Talk:German battleship Bismarck/Archive 9

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cameron expedition

I'm not going to break 3rr, hence not another revert, but FYI, I did read the source. The report actually states that damage from possible torpedo hits is impossible to determine. The reason the report cites for this is that the part of the ship that would be damaged by them has been either destroyed by the effects of sinking (aided by said torpedo hits and/or shell damage), or buried in the mud. Hence my edit summary that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The current two alineas seem to be somewhat misinterpreting what is actually being said. Licks-rocks (talk) 18:48, 26 August 2022 (UTC)

Wford's edit does not improve things. Again, only 30 metres of the armoured deck was inspected. The way it is currently included is confusing at best and outright misleading at worst, because it still uses this claim in a way that is completely unsupported by the actual text. we are talking 30 metres on one side of a ship that is around 250 metres in lenght. You just can't use that to support the claim that barely any damage was done.--Licks-rocks (talk) 10:48, 27 August 2022 (UTC)

Yes, the current version includes stuff like "thorough examination of the entire hull" which is absolutely false, as the expedition report says they only inspected part of the hull. It also obscures the overall conclusion of the report that "who sunk the Bismarck, the British or the Germans? Both". For now we should try to isolate the false claims into the "expeditions" section, suitably tagged as disputed, and try to correct them to an accurate representation of what the report actually says. Fangz (talk) 12:53, 27 August 2022 (UTC)

It's worth pointing out that the line in question is actually more or less pulled straight from the report, which states (on page 30) that "it is significant to note that Jim Cameron's complete survey of the hull detected only two instances where the armor-piercing shells actually penetrated all the way through the 320-mm main side belt armor."

Yes, there are problems with how some of the material is presented, more context is needed, but we don't need to over-correct and throw it all out. Parsecboy (talk) 13:28, 27 August 2022 (UTC)

The problem is that the sentence you are quoting does not exist in isolation. Same as with the torpedo's, every sentence surrounding it warns us that the ship is too damaged to determine how much damage was truly done to it. You can't say that the report supports the idea that the british did very little damage when the report explicitly states that the main reason they saw no (or little) damage is that the hull of the ship ship has been largely obscured by mud and what remains has been destroyed to such an extent by the sinking process that it is impossible to tell how much damage there was before it sank. "A complete survey of the hull" in this context clearly refers to the part that was actually available to be surveyed, which will be significantly smaller than the entire hull. The article is currently stating a lot of things as if they are absolutely certain that the Cameron report is much more nuanced about. EDIT: or it was, when I last saw it, but I see Fangz implemented a very good rewrite. Licks-rocks (talk) 14:32, 27 August 2022 (UTC)

Well, no, much of the hull at the belt level and above is visible, so they would have certainly been capable of surveying it to find penetrations of the belt. The actual context that addresses this is already in the article: that the belt represents a relatively small target, which would have been difficult to hit under the conditions.

The general problem we need to address is an accurate representation of the report. But this goes both ways; one of the recent edits includes the line "British gunnery accuracy was "mediocre at best", partially due to the "miserable" firing conditions and the ship's list to port, with only around 10% of fired medium caliber shots hitting." cited to page 32; I don't see the word "miserable" anywhere on that page (though they note the sea state 6 conditions) and nowhere do they credit Bismarck's list to port as causing problems for the British gunners (how on earth that would be, I do not know). As Pbritti noted below, we need to slow down a bit and make sure we're getting this right. What we probably want to do is drill down line by line, reach a consensus on whether a particular detail should or shouldn't be mentioned, or what additional context is needed to understand it. What I don't want to have happen is yet another rehash of the sunk/scuttled crap that periodically pops up here. Parsecboy (talk) 17:57, 27 August 2022 (UTC)

The "miserable conditions" and the effects of the list to port are described on page 34. (The list to port is significant because it caused parts of the armour belt to be submerged beneath the water, which accounts to the lack of hits to it during the later phase of the battle.) The important thing to understand about the report is the way in which it separated out fire (and torpedo fire) during the later part of the engagement. The purpose is to critique Mearns' assertion that the Bismarck was already rapidly sinking at the time of the scuttling by demonstrating that there wasn't a particularly great increase in the rate of damage taken by the ship during the latter part of the engagement that would lead immediately to a sinking. The report in no way claims the Bismarck was not sinking and/or critically damaged at all, instead it states the most important damage was taken early on. Fangz (talk) 22:12, 27 August 2022 (UTC)

Why appear to perpetuate the suggestion that RN large calibre shells were incapable of penetrating Bismarck's main belt by quoting only a "selected excerpt" from Cameron's report?

Cameron's report does indeed say on page 31 "A thorough bow to stern and gunwale to mudline survey of the hull in high definition video and by visual inspection revealed only TWO hits which penetrated all the way through the main side belt armour. This is an astonishing result, given the number of large calibre shells (719) fired at Bismarck from 08.47 until 10.14".

It then states directly underneath that line that... "On the 320mm main side belt and on the 145mm upper belt above the level of the batteriedeck level, there are a very large number of "splash" and gouge marks with spray patterns of smaller splinter impacts. MOST IF NOT ALL OF THESE ARE HITS FROM SECONDARY GUNS" (My capitalization)

In spite of Cameron strangely affecting his astonishment at the "result, given the number of large calibre shells (719) fired at Bismarck" he then immediately CLEARLY states that the lack of penetrations is absolutely consistant with the near complete absence of large calibre hits on the main belt. In fact the 2 penetrations he mentions are indeed both from 406mm hits from HMS Rodney.

If you believe as you say that "Yes, there are problems with how some of the material is presented, more context is needed" then allow people to add that context without heavy handed editing. 92.15.182.141 (talk) 23:28, 29 August 2022 (UTC)

Why are you quoting me and accusing me of preventing people from adding context? The only edits I've made to the article have been to correct typos and grammar. It sounds like you aren't following the discussion very closely, or you have me confused with someone else. Parsecboy (talk) 12:17, 30 August 2022 (UTC)

I have in the past been a "victim" of 2 edit removals by yourself, of absolutely correct information backed up by in one case by original source material from admiralty files from the UK national archives as well as a second incident where first hand witness testimony was arbitrarily dismissed on the Bismarck page. Though it would have been under a different IP address. So your current plea of "The only edits I've made to the article have been to correct typos and grammar", is not the full truth. The apparent reason for these removals was because I had not "cleared" them with you prior to posting. Then when I attempted to engage in an initially civil discussion over the content of the edits & the corroborative evidence as well as the actual removal of the edits you very quickly became surly, high handed and combative, which still seems to be the case reading some of the dialogue above. I've no wish to start a "flame war" in the chat, but it is quite evident that a small number of "preferred editors" or whatever wiki choose to call you, have carte blanche to dismiss the valid contributions of others with little redress. Now please do feel free to switch to defensive mode and issue forth with your counter strike. 92.15.182.141 (talk) 18:40, 30 August 2022 (UTC)

Though I forgot to add that it is heartening to see your post below that you consider that too much weight is attached to Cameron's survey, over those of the other expeditions. Maybe the future looks more balanced after all? Thank you. 92.15.182.141 (talk) 18:42, 30 August 2022 (UTC)

If what you were adding was original research, then I was correct to revert your additions. We write articles based on secondary sources, we do not use archival material. As for my "current plea", I was clearly referring to the current situation. Obviously, I have done far more than typo corrections and grammar. And if you wonder why I become "surly, high handed and combative", consider my position. This article is constantly bombarded with edits from people who, like yourself, might be well meaning but don't understand how encyclopedia articles are written, or Wehraboos trying to insert "BiSmArCk WaS a 'He'" garbage, or the latest dust-up over the sunk/scuttled debate (not to mention "hey, did you know about Sabaton?" and other variations of every. single. pop. culture. reference). It is doesn't exactly engender patience. Parsecboy (talk) 20:25, 30 August 2022 (UTC)

The more I think about it, what probably needs to be done is to cut most of the content on Cameron's expedition altogether. We have 5 sentences on the Woods Hole expedition and 4 sentences on Mearn's expedition, but three whole paragraphs on Cameron's. We don't spend half as much time delving into the conclusions of either of those surveys, but we do with Cameron, which strikes me as WP:UNDUE. It might be a good solution to simply cut the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs on the Cameron expedition entirely, and perhaps incorporate any information that contradicts Ballard's findings (i.e., Ballard says he only found one hole in the belt, we should point out that Cameron's team found a second). Jackson's fairly dubious claim about 356mm shells bouncing should go (I don't believe that I have that book, so if anyone has a copy and can tell where he got that idea from, it would be helpful to share) as it doesn't seem to be supported by any of the surveys that I've seen. Parsecboy (talk) 12:17, 30 August 2022 (UTC)

I agree that the Cameron report is given undue space and weight and should be trimmed considerably. Post war testing showed that RN and KM armour was very similar and in numerous trials RN 14in AP rounds were easily able to penetrate 12in RN armour at 30 degree obliquity at less than 1600fps Striking Velocity and 14in armour at ~1800fps SV. Battleship Bismarck (2019) states clearly that the apparent small number of penetrations of Bismarck's main belt was due to Bismarck being low in the water and shells being unable to strike the belt due to the large waves present due to gale force winds. However, it should be noted that when target obliquity exceeds about 40 degrees, that AP shell performance declines dramatically and most 14, 15 and 16in shells will fail when striking thick armour at over 40-45 degrees at typical engagement ranges (finding non-primary sources for this data from the UK Armour Piercing Projectile Committee isn't easy). Damwiki1 (talk) 22:16, 30 August 2022 (UTC)

We need to also consider that the Cameron expedition had better technology than earlier visits, it was seemingly more extensive and thorough, and it had more findings. The Cameron findings agreed with those of the first two expeditions, although it went further, so it makes sense to report more findings. To treat the Mearns expedition as equal to the Cameron expedition, would itself be UNDUE.

