Talk:Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory

Please add comments at the end, or at the end of the relevant section, and sign them with 4 '~' in a row. Thanks.

This article was nominated for deletion on November 1, 2005. The result of the discussion was keep.

— JIP | Talk 20:27, 6 November 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Why?

Man to all conspiracy nuts, just answer me: Why the fuck ths US needed a enourmous catastrophe like that? Just for a Cause to go to WAR and mobilize the masses? If i knew that japan will attack, and has mobilised its whole fleet, i can be prepared and still have a reasonable cause to go to war...

From that adage "Timing is everything." - Why did not the earlier incidents in the Atlantic not bring a declaration of war?

Because Hitler was going out of his way to avoid it, & Congress seems not to have given a damn? Trekphiler 01:33, 27 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

"... & Congress seems not to have given a damn?" A review of Congressional Record, 77th Congress, First Session, Volume 87, Part 8 shows the details of Stark's report to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs regarding the Greer incident. Stark let's it slip that the US was the aggressor, that delivering mail to Iceland was a cover story.

Also, see Stark's 22 September 1941 letter to Hart " ... We are now escorting convoys." Imagine FDR going to Congress and asking for a declaration of war ... where the US "fired" first!

What political party controlled each house of Congress and occupied the White House at this time?

"Congress seems not to have given a damn" I don't recall a declaration of war, & a submarine firing on an American destroyer is casus belli regardless of the circumstances, had Congress chosen to see it as such. And Greer wasn't the only "shot". Recall Rueben James.

"Imagine FDR going to Congress and asking for a declaration of war ... where the US "fired" first!" Which is the other side of my argument; Hitler didn't want a war, either... Trekphiler 15:55, 12 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

So, in fact, Congress did "give a damn" and had hearings. You may recall from the US Constitution, the President asks for the declaration of war. FDR did not ask. Why? If FDR wanted so badly to be in a war against Germany, why not go the Congress and ask for a declaration of war?

only obsolete ships at Pearl -- carriers gone. Means something?

This article contains no discussion about why only obsolete old ships were in port at the time of the attack, while the valuable new aircraft carriers happened to be at sea. It's not good enough to say that they were only thought of as being useful for reconnaisance. The aircraft on them were fitted with guns and bombs - wheras reconnaisance aircraft would mainly need to fly economically. Does anyone know why the aircraft carriers were not in port on 7-Dec-41, please? --New Thought 16:29, 31 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

"One rationale here, of many, relates to the on-going effort to bolster the B-17 fleet in the Philippines as a strategic force against Japan. See in Layton's text an insert of a chart showing the RoA (i.e., radius of action) of the B-17 C&Ds (as well as the B-24 C&Ds and the very "short-legged" B-18A). The carriers were used to place aircraft at Wake and Midway, those to act of air cover as the B-17s were being ferried during their hops to the Philippines. Of course, that is just one rendition of the story ... there are many others. -jamaksin"

I believe I can answer. Hopefully this site will help http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/ "An intersting site with much good material.

(However, a real bastion of objectivity for many, and not so for many others. -jamaksin")

Pure dumb luck. Fears of Japanese attacks on Midway & Wake →reinforcement transported by CV→no CVs in harbor. And Sara was under refit, ditto. This isn't in dispute. (I haven't seen the "escort B-17s" argument before, but I haven't read Layton, either...) Trekphiler 10:59, 14 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

And you wonder why your comments were removed by the mods?(SS)

205.188.116.73 (AKA Jamaskin) please don't vandalize ("viz., Using exact references to make needed corrections to obvious errors of omission and bias - jamaksin") the page anymore and keep your comments here. Also please show me a copy of pg 111 from the NA. The doc that starts out "Station H November, 1941. Naval Movement reports...

If you can post any errors here, I would be happy to read them. (SS)

"Two specific citations - both within the public domain were provided in full - to this query and were posted as such. Along with those was a note regarding call sign HA N 8, also of 28 Nov. As these citations and note have been removed, I cannot help you. -jamaksin"

Put them here because my copy states: 28 Nov (Call) HA N 8 (Identification) (Blank) (Indicator) Code movement (Position) (Blank) (Time) 0810 (Sheet) 94069 I posted a copy here As you can see there are no handwritten comments on the original document in the code movement for call sign RU SI 8. Nor is there any comments written under HA N 8.

(SS)

Wasn't the bulk of the US battleships at Pearl? That was hardly a collection of "old and obsolete" ships, to the naval establishment then it was THE warfleet. For the suggestion that only expendable ships were at Pearl to work,the USN ought to have kept back their newer, most modern battleships. It was hardly even possible to fully appreciate the impact of carrier-based airpower before the pacific war. And note that at Taranto (as well as at Pearl Harbor) the planes hit stationary ships, at least in the later case also achieving total surprise. It was only natural to assume that aircrafts would be unable to achieve this against a fully alert battlefleet maneuvring out in the ocean. thestor 12:34, 25 April 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Well, no. The heavies were considered the "main fleet", but most of the BBs at Pearl that morning were old & slow by comparison to the newest, & obsolete for the duties they'd have been called on for when the PW started, i.e. TF escort (as I've said repeatedly on Talk:attack on Pearl Harbor, without anybody actually listening... Moreover, it wasn't "total surprise" nobody thought was achievable, but successful sinkings against maneuvering ships; JUDGEMENT & Mitchell's stunt were against anchored ships. Sinking PoW & Repulse put paid to that notion PDQ. Trekphiler 01:43, 27 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Okay then, but where were the brand new battleships of the USN during the attack then?

Atlantic Fleet, where the greater perceived threat was. Portsmouth, I think. Trekphiler 15:57, 12 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Breaks

I added a bit on "such breaks as existed". Holmes & Blair (& I think Kahn) mention them; evidently, they were only into the additive table. This would be important in the ultimate reading of JN-25B, but I'm not qualified to say (tho the article should!) how the additive table breaks assisted. Trekphiler 11:03, 14 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

For those perhaps a bit "more qualified" ... from Kahn's The Codebreakers circa 1967, page 47 is: "Cavite was spottily reading JN25 messages - which revealed nothing about Pearl Harbor - until December 4, when the superencipherment was suddenly changed. As a message that moved on the COPEK channel put it: 'Five numeral intercepts subsequent to zero six hundred today indicate change of cipher system including complete change of differentials and indicator subtractors X All intercepts received since time indicated checked against all differentials three previous systems X No dupes.' "

As a comment - an extraordinary piece of writing from 1967. As questions, perhaps "Trekphiler" might: (a) posit why quoted passage is so significant? - i.e., Cavite was spottily reading JN25 messages ... and (b) on December 4, 1941 what variant of JN25 was being read as noted by Kahn, for example was it JN25b7? ..., and (c) COPEK means what?

