Standoff at the Khyber Pass (1834–1835)
| Standoff at the Khyber Pass | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Afghan-Sikh Wars | |||||||
 Painting titled 'Entrance to the Khyber Pass' by James Atkinson, ca.1840s | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 Sikh EmpirePeshawar Sardars (defected) |
.svg){kind=small} Emirate of Kabul | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Maharaja Ranjit Singh Hari Singh Nalwa Gulab Singh Dhian Singh Lehna Singh Majithia Tej Singh Jean-François Allard Paolo Avitabile Josiah Harlan Jean-Baptiste Ventura Faqir Azizuddin Claude Auguste Court Attar Singh Sandhanwalia Khushal Singh Misr Sukh Raj Jawala Singh Sultan Mohammad Khan (defected) |
Dost Mohammad Khan Wazir Akbar Khan Jabbar Khan | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 80,000-102,000 | 100,000-130,000 | ||||||
The Standoff at the Khyber Pass (1834–1835) was a short conflict from May 1834 to May 1835 by the Sikh forces led by Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the Afghan forces led by Dost Mohammad Khan. The conflict began as the Sikh Empire expanded into Peshawar, deposing the Peshawar Sardars, while also supporting the deposed Durrani dynasty in their attempts to return to the throne of Afghanistan under Shah Shuja Durrani.
Following Shah Shuja's defeat at Kandahar, Dost Mohammad began mobilizing for conflict with the Sikhs and met the Sikhs at the Khyber Pass in a standoff. Following treachery and intrigues by the Sikhs, the Afghans withdrew, and no major engagement took place, ending the short conflict with the withdrawal of Afghan forces on 11 May 1835.
Background
In 1834, Ranjit Singh coincided with the deposed Durrani ruler, Shah Shuja Durrani to restore him to the throne with the aid of the British. Ranjit Singh invaded Peshawar, which was ruled by the Peshawar Sardars, and was captured in May 1834. Shah Shuja however, was defeated by Dost Mohammad Khan and the Kandahar Sardars, being forced to withdraw.[1][2]
Seeing the occupation as an unjust usurpation of his deposed brothers domains, he informed Ranjit Singh that Hari Singh Nalwa had removed them from their lands, and that Dost Mohammad would take revenge after he had defeated Shah Shuja in Kandahar, threatening that the Afghans would attack Peshawar, intent on removing the Sikhs from there, and even the Punjab.[3]
Ranjit Singh and the Afghans attempted to conciliate relations, but nothing came as a result, leading to Dost Mohammad's mobilization. Dost Mohammad began assembling his armies, and raised already 20,000 men with him. He attempted to make alliances with the Persians and the British, asking for their assistance toward expelling the Sikhs from Peshawar. It was however, refused. The two armies began preparing for war, as Ranjit Singh sent reinforcements from across the Punjab, also assembling 20,000 men and ordering for the reconstruction of defenses in Peshawar, including the fortifying of the Bala Hissar in Peshawar.[4]
To further legitimize his cause, Dost Mohammad Khan took the title of Amir al-Mu'minin, meaning "Commander of the faithful", and declared a holy war against the Sikhs, rallying Muslims in the region toward his cause. He began his march toward Peshawar from Jalalabad on 2 January 1835, with large amounts of Muslims coming from various surrounding regions flocking to support the Afghans in their cause.[5]
Skirmishes and Standoff
Hari Singh Nalwa, stationed in Peshawar with about 20,000 men, faced desertion from Sikhs and Hindus, which he prevented by placing Kanwar Kashmira Singh at the ford of the Indus river to prevent any crossings without permission. Dost Mohammad continued his advance, and upon reaching Dakoh, he captured Sultan Mohammad Khan, and Pir Mohammad Khan, seizing riches from both of them.[6] In December 1834, a skirmish took place which saw Akbar Khan, the son of Dost Mohammad Khan, fight engagements with different Sikh outposts. In one such engagement, Hari Singh Nalwa was defeated, leaving around 150 Sikhs dead and wounded, forcing him to withdraw to Peshawar.[6]