"Post war testing" of RN shells vs RN armour is not relevant here, and is WP:OR. The FACT is that the main armour belt worked as designed on the day, the British gunnery was "mediocre", and we don't need to wallow in OR excuses for this.

The fact that some phone lines were cut, does not mean that all phone lines were cut - obviously.

I don't see in the source any mention of a 15 degree list. However we do see that the Bismarck was listing slightly from the original earlier battle where the Hood was sunk, although it travelled many miles despite this issue. This original damage was later worsened by the seepage from the torpedo hit on the rudders, although the seepage was still not critical, and consequently there was deliberate counter-flooding, which ceased only when Oels decided to scuttle. We have multiple witnesses who saw the interior of the ship when they were scuttling, vs some RN officers who saw the ship from miles away, rolling in a gale-force sea, drenched in spray. Which view is more reliable? Wdford (talk) 10:19, 31 August 2022 (UTC)

Using terms like this: "...we don't need to wallow in OR excuses for this..." seems to indicate a less than neutral attitude on your part when considering edits for the article.

This is from page 34 of The Wreck of the Bismarck: A Marine Forensic analysis:

"SOME OBSERVATIONS

Bismarck's sinking was a brutal, up-close action. Admiral Tovey wanted to sink Bismarck

with the gunfire at his disposal. Swordfish aircraft with torpedoes were in the vicinity but were

not called upon to enter the action. Point-blank fire was relatively ineffective, with many shells

skipping off the water and riddling the superstructure pointlessly, or missing entirely because of

the low freeboard. At short ranges, the salvo dispersion pattern was narrower and more

elongated. Since both British battleships were firing almost straight abeam Bismarck, on either

side, they were trying to hit a target with very little freeboard in a high sea state. These miserable

conditions - violent seas and marginal visibility - made good gunnery accuracy an "iffy"

prospect, at best.

Unless the shells hit below the armor belt, very unlikely at such close ranges because of

protective effect of water with such flat trajectories, they were not going to cause damage that

would sink the ship.

As a result of the port list, by the end of the gunnery engagement, the lower edge of the armor belt on the port side may have been submerged some 7-8 meters below the water (perhaps two deck heights) - much more than normal, In a sense, the port list contributed to protecting the port side of the damaged ship from gunfire, every degree of added list decreasing the vulnerability of many vital compartments.

By 0945; it was becoming obvious that British shellfire was not contributing to sinking

the ship. The two battleships and two heavy cruisers had fired away for the last hour without any

apparent effect. Shellfire had riddled the stack structure, swept away searchlights, demolished

the antiaircraft batteries, pummeled the superstructure, carried away hose reels and fire

extinguishers, and destroyed the teak deck in areas. Crew members who were in exposed areas

were killed or severely wounded. Close-range gunnery later in the engagement devastated

Bismarck's superstructure and the parts of the hull structure above the waterline, overwhelming

and defeating the ship and causing massive casualties, but not speeding the sinking of the ship.

Bismarck was overwhelmed and defeated by the gunfire and torpedoes of the Royal

Navy, gradually sinking due to uncontrollable progressive flooding, Scuttling charges were

detonated shortly after 1020, and the battered ship listed heavily to port around 1035. Shortly

thereafter, the ship capsized to port and sank by the stern, her bow disappearing around 1040."

Bismarck's main armour belt was about 4.8m high with about 2m above the waterline at full load, and for it to be completely submerged by 2-3 (bolded section; 7-8m minus 5m) metres by the end of the action implies a very considerable list and the gunnery action ended before the scuttling charges were detonated. It also shows clearly why the belt armour suffered so few 14 or 16in hits. The report uses the term mediocre to describe RN gunnery achieving a mere ~10% hit rate but it doesn't give any examples of better than mediocre gunnery under similar sea-state conditions. In fact 'mediocre' might imply 'excellent' gunnery in comparative terms and, of course, Bismarck achieved no hits at all. The post war testing was of comparisons of RN and KM armour, including some from Tirpitz. The AP shell trials were conducted before and throughout the war. This table entitled: Penetration curves of an armor-piercing shell against plates with a hardened surface shows the dramatic decline in AP shell performance as the striking angle departs from the normal (right angle or 90 deg impact). At 18.4km Bismarck's 38cm AP shells will penetrate about 480mm of armour at 90deg impact or zero obliquity, but only about 280mm when the impact angle increases to 40 degrees obliquity. Damwiki1 (talk) 23:22, 31 August 2022 (UTC)

There is some good detail here, which would help the article a lot. Especially where the authors point out that the British gunnery was "relatively ineffective", and that "they were not going to cause damage that would sink the ship." This point was made repeatedly, but some editors continue to speculate about "massive hidden damage". Not very neutral.

To suggest that 'mediocre' might imply 'excellent' gunnery in comparative terms is obviously highly non-neutral as well. If the expert authors wanted to say that the British gunnery was comparatively excellent, they would have used those words.

You would think that, at some point during this long ineffective bombardment, some British officer would realise that their tactics were seriously flawed, but seemingly this was not within their scope.

Bismarck was operating without the ability to steer a course, and still achieved a straddle at long range before their guns and fire control were destroyed. For a clear impression of Bismarck's gunnery under equal conditions, you need to ask the captain of HMS Hood.

The authors pointedly state that, "by the end of the gunnery engagement", the port side armour belt "may have been" submerged some 7-8 meters. It is clear that the British carried on shooting even after the scuttling was underway, as Oels was killed by a shell long after leaving the engineering deck. The end of the gunnery bombardment came very late in the process.

The post war testing is WP:OR. Everyone knows that angled armour is more effective – that is why tanks and turrets had angled armour. In addition the ship was rolling in heavy seas, and the angle of impact was constantly changing. The British commanders should have factored that in when they decided on their tactics. However main belt armour was seldom exposed to direct fire – the shells had to punch through hull plating etc to reach the main belt, and would be deflected slightly in the process. Similarly, the main armour deck was deep inside the ship, and plunging fire had to negotiate many layers of stiff obstacles before arriving at that level. Consider the later case of the Tirpitz, and how much punishment it absorbed before finally being sunk by multiple Tallboy bombs. Tovey's battleships had no firepower to remotely match a Tallboy bomb, and Tovey's cruisers had no torpedo to remotely match the mines of the X-Craft midget submarines.

Wdford (talk) 22:34, 2 September 2022 (UTC)

Bismarck's main armour belt was externally mounted on the hull, but was protected by the high waves and list on the port side of the ship and this is plainly stated. Bismarck's 38cm gun turrets were penetrated by RN AP shells and disabled, even though the turret faces were thicker than the belt armour. The RN battleships quickly destroyed Bismarck's fighting power so the bombardment was not "ineffective". When the effects of waves, list and target obliquity are taken into account the the small number of main belt hits and penetrations by 14in and 16in shells is not surprising in anyway. The only actions fought in similar sea-states would be Scharnhorst and Gneisenau vs Renown and Scharnhorst Vs Duke of York; including the sinking of Bismarck, the 3 KM battleships scored a combined total of 4 hits in those 3 actions, so gunnery in severe weather was not an easy task. Rodney ceased fire at 1014 and KGV at 1021, so just about the time that the scuttling charges are stated to have detonated. Oels vacated the engineering spaces well before 1020 to avoid the time fuzed scuttling charges. Comparing the attack on Tirpitz by Tallboys or mines to the sinking of Bismarck is OR given the the tactical situations and the weapons employed. There are numerous accounts which detail Tovey's choice of tactics, and his decision to break off the action after just over 90mins of gunfire. Given the lack of RN casualties and rapidity with which Tovey destroyed Bismarck's offensive power, Tovey's tactics were quite successful. Damwiki1 (talk) 02:13, 3 September 2022 (UTC)

The stated mediocrity of the British gunnery was not stated relative to their inability to hit the side of the hull, it was stated relative to their inability to hit the ship at all – an enormous static defenseless target at point blank range. "Mediocre" really meant "mediocre".

The source states (G&D pg 34) that Tovey "wanted to sink Bismarck with the gunfire at his disposal", and that he specifically chose to NOT use torpedoes. Closing up to shoot should have improved the hit-rate on the superstructure, but would not have helped to achieve the objective of sinking the ship by gunfire. Tovey's tactics were therefore NOT "quite successful", in fact they were exactly the opposite. This is an extreme case of non-neutrality, on par with interpreting "mediocre" to mean "excellent".

The sources agree that Oels gave the order to scuttle sometime between 09h20 and 09h30, at which point damage control and counter-flooding activities were deliberately halted so as to allow the ship to sink. Even Statz confirmed this. The "progressive uncontrolled flooding" that took place thereafter was part of the deliberate scuttling process, and the "uncontrolled" flooding could have been controlled had the crew chosen to do so. Notwithstanding, when the machinery spaces were abandoned half an hour later after igniting the fuses, the lights were still on, the engines and generators were still running, and the survivors saw little water down below. The "progressive uncontrolled flooding" was clearly not happening very quickly, until after the scuttling charges detonated.

