stop voting for them on subsequent ballots. Sometimes they stop because the candidate has conceded and withdrawn from the race, with or without throwing his support to anyone else. Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised (which simply calls this method "balloting"), specifically advises against eliminating anyone and points to real-world situations where an early-ballot last-place finisher finally ended up with a majority, as a compromise candidate, when the top contenders repeatedly deadlocked. Also, if a candidate is eliminated on each round, no election can take more than n-1 ballots, for n candidates. Jeepien (talk) 20:00, 7 March 2008 (UTC)

A mistake?

The article now in the end says "In Example II Knoxville wins, the last choice of both Nashville and Memphis supporters." But obviously Knoxville is not the last choice of the Nashville supporters, as Memphis would then have won in the last round. Or have I completely misunderstood the concept? Fomalhaut76 (talk) 19:04, 18 October 2010 (UTC)

Reverse gender? Tactical Voting says "she" not "he or she"

Usually the male is the default. This is something new? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 174.73.22.113 (talk) 15:48, 29 December 2014 (UTC)

"An exhaustive ballot produces the same result as an Instant-runoff voting or Preferential voting ballot but requires multiple ballots where a preferential voting system uses only one ballot."

This claim has no citation and appears to me to be false. IRV does not allow voters to "change" their first choice in light of earlier rounds. Suppose we have an election with 4 candidates, A, B, C, and D, and it is common knowledge that everyone who doesn't most prefer A least prefers A. Further suppose that if everyone voted according their "true" preference order then IRV would eliminate the candidates in the order D,C,A. Now suppose everyone who most prefers A has C as their second choice. In an exhaustive ballot system, supporters of A would be rational to vote for C in the second round if the first round reveals that A cannot win and this could result in a win for C, but if it's not known before the first round whether A can win, an IRV system would lock those who initially voted for A into that support so that they cannot prevent B from winning. Should this claim be removed or edited to say "in the absence of strategic voting"? 107.77.75.119 (talk) 18:37, 22 April 2015 (UTC)

Yes this statement is clearly untrue - Instant-runoff or Preferential ballots are determined on the first round, whereas voters in Exhaustive ballots can change their vote, so it is not possible to state that they give the same results deterministically. Pseudocoder (talk) 12:50, 29 April 2015 (UTC)

I was going to make a very similar point in respect of the bracketed comment in the lede - "In some circumstances, the two or more lowest candidates can be eliminated simultaneously if together they have fewer votes than the lowest candidate above them. In other words, this "bulk exclusion" cannot change the order of elimination, unlike a two-round system." There are at least three implied assumptions with this assertion, none of which are universally valid: a) voters are entirely rational in their choices, b) circumstances do not alter between rounds in a way that would change preferences and c) voters always vote for the candidate they want to win.

In a true multi-round ballot (as opposed to any alternative vote arrangement) b) is clearly not the case since a key consideration - the field of candidates - has altered even barring any external events. That in turn effects c) since tactical votes may be reconsidered. For example, your preferred candidate is A but you vote B because you consider he has the better chance of defeating C whom you really don't want. You don't need to do that if C is no longer in the running, but you can't change your vote to A if he is no longer in the running either. I'm always slightly suspicious of parenthetical remarks like that in particular - they sometimes get used to imply you are simply expanding on the previous point for the sake of clarity, when as here they actually make completely new, unsourced and contentious points. Pink Fluffiness (talk) 12:04, 8 November 2015 (UTC)

Both produce different results because of possible tactical voting.

At a election with A, B and C candidates, you could have a situation where your prefer A to B and think C sucks. You think the second round will be (A or B) against C and think that the voters that will vote B will prefer C to A, so instead of voting A you vote B.

Your idea is that if the second round is B vs C, voters that selected A, at previous round, will vote B making it win. If somehow A and B go to the second round, you will be able to select A, your true choice. If used the same tactic as you, A may win.

At previous example, if A and B gone to second round, your choice would be automatically a B.

Even the 50% rule influence the election (assuming you use exhaustive ballot instead of runoff). Imagine you ALWAYS removed the last candidate and had a new round, no matter if the most voted had 50% of the votes or not. At previous example (and assuming alot of people use the same type of tactical voting system), you could have a situation where B get more than 50% of the votes, but then B goes to second round vs A, and lose because most of people that vote B were tactical voters that prefer A.