Seeking to avenge his defeat, Hari Singh began using intrigue. He at first asked Ranjit Singh to hold Dost Mohammad to negotiation, while he attempted to divide the camp of the Afghans by offering large bribes to Sultan Mohammad Khan. Hari Singh however, remained impatient, and wished to battle. This was dismissed by other generals, and Ranjit Singh, fearing that Hari Singh would attack by himself, ordered him to await for his arrival.[7]
By the end of March 1835, reinforcements from Gulab Singh had arrived arrived at the Sikh camp, while Ranjit Singh led forced marches and began approaching in April.[8] On 6 May 1835, Ranjit Singh reached the suburbs of Peshawar. Sultan Mohammad Khan, the brother of Dost Mohammad. Sultan Mohammad met the Maharaja and gave him gifts, and Ranjt Singh gave him a letter for Dost Mohammad Khan to make peace. On 7 May, the Ranjit Singh viewed Dost Mohammad's camp from a distance with a telescope. The camp was at the mouth of the Khyber Pass. According to Hari Ram Gupta, "The strength he possessed was 40 to 50,000 of his own and 60 to 80,000 Ghazis." Ranjit Singh created a camp at Kaikuon and stationed his troops about 6 km from the Khan's camp.[9]
Ranjit Singh chose intrigue rather than facing the Afghans in battle and began sending negotiation efforts to Dost Mohammad Khan. However, the true intentions of this were to divide Dost Mohammad Khan's supporters with bribes, prominently, Sultan Mohammad Khan. Josiah Harlan and Faqir Aziz were sent to the camp of Dost Mohammad, who plotted intrigue in the Afghan camp, including making some of his supporters and brothers jealous of the powerful position Dost Mohammad Khan held. This led to Sultan Mohammad's withdrawal from the camp at night with over 10,000 men, as this force defected to the Sikh camp. This sent the Afghan camp into disarray.[10]
The French division under Jean-François Allard, Paolo Avitabile, Claude Auguste Court and Jean-Baptiste Ventura commanded 20 to 22,000 men who marched very slowly and suitably towards the left flank of Dost Mohammad Khan's army. The main Sikh army led by Hari Singh Nalwa, Gulab Singh, Misr Sukh Raj, Tej Singh, Attar Singh Sandhanwalia, Khushal Singh, Dhian Singh, Jawala Singh, Lehna Singh Majithia and Maharaja Ranjit Singh numbered 60–80,000 and approached Dost Mohammad Khan's center and right side.[9][11]
Dost Mohammad Khan rejected a truce with the Sikhs. He withdrew at night with his troops and Ghazis, believing that he was being surrounded and having faced a bad omen with the stirrup of a horse, the Afghans withdrew and took all their ammunition and guns with them.[9][12][13][14]
Aftermath
Following the Afghan withdrawal, it was believed to be a tactic to lure the Sikhs into Afghan territory where the Afghans could fight on better odds. To remove this concern, Hari Singh, and Dhian Singh were sent with other chiefs to advance up to the Khyber pass, investigating and concluding that the Afghans had fully withdrawn.[15] After this encounter, Maharaja Ranjit Singh returned to Lahore.[9]
References
- ^ Dalrymple, W. (2013). The Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan. Borzoi book. Bloomsbury. p. 72. ISBN 978-1-4088-1830-5. Retrieved 15 June 2020.
- ^ Lee, Jonathan (2019). Afghanistan: A History from 1260 to the Present. Reaktion Books. p. 205. ISBN 9781789140101.
- ^ Sandhu, Autar Singh (1935), General Hari Singh Nalwa, Lahore: Cunningham Historical Society, p. 57
- ^ Sandhu 1935, p. 57-59.
- ^ Sandhu 1935, p. 60.
- ^ a b Sandhu 1935, p. 62.
- ^ Sandhu 1935, p. 62-63.
- ^ Sandhu 1935, p. 63.
- ^ a b c d Hari Ram Gupta (1991). History Of The Sikhs Vol. V The Sikh Lion of Lahore (Maharaja Ranjit Singh, 1799-1839). pp. 176–177. ISBN 9788121505154.
- ^ Sandhu 1935, p. 64-66.
- ^ George Buist (1843). Outline of the Operations of the British Troops in Scinde and Afghanistan. p. 9.
- ^ Joseph Davey Cunningham (1843). A History of the Sikhs, from the Origin of the Nation to the Battles of the Sutlej. p. 9.
- ^ Syed Waheeduddin (1843). The Real Ranjit Singhj. p. 9.
- ^ Hamid Wahed (2013). A Concise History of Afghanistan in 25 Volumes. p. 385. ISBN 9781490714479.
- ^ Sandhu 1935, p. 67.