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Published contributions to the philosophical debate about conspiracy theories prior to 2006 are collected in David Coady's ''Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate'' (Ashgate 2006), which also includes several new essays by the same authors. Contributors include David Coady, Charles Pigden, Brian L. Keeley, Lee Basham, and Steve Clarke. The relevant pages from Karl Popper regarding the "conspiracy theory of society" are also included. The debate is focused primarily on epistemic issues such as "when if ever it is rational to believe conspiracy theories" (Coady 2006, p. ix). The book begins with Popper's idea of the "conspiracy theory of society" and Charles Pigden's response.
Published contributions to the philosophical debate about conspiracy theories prior to 2006 are collected in David Coady's ''Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate'' (Ashgate 2006), which also includes several new essays by the same authors. Contributors include David Coady, Charles Pigden, Brian L. Keeley, Lee Basham, and Steve Clarke. The relevant pages from Karl Popper regarding the "conspiracy theory of society" are also included. The debate is focused primarily on epistemic issues such as "when if ever it is rational to believe conspiracy theories" (Coady 2006, p. ix). The book begins with Popper's idea of the "conspiracy theory of society" and Charles Pigden's response.


Brian Keeley's 1999 essay, "Of Conspiracy Theories," which originally appeared in ''The Journal of Philosophy'', prompted a new phase in the debate. Keeley focused on a subset of conspiracy theories that he called "unwarranted conspiracy theories" (UCTs). According to David Coady, Keeley argued that several generalizations about conspiracy theories "suggest a ''prima facie''case against belief in them" (Coady 2006, p. 6). Lee Basham takes a more sympathetic view, suggesting we should adopt an attitude of "studied agnosticism" (Coady 2006, p. 7). Steve Clarke argues that because conspiracy theories overestimate dispositional explanations an attitude of prima facie skepticism towards them is warranted. David Coady, however, suggests that there is another error that should be considered, "the error of being excessively unwilling to believe conspiracy theories." Here argues that this error is more widespread and insidious (Coady 2006, p. 9).
Brian Keeley's 1999 essay, "Of Conspiracy Theories," which originally appeared in ''The Journal of Philosophy'', prompted a new phase in the debate. Keeley focused on a subset of conspiracy theories that he called "unwarranted conspiracy theories" (UCTs). According to David Coady, Keeley argued that several generalizations about conspiracy theories "suggest a ''prima facie''case against belief in them" (Coady 2006, p. 6). Lee Basham takes a more sympathetic view, suggesting we should adopt an attitude of "studied agnosticism" (Coady 2006, p. 7). Steve Clarke argues that because conspiracy theories overestimate dispositional explanations an attitude of prima facie skepticism towards them is warranted. David Coady, however, suggests that there is another error that should be considered, "the error of being excessively unwilling to believe conspiracy theories." He argues that this error is more widespread and insidious (Coady 2006, p. 9).


