Jump to content

Democratic backsliding: Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Browse history interactively
← Previous editNext edit →
Content deleted Content added
VisualWikitext
→Manifestations: Added bullet point for the misuse of the legislative process to antidemocratic ends. This seems to be a clear feature of democratic backsliding and perhaps the other bullet points did not encompass this point.
Line 8: Line 8:
*[[Free and fair election]]s are degraded;<ref name="DemDigest" />
*[[Free and fair election]]s are degraded;<ref name="DemDigest" />
*[[Liberalism|Liberal]] rights of [[freedom of speech]] and [[Freedom of association|association]] decline, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge the government, hold it to account, and propose alternatives to the current regime;<ref name="DemDigest"/>
*[[Liberalism|Liberal]] rights of [[freedom of speech]] and [[Freedom of association|association]] decline, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge the government, hold it to account, and propose alternatives to the current regime;<ref name="DemDigest"/>
*The policy making process is increasingly targeted to privileged groups and counter to the needs and views of the majority of citizens, and legislation is used to antidemocratic ends.
*The policy making process is increasingly in service to privileged groups and counter to the needs and views of the majority of citizens, and legislation is used to antidemocratic ends.
*The [[rule of law]] (i.e., judicial and bureaucratic restraints on the government) is weakened,<ref name="DemDigest"/> such as when the [[independence of the judiciary]] is threatened, or when [[civil service]] tenure protections are weakened or eliminated.<ref name="HuqGinsburgVox">Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, [https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/2/21/14664568/lose-constitutional-democracy-autocracy-trump-authoritarian How to lose a constitutional democracy], ''Vox'' (February 21, 2017).</ref>
*The [[rule of law]] (i.e., judicial and bureaucratic restraints on the government) is weakened,<ref name="DemDigest"/> such as when the [[independence of the judiciary]] is threatened, or when [[civil service]] tenure protections are weakened or eliminated.<ref name="HuqGinsburgVox">Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, [https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/2/21/14664568/lose-constitutional-democracy-autocracy-trump-authoritarian How to lose a constitutional democracy], ''Vox'' (February 21, 2017).</ref>
*The government manufactures or overemphasizes a [[national security]] threat to create "a sense of crisis" that allows the government "to malign critics as weak-willed or unpatriotic" and to depict defenders of democratic institutions "as representatives of a tired, insulated elite."<ref name="HuqGinsburgVox"/>
*The government manufactures or overemphasizes a [[national security]] threat to create "a sense of crisis" that allows the government "to malign critics as weak-willed or unpatriotic" and to depict defenders of democratic institutions "as representatives of a tired, insulated elite."<ref name="HuqGinsburgVox"/>

Revision as of 20:46, 17 June 2019

In political science, democratic backsliding is a gradual decline in the quality of democracy.[1]

This decline is caused by the state-led weakening of political institutions that sustain the democratic system. These essential components of democracy can be threatened in different ways. Thus, the concept of democratic backsliding can take various forms. Political scientist Nancy Bermeo has written that blatant forms of democratic backsliding such as classic, open-ended coups d'état and election-day fraud have declined since the end of the Cold War, while more subtle and "vexing" forms of backsliding have increased. The latter forms of backsliding entail the debilitation democratic institutions from within. These subtle forms of backsliding are especially dangerous when they are legitimized through the very institutions that ought to protect democratic values.[2]

Manifestations

Democratic backsliding occur when essential components of democracy are threatened; for example, when:[3][4]

  • Free and fair elections are degraded;[3]
  • Liberal rights of freedom of speech and association decline, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge the government, hold it to account, and propose alternatives to the current regime;[3]
  • The policy making process is increasingly in service to privileged groups and counter to the needs and views of the majority of citizens, and legislation is used to antidemocratic ends.
  • The rule of law (i.e., judicial and bureaucratic restraints on the government) is weakened,[3] such as when the independence of the judiciary is threatened, or when civil service tenure protections are weakened or eliminated.[5]
  • The government manufactures or overemphasizes a national security threat to create "a sense of crisis" that allows the government "to malign critics as weak-willed or unpatriotic" and to depict defenders of democratic institutions "as representatives of a tired, insulated elite."[5]

