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Hoepner commanded the 4th Panzer Group in the drive toward [[Leningrad]] as part of [[Army Group North]] under [[Wilhelm von Leeb]].{{sfn|Zabecki|2014|p=615}} The army group defeated the defending Soviet [[Northwestern Front]], inflicting over 90,000 casualties and destroying more than 1000 tanks and 1000 aircraft, and advanced northeast of the [[Stalin line]].{{sfn|Glantz|2012}}
Hoepner commanded the 4th Panzer Group in the drive toward [[Leningrad]] as part of [[Army Group North]] under [[Wilhelm von Leeb]].{{sfn|Zabecki|2014|p=615}} The army group defeated the defending Soviet [[Northwestern Front]], inflicting over 90,000 casualties and destroying more than 1000 tanks and 1000 aircraft, and advanced northeast of the [[Stalin line]].{{sfn|Glantz|2012}}


During his command on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]], Hoepner pursued a policy of [[scorched earth]], demanding "ruthless and complete destruction of the enemy."<ref>{{cite web|last=Friedmann|first=Jan|url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,605223,00.html|title=Dubious Role Models: Study Reveals Many German Schools Still Named After Nazis|website=Spiegel.de|date=4 February 2009|accessdate=7 November 2016|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110920081337/http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,605223,00.html|archivedate=20 September 2011|df=dmy-all}}</ref> By mid-July, his Panzer Group seized the [[Luga River|Luga]] bridgehead and had plans to advance on Leningrad. The staff and detachments 2 and 3 of ''[[Einsatzgruppe A]]'', one of the mobile killing squads following the Wehrmacht into the occupied Soviet Union, were brought up to the Luga district with assistance from the army. "The movement of ''Einsatzgruppe A''—which the army intended to use in Leningrad—was effected in agreement with Panzer Group 4 and at their express wish," noted [[Franz Walter Stahlecker]], the commander of ''Einsatzgruppe A''.{{sfn|Jones|2008|p=35}} Stahlecker described Wehrmacht's cooperation as "generally very good," and "in certain cases, as for example, with Panzer Group 4 under the command of General Hoepner, extremely close, one might say even warm."{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=37}}
During his command on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]], Hoepner pursued a policy of [[scorched earth]], demanding "ruthless and complete destruction of the enemy."<ref>{{cite web|last=Friedmann|first=Jan|url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,605223,00.html|title=Dubious Role Models: Study Reveals Many German Schools Still Named After Nazis|website=Spiegel.de|date=4 February 2009|accessdate=7 November 2016|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110920081337/http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,605223,00.html|archivedate=20 September 2011|df=dmy-all}}</ref> By mid-July, his Panzer Group seized the [[Luga River|Luga]] bridgehead and had plans to advance on Leningrad.


===Battle of Moscow===
===Battle of Moscow===

Revision as of 08:46, 17 February 2018

Erich Hoepner
Born(1886-09-14)14 September 1886
Frankfurt (Oder)
Died8 August 1944(1944-08-08) (aged 57)
Plötzensee Prison
Allegiance German Empire
 Weimar Republic
 Nazi Germany
Service/branchArmy (Wehrmacht)
Years of service1905–42
RankGeneraloberst
Commands heldXVI Army Corps
4th Panzer Group
Battles/warsWorld War I

World War II

AwardsKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross

Erich Hoepner (14 September 1886 – 8 August 1944) was a German general during World War II. An early proponent of mechanization and armored warfare, he was a Wehrmacht army corps commander at the beginning of the war, successfully leading his troops during the invasion of Poland and the Battle of France.

As commander of the 4th Panzer Group on the Eastern Front during Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hoepner pursued a policy of scorched earth, closely cooperated with the Einsatzgruppen and implemented the Commissar Order. His Panzer group, along with the 3rd Panzer Group, spearheaded the advance on Moscow in Operation Typhoon, the failed attempt to seize the Soviet capital.

Dismissed from the Wehrmacht after the failure of the 1941 campaign, Hoepner launched a successful lawsuit to restore his pension rights. He was implicated in the failed 20 July Plot against Adolf Hitler and executed in 1944.