Love to be able to tell you, but for "(c) COPEK means what?", it's clear it's a hi-lev/hi-security comm channel, but beyond that, BTHOOM... IIRC, it's the codeword for the USN's top code system, equal (roughly) to the Flag Officers' Code (I think). "Significance"? I think Kahn means, "don't overstate the case", which is what I was getting at. Kahn is doing what Rochefort, Fabian et al. would've been doing: saying, "this change means something's up", without knowing what or where, especially since it was the second change in under 6mo; same change happened before Midway, & guess what? Many see "spottily reading" & think it was a gold mine; I'd say it was more a case of a few words here & there, maybe no more than knowing they were on the right track. And yes, IIRC, it's JN-25B & it went to -25C just before Midway (but I can't find it in Blair & I don't have Holmes or Kahn at hand...) Kahn should say; check the index for the JN-25 refs. BTW, CAST moved to Corregidor 9/41. (I've got Blair open...) Trekphiler 01:45, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

Germans

What is the fascination with the Germans? Kuhn was a poseur & Popov was a double; Prange deals with them in exhaustive detail, & dismisses them as significant. Trekphiler 11:19, 14 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Read the wikipedia article about conspiracy theories. A common theme is that people just can't deal with the fact that another people deemed as "inferior" struck a heavy blow against them. Therefore, some other people of not "inferior" stock have to be involved. Usually people on the own side, but I guess in this case the Germans were also a good choice, much better than the Japanese, who apparently up to Pearl Habour were mostly seen as comical short men with a funny language. thestor 12:25, 25 April 2007 (UTC)[reply]

You definitely got that right. MacArthur refused to believe it was Japanese pilots hammering him in the Philippines. And the conspiracy nuts don't get one thing: a conspiracy implicitly means the Japanese were too stupid to do it alone... Trekphiler 02:11, 27 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Sabotage

I deleted & rewrote this:

"In addition, Short had sent coded messages to Washington that, when decoded, said he was making preparations for a possible attack. With Washington thinking Short was understanding the situation there was no need to risk breaking security by being more blunt in the warnings. However, Short had changed his code words without informing Washington; or, as it now known, General Short did in fact notify Washington what his specific alert was, as is on the record with the signature of General Gerow and others, and they did not disabuse that with any specific changes to Short's Alert Level. Therefore, his messages that indicated he was preparing for a possible attack were meant to say he was preparing to guard against only sabotage which Washington accepted without any change."

As it is, it isn't clear, & his alert level wasn't the issue. Moreover, his instructions were to expect sabotage, not air attack. Trekphiler 11:42, 14 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry about the delay in reply. I've only just noticed this comment. I think the point here is that had Washington understood Short's changes in the meaning of his report ("I have instituted alert level 3"), there might have been more understanding in DC that Short wasn't preparing for an actual attack, but was thinking sabotage. In short, part of the problem is that what Short was reporting wasn't what DC thought he was doing. And some of htat was due to the redefinition of the meaning of alert level designations. And that was due to Short's innitiative in changing them. ww 16:09, 11 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry about the delay in reply. (I've just come back to this page...). I wasn't aware Short had changed his codewords or alert ratings, so maybe I sounded stupid; as rewritten since I posted, it's clearer & more accurate. I did intend to make the point DC didn't correct him; now I see why not. Nevertheless, I can't help think any error falls on DC as the senior command; if they didn't know, they should have. Trekphiler 10:22, 13 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Sounds a bit harsh to me, after all, how should DC have known that Short introduced a new alert system, where the state of alert usually used for full war preparation was now intead sabotage alert? He was effectively speaking another language to DC, but made it sound (though not mean) the same as the old one. thestor 12:27, 25 April 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Maybe I'm not clear (again, still). I'm of the general opinion it's the responsibility of the senior command to know when Short "was effectively speaking another language", because (unless I'm very mistaken) he'd have to get permission to change the alert status designators, & DC should know about it; if not permission, he should (must?) inform DC, & DC should definitely know about that. Maybe most of all, I have a problem with people (still!) trying to hang it on Short (& Kimmel) & excusing DC. Evidently, senior officers never get punished. (Cf Mi Lai, Tailhook, & Abu Ghraib, just to name 3 offhand; a Lt, a 2.5-striper, & a chicken Col? Four stripers deserved to go down for Tailhook, & the SecDef should be gone for Abu Ghraib.) Trekphiler 02:19, 27 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

"... Four years after Pearl Harbor this ultimate responsibility on the part of Washington was finally admitted by Gen. L. T. Gerow, chief of Army war plans in 1941. He conceded that Gen. Short was justified in assuming his defense alert number 1 had the full approval of the Army high command. This admission followed the reading to the congressional committee of excerpts from the Staff Officer's Field Manual, stating that the general staff is responsible for making sure its instructions to field commanders are understood and for enforcing execution of such instructions." [Morgenstern, copyright 1946, Pearl Harbor - The Story of the Secret War, ending paragraph on page 84.]

Thank you!! That's exactly what I meant! Trekphiler 02:21, 27 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Windy

Evidence of a "winds execute" is so flimsy, & the "winds" issue adds so little, IMHO it should be deleted. Trekphiler 12:03, 14 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

" ... In Las Vegas, I was warmly received by Marie and Ralph Briggs, who put their lovely house at my dispossal so that I could talk to Ralph about his experiences at length, thus enjoying the first interview he has ever given since leaving the U.S. Navy as to how he received the Winds message. I was pleased that I was able to show him the first documentary proof from the Australian archives that his story could now be confirmed after so many frustrating years." (emphasis edded) [Rusbridger and Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor in Acknowledgements, page 14, 1991]

Technical Assistance

I deleted this:

"Page 81, left-column has the text " ... Nevertheless some wireless communication had to take place, for it would be folly to expect the voyage for this armada of ships to co-ordinate without it. Short wave signals from Japan could be picked up by the larger ships but not the small craft - more especially the low-lying submarines - this was impossible, because of their aerials and the curvature of the earth. To solve this problem Nagumo's radio technicians had to resort to a subterfuge. High frequency (short wave) signals, picked up by one of the carriers, were re-transmitted simultaneously on a low frequency [sic longwave]. These short range signals the smaller ships could intercept, and the hoax worked almost perfectly because none of the US monitoring stations was looking for a Japanese signal in the low frequency band. However, ..." [Release of the classified CV AKAGI source materials would be very helpful here.]"

This is as mistaken as the belief of Lurline's radioman, based on an inadequate grasp of naval communications. Under radio silence, navies resort to older techniques, developed & used for decades before radio, blinker light & morse; when these are inappropriate, flag & semaphore, in use for over 200yr, are available. Trekphiler 12:36, 14 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Odd. A verified and sourced quote from a known text [A. J. Barker's Pearl Harbor - Battle Book 10] - deleted. The "radioman" in question here (Grogan) held a US Navy reserve commission and had decades of military and maritime experience beginning with the US Navy in WWI; signal flags and narrow-beam blinkers of necessity mean "line of sight" and are useless in heavy weather (e.g., From Layton's And I Was There page 249 " ... Naguno's striking force had run into the first really big storm ...") and/or when vessels are scattered beyond the horizon.