The weapons employed against the Tirpitz were very much more powerful than those deployed against the Bismarck, and we see how much punishment the Tirpitz absorbed from those much bigger weapons, before it finally succumbed. Bismarck, a sister ship, clearly was capable of surviving Tovey's much lighter weapons, and floating long enough to potentially be captured. This supports the fact that no evidence was found of plunging fire having penetrated the main armour deck.

Wdford (talk) 21:46, 5 September 2022 (UTC)

Bismarck was hit hundreds of times by RN guns so your statement: "it was stated relative to their inability to hit the ship at all" is completely incorrect. Tovey ordered RN destroyers to engage and torpedo Bismarck the night before the action, and Rodney fired torpedoes at Bismarck continuously throughout the action. Norfolk fired 4 torpedoes at 0906 and her remaining 4 at 1010. Dorsetshire was the only ship that had any torpedoes left after 1010. So it is obvious that Tovey permitted his ships to use torpedoes as they saw fit to do so. However the very poor sea-state and high waves made for inaccurate torpedo fire as well and of the 20 torpedoes launched by Rodney and Norfolk only two were considered probable hits (all data in this reply from Battleship Bismarck: (2019). So your statement, above, that Tovey choose not to use torpedoes is incorrect. From the source mentioned, at approximately 0930 Bismarck had two flooded boiler rooms, and 2 of the 3 engine rooms were flooded or flooding and had extensive flooding forward and aft. The list to port was severe enough to bring the waterline over the batteriedeck deck on the port side at which time it was obvious to her damage control team that Bismarck was sinking and it was this conclusion that spurred the order to scuttle Bismarck: "Not only was the water coming aboard the main deck, it was also accumulating on the batteriedeck (damage control deck) from this point on Bismarck was sinking slowly, but her very large metacentric height kept her afloat. When commander Oels gave the scuttling order around 0930..." basically after 0930 the order to evacuate the machinery spaces ensured a more rapid loss of floatation and stability but this only hastened her inevitable demise, but somewhat pyrrhicly the increased draft and list made it harder for the RN battleship's main armament to strike Bismarck's belt armour. In a moderate seastate, such as at the Denmark Straits, Bismarck's side armour would have suffered more penetrating hits, and the two 14in under waterline hits by Prince of Wales, alone, caused thousands of tons of flooding aboard Bismarck.

Again, your comparisons to Tirpitz are OR and not relevant. There is abundant evidence that Bismarck was sinking prior to the scuttling order and that her heavily armoured main battery turrets, with thicker armour than her main belt were progressively destroyed by 14 and 16in shell hits. On page 422 a diagram details how Bismarck's main armoured deck was penetrated by fragments from a 16in shell hit, that also penetrated the 320mm main armour belt. The idea that Bismarck was 'unsinkable' is a more than a bit nonsensical, since it was the fact that she was sinking that prompted the scuttling order. Damwiki1 (talk) 10:35, 6 September 2022 (UTC)

The source states that Tovey "wanted to sink Bismarck with the gunfire at his disposal". (G&D pg 34). When it became "obvious" that the RN gunfire wasn't going to achieve the objective, Tovey changed his tactics. By then the Bismarck was virtually under water from scuttling. The fact that Rodney was throwing torpedoes as well, does not undermine the obvious fact that Tovey's tactics were poor, it merely indicates that the captain of Rodney was getting desperate. We also see that the RN torpedo crews were no more accurate than were the gunners.

The use by G&D of the word "mediocre" comes from the fact that Bismarck was hit hundreds of times by RN guns, mostly on the superstructure. However the RN guns actually fired thousands of rounds – most of them at point blank range, at a huge defenceless stationery target. As a percentage of rounds fired, the hit rate was very poor, hence their word "mediocre" and my word "relative".

I note your use of the phrase "approximately 0930". Bismarck had six boiler rooms. There was some water in two engine rooms, which had been leaking in over several days from the shaft alleys, after the seals were displaced by the detonation of the original aerial torpedo. This flooding was not severe, and had been controlled until this process was deliberately abandoned at 0930 as the initial step of the scuttling process. At 1000 the crew were setting explosive charges in these engine rooms, so the now-deliberately-uncontrolled flooding was still not too serious in these particular compartments.

It is clear that Oels made the decision to scuttle at 0930 when the last of the main armament was disabled, and it was no longer possible to fight back. Oels was the best-informed person aboard about the damage situation, and at 0930 he was still concerned that the ship was floating well enough to be captured. Nobody risks his life to scuttle a ship that is already undoubtedly sinking. It is accepted that the first step in the scuttling process was to cease controlling the existing flooding – by ending counter-flooding and opening the water-tight doors to the flooded shaft alleys - which per Statz took effect by 0930.

In "Battleship Bismarck: A Design and Operational History" by Garzke and Dulin, they state "That port list would gradually increase as the battle occurred, particularly after 0930, bringing the main deck to the level of the sea." Taking all the evidence together, the main deck reached the level of the sea only at the end of the battle, when the ship was already on the verge of capsizing due to scuttling efforts.

Bismarck had the same armour as Tirpitz, so comparing their ability to survive punishment in action is much more useful than your post-war study of shooting at loose pieces of armour plate from Tirpitz in a non-representative environment.

The Cameron report makes a detailed list of every visible shell-hole, and nowhere does it list any hits through the main frontal armour of a main turret. It would seem that the main turrets were disabled by hits through the thinner metal of the roof or the back or the side, or due to damage to the rotating mechanism, and in one case a gun barrel was hit. Wdford (talk) 21:34, 7 September 2022 (UTC)

I don't see why the Brits would be in any way desperate at that point in the battle. The bismarck was dead in the water and being abandoned by that point. Scuttling an enemy warship with torpedo's rather than waste gunfire when the enemy is no longer fighting back is a fairly common occurrence, and in fact the Germans were in the process of scuttling the ship themselves at that point. --Licks-rocks (talk) 19:34, 8 September 2022 (UTC)

Remarks like these indicate a non-neutral POV:

"The source states that Tovey "wanted to sink Bismarck with the gunfire at his disposal". (G&D pg 34). When it became "obvious" that the RN gunfire wasn't going to achieve the objective, Tovey changed his tactics. By then the Bismarck was virtually under water from scuttling. The fact that Rodney was throwing torpedoes as well, does not undermine the obvious fact that Tovey's tactics were poor, it merely indicates that the captain of Rodney was getting desperate. We also see that the RN torpedo crews were no more accurate than were the gunners."

Rodney (before 0916) and Norfolk (0906) began firing torpedoes as the range closed to within effective torpedo range and there was no prohibition on the use of torpedoes by Tovey. I have pointed out to you that in 3 gunnery engagements (Lofoten, Bismarck's Last Battle, Northcape) in similar sea states that 4 KM battleships scored a total of 4 hits out of hundreds of 28cm and 38cm rounds fired. If RN gunnery is to be judged 'mediocre' then how should we characterize KM gunnery?

Status of Bismarck at the time of the order to prepare the ship for scuttling:

"Analysis of Bismarck’s Damage Josef Statz marked up some deck plans to recollect the flooding situation as he left damage control central after 0930 and just around the time that he had a telephone conversation with Lieutenant Commander Burkard von Müllenheim-Rechberg on the status of command of Bismarck. Figure 22-1 illustrates the flooding status of Bismarck at that time."(page 449) As I stated previously two of the 3 turbine rooms were flooded or flooding and 2 of the 6 boiler rooms were flooded or flooding, with extensive flooding forward and aft.

"After both Rodney and King George V passed the stern of Bismarck, they made a 180-degree turn and closed range to 6,000 and 11,000 meters, respectively. As King George V made her way north on her new heading, officers using binoculars observed a number of straddles, and hits could be seen striking the unarmored superstructure. Several 134-mm shells hit the 145-mm side armor but ricocheted off the armor or exploded on contact. At 0925 Bismarck took a 5- to 8-degree list to port, depending on the rolling response and a deeper draft than 10.2 meters that brought her main deck on the port side to the level of the sea.19 This allowed a surge of water on the main deck and, from where there were holes, the commencement of downflooding below. Hence, water accumulated on the Batteriedeck, creating a free-surface effect that started to erode stability." (page 413)

Footnote 19: "At 0930 a critical point had been reached in the transverse stability of Bismarck. With water coming onto her main deck, the ability to right herself began to diminish. The U.S. Navy Handbook of Damage Control states that when water starts collecting on the damage control deck, it is time to evacuate the ship. Not only was water coming aboard the main deck, it was also accumulating on the Batteriedeck (the damage control deck). From this point on Bismarck was sinking slowly, but her very large metacentric height kept her afloat. When Commander Oels gave the scuttling order around 0930, this command ensured that significant sinkage would occur, and downflooding would start below as the crew made their way topside through watertight hatches that would be left open in the Batteriedeck. This flooding ensured an increasing overturning moment to bring about capsizing to port." ([page 581) So again, Bismarck was sinking when the order to prepare for scuttling was given.