Early years and World War I

Hoepner was born in Frankfurt (Oder), the son of General Kurt Hoepner. He was commissioned into the Imperial German Army as a cavalry lieutenant in 1906, joining the 13th Schleswig-Holstein Dragoons Regiment (de). In 1911 he attended the Prussian Staff College and was assigned to the General Staff of the XVI Corps. When the First World War began, he was assigned to the Western Front, serving as a company commander and staff officer for several corps and armies. He fought with the 105th Division in the German Spring Offensive of 1918, ending the war as a Rittmeister (Cavalry Captain).[1][2]

Interwar period

Hoepner remained in the Reichswehr during the Weimar Republic period.[1] He was promoted to the rank of Generalmajor in 1936, and in 1938 was given command of the 1st Light Division (later 6th Panzer Division), an early panzer unit that was part of the nucleus of the expanding German Panzerwaffe. Claus von Stauffenberg served on Hoepner's divisional staff.[3] After the Blomberg–Fritsch affair, and as the Sudetenland crisis unfolded, Hoepner joined the Oster conspiracy, a plan to kill Adolf Hitler and overthrow the SS should Hitler move to invade Czechoslovakia. Hoepner's role in the plan was to lead the 1st Light Division toward Berlin and seize key objectives against the SS forces in the city. The conspiracy collapsed with the appeasements by Neville Chamberlain and Édouard Daladier and the signing of the Munich Agreement. Upon his rival Heinz Guderian's assumption of command of the XIX Corps; Hoepner replaced him as the commander of the XVI Army Corps. He led the corps in the occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and was promoted the next month to General of the Cavalry.[4]

World War II

Invasion of Poland and Battle of France

Hoepner commanded the XVI Army Corps in the Invasion of Poland where he covered the 230 km (140 mi) to Warsaw in only a week as part of the 10th Army.[5] Hoepner and his corps were transferred to the 6th Army for the invasion of France, where he spearheaded attacks on Liège and then Dunkirk and Dijon. On 22 May, the SS Division Totenkopf was assigned to XVI Corps, starting what was to be a long period of friction and mutual dislike between Hoepner and the SS. During the Battle of Dunkirk, rumours began to spread of SS troops mistreating prisoners, and on 24 May Hoepner issued a special order to his units that any soldiers caught mistreating prisoners would face immediate court-martial.[6]

Three days later troops from the SS Division Totenkopf killed almost a hundred British prisoners in the Le Paradis massacre. When word of the massacre reached Hoepner he ordered an investigation into the allegations, demanding that the SS division commander, Theodor Eicke be dismissed if evidence could be found that British prisoners had been mistreated or killed by SS forces. Eicke made an excuse to Himmler that the British had used dum-dum bullets against his forces. He and the Totenkopf unit suffered no consequences, and the matter was forgotten.[7] Hoepner continued to hold a personal and professional dislike of Eicke, calling him a "butcher" for his disregard of casualties, and he maintained his low opinion of the Waffen-SS.[8] After the conclusion of the fighting in France, Hoepner was promoted to the rank of Generaloberst in July 1940 and given command of the 4th Panzer Group slated for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union.[1]

Eastern Front

Hoepner commanded the 4th Panzer Group in the drive toward Leningrad as part of Army Group North under Wilhelm von Leeb.[2] The army group defeated the defending Soviet Northwestern Front, inflicting over 90,000 casualties and destroying more than 1000 tanks and 1000 aircraft, and advanced northeast of the Stalin line.[9]

During his command on the Eastern Front, Hoepner pursued a policy of scorched earth, demanding "ruthless and complete destruction of the enemy."[10] By mid-July, his Panzer Group seized the Luga bridgehead and had plans to advance on Leningrad.