Regardless of how necessary it was to use the radio, the source says that Nagumo used it. Generally it is assumed that a source has documents or interviews with survivors to back up such statements. Therefore, whether it was necessary or not, Nagumo used the radio (assuming the source is valid), and it should be noted. Whether said action was logical or not, Nagumo did it and the text should remain in the article if it is true. Fanra 13:17, 17 June 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry but what source are we again discussing? There are also sources (Japanese survivors of the Kido Butai) claiming that radio silence was observed IIRC. What source is now claiming that the Japanese task force DID in fact break radio silence? thestor 07:44, 6 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Besides Farago's The Broken Seal (Bantam paperback edition - POSTSCRIPT), also see Wilford's Pearl Harbor Redefined for one; of, course, Stinnett's Day of Deceit is another; and, Victor's The Pearl Harbor Myth is another. And, as Prange flags SHIRIYA as part of the Kido Butai, also Prados' Combined Fleet Decoded. There are also several recent journal articles.

To fact-check the above, see Farago's The Broken Seal (paperback edition), on lower page 381, regarding Grogan, is " ... whose own credentials included a reserve commission in the U. S. Navy with years of service in Naval Communications."

We are talking about the radiomen of the Lurline, right? So he may have had experience with radio communications. But did he actually claim to have intercepted transmissions from a Japanese task force NEARBY? Couldn't he have gathered Japanese communication from another source then the Kido Butai? Radio signals can go a heck long way, and a single radioman on a lone civilian freighter probably could not do a triangulation. Again, we have the testimony of Japanese survivors claiming that radio silence was observed during the travel to Pearl. thestor 07:39, 9 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

On Grogan ... "So he may have had experience ..." No, he definitively did have a US naval communications background - decades worth; no "may have..." about it.

Mention of "triangulation" - agreed. However, common practice then as now ... "relative bearings." These are used to determine the general direction of a signal source, and if multiple relative bearings are taken over time of the signal, movement in the source can be established.

All of the Japanese merchant fleet had returned to Home Waters; Grogan did not say Russian vessels - very easy for him to determine. He did use the call sign for Japanese shore stations. No doubt, his now "missing" radio log would be helpful.

Perhaps ... but we now have at least six (6) "broken radio silence" instances in the public domain (viz., Ranneft, Ogg, Grogan, 30Nov41 COMSUM14 AKAGI "tactical circuit" message, and "code movement" annotated report from STATION H on 28Nov41, and also from STATION H, submarine call sign WA HI 8 on 6Dec41) all occuring at approximately the same time. All are independent of each other. There are other examples. None, however, generated an action such as, e.g., CINCPAC: FLASH IMMEDIATE: UNKNOWN SIGNAL SOURCE APPROX N-NW PEARL ADVANCING WESTERLY X INVESTIGATE X REPORT X

On Japanese survivors ... Yes, yes, ... as Prange says. But we also have contradictory claims, some even from the Japanese. What we DO NOT have are the official records ... say, the US Navy Mid-Pacific RDF records for all monitoring stations (i.e., Hawaii, Samoa, Dutch Harbor, Midway, Wake, Guam, ...), nor various "Y" services such as - from Canadian records (Gordon Head, Esquimalt, ...), nor Dutch files (Batavia), nor British files (Singapore, Hong Kong), nor Australian/New Zealand RDF stations during this period. So, why are these all - US and Allied - RDF logs still classified in July 2007 even after numerous and quite specific FOIA requests? Any surmise?

[Stinnett's Day of Deceit (paperback edition), on pages 266-67 shows an August 1941 disposition/RDF bearing chart for Call Sign "8E YU" - CV AKAGI, and on page 315 shows a handwritten STATION CAST RDF report (viz., TESTM dispatch) from 5 December 1941. Wilford's MA Thesis, on page 167, shows TESTM messages numbers 051515, 051525, and 051535 as sent to STATION HYPO, in their encoded and decoded form. To note, from TESTM 051535, "VICTOR" is the US Navy RDF monitoring station in America Samoa.

Mr. Stinnett and now Dr. Wilford are to be highly commended for their superlative efforts as these are the first public displays of this RDF data, which clearly demonstrate the US Navy's excellent RDF skills and in situ capabilites.]

Unless you've got a source that isn't a conspiracy nut, I'm more inclined to believe the Japanese on this one. Their records, reproduced in Prange, Goldstein, & Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, indicate the radio keys were removed. Moreover, "narrow beam blinker"? I'm thinking of 24" searchlights (if needed). And do you really believe professional navy navigators can't keep station in heavy weather? Or that they'd be beyond "line of sight"? Just how much separation do you think they were keeping from Akagi, anyhow? Over the horizon? "So, why are these all - US and Allied - RDF logs still classified in July 2007 "? BTHOOM. Considering the number of people in USG with the ability, & inclination, to classify things secret even as we speak, & a general tendency by bureaucrats & politicians not to want to release any information, I'm not too surprised by this; I can just hear the CIA & NSA wanks saying it'll compromise sources & methods. (Yeah, al Q still uses radios, that's the method... Or is it NSA/CIA persuading the carriers to give up your phone/email records, just like they did the cable coys, when that was against the law...?) Trekphiler 02:43, 27 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

"Over the horizon?" ...

Beyond the Horizon ... a few seeds along the way for those Baker Street irregulars;

A. Hawaii Operation, VADM Shigeru Fukudome, "US Naval Institute Proceedings", December 1955, pp. 1315-1331. Something about a Patrol Mission for three submarines (I-19, I-21, and I-23).

B. "Formation for Alert Steaming" from The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, edited by Goldstein and Dillon, on page 187.

Submarine Division is shown on flank of Akagi. Comment is due to fog, positioned some 8 miles away.

From The American Practical Navigator (aka Bowditch), Appendix, simplified formula to calculate the distance to the horizon from varying "lookout" heights. Who sees farther, a lookout on AKAGI's island or a lookout on the I-boats, even with the I-boat being 8 miles "nearer" the horizon?

The answer begets a question: What good are these "patrol" I-boats on my flank? Sanity check?

C. From Layton's And I Was There, page 213, "Three large submarines, ... scouted two hundred miles ahead of the striking force, ...

So, let's see, curvature of the earth, following seas, ... Yup, beyond the horizon. Flags, blinkers, ... ain't gonna work. They are useless.

D. Also edited by Goldstein and Dillon, The Pacific War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II, from "Japanese Monograph No. 102: Submarine Operations December 1941-April 1942", on page 235:

"Besides the above forces, attached to the Carrier Striking Force from the 6th Fleet to perform patrol duties, were the submarines I-19, I-21 and I-23. In addition to acting as the Patrol Unit in front of the Carrier Striking Force, this unit was to rescue the crews of downed aircraft and be prepared to resist counterattack.