In 2007, a special issue of ''Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology'' contained several more essays that continued the debate. Therein, Neil Levy, in "Radically Socialized Knowledge," argues that conspiracy theories, conceived of as conflicting with officially endorsed accounts, "should be treated with ''prima facie''scepticism" because they conflict with the views of the relevant epistemic authorities.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Coady|first=David|date=2007|title=Introduction: Conspiracy Theories|url=|journal=Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology|volume=4.2|pages=132|via=}}</ref><ref name=":1">Dentith, M R. X. (2018). “When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might Be the Best Explanation,” p. 4. In Dentith (ed). ''Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously''. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.</ref> David Coady, in "Are Conspiracy Theories Irrational?" responds to Levy, arguing that "conspiracy theorists need not be particularly sceptical of epistemic authorities as such."<ref name=":0" /> Coady also argues that Levy’s position trades on an ambiguity between "institutional authority" and "epistemic authority." <ref>Coady, David. (2018). “Anti-Rumor Campaigns and Conspiracy-Baiting as Propaganda,” pp. 174-175. In Dentith (ed). ''Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously''. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.</ref> Coady takes the position that the pejorative use of the phrase "conspiracy theory" ought to be discontinued.<ref name=":0" /> Pete Mandik "characterizes conspiracy theorists as people who fail to recognise that sometimes shit just happens."<ref name=":2">Coady, David (2007). "Introduction: Conspiracy Theories". ''Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology''. '''4.2''': 133.</ref><ref name=":1" /> Charles Pigden, on the other hand, frames the issue in terms of the "ethics of belief." He argues that the conventional wisdom about conspiracy theories—that they "should neither be believed nor investigated"—is dangerously mistaken on any of a variety of interpretations of the phrase "conspiracy theory."<ref name=":2" />
In 2007, a special issue of ''Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology'' contained several more essays that continued the debate. Therein, Neil Levy, in "Radically Socialized Knowledge," argues that conspiracy theories, conceived of as conflicting with officially endorsed accounts, "should be treated with ''prima facie''scepticism" because they conflict with the views of the relevant epistemic authorities.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Coady|first=David|date=2007|title=Introduction: Conspiracy Theories|url=|journal=Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology|volume=4.2|pages=132|via=}}</ref><ref name=":1">Dentith, M R. X. (2018). “When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might Be the Best Explanation,” p. 4. In Dentith (ed). ''Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously''. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.</ref> David Coady, in "Are Conspiracy Theories Irrational?" responds to Levy, arguing that "conspiracy theorists need not be particularly sceptical of epistemic authorities as such."<ref name=":0" /> Coady also argues that Levy’s position trades on an ambiguity between "institutional authority" and "epistemic authority." <ref>Coady, David. (2018). “Anti-Rumor Campaigns and Conspiracy-Baiting as Propaganda,” pp. 174-175. In Dentith (ed). ''Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously''. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.</ref> Coady takes the position that the pejorative use of the phrase "conspiracy theory" ought to be discontinued.<ref name=":0" /> Pete Mandik "characterizes conspiracy theorists as people who fail to recognise that sometimes shit just happens."<ref name=":2">Coady, David (2007). "Introduction: Conspiracy Theories". ''Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology''. '''4.2''': 133.</ref><ref name=":1" /> Charles Pigden, on the other hand, frames the issue in terms of the "ethics of belief." He argues that the conventional wisdom about conspiracy theories—that they "should neither be believed nor investigated"—is dangerously mistaken on any of a variety of interpretations of the phrase "conspiracy theory."<ref name=":2" />

Revision as of 02:09, 17 October 2019

The philosophy of conspiracy theories is the academic study of conspiracy theories, typically published in philosophy journals or academic books written by philosophers.

The conspiracy theory of society

The debate in analytic philosophy regarding conspiracy theories began in the mid-1990s when Charles Pigden challenged Karl Popper's position.[1] Popper, an influential philosopher of science, described what he called the "conspiracy theory of society," according to which history is a product of conspiracy, intended by some individuals or groups. Popper argues that this view must be wrong because not everything is intended.[2][3] Although Popper's critique has been and continues to be influential,[4] Pigden has maintained that Popper's argument does not apply to most conspiracy theories, which do not posit complete control of events.[5][6] Pigden also points out that when a conspiracy fails in some way, a theory about the conspiracy is still a conspiracy theory and may still play an explanatory role.[7]

Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate

Published contributions to the philosophical debate about conspiracy theories prior to 2006 are collected in David Coady's Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate (Ashgate 2006), which also includes several new essays by the same authors. Contributors include David Coady, Charles Pigden, Brian L. Keeley, Lee Basham, and Steve Clarke. The relevant pages from Karl Popper regarding the "conspiracy theory of society" are also included. The debate is focused primarily on epistemic issues such as "when if ever it is rational to believe conspiracy theories" (Coady 2006, p. ix). The book begins with Popper's idea of the "conspiracy theory of society" and Charles Pigden's response.

Brian Keeley's 1999 essay, "Of Conspiracy Theories," which originally appeared in The Journal of Philosophy, prompted a new phase in the debate. Keeley focused on a subset of conspiracy theories that he called "unwarranted conspiracy theories" (UCTs). According to David Coady, Keeley argued that several generalizations about conspiracy theories "suggest a prima faciecase against belief in them" (Coady 2006, p. 6). Lee Basham takes a more sympathetic view, suggesting we should adopt an attitude of "studied agnosticism" (Coady 2006, p. 7). Steve Clarke argues that because conspiracy theories overestimate dispositional explanations an attitude of prima facie skepticism towards them is warranted. David Coady, however, suggests that there is another error that should be considered, "the error of being excessively unwilling to believe conspiracy theories." He argues that this error is more widespread and insidious (Coady 2006, p. 9).