Armour penetration by 14in and 16in AP shell hits (all quotes from Battleship Bismarck: (2019):

"During the Cameron expedition, four complete penetrations of the exposed upper and lower (main) armor belts, two in the upper one and two in the lower one, were discovered. Because the ship had sunk into the sediment, only a portion of the lower belt was visible for a complete and accurate count of shell penetrations.22 However, with the port list possibly reaching as much as 15 degrees and the close range at which the battle was fought, only the upper surface of the lower belt would have been subject to direct shell hits. The 152-mm and 134-mm shells would have detonated on impact with this heavy armor but certainly would have exploded within the superstructure. A shell, most likely a 406-mm shell from Rodney, struck turret 64 and was seen to detonate inside that caused a fire and disruption of the turret walls. This was clearly shown in the video footage of the wreck." (page 438)

"It is important to remember that this battle was fought at extremely close ranges. Bismarck’s side armor was theoretically vulnerable to the 356-mm guns of King George V inside ranges of 13,700 meters and to the 406-mm guns on Rodney at a somewhat greater range. As a practical matter, Bismarck was vulnerable to penetration by British heavy-caliber shellfire throughout almost all this gunnery engagement. When the battle was fought at very close ranges, the shells had a flat trajectory that was highly susceptible to ricochets off the surface of the water, causing overshoots or hits in the upper hull or superstructure of Bismarck. With the waves at six to seven meters, there also was the possibility of shells hitting the crests of waves and exploding. This close-range gunnery situation precluded the possibility of a diving shell hit against the underwater portion of the hull of the German ship, as occurred during the battle between Prince of Wales and Bismarck. There were many shells that ricocheted off the 50-mm main deck armor due to the low trajectory angle of impact, although there were a few penetrations of the deck armor. See table 21-1 in chapter 21, which summarized the number of shells fired at Bismarck over a period of some 90 minutes during the final battle." (page 449)

FORWARD CONNING TOWER The after port side of the forward conning tower was hit several times by 356-mm and 406-mm shells. As many as twenty-five shell holes or gouges were found in the 350-mm armor. There was one large hole punched into the armor plate on the port side by gunfire from King George V before she ceased fire around 1014. Statz, who viewed this damage from both the outside and inside, indicated that the port side surface of the conning tower looked like “swiss cheese” when he passed by after this British battleship ceased fire. The heavy armored door on the port side of the conning tower is swung open and hanging from its hinges. It should be noted that some full or partial penetrations of the 350-mm vertical armor of the conning tower probably took place because of the close ranges at which the later portion of the battle was fought by Rodney and King George V, especially during the later stages when Bismarck was essentially defenseless and a stationary target.

"The enormity of damage in this area of the ship was not assessed until the 2002 Cameron expedition to Bismarck. There is evidence of three shell hits around the barbette of turret Dora that are attributed to 406-mm gunfire from Rodney, probably between 1005 and 1014. Two of these were penetrations that one survivor believed could have started the fire in the magazine of turret Dora. A shell hit on the forward port quarter demolished a segment of the 340-mm barbette and ripped a large hole in the main deck. This was the shell hit that was responsible for killing personnel in the aft battle dressing station. Another hit, found in the aft starboard segment of the barbette, appears to have exploded in the turret’s substructure." (page 461) Damwiki1 (talk) 22:20, 8 September 2022 (UTC)

'FORWARD CONNING TOWER... and a stationary target." excerpt was from page 454. Damwiki1 (talk) 02:10, 9 September 2022 (UTC)

The G&D source states that Tovey "wanted to sink Bismarck with the gunfire at his disposal" (G&D pg 34). When it became "obvious" that the RN gunfire wasn't going to achieve the objective, Tovey changed his tactics. This is stated by the source. Believe it or not.

There is no doubt that some compartments were "flooding" when Statz left the damage control centre. Four things are important here, which you keep glossing over:

• "Flooded or flooding" includes any water at all – even just a few inches. It doesn't mean the compartment was full to the ceiling, by any means.
• Statz left the DC compartment a short while after Oels left. Oels left only after he had initiated the scuttling, which included – immediately – opening all water-tight doors. Specifically, G&D speak of the water-tight doors connecting the machinery spaces with the shaft alleys – at least two of which were long since flooded due to leaking seals, from the torpedo hit days earlier. Once those doors were open, the engine rooms etc would effectively have started "flooding" – and would have lit up as such on the DC boards. There is no mystery here.
• Long after 0930, the engineers were still placing explosive charges in the machinery spaces, so even then they were not yet really flooded, or sinking.
• When they climbed out after setting the charges, the lower decks looked like "Easter Sunday in harbour". Doesn't sound much like a sinking ship.

The "extensive flooding forward and aft" consisted of leaking from the battle-damage from Prince of Wales, and from the aerial torpedo hit, and the ship had been listing to port ever since. Bismarck's crew had been managing this for days already, including while steaming at high speed in a serious storm. Nothing to get excited about here either.

Bismarck's freeboard on calm seas was less than 5 meters. The storm at this time was putting up waves far in excess of that, plus the ship was obviously rolling heavily on the stormy seas as well. It didn't need to be sinking to get water cascading onto the deck. Certainly some of this water flooded down through shell holes to the Batteriedeck, but it could not reach the lower levels. Even when the ship was being abandoned, much later, some of the hatches on the Batteriedeck were covered in water and some were not.

G&D also state that the scuttling command would ensure that "significant sinkage would occur, and downflooding would start below as the crew made their way topside through watertight hatches that would be left open in the Batteriedeck." While the hatches and water-tight doors remained closed, the flooding was well under control.

You cite the fact that the "very large metacentric height kept her afloat" – ie the ship was not actually sinking as such. You cite this almost as though it were a freakish coincidence, although obviously the ship was designed for this very eventuality.

G&D state that "The near miss shells that exploded alongside the port side and those hits that silenced the forward turrets and the main battery director resulted in the executive officer, Commander Oels, ordering the scuttling of the ship around 0930". No mention that the ship was sinking. This is consistent with other sources, which specifically state that Oels decided to scuttle after the main guns were all disabled, and Bismarck was no longer able to fight. Elsewhere, in their account of the testimony of Bruno Zickelbein, G&D actually repeat the quote that Oels went around telling people: "Comrades, we can no longer fire our guns, and we have no more ammunition anyway. Our hour has come. It is time to abandon ship. She will be scuttled." To claim that Oels decided to scuttle because the ship was already sinking, is thus a gross misrepresentation.

The Cameron expedition did indeed find just two penetrations of the main armour belt – one of which was apparently on a section of plate that had been dislodged by an earlier torpedo hit. You cannot just assume that there were lots more holes in the concealed areas than in the visible areas. Also, behind the outer armour belt was the heavily-sloped armour of the armour deck – the so-called turtle-shell design. The outer side armour sloped in the opposite direction, so even when the ship was rolling so as to allow the incoming shell to make a perpendicular strike on the outer layer, the inner layer would be at its most oblique. Again, that was not a coincidence.

You cannot sink a warship by shooting at the conning tower – see above re poor tactics.

It is interesting that G&D continually use ambiguous phrases like "flooded or flooding", "shell holes or gouges" – how many holes were there actually, and how many were just gouges? It's almost as though they are reluctant to spell it out, for some reason. Wdford (talk) 20:15, 12 September 2022 (UTC)

Again, you are not showing a neutral PoV and seem to want to selectively use outdated references to advance the idea that Bismarck was invulnerable or unsinkable by the RN. G&D in Battleship Bismarck: (2019) has to be given more weight than their article published 17 years earlier. In Battleship Bismarck: 2019 they state that Rodney and Norfolk were firing torpedoes well before 0945, so the earlier statement in the 2002 reference is incorrect. Surely this should be obvious to you?

I gave you lengthy excepts from Battleship Bismarck: (2019) that states that Bismarck was slowly sinking by 0925 due to water entry via the main deck, due to her port list. Her large metacentric height ensured that her sinking would take some time, but was inevitable.

There are numerous references that state flooding, damage and smoke in the Bismarck's engineering spaces.

We cannot assume there weren't more penetrating hits through the belt armour that was hidden from view by the UW survey. We have to report, fairly, what the sources state.

I gave you references to 14in shells penetrating the rounded (thus unlikely to be struck at right angles) 350mm armour of the conning tower. Please explain how the 320mm belt armour can be invulnerable to 14in and 16in hits when the 350mm CT wasn't. Clearly, the effect of the list and the high waves present protected the belt armour from being hit by 14in and 16in shells, which constituted less than 30% of the shells fired against Bismarck, and they had the flattest trajectory of all the guns fired and therefore would be most susceptible to striking waves prior to striking the side armour.