"... the Patrol Unit in front of the Carrier Striking Force, ..." Goldstein and Dillon contradict themselves.

Any surmise as to why? [Hint: Need to rationalize/cloud "radio silence" ...]

As another "sanity check" of Prange and associates, another question. Prange's At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, on page x of the Introduction, second to last paragraph has: "The Japanese put very little about the Pearl Harbor plan on paper, and what was available aboard four of the carriers of Nagumo's force (including his flagship, Akagi) went down at Midway in June 1942.

If this statement is so, where did the "papers" in the references used above (items B and D) come from? In Prange, there are many, many other errors.

Ahh, the vicissitude of ignorance...

" However, common practice then as now ... 'relative bearings.'" I recall seeing a source placing all of Grogan's bearings in the area of the Kuriles, hence a product of IJN's deception op...

"Patrol Mission for three submarines", "Submarine Division is shown on flank of Akagi", "Layton's And I Was There, page 213, 'Three large submarines, ... scouted two hundred miles ahead of the striking force, ...'". Key word: "submarine". Able to submerge, hence gain invisibility. Didn't apply to carriers (or cruiser, or destroyers). Also, IJN submarines not notorious for comm silence. Not to mention, detecting sub message traffic wasn't indicative of anything, considering 1-6/12/41 was still peacetime...

"Patrol Mission for three submarines", "Layton's And I Was There, page 213, 'Three large submarines, ... scouted two hundred miles ahead of the striking force, ...'". Keyword(s): patrol & scouting. They were expected to signal to Kido Butai; their detection did not give away the position of the task force.

"Who sees farther, a lookout on AKAGI's island or a lookout on the I-boats". This is a misunderstanding of the nature of blinker signalling, I'm guessing. Akagi would see blinker from an I-boat at considerable distance, & a TF ship with their big-ass blinkers would be able to signal to an I-boat a fair distance off, but this misses the point. The question is, "Was radio necessary between members of the Kido Butai?" Answer, no, because DDs & CCs in company with Akagi would never be over the horizon. I-boats not an issue; for comm with them in company, they aren't over the horizon, either. Which is, more or less, what I said; your acceptance of the need for radio reflects the same ignorance Stinnett shows.

"Flags, blinkers, ... ain't gonna work. They are useless." Well, no, as noted. Ships in company, such as a task force escort group, have comm by flag or blinker for two centuries. Just because it's convenient for the conspiracy doesn't mean these methods cease to function. You need to explain why Akagi signalmen wouldn't use them, at all, which the continuous (or repeated) DF fixes imply; "fog" or "weather" doesn't get it, because a 24" searchlight is pretty d*mn effective in weather, & standing orders would serve for periods of fog (& it's not like the TF didn't know where they were bound, or what stations the other ships in the TF were keeping...). I frankly don't give a d*mn how experienced a radio operator Grogan was; his supposed evidence implies IJN signalmen were all incompetent, to a man, which I flat don't believe. Any questions? Trekphiler 00:18 & 00:22, 28 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

A. Re: Kuriles - may want to check your comment - a citation would also help; "hence" as an implied QED is unsupportable here, got any cross bearings? Familiar with Rochefort's impressions of IJN radio deception efforts (See Layton, pages 228-229)? Of course, recall mention of those still classified RDF and "code movement" reports from the period - that curious pattern of FOIA denials.

[Another odd thing about the Kuriles, before 1941 the US Navy had a very detailed and complete set of charts for "Hitokappau Wan" (now O. Iturup), and yet in the APHB is the comment about an unknown port. But that is another thread ...]

B. Re: Patrol Unit of three I-boats. Patrol Mission SOP - surface cruising ahead of main force was then the norm; submerge to avoid detection. Why?

Lookouts perched on the conning tower (now called the "sail") constantly scanning versus using a periscope - extended fully - to scan. Who "sees" farther? (Recall Bowditch).

The tasking of a Patrol Mission is what? Does that change for "peace time" - a non sequitur.

From Japanese sources of the planning and operational aspects of the three I-boats (See "Jane's Fighting Ships of World War II for I-boat specificatons), their patrol line advanced in front of the Striking Force main body, and well beyond visual range. It is hundreds of miles ahead in fact as the Japanese and Layton tell us.

So, how again does the main body of the Striking Force communicate with these I-boats? Or, what would cause such a need to contact these I-boats, established as "being over the horizon" ...?

C. Causes such as: (a) the known and several changes in course of the Striking Force, (b) the December 5th alert (See: The Pearl Harbor Papers, edited by Goldstein and Dillon, pages 38-39) which caused a immediate zig-zagging and wide dispersal of the main body, (c) weather (See: Morison's Two Ocean War, page 46), ..., etc.

[An aside here, when vessels within a convoy were alerted to the danger of attack (e.g., surface raider, submarines), what was their reaction, e.g., do they scatter? Or, if the convoy experienced heavy seas and poor visibility? And, did these "events" place any vessels beyond the horizon? What was done to re-group the convoy?]

And, lest we forget, Nagumo was sensitive to a timeline, as other Japanese operations were in process.

D. Re: those flags and blinkers. It is your statement " .. wouldn't use them, at all, ..." Where did this "..., at all" come from? Where is the citation from Stinnett's work (edition and page) which says that? The initial statement regarding flags and blinkers ... "line-of-sight".

Now - just how can Akagi's signalmen, no matter how expert, use flags and/or blinkers to communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats - as they are far beyond "sight" ... patrolling hundreds of miles ahead of the Striking Force?

And, " ... which the continuous (or repeated) DF fixes imply; ..." Citation? Context?

"Re: Kuriles". I'd cite if I could; I don't have it handy & can't recall it.

"Lookouts perched on the conning tower (now called the "sail") constantly scanning versus using a periscope - extended fully - to scan." That was American practise; I'm unconvinced IJN submariners did it. "just how can Akagi's signalmen, no matter how expert, use flags and/or blinkers to communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats"? How does this necessitate Kido Butai radiating? Nagumo received reports, he didn't issue them. I notice you prefer to ignore that.

"C. Causes such as:" planned course changes? Are IJN navigators stupid? Incompetent? Weather: the same. The Kido Butai would not have been scattered beyond the horizon by a typhoon, much less a bit of heavy weather. And DDs would routinely "shepherd" (as they did for Atlantic convoys...), using flag & blinker to communicate as needed (& even merchantmen were capable of coping with that; for damn sure IJN signalmen could). Reaction to attack? This isn't PQ-17, it's a fleet task force, with six aircraft carriers and about a dozen destroyers; Pearl Harbor Papers records numerous "attacks" (always claimed successful, BTW) on phantom submarines, which was SOP throughout the war. So much for "time pressure". (BTW, what was the contingency plan for Nagumo being delayed?)