Forms

These more common forms of democratic backsliding can occur in the following ways:

  • Promissory coups. In a promissory coup, an incumbent elected government is deposed in a coup d'etat by coup leaders who claim to defend democracy and promise to hold elections in order to restore democracy. In these situations, coupmakers emphasize the temporary and necessary nature of their intervention in order to ensure democracy in the future.[2] This is unlike the more open-ended coups that occurred during the Cold War. Political scientist Nancy Bermeo notes that "The share of successful coups that falls into the promissory category has risen significantly, from 35 percent before 1990 to 85 percent afterward."[2] Examining 12 promissory coups in democratic states between 1990 and 2012, Bermeo found that "Few promissory coups were followed quickly by competitive elections, and fewer still paved the way for improved democracies."[2]
  • Executive aggrandizement. This process contains a series of institutional changes by the elected executives, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge the government and hold it to account. The most important feature of executive aggrandizement is that the institutional changes are made through legal channels, making it seem as if the elected official has a democratic mandate.[2][6] Some examples of executive aggrandizement are the decline of media freedom and the weakening of the rule of law (i.e., judicial and bureaucratic restraints on the government), such as when judicial autonomy is threatened.[2]
  • Strategic harassment and manipulation during elections. This form of democratic backslidings entails the impairment of free and fair elections through tactics such as blocking media access, disqualifying opposition leaders, or harassing opponents. This form of backsliding is done in such a way that the elections do not appear to be rigged and rarely involves any apparent violations of the law, making it difficult for international election monitoring organizations to observe or criticize these misconducts.[2]

Democratic backsliding is often led by democratically elected leaders, and uses tactics that are "incremental rather than revolutionary."[7] This also makes it harder to pinpoint when a democracy breaks down, because as Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt pointed out, this happens "slowly, in barely visible steps".[6]

Causes of democratic backsliding

Populism

Pippa Norris of the Harvard Kennedy School and the University of Sydney argues that the two "twin forces" pose the largest threat to Western liberal democracies: "sporadic and random terrorist attacks on domestic soil, which damage feelings of security, and the rise of populist-authoritarian forces, which feed parasitically upon these fears."[8] According to Norris, the reinforcement of these insecurities has led to more support for populist-authoritarian leaders. Also, Norris argues that this latter risk is especially pronounced in the United States during the presidency of Donald Trump. For example, Norris argues that U.S. President Donald Trump has benefited from the mistrust of 'the establishment' and that he continuously seeks to undermine faith in the legitimacy of the media and the independence of the courts.[9]

A 2018 analysis by political scientists Yascha Mounk and Jordan Kyle links populism to democratic backsliding, showing that since 1990, "13 right-wing populist governments have been elected; of these, five brought about significant democratic backsliding. Over the same time period, 15 left-wing populist governments were elected; of these, the same number, five, brought about significant democratic backsliding."[10]

A December 2018 report by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change concluded that populist rule, whether left- or right-wing, leads to a significant risk of democratic backsliding. The authors examine the effect of populism on three major aspects of democracy: the quality of democracy in general, checks and balances on executive power and citizens' right to politically participate in a meaningful way. They conclude that populist governments are four times more likely to cause harm to democratic institutions than non-populist governments. Also, more than half of populist leaders have amended or rewritten the countries' constitution, frequently in a way that eroded checks and balances on executive power. Lastly, populists attack individual rights such as freedom of press, civil liberties and political rights.[7]

Economic inequality and social discontent

Many political economy scholars, such as Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, have investigated the effect of income inequality on democratic breakdown.[1] Studies of democratic collapse show that economic inequality is significantly higher in countries that eventually move towards a more authoritarian model.[11] Hungary is an example of a country where a large group of unemployed, low-educated people were dissatisfied with the high levels of inequality, especially after the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Viktor Orbán used this dissatisfaction of a relatively large segment of the population in his advantage, winning popular support by using national-populist rhetoric.[12]