You have no problem doubting G&D in your last sentence, when they don't support your position, but take them as gospel when they do. Sometimes sources are contradictory so we have to use them carefully. For example the statement regarding Tovey's tactics and torpedoes, as the timeline establishes that there was no prohibition on the use of torpedoes in the early stages of the action. It's also clear that Bismarck's belt armour could be penetrated by 14in and 16in AP shells. Tovey sank Bismarck and his ships avoided casualties and damage from Bismarck. Damwiki1 (talk) 21:03, 12 September 2022 (UTC)

Can we cut this out already? Nothing either of you say here will change the fundamental fact that pretty much everyone who has examined the wreck agrees that Bismarck would have sunk as a result of the damage inflicted by the RN sooner or later, and that the scuttling hastened the sinking. Can we nibble around the edges of what this article presents? Sure. But we can do without the walls of text. If there's a specific point that should be included in the article, let's address them one by one, ideally in their own section, so we can stay focused and be productive, rather than yell past each other. Parsecboy (talk) 12:09, 13 September 2022 (UTC)

I think there should be section that describes finding the wreck and then an overview of the state of the wreck using the best available data. This should be entirely divorced from the sections detailing the battles and the sinking of the Bismarck and the various theories advanced on how and why she sank. Damwiki1 (talk) 22:12, 16 September 2022 (UTC)

Battleship Bismarck: (2019)

I removed a statement from the article because it is not supported by the reference and gives an entirely misleading impression of the state of Bismarck below the main armoured deck. This is an extract from the reference:

"Lieutenant Commander Junack returned to his battle station in the middle engine room (compartment VIII) when Commander Lehmann returned to his post in the propulsion control center. Soon after the final battle started, water began entering the ventilation shafts, a sure sign of how close enemy shells were landing near Bismarck. He noted after a time that the intake ventilators began to draw in air mixed with a red-orange colored smoke. Water from near misses also came down these ventilator shafts. He ordered his middle engine room crew to put on their gas masks. As the shells increased in number, it was difficult to determine whether the din from above was caused by his ship’s guns or enemy shells striking Bismarck. There were a few cracks above that sounded like the ship was firing, but he concluded that most of the ship’s guns probably were being silenced. He believed that enemy shells were beginning to take their toll from the tone of the noise above. This was confirmed at 0930, when he realized that no commands had been received from the bridge personnel in the last fifteen minutes using the engine room telegraph. The steam pressure to his engine room was only slightly reduced, indicating that no shells had reached the boiler rooms supplying him with steam. The lights were still on in his space. When it became quieter above, Junack sent his most senior petty officer to the engine room control station for orders, but he never returned...Waiting for a command to set the timing device, he decided to send his master chief above to get further orders. The man did not return. Shortly after 1010, Junack decided to proceed with Measure V after a personal inspection of his space for the last time to make sure that all the watertight doors in and to the shaft alley were open. He then sent all the crew in his space topside, with the exception of the chief machinist, who set the nine-minute delay fuzes to the scuttling charges. Junack and the chief machinist left the middle engine room with the turbines turning in accordance with the last order, “slow ahead,” and the lights still shining. Some fumes and smoke from a fire in the forward two firerooms on the starboard side came in through the intake vents. Junack was the last man to leave the middle engine room. As Junack proceeded to the Oberes Platformdeck and then to the Zwischendeck, he found the lights still brightly lit. The latter deck was very quiet and it reminded him of Easter Sunday in harbor when there was liberal leave. Once he entered the Batteriedeck there was a strong smell of fire and exploded munitions. The time was around 1020. By that time, the British shelling had stopped, so it was very quiet. Upon reaching the Batteriedeck, Lieutenant Commander Junack was stunned by the damage he saw there and then he heard the explosions of the charges in the middle engine room, so he knew that it was time to act fast." (page 544). A fireroom is another term for boiler room. So the engine room personnel could hear very loud noises from the battle above whilst smoke and fumes forced them to don gas masks. There was also a fire raging in two of the boiler rooms. Damwiki1 (talk) 19:30, 13 September 2022 (UTC)

Once again, your lack of neutrality is blatant. Battleship Bismarck: (2019) clearly states that the engineering officer Junack left the engineering spaces with the lights all on, the turbines turning, the shafts turning, and steam pressure "only slightly reduced, indicating that no shells had reached the boiler rooms supplying him with steam." This very reliable source also specifically stated that as he ascended, the conditions on the lower decks "reminded him of Easter Sunday in harbor". That was exactly the "state of Bismarck below the main armoured deck". I understand that this does not support your POV, so I guess once again you want us to cherry-pick this source?

You make a big deal about smoke and water entering the engineering space, but the source clearly states that the smoke was drawn in through the ventilators – from the surface action, and from the boiler rooms, not from damage to the engineering spaces. Ditto the water – trickling down the ventilators from splashes on the surface, caused by near-misses. The source does not mention any fires raging in the boiler rooms. Since boilers are where the fuel is burned, they are well designed to deal with fire, and the smoke could even have been from a loosened exhaust fitting. G&D (2019) specifically state in various places that the ventilators were damaged on the surface, causing blockages in the air feed to the boilers, "resulting in poor combustion" and thus the boilers producing huge amounts of "black oily smoke". Your wording of "a fire raging in two of the boiler rooms" is again seriously POV.

I agree that we should use sources cautiously where they clearly reflect conflicting primary sources. In this case, surely the eye-witnesses who were inside the Bismarck are more reliable than observers who were literally miles away, peering through spray and smoke?

And why should Battleship Bismarck: (2019) be given more weight than their article published 17 years earlier? There have been no more visits to the wreck since 2002? Statz has given no more interviews since 2002? How has the later version "improved", other than some of the wording being made a bit ambiguous to be more accommodating of the British sensibilities?

The fact that some British ships were firing torpedoes, does not change the fact that Tovey had wanted to sink the ship using gunfire, as Bismarck had sunk the Hood. The fact that some of his ships took some initiative – albeit with minimal success – does not change that reality.

Finally there is the major issue that you keep fudging – the scuttling did not happen after 10:00 when the charges were detonated, the scuttling started at 09:30 when the water-tight doors were deliberately opened, the counter-flooding was deliberately halted, and the crew deliberately allowed progressive uncontrolled flooding to commence. It's doubtful that the ship could have capsized solely due to water on the Batteriedeck, due to the deliberate design of the large metacentric height. On-going counter-flooding would have also made a contribution, had it been implemented. However Parsecboy is correct that most experts agree the ship would have sunk eventually, because the Bismarck could not have sailed home unaided once the British ships all ran out of fuel and ammunition, and the ship could not have been towed to France by U-boats.

Wdford (talk) 15:20, 14 September 2022 (UTC)

There has been extensive criticism of your edits in this article from a number of editors. I provided a lengthy quote from the the source material. As you can read above: "As Junack proceeded to the Oberes Platformdeck and then to the Zwischendeck, he found the lights still brightly lit. The latter deck was very quiet and it reminded him of Easter Sunday in harbor when there was liberal leave. Once he entered the Batteriedeck there was a strong smell of fire and exploded munitions. The time was around 1020. By that time, the British shelling had stopped, so it was very quiet. " Junack was referring specifically to the Zwischendeck, after the RN had ceased fired, so yes it was quiet as the gunfire part of the action was essentially over. During the action there was considerable noise in he engine room which was also filled with smoke, to the extent that he and his crew had to wear gas masks.... and that doesn't sound like a typical 'Easter Sunday' and your edit: "noting as they climbed up that the lower levels of the ship were very quiet and brightly lit, and that it reminded them of 'Easter Sunday in harbor" " fact mischaracterized his statement. Boiler rooms are not fire proof and fires in any compartment are a very serious matter, especially one that is fed with oil fuel; you seem fixated on the idea that Bismarck was some sort of invulnerable Nazi super-ship immune to damage. The quote states fire and doesn't tell us the cause, but it was sufficient to spread smoke into adjacent compartments. Eyewitness accounts, made years after the action are also likely to be highly misleading, but if we're going to use them, rather than the actual secondary source material, then we'd have to include statements from survivors who tell of RN 14in and 16in shells penetrating into the machinery spaces... In fact we have to try and summarize the condition of the ship and fairly characterize conditions on the ship during the action. The centre turbine room and it's associated central boiler rooms, containing 4 boilers, each sufficient to provide Junack's turbine with the modest steam required for slow speeds, were the best protected machinery spaces on the ship and it's not surprising that they could maintain steam pressure, especially given the very modest demands for steam as the turbines were barely moving.

When authors revise their works, the revisions have to be given more weight, especially when they are part of a 600+ page volume devoted specifically to Bismarck, with specific chapters analysing the final action.

Again, you try and take a few words and try to build up a false story of Tovey being a man fixated on revenge rather than an Admiral with a job to do, which was to silence Bismarck as rapidly as possible, and then sink her, as quickly as possible, at the least cost in lives and ships as possible. Only 3 of Tovey's ships present at the final action carried torpedoes, ad two of them began firing them as Bismarck came into range of their torpedoes. Again, the idea that Tovey ordered his ships to use gunfire alone is completely false. Tovey did use gunfire to rapidly destroy Bismarck's offensive power, and then ordered her finished off with torpedoes. The gale force storm and high waves shielded Bismarck's belt armour, and thus her machinery spaces from RN 14in and 16in shells, and the same conditions would have made long range plunging fire inaccurate. Tovey used tactics appropriate to the weather conditions and sank Bismarck without losing a man in the process. He was low on fuel and did, however, have to fear U-boat and Luftwaffe attacks, and so time was of the essence.

There's preparation for scuttling, which seems to have begun around 0930 which was also when Bismarck's internal communications began to break down so it's difficult to assess how effective that was, and then there's the actual scuttling (opening the ship's hull to the sea) which occurred around 1020. From Battleship Bismarck: (2019):

At 0925 Bismarck took a 5- to 8-degree list to port, depending on the rolling response and a deeper draft than 10.2 meters that brought her main deck on the port side to the level of the sea.19 This allowed a surge of water on the main deck and, from where there were holes, the commencement of downflooding below. Hence, water accumulated on the Batteriedeck, creating a free-surface effect that started to erode stability." (page 413)

Footnote 19: "At 0930 a critical point had been reached in the transverse stability of Bismarck. With water coming onto her main deck, the ability to right herself began to diminish. The U.S. Navy Handbook of Damage Control states that when water starts collecting on the damage control deck, it is time to evacuate the ship.