"Where is the citation from Stinnett's work (edition and page) which says that?" Stinnett (& you) claim Kido Butai was radiating. I say (& demonstrate why) there was no need for it. "which the continuous (or repeated) DF fixes imply"? This is Stinnett (& you) claiming Kido Butai was radiating. Demonstrate a need for it. "at all"? Any use of radio implies Nagumo's signalmen were too stupid to use flag or blinker; repeated use implies little or no use of flag or blinker, & demands IJN signalmen be incompetent, to a man. You offer no persuasive reason to use radio, & your excuses reflect an ignorance of TF operations. Take a look at Midway. Yamamoto continually recieved reports; he radiated none, to preserve radio silence (& thereby conceal his location...). Was Nagumo so stupid he didn't know this? (Stinnett, & you, imply as much.) Trekphiler 15:50, 12 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

How, again, does Akagi communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats which are far beyond the horizon - for example, to notify them of a main body course change?

Where does Stinnett say that flags, blinkers WERE NEVER USED? (edition, page)

Also, where is the specific citation for "... which the continuous (repeated) DF fixes ..." Or, if that is a surmise, indicate as such. Here, it should be noted that the RDF logs remain classified.

Just a fact - naval communications RECEIVERS of this era did, as you say - "radiate" - whenever they had power applied. In fact, those frequencies were monitored.

James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WWII

Quote from the Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate article

James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WWII (Summit, 1991) which posits that while the Americans couldn't read the Japanese naval code (JN-25), the British could, and Churchill deliberately withheld warning because the UK needed US help. Sir Nave was an Australian cryptographer whose diaries were used in writing this book; he later distanced himself from its content. A check against them has made clear that some of the charges Rusbridger makes here are unsupported by Nave's diaries of the time. The information shown in the Appendix is of interest to note, especially a true copy of SRN-116741.

Requests

I think we should provide references substanciating the above mentioned claims :

If the sentence : he later distanced himself from its content (diff) is true, we should know when this distanciation was made, and in which publication this distanciation was made if it was ever made.
If the sentence : A check against them has made clear that some of the charges Rusbridger makes here are unsupported by Nave's diaries of the time (diff) is true, we should know who, (when, in which publication) made the check.--Teofilo talk 14:09, 3 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Explain your edits better here jamaskin. I believe some of your information would improve this artcile, however its filled with wild speculation, jargon errors, non encyclopedic edits, and info. some that already has been addressed. Also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:NPOV_tutorial#Accusations

I also agree that some clean up is needed within this article.

" All other Pacific commands took appropriate measures for their situations."

What about the B 17s being caught on the ground un-camouflaged on Clark Field, well after Pearl Harbor? What about the dive bomber pilots in the Philippines without their airplanes? What about canceling the plan to stock food and other supplies on the Bataan Peninsula?

The ticky-tacky response is that Phillipines wasn't Federalized until after MacArthur made most of his monumental misjudgements and too late to repair them before the Japanese arrived on a roll. More substantially, MacArthur was at least thinking, though deranged thinking, about a land invasion by the Japanese, and making preparations, though wrongfooted ones. Pearl Harbor didn't even take that much precaustion against an attack -- no torpedo nets, minimal long distance partolling by the B-17 and PBYs they actually had, thought that wasn't enough to manage an all directions, continuous surveillance, actually ready anti-aircraft guns (ammunition was in locked sotage when the attack began!!), failure to get the radar stations in actual operation as opposed to training mode (where they had long been) or to get the early warning center at Pearl (where Lt Tyler was) actually operational, etc, etc

As for the mismanagement in Phil of those planes, leading to their total loss, it clearly wasn't due to any plot from Washington to deprive MacArthur of information. Those planes were hit about 9 hours after the Pearl Harbor attack. There was pleanty of warning time to do something more effective than burn on the runway.

Guam, Wake, the Canal, etc all took seriously the late Nov warnings and would not have cuaght so flatfooted as was Pearl. Smashed to be sure, but at least they were awake enough to notice the attack before the planes came around the mountains on their attack runs. There was more disdain for what they'd been warned about in Pearl (on all sides) than would have been acceptable to me had I been Marshall or Knox or Roosevelt. ww 00:54, 23 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Split

Article seems to get a bit long, should i split it out? --Striver 18:41, 1 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

It'd be better to trim it it if it's too long. I don't see a logical split. -Will Beback 21:50, 1 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Please read Wikipedia:How to break up a page--Striver 22:57, 1 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I see now that you put a split marker above the bilbiography. I still believe that this article has too much casual writing, is too-weaselly, and would benefit by shortening.

For example:

Another point brought up in the debate is the fact that neither Admiral Kimmel or General Short ever faced court martial. It is suggested that in order to do so the military would have had to release information they did not want to see the light of day.

Who brings up this point? Who suggests?

Suggest research on Myron C. Cramer, US Army's Judge Advocate on orders of Stimson. Extant reports/findings triggered denial of Short's courts martial, and the efforts of US Army officers Henry Clausen and Carter Clarke.

However this is much more likely (or perhaps not) to be part of the radio deception program to mislead enemy intelligence into believing that the units and commands of the Kido Butai were continuing to exercise off Kyushu and the Western Inland Sea.

How do we know what is more likely (or not)?

-Will Beback 23:18, 1 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

The first example is about verifiablity, and it can be fixed. The second example is pov and need to be qualified in order to be npov, "x states that y is probable" instead of "y is probable". I have not read the entire artilce, im a new-bee in this topic and dont know more than i have listened on some interviews. However, i like the topic. In any case, does that mean that we should not break that part out? --Striver 23:22, 1 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Splitting out the bibliography would mean removing the sources, and I don't see how that would help. -Will Beback 23:33, 1 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

ok. --Striver 23:40, 1 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Why is there no mention of this documented note ?

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Warning of an Attack on Pearl Harbor, 27 January 1941

[Telegram: Paraphrase]

TOKYO, January 27, 1941-6 p.m. [Received January 27-6: 38 a.m.]

125. A member of the Embassy was told by my ------- colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic.

GREW

Source: U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 617-618

The note was mentioned in the discussion of intelligence about the attack at Attack on Pearl Harbor. It is not now thought, nor was it then, to have been 'real'. And in fact, given the timing, it was almost certainly not as Yamamoto had only just begun to consider it. No planning, even preliminary, was underway at the time, if memory serves. If it reflected a real proposal, it was not the one which actually resulted in 7.12.41. This was one of several reports which suggested such a thing. None came with sufficient evidence that they compelled belief. ww 21:33, 4 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Proposal to split out bibliography?

This article was split from attack on Pearl Harbor sometime ago, and has rather grown since then. The bibliography has also grown, though it remains unsatisfactory as of now. Splitting it out would force a reader interested in the subject to chase down three articles, before even getting to any of the original sources. I don't think we've so much of a problem with the article as it stands that it makes much sense to force the reader to those lengths, despite a longish article. It will make no difference to WP hardware/software, and will not unduly increase load time over even a slow Net connection (this article is essentially all text). I see no reason to bother, and a couple not to.