Prevalence

The U.S.-based research group Freedom House, in reports in 2017 and 2019, identified democratic backsliding a variety of regions across the world, including for example Hungary and Poland in Europe, Turkey in the Middle East, Venezuela in Latin America and the United States in North America.[13][14]

The scholarly recognition of the concept of democratic backsliding reflects a reversal from older views, which held "that democracy, once attained in a fairly wealthy state, would become a permanent fixture."[3] This older view came to be realized as erroneous beginning in the mid-2000s, as multiple scholars acknowledged that some seemingly-stable democracies have recently faced a decline in the quality of their democracy.[11] Huq and Ginsburg identified in an academic paper "37 instances in 25 different countries in the postwar period in which democratic quality declined significantly (though a fully authoritarian regime didn't emerge)," including countries that were "seemingly stable, reasonably wealthy" democracies.[5]

Hungary

Since 2010, Hungary has been a prominent example of democratic backsliding.[15][16]

Turkey

Since the early 2000s, Turkey has been considered another example of democratic backsliding.[17]

Venezuela

Since the late 1990s, Venezuela has been considered a nation that has undergone a significant backslide in democratic institutions.[18] Chavismo propelled democratic backsliding in Venezuela.[19]

See also

References

  1. ^ a b Walder, D. and Lust, E. (2018). "Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding". Annual Review of Political Science. 21(1): 93–113 – via https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628. {{cite journal}}: External link in |via= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  2. ^ a b c d e f g Bermeo, Nancy (January 2016). "On Democratic Backsliding" (PDF). Journal of Democracy. 27 (1): 5–19.
  3. ^ a b c d e "How democratic backsliding happens". Democracy Digest. February 21, 2017.
  4. ^ Waldner, David; Lust, Ellen (2018-05-11). "Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding". Annual Review of Political Science. 21 (1): 93–113. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628. ISSN 1094-2939.
  5. ^ a b c Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to lose a constitutional democracy, Vox (February 21, 2017).
  6. ^ a b Levitsky, Steven; Ziblatt, Daniel (2018). How Democracies Die. United States: Crown. pp. 76–78.
  7. ^ a b Kyle, Jordan; Mounk, Yascha (December 2018). "The Populist Harm to Democracy: An Empirical Assesment" (PDF). Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |dead-url= (help)
  8. ^ Norris, Pippa (April 2017). "Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks" (PDF). Journal of Democracy (Scholarly response to column published online). Online Exchange on “Democratic Deconsolidation”. Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved 2018-08-28.
  9. ^ Norris, Pippa (April 2017). "Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks". Journal of Democracy.
  10. ^ Kyle, Yascha Mounk, Jordan (2018-12-26). "What Populists Do to Democracies". The Atlantic. Retrieved 2018-12-27.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  11. ^ a b Huq, Aziz; Ginsburg, Tom (2018). "How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy". UCLA Law Review. 65: 78–169.
  12. ^ Greskovitz, Béla (2015). "The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East Central Europe". Global Policy. 6 (1): 28–37.
  13. ^ "Democracy in Retreat". Freedom House. 2019. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |dead-url= (help)
  14. ^ Esther King (January 31, 2017). "Democratic backsliding threatens international order: report". Politico.
  15. ^ Kingsley, Patrick (2018-02-10). "As West Fears the Rise of Autocrats, Hungary Shows What's Possible". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2019-05-27.
  16. ^ Bozóki, András; Hegedűs, Dániel (2018-10-03). "An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union". Democratization. 25 (7): 1173–1189. doi:10.1080/13510347.2018.1455664. ISSN 1351-0347.
  17. ^ Bennhold, Katrin; Gall, Carlotta (2018-09-26). "Turkey's Erdogan Changes His Tune, Seeking Support and Cooperation in Germany". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2019-05-27.
  18. ^ Sabatini, Christopher (2016-11-01). "The Final Blow to Venezuela's Democracy". Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2019-05-27.
  19. ^ Hawkins, Kirk (2016). "Chavismo, Liberal Democracy, and Radical Democracy". Annual Review of Political Science. 19: 311–329. SSRN 2779566.

Further reading

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Democratic_backsliding&oldid=902290786"