When a ship losses sufficient freeboard, then counterflooding becomes progressively less effective, since it has the effect of increasing the draft and thus further eroding freeboard. We don't know how long Bismarck could have survived if no order to scuttle was given, but OTOH, once central communication broke down, (Junack sent two POs to request information and none returned...a further indicator that all was not well in the machinery spaces) there could be no further centralized damage control anyways. We do know that Dorsetshire had 4 remaining torpedoes when Bismarck sank and that a squadron of FAA torpedo bombers were circling Bismarck waiting for an order or opportunity to attack Bismarck, but these potential torpedoes are never part of the calculation regarding Bismarck's long term survival. All the major sources agree that Bismarck would have sunk eventually. If we factor in the remaining torpedoes it seems likely that Bismarck was going to sink around 1040 regardless. However, the RN had abundant forces remaining, that were still closing onto Bismarck's position when she sank, so it's not like the RN was going away, even if Tovey's forces had to depart. Damwiki1 (talk) 18:31, 14 September 2022 (UTC)

See Tovey's Despatch:

"65. At 1025 as I still had no definite information.

I asked Commander-in-Chief if he

had disposed of the enemy; he replied that she

was still afloat, adding three minutes later that

he could not get her to sink by gunfire. Shortly

afterwards Commander-in-Chief also informed

me that he had been forced to discontinue the

action on account of fuel. I was about to order

the T/B striking force to finish off the BISMARCK

when DORSETSHIRE, who had been

ordered by Rear-Admiral Commanding, 1st

Cruiser Squadron to torpedo the enemy at close

range, reported at 1034 that the BISMARCK

was sinking and that 1039 that she had been sunk." Damwiki1 (talk) 00:05, 15 September 2022 (UTC)

On the matter of the line from Junack in question, I don't think it was presented fairly in the article. It gave the impression that everything was nice and orderly below decks, when the sense I get from reading the full passage in G&D is that he was referring to how quiet and empty the lower decks were - note he tied it to Easter because there was ample leave given (i.e., most of the crew were ashore), not because everything was operating as it should have. Parsecboy (talk) 11:54, 15 September 2022 (UTC)

On the matter of the line from Junack in question, it was presented as it was recorded in the source. Undoubtedly the lower decks were empty – the ship was being abandoned. However there was never any mention of any serious damage, only that some smoke was drawn in through the ventilators from elsewhere, and some noise.

The peaceful scene is contrasted with the last line in the same paragraph, which reads that "Upon reaching the batteriedeck, Lieutenant Commander Junack was stunned by the damage he saw there." If the lower decks had been shot to shambles, they would not have been STUNNED to find that the upper decks were badly damaged as well. There is no doubt that the line about Easter Sunday is correct as recorded.

It is also interesting that at 1020 they could still climb up into the batteriedeck from below – the batteriedeck was damaged but still not flooded in every compartment.

The source did NOT say that the boilers were only providing enough steam for slow speeds, the source said that "The steam pressure to his engine room was only slightly reduced, indicating that no shells had reached the boiler rooms supplying him with steam." Please stop blatantly distorting the sources.

In the section "Analysis – Bismarck's state at the end": at page 678 (ebook) G&D specifically state re the armour deck that "There were no reports from survivors of penetrations in that deck", and continue to state that even Statz reported that there were no explosions near his station.

Re Tovey and his torpedoes, the G&D source says in 2019 the same as they said in the earlier editions. In the section "Cease fire and departure from the battle area": at page 673 (ebook) G&D state that: "In the meanwhile, shelling continued from the four British ships in an effort to sink Bismarck by shellfire upon orders from Admiral Tovey." At page 674 (ebook) G&D state that Tovey became worried about running out of fuel, and that "He was now convinced that gunnery was not going to sink Bismarck. It was then that he ordered any ships with torpedoes to use them against the wreck, and Dorsetshire complied. Admiral Tovey informed Vice Admiral Somerville at 1045 that he was unable to sink Bismarck by gunfire." I trust this will put your POV to rest?

You calmly cherry-pick the observation that "At 0925 Bismarck took a 5- to 8-degree list to port, depending on the rolling response and a deeper draft than 10.2 meters that brought her main deck on the port side to the level of the sea.19 This allowed a surge of water on the main deck and, from where there were holes, the commencement of downflooding below." However the statement from Footnote 19 of Chapter 19: The Final Battle: Prelude (G&D 2019 page 914 ebook), states as follows: "When Commander Oels gave the scuttling order around 0930, this command ensured that significant sinkage would occur, and down-flooding would start below as the crew made their way topside through watertight hatches that would be left open in the batteriedeck. This flooding ensured an increasing overturning movement to bring about capsizing to port." The increased detail makes it clear that the real down-flooding – and listing - was the direct result of deliberately opening the hatches, which had been sealed until then. Again, you choose the statement that suits your POV due to incompleteness, and ignore the more detailed statements that give proper context. Once again, your neutrality is conspicuously absent.

G&D repeatedly state that Bismarck had excellent transverse separation – as many as 1500 water-tight compartments." In the section "Analysis: Bismarck's state at the end": at page 679-680 (ebook) G&D speak again of the stability, subdivisions and metacentric height, and state that: "As a result, it was necessary to cause massive off-center flooding to capsize and sink a Bismarck-class battleship". Clearly, flooding a few compartments of the batteriedeck would not have caused the listing described.

You also now come with a POV definition that opening the water-tight doors and deliberately allowing down-flooding to cause capsizing, while simultaneously ceasing counter-flooding, is not "actual scuttling" – even more evidence of poor neutrality.

G&D have chosen to write their book by describing the same issues multiple times in multiple different sections, and they do not always use the same words. We need to be careful that we use the full detail, rather than a summarised version that creates misleading impressions. Wdford (talk) 17:11, 15 September 2022 (UTC)

Abandoning ship is not scuttling! It's abandoning ship. Scuttling is opening the ship's hull to the sea. This is from the Merriam Webster Dictionary:

1

: to cut a hole through the bottom, deck, or side of (a ship)

specifically : to sink or attempt to sink by making holes through the bottom

All the statements below are direct quotes from Battleship Bismarck: (2019) and the chapter detailing survivor accounts.

Blum left the space with Commander Lehmann standing at the controls and proceeded to the electrical engineer’s workshop where he had a night watch position near the uptakes and intakes to the funnel. Several of his comrades gathered in there on the Zwischendeck in compartment X. He decided to wait here and rest, because if something was really going to occur, the phone would ring. He could hear the British shells hitting above but had confidence that the armor protection of the ship would keep him from harm. Suddenly, there was a loud crash as one of Rodney’s 406-mm shells exploded in the space above, and fragments penetrated starboard boiler room number one in compartment XI.(p. 547)

Wilhelm Schmidt Between 0935 and 0945, a messenger came from damage control central asking Schmidt to send a damage control party to extinguish fires on the main deck aft. None of the men who were sent ever returned. Around 0935, about five heavy shells penetrated the main deck in the stern section of the ship. They entered through the main deck and proceeded down through the Batteriedeck and Zwischendeck with heavy explosions. “As each shell exploded,” recalled Schmidt, “you could sense sharp tremors within the ship.” It is believed that these shell hits came from King George V and Rodney when these made their close approach to Bismarck between 0925 and 0940. Two of these shells exploded in compartments I and II. The one that detonated in compartment II generated a large amount of nitrous gas and started fires on the decks above. These spaces had already been reduced to shambles by the torpedo hit in the stern that had crippled Bismarck. The gasses from the explosion seeped through the closed armored door of the aft armored bulkhead in the vicinity of Schmidt’s action station in compartment III. Shell splinters from the third hit extinguished the lighting and put a ventilator on the main deck out of action.(p. 548)

Zimmermann made his way to the Batteriedeck and then aft to compartment VIII, where he witnessed the deaths of Commander Oels and many other crew members in the vicinity of the aft canteen. He noted that the shell created a hole in the Batteriedeck and the Zwischendeck below.(p. 554)

Heinrich Kuhnt Heinrich Kuhnt, stationed in the port engine room, was kept informed of the battle progress. The news of the final battle was not good, but Kuhnt and his mates felt safe with the armor protection above and around them despite the noise from shell hits above. Occasionally sporadic fragments from these hits would rattle around in the ventilation ducts that supplied air to the port engine room. Kuhnt became concerned by the increasing list to port as he remembered his experiences aboard the light cruiser Karlsruhe, which had been disabled and sunk by a torpedo hit from a British submarine during the invasion of Norway. At some point after 0930, there was a 356-mm shell hit in compartment X that may have exploded in the condensate tank in the double bottom, damaging the port longitudinal bulkhead and rupturing the outboard strake of the inner bottom plating in the port engine room. Water began to seep into the port engine room, and eventually the water covered the turbines.(p. 557)

Around 0915 on 27 May it was apparent to Commander Oels and Lieutenant Commander Jahreis that the ship was being severely damaged and she eventually was going to sink. There were no longer any reports from the forward half of the ship, and the bridge had not responded to any calls. Serious fires were being reported in the forward section of the ship. Telephone calls were placed to all stations, and only a few responded. Oels and Jahreis decided to take one party of men topside through the communications tube and another aft to spread the word below decks that the ship was to be scuttled.(p. 562)