Battle of Moscow

In September, Hoepner's Panzer group was transferred to Army Group Center in preparation for Operation Typhoon, the German assault on Moscow.[2] In early October, the panzer group completed the encirclement at Vyazma. Günther von Kluge, commander of the 4th Army, to which the 4th Panzer group was subordinated, instructed Hoepner to pause the advance, much to his displeasure, as his units were needed to prevent breakouts of Soviet forces. He was confident that the clearing of the pocket, and the advance on Moscow, could be undertaken at the same time and viewed Kluge's actions as interference, leading to friction and "clashes" with his superior, as he wrote in a letter home on 6 October.[11] Hoepner did not seem to appreciate that his units were very short on fuel; one of the divisions, the 11th Panzer, reported having no fuel at all. Only one armoured division, the 20th Panzer Division, was advancing towards Moscow amid deteriorating road conditions.[12]

Once the Vyazma pocket was eliminated, other units were able to advance as well starting on 14 October. The heavy rains and onset of the rasputitsa ("roadlessness") caused frequent damage to tracked vehicles and motor transport further hampering the advance.[13] By early November, Hoepner's forces were depleted from earlier fighting and weather conditions, but he, along with other Panzer Group commanders and Fedor von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, was impatient to resume the offensive. In a letter home, Hoepner stated that just two weeks of frozen ground would allow his troops to surround Moscow, not taking into account the stiffening Soviet resistance and the condition of his units.[14] In the words of the historian David Stahel, Hoepner displayed "steadfast determination, and often excessive confidence" during that period.[15]

On 17 November Hoepner’s Panzer Group 4 renewed its offensive towards Moscow alongside the V Army Corps of Kluge’s 4th Army, as part of the continuation of Operation Typhoon by Army Group Centre. The Panzer group and the army corps represented Kluge’s best forces, most ready for a continued offensive. In two weeks of fighting, Hoepner’s forces advanced 60 km (37 mi), or 4 km (2.5 mi) per day on average. [16] Lacking strength and mobility to conduct concentric operations and battles of encirclement, the Panzer group undertook a series of frontal assaults which proved increasingly costly, resulting in high attrition rates of men and materiel.[17] A lack of tanks, insufficient motor transport and a precarious supply situation, along with tenacious Red Army defences and the air superiority achieved by Soviet fighters hampered the attack.[18]

Panzer Group 3 further north saw slightly better progress, with 6 km (3.7 mi) daily on average. The attack by Guderian’s Panzer Group 2 on Tula and Kashira, 125 km (78 mi) south of Moscow, achieved only fleeting and precarious success, while Guderian himself vacillated between despair and optimism, depending on the situation at the front.[19] Facing pressure from the German High Command, Kluge finally committed his weaker south flank to the attack on 1 December. In the aftermath of the battle, both Hoepner and Guderian blamed slow commitment of the south flank of the 4th Army to the attack for the German failure to reach Moscow. However, in the opinion of David Stahel, this assessment grossly overestimated the capabilities of Kluge’s remaining forces.[20] It also failed to appreciate the reality that Moscow was a large metropolis that German forces lacked the numbers to encircle. With the outer defensive belt completed by 25 November, Moscow was a highly fortified fortress which the Wehrmacht lacked the strength to take in a frontal assault either.[21]

As late as 2 December, Hoepner urged his troops forward stating that "the goal [the encirclement of Moscow] can still be achieved." The next day, he warned Kluge that failure to break off the attack would "bleed white" his formations and make them incapable of defence. Kluge was sympathetic since the south flank of the 4th army had already had to retreat under heavy Soviet Army pressure and was on the defensive.[22] Hoepner was ordered to pause his attack, with the goal of resuming it on 6 December. In a letter home, Hoepner blamed Kluge for the inability to seize Moscow: "I alone came to within thirty kilometres to Moscow... It's very bitter (...) in the deciding moment to be left in the lurch and forced to resignation." Such "blinkered thinking" on Hoepner's part was common among the commanders who conceived and executed the offensive, which in Stahel's opinion "even before it began, made little practical sense."[23] On 5 December 1941, with orders to attack the next day, Hoepner called a conference of chiefs-of-staff of his five corps. The reports were grim: only four divisions were deemed capable of attack, three of these with limited objectives. The attack was called off; the Red Army launched its winter counter-offensive on the same day.[24]

Dismissal and 20 July Plot

In January 1942, Hoepner requested permission from Kluge, who was by that time appointed commander of Army Group Centre, to withdraw his over-extended forces. Kudge advised him that he would discuss the matter with Hitler and ordered Hoepner to get ready. Assuming that Hitler's permission was on the way, and not wanting to risk the matter any longer, Hoepner ordered his troops to withdraw on 8 January 1942. Afraid of what Hitler might think, Kluge immediately reported Hoepner, causing Hitler's fury. Hoepner was dismissed from the Wehrmacht on the same day.[25]