It would be a little neater though, evening off article lengths a little. ww 05:23, 2 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Seeing as how it has been almost a year since anyone has commented on this, I'm removing the split tag. Fanra 20:39, 30 May 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Intresting article

Here is a intresting article on US Gov using Problem-reaction-solution: [1]. --Striver 20:27, 7 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

article is getting well out of hand

I've been a contributor to both this and the main Attack article for some years now. So this observation comes from a longish perspective.

This article is now so sloppy that it is an Wikimbarrassment. Editors have been adding snippets of entirely opaque evidence to paragraphs which attempt to summarize current understanding of <whatever>. This is simply bad writing, aside from content problems. And there is much similar stuff.

WP articles are not places to list raw evidence for or against. To the extent WP is a place for raw evidence at all, it is the Talk pages which are. WP articles should summarize the state of knowledge about this or that topic, NPOVishly. In this case, that knowledge includes the facts that there are many arguments in favor of (one or another sort of conspiracy), that essentially all are controversial, that most are supported by some (also controversial) evidence, and all by much (also controversial) speculation. That's fair enough to note in a well-written and well-organized way in a WP article, but embedding the reader in a tarball of entirely opaque references to evidentiary bits (which are not themselves presented) is not. And, the bibliography is contaminated by allegations of bias and incompetence, again without much in the way of evidence.

In short, this article is likely inevitably to be the resultant of pushing and pulling of dispute about events and intents, and so somewhat clangerous, but it has now reached a stage of dissolution and failure to meet WP standards that is rapidly approaching (if not already passed) so low a quality as to suggest its deletion.

Comments from other editors, please? ww 16:01, 11 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

>> I agree this article is an embarassment. I was going to attempt to clean it up some but I think there is no way to do that without junking half of it and starting over. The Attack on Pearl Harbor United States preparedness section covers most of the relevant material and is better written, sourced, and wikified. The only value I see in this link is a separate discussion of the various inquiries that followed the attacks, and possibly a discussion of the conspiracy theories that have been written. For the latter, the model might be a similar article on Kennedy assassination theories? I think the article can be saved though...a discussion of the conspiracy theories are worthwhile if only because so much has been written on them to date, much like the Kennedy assassination. ppfleiger 19:13, 15 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Please don't delete this article. Otherwise all the conspiracy stuff would end up in the main Pearl Harbor article. -Will Beback 20:50, 15 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I came to thsi article today knowing nothing about it (except perhaps watching one TV documentary). Although it is a bit disorganised and in need of tidying up, I found it informative.Billlion 14:20, 29 October 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Its got some good stuff. However one person "jamaskin" is putting in unsupporting, wild and incorrect information. If anyone has questions as to why I remove his materical let me know. I'd be glad to discuss.

It's got some excellent stuff. I've been reading in this area for 25yrs, & I learned things. Trekphiler 10:40, 13 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Talking head

Just some assorted comments. I added this:

"(This was in part due to fears of compromise as a result of poor security, after decrypts were found in a wastebasket.^{[citation needed]})

I've seen it in a couple of places, but I can't cite a source offhand. Can somebody?

You are correct, there are many references to this incident; following is an early one -

"... The tightening may have resulted from several scares that Washington had just had. In March, State lost MAGIC memorandum No.9. A horrified Army intelligence officer once found another MAGIC memorandum casually discarded in the wastebasket of Brigadier General Edwin M. (Pa) Watson, the President's military aide. In Boston the F.B.I. picked up a man connected with the cryptanalytic work who was attempting to sell information on it. The worst fright of all came in the spring of 1941. ..." [Kahn, The Codebreakers, 1967 edition, page 26]

What was the "worst fright" that came in the Spring of 1941?

I also added this:

"In Short's defense, it should be noted he had training responsibilites to meet, and the best patrol aircraft, B-17s and B-24s, were in demand in the Philippines and Britain, both of which had higher priority."

From the Knox Report (from December 15, 1941), General Observations Section, (Hearings, Part 24, page 1753):

" ...Of course the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.

The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well disposed antiaircraft artillery. There is a dangerous shortage of guns of this type on the Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who has pressed consistently for these guns. ..."

Actually, the best defense would have been to detect the Kido Butai with B-17s or PBYs before they launched & make them turn back... Trekphiler 09:29, 20 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Just in case, just how many PBY's (PBY-5) were delivered to Pearl Harbor in 1941 and when? Any known "air worthiness" problems with those birds? And, during that same period, how many were shipped aboard via Lend-Lease? And, who made that decision? (See Gannon's Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Nation under Attack published in 2001, note 78 from Chapter Six "War Warning.") And where were the B-17's destined for; Pearl Harbor being a "stop over" point for the trans-shipment to where?

Not an "air worthiness" ish with the PBYs so much as "unavailability". Bellinger had (IIRC) 54 PBYs in HI, only about a doz actually assembled & flying, the rest in the pipeline being uncrated & assembled. B-17s were en route to Luzon, where they were supposed to deter the Japanese... (The plan was to attack Japan if war broke out, recovering them in Siberia. This plan was approved by MacArthur beforehand. He denied it postwar.) Trekphiler 03:00, 27 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Well, not quite. You might look into Gannon's text regarding PBY-5 engine problems, viz., "run in" procedures ... cracked cylinder-heads, oil leaks, ... And, the lack of spare parts was due to ...?

and this:

"(The third, Saratoga, was in routine refit in Puget Sound.)"

Also, re. Lyttelton's comment, except for his remark, "Japan was provoked into attacking", he has the situation exactly right. Take a look at what FDR was doing in the Atlantic. There was plenty of casus belli to go around for Germany or Congress to declare war; neither was willing. Trekphiler 10:40, 13 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]

The assorted attacks on US vessels were on the high seas, and IIRC, not a result of a deliberate policy to start a war. FDR did take numerious actions which were decidely not even handed (Lend-Lease, the takeover of convoy escorting in the Western half of the N Atlantic, etc). US personnel were killed an ssin[ps sunk by the Germans and FDR refrained from asking for a declaration. I think the causus belli were not from the British, the other nation active inthe N Atlantic, but from the Germans. And that FDR didn;t go to war over such incidents speaks to a reluctance to do so, not a devious plat to find a way to do so. ww 22:05, 13 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Or does it speak to Stark's comments about the US being the agreeosr?