“Comrades, we can no longer fire our guns and anyway we probably do not have any more ammunition. Our hour has come. We must abandon the ship. She is going to be scuttled. All hands to the main deck.”31 Just after the Oels party cleared compartment XIII, a 406-mm shell exploded within a crew space on the starboard side of the Zwischen-deck that was above in compartment XI, sending fragments into the boiler room, knocking out electrical power in that area, and filling the area with noxious fumes. A number of ratings were scalded by fractured steam pipes...(p. 563)

(31) Although an exploding British shell killed Commander Oels, there were enough recollections from other Bismarck survivors to document his experiences. In this endeavor, Josef Statz was extremely helpful in documenting the last minutes that Oels spent in damage control central. By analyzing Bismarck’s condition and the general arrangements of Bismarck, the path that Oels took to arrive at the place where he lost his life, as well as the damage sustained from British shellfire that occurred on the portside, a possible track of the Oels party could be recreated.(p. 585)

As Zickelbein tried to find a way out from the port side of the Batteriedeck, more shells hit and the lights went out. Zickelbein found breathing very difficult and reached into his pockets to pull out a handkerchief to cover his nose and mouth against the dense, acrid smoke that also burned his eyes. Making his way forward, he managed to find an access trunk. Waiting for some wounded to be carried above, Lieutenant Arvid Thiele told Zickelbein and his party to leave the wounded men where they lay as “they would sleep better there.”23 Another shell hit and killed those closest to the trunk. Zickelbein was not hurt, but water started to pour down from the main deck, and soon it was above his waist.24 Once he regained his senses, he made his way up the damaged access trunk to the main deck, where he eventually gained the safety of the sea.(p. 559)

(24) Zickelbein’s report of this much flooding on the Batteriedeck is significant. There were other large pockets of water on the port side caused by shells’ penetrations of the main deck followed by flooding of interior compartments from wave action or water from near misses along the portside. Such flooding led to a free-surface effect as well as an increasing port list that diminished the transverse stability of Bismarck and would contribute her eventual capsizing.(p. 585) Damwiki1 (talk) 20:26, 15 September 2022 (UTC)

And still you continue with your blatant lack of neutrality, with this semantic attempt to pretend that there is a major difference between the crew deliberately sinking their own ship by initiating down-flooding from above vs the crew deliberately sinking their own ship by initiating up-flooding from below. Scuttling a ship is when the crew deliberately sinks their own ship – regardless of how they do it. In this case, due to the storm and the amount of water landing on the deck, they commenced by deliberately opening all the water-tight hatches to allow large-scale down-flooding to start, and they halted any counter-flooding activities, so as to encourage this very stable ship to eventually capsize. The source is clear on this, but yet you persist in pretending otherwise. Pathetically obvious POV.

You are also persisting in your blatant cherry-picking. Both the Batteriedeck and the Zwischendeck suffered heavy damage, but both were above the armour-deck. Compartments I and II were right at the stern, and were not even covered by the armour deck or citadel. The source is clear that no survivor reported a shell penetrating the armour deck. In this single case of fragments entering the boiler room, nowhere does the source actually say how those fragments got below the armour deck, and they may very well have come down the funnel or a ventilator shaft. The source is clear that the "port list would gradually increase as the battle occurred, particularly after 0930", i.e. after the crew had commenced the deliberate down-flooding process. Obviously there were flooded compartments on the Batteriedeck – nobody ever contested that – but the Batteriedeck was far above the armour deck, and it was flooding from above. It was divided into many isolated compartments to limit the free-surface effect, and your own cited passage refers to this water being "large pockets of water". Obviously this extra weight would also eventually contribute something to the eventual capsizing, after over an hour of deliberate down-flooding and half an hour after the detonation of the charges. Wdford (talk) 17:36, 16 September 2022 (UTC)

I am providing extensive quotes from the reference material, and I don't understand how that shows a lack of neutrality.

Bismarck's crew were ordered to begin abandoning ship around 0930 when it was apparent that Bismarck was slowly sinking, and to do this they had to move up to the main deck, and a consequence of this is that it allowed more water to flow downward into the hull as critical hatches had to be left open for the crew to escape, which did indeed accelerate the process of sinking...but if this is 'scuttling' then virtually every ship that sinks, after the crew abandons ship, is actually scuttled! Of course the contention that abandoning ship is scuttling is absurd. As I pointed out and as the references state, internal communications began to break down on Bismarck prior to the decision abandon ship and initiate scuttling, so effective damage control including counterflooding had ended, whether or not the ship's damage control teams wanted to or not. Additionally, counterflooding, for example, becomes less effective and can actually hasten capsizing once a free surface effect begins on the upper internal decks of the ship as was occurring prior to 0930.

I pointed out examples of shell hits that penetrated the armoured deck of the Zwischendeck to damage spaces below the armoured deck...as you'll realize if read the quotes again. See Battleship Bismarck: (2019) pages 419-421 for an explanation and a diagram of how fragments penetrated the armoured deck into the boiler room. Damwiki1 (talk) 21:51, 16 September 2022 (UTC)

So, as before, still just more cherry-picking and misrepresentation. In the section "Analysis – Bismarck's state at the end": at page 678 (ebook) G&D specifically state re the armour deck that "There were no reports from survivors of penetrations in that deck", and continue on to state that even Statz reported that there were no explosions near his station. This is directly from the source, and it is massively clear and unambiguous. The physical inspection of the wreck also found no evidence of penetrations. However you continue to claim that shell hits "penetrated the armoured deck", and you claim that there is "an explanation and a diagram" to show how fragments penetrated the armoured deck into the boiler room.

Re your various references, they never say that a shell penetrated the armour deck. They also never actually say that fragments of a shell penetrated the armour deck. Since there were no surviving witnesses to this shell-burst, and no direct observation was possible when the wreck was inspected, their little cartoon sketch is totally hypothetical. The various mentions of this event in the source use wording like "fragments penetrated starboard boiler room number one" and "sending fragments into the boiler room". The possibility that these fragments entered the boiler room via the exhaust tubes or the air intakes etc is greatest, and your attempts to twist this into "evidence" of a penetration of the armour deck is once again WP:synth at best.

Schmidt reported that shells exploded in the stern section of the ship. The armour deck did not extend right to the stern, and the source specifically mentions compartments I and II, which were right at the very back, beyond the protection of the armour deck. Again, you are trying to exploit apparent ambiguity to make a POV point.

Heinrich Kuhnt mentioned that a shell "may have" exploded in the condensate tank in the double bottom, causing water to begin to "seep into the port engine room". Kuhnt had no way of knowing how big the shell was. However in order to penetrate the armour deck and then explode in the bottom of the hull, this amazing shell would have tunnelled downward through the entire ship before exploding, dodging innumerable solid items along the way, despite having been fired at a very flat horizontal angle. This all sounds massively unlikely, and the source accordingly volunteers no explanation. The plating in that condensate tank – and the hull beneath – was not very strong, so a huge shell would have blasted all the plating to scrap, opening the interior of the ship to the ocean. The ship would have sunk rapidly, but instead the source mentions water "seeping in", which implies minor bucked plates at best. It was thus probably a near-miss which exploded underneath the ship – presumably part of the "miserable weather" effect. Once again, you engage in blatant synth.

Re the evacuation, nobody would be able to climb up ladders with columns of freezing seawater cascading down onto their heads. Obviously they evacuated using the hatches that were NOT down-flooding The hatches that were down-flooding were left open specifically to allow the lower decks to flood and to capsize the ship – exactly as described in the source. The counter-flooding was halted as soon as the order was given to scuttle – exactly as you would expect. Your ridiculous assertion that the counter-flooding was coincidentally abandoned because the telephone stopped working, is once again blatant wp:synth.

And finally, while a free-surface effect certainly is dangerous, the Bismarck was designed to minimise this risk, by having the upper decks sub-divided into thousands of sub-compartments – thereby limiting the flooding to "pockets" where the destabilising effect would be relatively minor. As I have pointed out previously.

Wdford (talk) 11:40, 22 September 2022 (UTC)

Basically, you dispute every statement that doesn't suit your narrative that Bismarck was invulnerable to RN guns...it really sounds a lot like your own WP:OR to me. Battleship Bismarck: A Design and Operational History carefully analyses the last battle and gives it's conclusions. I have provided lengthy quotes from this large book, whose authors have personally viewed the wreck and have published extensively on the design and history of the Bismarck.

Anyways, this extract states very clearly that the main armoured deck was penetrated: "Around 0935, about five heavy shells penetrated the main deck in the stern section of the ship. They entered through the main deck and proceeded down through the Batteriedeck and Zwischendeck with heavy explosions. " The shells passed through the Zwischendeck, so by definition they had to pass through the armoured deck. We know that only a small portion of the armoured deck could be surveyed robotically. There was a little over 100 survivors from Bismarck out of a crew of over 2000. By definition a 14in or 16in AP shell that detonates in a compartment will kill or wound everyone in that compartment, so a lack of survivor accounts of shells exploding below the armoured deck is not surprising, but the effects of even shell fragments could be lethal as well:

"Shell fragments were sent down into the after starboard boiler room, starting a fuel oil fire, and bursting some steam pipes. Superheated steam from this boiler room scalded a number of ratings who had survived. In the commotion, Machinist’s Mate Blum saw survivors from that boiler room stagger into his area. However, this shell hit came later in the action where Statz was not in a position to be aware of such a hit." (Battleship Bismarck: A Design and Operational History p. 437)

Bismarck's main armoured deck was extended all the way aft to cover the steering room, in compartment I.