Hitler directed that Hoepner be deprived of his pension and denied the right to wear his uniform and medals, contravening then-current laws and Wehrmacht regulations.[26] Hoepner filed a lawsuit against the Reich to reclaim his pension. Judges at the time could not be dismissed, even by Hitler, and Hoepner won his case.[27]

Hoepner at the Volksgerichtshof

Hoepner was a participant in the 20 July Plot against Hitler in 1944, and after the coup failed he was arrested and tortured by the Gestapo. Hoepner refused the opportunity to commit suicide and demanded a trial. He was given a summary trial by the Volksgerichtshof and sentenced to death. Like other defendants, including Erwin von Witzleben, Hoepner was made to wear ill-fitting clothes, and was not allowed to have his false teeth as a humiliation during his trial. Although judge Roland Freisler berated Hoepner, he objected to him being made to dress in such a way.[28] Hoepner was hanged by wire mounted from meat hooks on 8 August, at Plötzensee Prison in Berlin.[29]

Under the Nazi practice of Sippenhaft, by which family members were punished collectively for the crimes of their kin, Hoepner's family was arrested, including his wife, daughter, son (a major in the army), brother, and sister.[30] The three women were sent to Ravensbrück concentration camp. His sister was soon released, but Mrs. Hoepner and her daughter were placed in the notorious Strafblock for four weeks' additional punishment.[31][32] Hoepner's son was first held at a specially created camp at Küstrin (now Kostrzyn nad Odrą) and then sent to Buchenwald concentration camp.[33]

Commemoration

Memorial plaque for Hoepner and Henning von Tresckow in the Bundeshaus, Berlin.

In 1956, a school in Berlin was named after Hoepner because he had joined the 20 July plot and was executed by the Nazi regime. In 2009 the school's director attested to the fact that "the name had been controversial from the start and was repeatedly debated." The school voted to drop the name in 2008.[34]

Awards

References

Citations

  1. ^ a b c Tucker 2016, p. 793.
  2. ^ a b c Zabecki 2014, p. 615.
  3. ^ Mitcham 2006, p. 76.
  4. ^ Fest 1997, p. 68.
  5. ^ Tucker 2016, pp. 793–794.
  6. ^ English 2011, p. 14.
  7. ^ Sydnor 1977, pp. 108–109.
  8. ^ English 2011, pp. 11–12.
  9. ^ Glantz 2012.
  10. ^ Friedmann, Jan (4 February 2009). "Dubious Role Models: Study Reveals Many German Schools Still Named After Nazis". Spiegel.de. Archived from the original on 20 September 2011. Retrieved 7 November 2016. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  11. ^ Stahel 2013, pp. 74–75, 95.
  12. ^ Stahel 2013, p. 95.
  13. ^ Stahel 2013, pp. 173–174.
  14. ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 78–80.
  15. ^ Stahel 2015, p. 7.
  16. ^ Stahel 2015, p. 228.
  17. ^ Stahel 2015, p. 223.
  18. ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 240–244.
  19. ^ Stahel 2015, p. 186−189, 228.
  20. ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 229–230.
  21. ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 235–237, 250.
  22. ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 295–296.
  23. ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 304–305.
  24. ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 306–307.
  25. ^ Evans 2008.
  26. ^ Lemay 2010, p. 219.
  27. ^ Kershaw 2009, pp. 837, 899.
  28. ^ Gill 1994, p. 256.
  29. ^ Tucker 2016, p. 794.
  30. ^ Loeffel 2012, p. 130.
  31. ^ Ravensbruck: Life and Death in Hitler's Concentration Camp for Women by Sarah Helm
  32. ^ Helm 2015, pp. 396–397.
  33. ^ Loeffel 2012, pp. 162–164.
  34. ^ Crossland, David (16 February 2009). "Nazi era lives on in German schools". thenational.ae. Archived from the original on 23 December 2017. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  35. ^ Fellgiebel 2000, p. 230.

Bibliography

Further reading

External links

Military offices
Preceded by
none
Commander of Fourth Panzer Army
15 February 1941 – 7 January 1942
Succeeded by
Generaloberst Richard Ruoff