I have to disagree. "[T]akeover of convoy escorting in the Western half of the N Atlantic" is most certainly not an act of a neutral. Neither is the order to report U-boats to RN escorts. An order to shoot U-boats on sight is definitely not. (That alone was casus belli, had Hitler chosen.) As for German actions, shooting 1 USN DD (Reuben James?) & sinking another (Greer?) (I always get them switcthed...), is casus belli, had Congress chosen. I suspect FDR didn't ask for a declaration because there wasn't enough public (or political) outcry over Reuben James & Greer (which makes nonsense of the oft-repeated fiction of Lusitania, no?), or maybe he was hoping Hitler'd do it for him. Either way, keeping Japan peaceful was crucial, which is why the orders to all Pacific commands were full of "let Japan make the first overt act" instructions (which the conspiracy loons take as evidence of conspiracy, rather than an effort to avoid war...). Trekphiler 08:18, 16 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Who "fired" the first shot on the Green in Lexington? And, who "fired" the first shot at the Old North Bridge in Concord? Or, the American Revolutionary War was started by a "shot" - "Heard Around the World" - but by a party which cannot be identified.

FDR and his War Cabinet simply could not risk that - there could be no question as to who "fired first" - exactly who.

See Beard, Charles Austin, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941 - A Study in Appearances and Realities, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 1948 - Chapters V and VI ("In Case of Attack" in the Atlantic and No Call for "Any Declaration of War"). For example, page 173, " ... The supplying of munitions to belligerents, using the American Navy to convoy ships to belligerents, and shooting at German submarines, are acts of war, in purpose and in reality. They will and are intended to carry the United States into full and open war. ..."

Why did not that happen in the Atlantic? Stark talked too much is why; this then led to the later FDR dicta of "first overt act " of war and "firing the first shot."

To clarify, I believe it was, if not a concerted plan, certainly a concerted effort by FDR to give Britain maximum aid, & to fulfill his promise come into the war; my guess is, FDR understood that would be the best thing he could do, per WW1. In the event, he was proven right; Hitler (& McCollum) saw that, too. Too bad the conspiracy nuts can't see it. Trekphiler 05:52, 1 March 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Some more stuff. I deleted "Corregidor" because I'm unclear it was on Corregidor at the time in question, & it'd been in Cavite for years before that. If somebody's sure of the location at that date, put it back. I rewrote

"If she had been directed to investigate the source of the planes"

to

"If she had been correctly directed to the source of the planes,

The Kido Butai had been picked up by DF; Holmes notes, due to an inability to distiguish reciprocal bearings, common to DF at the time, Halsey was sent the wrong way. Trekphiler 05:52, 1 March 2007 (UTC)[reply]

After your comment here, I'm not sure we disagree at all. Very confusing. As for Cavite / Corregidor, Station CAST started out at the Navy Yard and was moved to Corregidor during the retreat. It stayed there until evacuated by submarine after pushing the equipment they couldn't take with them into the bay. It's a famous account. CAST personell ended up in Australia as part of the Combined Bureau under MacArthur. It was they who got the soggy sheets found in the buried trunk at Sio New Guinea. Major break into Japanese army crypto systems. Hilarious description of that as well, with sheets hanging from stings all over the Bureau offices as they tried to dry them out. ww 21:08, 11 March 2007 (UTC)[reply]

"After your comment here, I'm not sure we disagree at all. Very confusing." Evidently I'm not making myself clear, which appears to be a common habit of mine. Probably I'm assuming knowledge where not everybody's got it. I did know CAST moved, just not when (without Blair or Holmes handy); I was busting Stinnett for putting them on Corregidor instead of at Cavite, without recalling, at the time he was talking about, they may have already moved to The Rock. (IIRC, it was just before the invasion; I don't have Blair to hand.) Blair does say 17 crypto guys were taken out by Seadragon, including CO Lt Rudy Fabian, in 12/41, & she went back for "the last 17", incl one of the linguists (cf Seadragon page; I put it in), but IIRC, that still left a bunch of them behind, to serve as infantry in those ridiculous dyed-yellow uniforms, which has to be the stupidest use of highly skilled & -trained people, which the Navy was short of, I've ever heard of. Trekphiler 09:29, 20 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Some suggested references:

The Breaking of the Japanese Army's Code by Joseph E. Richard, in Cryptologia, October 2004, Volume 28, No. 4, pages 289-308.

The Flaw in the JN25 Series of Ciphers by Peter W. Donovan, in Cryptologia, October 2004, Volume 28, No. 4, pages 325-340.

The Indicators of Japanese Ciphers 2468, 7890, and JN-25A1 by Peter W. Donovan, in Cryptologia, July-September 2006 issue, pages 212-235. (re: Sio, New Guinea - see page 225)

Bring a Tableau and Coloured Pencils.

Follow-on comment "... due to an inability to distiguish [sic distinguish] reciprocal bearings, ..." See Hewitt Inquiry, page 565, "... unilateral... " No such "inability" in US Navy systems existed in 1941; first patent for double-loop/sense antennae granted to Marconi Radio in 1907 (so-called Bellini Tosi (B-T) goniometer). US Naval Research Laboratory licensed design in 1920's, See Howeth XXII & Appendix M. (15 June 2007)

Inability may be too strong; Holmes says "difficulty" or "problem", IIRC; I'm guessing lack of experience by operators. Trekphiler 09:29, 20 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Holmes (aka Alec Hudson), who the Engineering Building at the University of Hawaii is named after, plotted locations (often said of ONLY merchantmen) - he was not a "radio wave propagation" kinda' guy.

Jasper was also accused of "planning" the 3/42 "attack" on Pearl by 2 Japanese flying boats (from a Sat Eve Post story he wrote...). (Postwar, prof of Math, IIRC. Curious thing: Ian Fleming worked sigint & was a writer prewar, too...) Trekphiler 03:00, 27 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Izzy and Eric would be proud; still however, not a "radio" guy! Fleming - not curious, a lunch on ALSOS anytime.

intercepting IJN encrypted traffic

There is a recent note here suggesting that the US had been intercepting IJN traffic for some time and therefore....

The US had indeed been intercepting some IJN traffic for many years. For example, the Panay incident, during which such interception and decryption made clear that the attack was not accidental as claimed by the Japanese, but deliberate.

However, traffic which is not broadcast can't be interecepted, and even intercepted traffic must be decrypted and then analyzed to yeield full information. For the period preceding the PH attack, the Japanes were planning and training in Japan (very little radio trafic) or were on radio silence from the attack force ships combined with a spoof operation from radio operators left behind in japan when it sailed. And, in any case, as is only sensible, the Japanese, including the IJN, were regularly changing thier crypto systems and for any given crypto system the keys in use.

["... with a spoof operation from radio operators left behind in japan ..." See Layton's And I Was There, bottom of page 317: "It's the same ham-fisted radio operator who uses his transmitting key as if he is kicking it with his foot." Seems at least one IJN radio operator was not left behind ... and on the Akagi no less.]