In 2007, a special issue of Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology contained several more essays that continued the debate. Therein, Neil Levy, in "Radically Socialized Knowledge," argues that conspiracy theories, conceived of as conflicting with officially endorsed accounts, "should be treated with prima faciescepticism" because they conflict with the views of the relevant epistemic authorities.[8][9] David Coady, in "Are Conspiracy Theories Irrational?" responds to Levy, arguing that "conspiracy theorists need not be particularly sceptical of epistemic authorities as such."[8] Coady also argues that Levy’s position trades on an ambiguity between "institutional authority" and "epistemic authority." [10] Coady takes the position that the pejorative use of the phrase "conspiracy theory" ought to be discontinued.[8] Pete Mandik "characterizes conspiracy theorists as people who fail to recognise that sometimes shit just happens."[11][9] Charles Pigden, on the other hand, frames the issue in terms of the "ethics of belief." He argues that the conventional wisdom about conspiracy theories—that they "should neither be believed nor investigated"—is dangerously mistaken on any of a variety of interpretations of the phrase "conspiracy theory."[11]

Generalists and particularists

The philosophical debate regarding the epistemic status of conspiracy theories has been characterized as between "generalists" and "particularists."[12] In 2010, Joel Buenting and Jason Taylor coined these terms, which they describe as follows:

"According to the generalist view, the rationality of conspiracy theories can be assessed without considering particular conspiracy theories. On this view, conspiratorial thinking qua conspiracy thinking is itself irrational. The particularist view about conspiratorial thinking denies that the rationality of conspiracy theories can be assessed without considering particular conspiracy theories."[13][14]  

In addition to Buenting and Taylor themselves, particularists are said to include Charles Pigden, David Coady, and Lee Basham,[15] as well as M Dentith, and Kurtis Hagen.[16] Buenting and Taylor categorize Brian Keeley, Steve Clarke, and Pete Mandik as generalists. Hagen suggests Neil Levy also qualifies as a generalist, but questions whether Keeley truly does.[17][18]

See also

Further reading

  • 2007. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4.2. (Special Issue: Conspiracy Theories)
  • 2018. Argumenta 3.2 (issue #6) (Special Issue: The Ethics and the Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories) Open access.
  • Coady, David. (ed.). 2006. Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
  • Dentith, Matthew. 2014. The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Dentith, M R. X. (ed). 2018. Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

References

  1. ^ Butter, Michael; Knight, Peter (2019), "The History of Conspiracy Theory Research", Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them, Oxford University Press, p. 39, ISBN 978-0-19-084407-3
  2. ^ Dentith, Matthew (2014). The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 15–16.
  3. ^ Popper, Karl (1972). Conjectures and Refutations, 4th ed. Routledge Kegan Paul. pp. 123–125.
  4. ^ Coady, David (2006). Conspiracy theories : the philosophical debate. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. p. 5. ISBN 0-7546-5250-5. OCLC 60697068.
  5. ^ Dentith, Matthew (2014). The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 16–17.
  6. ^ Pigden, Charles (1995). "Popper Revisited, or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories?". Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 25.1: 3–34.
  7. ^ Coady (2006). The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. p. 5.
  8. ^ a b c Coady, David (2007). "Introduction: Conspiracy Theories". Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology. 4.2: 132.
  9. ^ a b Dentith, M R. X. (2018). “When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might Be the Best Explanation,” p. 4. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  10. ^ Coady, David. (2018). “Anti-Rumor Campaigns and Conspiracy-Baiting as Propaganda,” pp. 174-175. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  11. ^ a b Coady, David (2007). "Introduction: Conspiracy Theories". Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology. 4.2: 133.
  12. ^ Hagen, Kurtis (2018). “Conspiracy Theorists and Social Scientists,” p. 139 n8. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  13. ^ Hagen, Kurtis (2018). “Conspiracy Theorists and Social Scientists,” p. pp. 128-129. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  14. ^ Buenting, Joel; Taylor, Jason (2010). "Conspiracy Theories and Fortuitous Data". Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 40.4: 568–569.
  15. ^ Dentith, M R. X. (2018). “When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might Be the Best Explanation,” p. 13. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  16. ^ Hagen, Kurtis (2018). “Conspiracy Theorists and Social Scientists,” p. 128. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  17. ^ Hagen, Kurtis (2018). “Conspiracy Theorists and Social Scientists,” p. 139 n8. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  18. ^ Keeley, Brian (2019), "The Credulity of Conspiracy Theorists," p. 424. In Joseph Uscinski (ed), Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780190844073
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