Heinrich Kuhnt's statement that a 356mm shell damaged the port engine room is an example of a shell that could damage the machinery spaces by following an underwater trajectory similar to the 24 May 14in hit on Bismarck that flooded a forward generator and boiler room.

The crew wouldn't be able to open hatches in areas of the ship that were flooded. Once the order to abandon ship was given hatches and doors were left open as the crew escaped, just as happens in any sinking ship and this is not scuttling.

"Around 0915 on 27 May it was apparent to Commander Oels and Lieutenant Commander Jahreis that the ship was being severely damaged and she eventually was going to sink. There were no longer any reports from the forward half of the ship, and the bridge had not responded to any calls. Serious fires were being reported in the forward section of the ship. Telephone calls were placed to all stations, and only a few responded. Oels and Jahreis decided to take one party of men topside through the communications tube and another aft to spread the word below decks that the ship was to be scuttled."(p. 562)

How can damage control operate when communications on the ship had clearly failed well before the order to scuttle? Damwiki1 (talk) 18:06, 22 September 2022 (UTC)

Actually, despite your innuendos, I am citing directly from your favourite reliable source, whose authors personally inspected the wreck 17 years ago. You, on the other hand, are relentlessly pushing your jingoistic POV by blatant cherry-picking, combined with a heavy smear of wishful interpretation.

As I have pointed out many times before, in the section "Analysis – Bismarck's state at the end": at page 678 (ebook) G&D specifically state re the armour deck that "There were no reports from survivors of penetrations in that deck". This is quoting directly from the source, and it is totally clear and unambiguous. Since the inspection of the wreck also found zero evidence of the armour deck being penetrated, the quote you cite can only have come from a German survivor – who is actually named in the source as Schmidt. However the source clearly says that no survivors reported the armour deck being penetrated. How to explain the apparent contradiction? Well, the Zwischendeck was above the armour deck, so Schmidt must have meant that the shells passed through the "volume" of the Zwischendeck rather than the "floor" of the Zwischendeck, and thus detonated "within" the Zwischendeck. Simple enough, considering that this is based on info from a man who does not speak English as his first language. You would have to read the slightly-ambiguous choice of wording with your own specific POV, while deliberately ignoring all other comments to the contrary, in order to assume it meant that the shells went through the armour deck below the Zwischendeck as well.

Add to this the FACT that the source states these shells came when the RN battleships "made their close approach", ie they were shooting flat, rather than lobbing in plunging fire from long range, which presents another apparent contradiction. Since Schmidt was in compartment 3 inside the citadel, he can be relied upon that the shells did explode in compartments 1 & 2, which were outside the citadel. However, how would Schmidt possibly have known the angle of their arrival? From that minimal range, the shells more likely entered those rear compartments through the thin side walls.

At least you are now accepting that the damage described by Kuhnt came from a detonation under water rather than a shell through the armour deck. Small progress. However it could not have been plunging fire as in the Prince of Wales case, because at this time the KGV was very close and shooting flat, whereas PoW was over 13km away. How did you miss that?

And you are still desperately cherry-picking and twisting in an attempt to negate the obvious fact that the scuttling began at 0930 – basing this on a broken telephone, of all things, despite no such attribution by the source. We know that the bridge was already wrecked, but the paragraph you cite actually states "there were no longer any REPORTS from the forward half of the ship", as well as in the same paragraph "serious fires were being REPORTED in the forward section of the ship." How did they get "reports" of the fires, if there was no way to communicate? Can you accept that perhaps the German navy could work around a broken telephone? Do you even read what you type?

NB: To repeat: I am working here directly from a very reliable source. Wdford (talk) 19:07, 26 September 2022 (UTC)

Conversions between tons and long tons in description of Bismark characteristics

I am not an expert on naval terminology and metrics, but I believe there is an error in converting between US tons and British (long) tons in this article. See the first two paragraphs in the section on characteristics (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_battleship_Bismarck#Characteristics). A US ton is 2000 lb. A long ton is 2240 lb (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_ton). The conversion ratio is therefore 2000/2240 or approx 0.893. If the Bismark displaced 41,700 tons, the equivalent in long tons should be 41,700 x 0.893 or 37,238 long tons, not 41,000 as stated in the article. Alternatively, if the Bismark's displacement was 41,000 long tons, then its displacement in US tons would be 45,900. I imagine that the original specifications would have been given in metric units. There were other values given in the same paragraph which seem to have been made with the same incorrect conversion. I have not made edits to the article, as I don't know which of the two values in each case is the true amount and which was the converted amount, but I thought I should bring it to your attention. I did not see any discussion of this in the existing text on this page. Kittycomehere.ca (talk) 07:33, 9 October 2022 (UTC)

You’re forgetting about metric tons, which is what the Germans still used to calculate their displacement. They were not party to the Washington Naval Treaty, which is where long tons were established as the standard measure. Parsecboy (talk) 08:46, 9 October 2022 (UTC)

Hi, Parsecboy! As I noted above, I agree that the German spec would have been in metric tons, and indeed the conversions would be very close to the values given if the units given as 'tons' were in fact metric tons. Since the website is international, it would be best to specify. Kittycomehere.ca (talk) 23:39, 10 October 2022 (UTC)

Firing on the Sheffield

The article states that Bismarck fired at Sheffield before and after the attack of the swordfisches of the Ark Royal. I checked F.O. Busch and von Mullenheim-Rechberg ( in Dutch so no use to mention page nbrs I suppose ) and also Stephen p. 92. They all 3 state that the only firing on Sheffield, with the casualties and smokescreen, is after 21h00, after the attack. Maybe there's confusion since the main battery and secundary battery also fired on the swordfishes ( as mentioned by von M-R they fired in the water to cause shell splash barrierres ) Is it ok if I correct that ? Klutserke (talk) 21:28, 20 December 2022 (UTC)

It seems unlikely that Bismarck firing at very close range to disrupt the Swordfishes would have achieved a straddle on Sheffield; according to Bercuson & Herwig, three men were injured by fragments from these rounds. What is more plausible is that the Germans were using Central European Time, an hour ahead of GMT, which is why the German sources place the engagement with Sheffield well after the torpedo attack. Parsecboy (talk) 13:48, 21 December 2022 (UTC)

Hoi, thanks for your reply. Here an overview of the sources that I have at hand :

• F.O. Busch mentions the swordfishes making contact first with the Sheffield around 08h00 and once more at 08h30, he places the swordfish attack between 08h55 and 09h25. Subsequently Bismarck opens fire on Sheffield, with the first salvo a mile astray but the second straddling. 12 casualties with 3 dead. ( pp 107-108 in the Dutch version )
• von M-R describes in chapter 19 and 20 how Sheffield makes contact at 17h40, the swordfishes make contact at 20h00 and again at 20h30. In the first page of chapter 20 von M-R describes then how he witnesses in his artillery director post the firing of the main and secundary guns on the airplanes, and then after the attack, how Schneider in his top artillery director post orders to fire on a cruiser, and straddles it with the second salvo.
• Stephen describes on pp. 89-92 the attack starting at 20h47 and the Bismarck firing six salvoes at Sheffield after being hit, with 3 killed and 2 wounded.

So according to these 3 there is only 1 attack from Bismarck on Sheffield, and after being hit. Would you have the Bercuson & Herwig easy at hand to cross-check that ? Klutserke (talk) 19:19, 21 December 2022 (UTC)

This extract is from the RN Historical Branch Battle Summary Five and reproduced in Bennett, G H. Bismarck: The Chase and Sinking of Hitler's Goliath :

: "Actually the Bismarck had received a deadly blow. The last shadowers (58) returning at 2325/26, had seen her make two complete circles. She had received two hits and possibly a third. One torpedo struck her the port side amidships doing little damage. One struck her on the starboard quarter damaging her propellors, wrecking her steering gear and jamming her rudders. This was the one that sealed her fate. The Sheffield was still shadowing astern when at 2140/26 the Bismarck, turning to port, opened fire with six accurate salvoes of 15-in.; none actually hit, but a near miss killed three men and seriously injured two. The Sheffield turning away sighted at 2142/26 the Cossack and her destroyers approaching from the westward and gave them the approximate position of the Bismarck. She had shadowed her closely since 1740/26 and had been able to direct the aircraft and destroyers on to her. Losing touch about 2155/26...".

Essentially the same information is given in G&D's Axis Battleships on page 235. Sheffield was fired upon by Bismarck well after the Swordfish attack that disabled Bismarck's rudder.

Damwiki1 (talk) 23:05, 25 December 2022 (UTC)

Plural of Swordfish

I always assume the most natural plural of Swordfish is Swordfish. It’s certainly the usage in the article on “Battle of Taranto“. Springnuts (talk) 23:29, 5 January 2023 (UTC)

conversion 14 inch to 356 or 360 mm

I see that a template is used to convert 14 inches to mm. Usually the 14 inch gun is calculatated to 356mm. But the template probably rounds to 2 digits, it shows 360. How should this be corrected ? Klutserke (talk) 14:36, 5 March 2023 (UTC)

You can add a digit parameter to force the template to round to whatever precision you want - generally, when converting from inches to mm, adding |0 to the template will get you the right rounding. It's fixed now, thanks for pointing it out. Parsecboy (talk) 17:33, 5 March 2023 (UTC)