So any discussion about "intercepting IJN' traffic must be explcit about what IJN system, the break status at the time, whether the signal was actually braodcast so it could be intercepted, etc. No blanket statement can be given, without misrepresetnation. As the crypto people say, the Devil is in the details. Taht's true about discussion of crypto as well. ww 16:17, 23 April 2007 (UTC)[reply]

I took out the entry in bracktes "makes no sense, IJN codes were read years prior to Pearl Habour" and put in the explanation from the article about the Japanese military code, namely that since the IJN didn't see much action in the war against China, there was not only less to transmit, but even more rarely was it needed to do so via radio. thestor 12:20, 25 April 2007 (UTC)[reply]

" ... In 1924 the Navy established a Communications Intelligence Organization under the Code and Signal Section ..." [Safford, SRH-149 A Brief History of Communications Intelligence in the United States prepared 21-27 March 1952, partially declassified and relased by NSA on 27 October 2005, page 4.]"

I deleted

"Notwithstanding the above, a statement by Vice Admiral Frank E. Beatty (US Navy retired) about the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese Nanshin (southward) fleet movement, from his article “Background of the Secret Report,” National Review, December 13, 1966, page 1261, has: “… When the Japanese Task Force emerged from Kamranh, it was shadowed and trailed by our submarines, so Washington was alerted as to the composition, course, and speed of this group of vessels. In addition, through our breaking of the Japanese codes, we were alerted as the destination of this particular group, it being known that the ships were headed for the KRA Peninsula, Khota Baru, their destination, was also broken out of code. ..." {fact} That is, " ... our breaking ..." of Japanese operational naval codes ... yielding specific intelligence."

as irrelevant to Pearl Harbor, and "yielding specific intelligence" is from the movement cypher, which it's acknowledged OP-20-G had broken, not JN-25. Also, can somebody clarify why, " suggest a check of a true copy of SRN-116741, and why this message is so significant)." should be included? Trekphiler 14:57, 12 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Another of those factual deletes, this also from a direct quotation from a cited source. To note, the rationale used ... "as irrelevant to Pearl Harbor" and the specific movement cypher is highlighted. The operative wording here is: "In additional, through our breaking of the Japanese codes, ..." - (1) those same "codes" were beginning used by the entire IJN at that moment, those forces moving South, toward Pearl Harbor, and elsewhere; (2) there is no specific mention of a particular code - movement or otherwise.

The moderators/editors should note this deletion has no basis in fact, and is the second such by user Trekphiler in this article now under discussion.

Reference to National Review deleted above has been fact-checked; it is absolutely correct and relevent to this discussion - fair dinkum!

From History of GYP-1 (MRRB, Record Group 38, page 35) " ...The reading of messages in Baker code before Pearl Harbor, however, must be considered a qualified success. Current messages were read on Corregidor but they were few in number and invariably ship movement reports: arrivals and departures, together with some fragmentary schedules. ..." [Or, some JN25 "Baker" messages were - intercepted, decoded, translated, and read for intelligence - before Pearl Harbor. Not "zero" or "none" - but some.] USER: Trekphiler seems badly informed on this topic.

"Or, some JN25 "Baker" messages were - intercepted, decoded, translated, and read for intelligence - before Pearl Harbor." I was wrong about that. So be it. I stand by the deletion as irrelevant to Pearl Harbor. The reference (read it) is to IndoChina. And (read it!) "invariably ship movement reports", which is, more or less, what I said... Notice I never said "none", just "none in reference to Pearl". If you're convinced this off-target reference is worthy in reference to Pearl, feel free to put it back. All I'd ask is, narrow the focus. This reference seems thrown in for its own sake. Trekphiler 06:24, 20 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

The deletion of the material was from the article's paragraph heading "JN-25". It is entirely appropriate there having a contribution to our understanding of the timing and level of penetration of JN-25; this being very germane to the overall topic of Pearl Harbor.

As the "mess" here was made by USER "Trekphiler" (as well as elsewhere), even with the contrition I was wrong about that. - whose obligation is it to clean them up? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 172.134.230.17 (talk) 11:59, August 20, 2007 (UTC)

Lend-Lease program

The line was added that the Lend-Lease program might have "provoked" Japan into attacking the US at Pearl Harbor. According to my knowledge, Japan had no real concern about Germany, the Axis agreement was one of convenience rather than real alliance. The "provoking" would be over the US embargo of oil and other materials to Japan. The USA also provided assistance to China. Every source I've read makes it pretty clear that this embargo left Japan with two choices, either end their war with China and scale back their Empire, or attack. See: Greater East Asia War in the Pacific. Fanra 21:14, 21 June 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Who authored the Lend-Lease Program legislation, which FDR signed into law as H.R. 1776?

" ... scale back their Empire, ..." - regarding that "Empire."

Treaty of Portsmouth, Root-Takahire Agreement, Treaty of Versailles, Olney Corollary (of the Monroe Doctrine) comparative to Stimson Doctrine (e.g., Yap Island).

FDR

Personally this whole debate is kinda stupid. so what if FDR knew about it. WE got into ww2 anyways and kicked some butt. would you have had him come up with a dumber reason than revenge? trcole123 15:05, 27 June 2007 (UTC)

This page is for discussing improvements to this article, not a place to air your personal opinions on the subject. DarkSaber2k 15:07, 27 June 2007 (UTC)[reply]

From Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War by George Morgenstern (Devin-Adair, 1947), end of Chapter 20 -"Who Was Guilty?" " ... The people were told that acts which were equivalent to war were intended to keep the nation out of war. Constitutional processes existed only to be circumvented, until finally the war-making power of Congress was reduced to the act of ratifying an accomplished fact."

Or, those "complicated moves" in FDR's approach "short of war" and US-Japanese foreign policy ... leading to the US entry into WWII.

Learning to add

I added "This is evidence of lack of manpower"; I'm inclined to also add, "CAST only had one." (because I'm fairly sure). Can somebody who has sources at hand confirm & add? I also added clarification here:

"Mentioned, for instance in Blair, Silent Victory, & Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets; it is also mistakenly used to explain the intercepts at the time of Midway in the film of the same name.</ref> to mislead enemy intelligence into believing the units and commands of the Kido Butai were continuing to exercise off Kyūshū and the Western Inland Sea; such commnuications in a combat zone (where radio silence was essential) would be by flag or blinker (another factor Stinnett and others conveniently ignore)."

And I added

"In addition, Roosevelt authorized U.S. destroyers to report U-boats, then later authorized "shoot on sight". Neither is the act of a disinterested neutral."

(which I mention above). Trekphiler 04:54, 20 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

And I deleted the ^{[citation needed]} tag from " Neither is the act of a disinterested neutral." Unless you believe it is & are prepared to offer evidence to that effect, I stand by that statement. Trekphiler 01:30, 27 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

This is not expressed in a neutral way.

Just at the beginning:

It may have been the failure to process and use this information effectively that has led some to invoke conspiracy theories rather than a less interesting mix of mistake and circumstance.

the text is suggesting a way to view things and is clearly sympathizing for it. The phrase "less interesting mix..." seems to suggest that what lead people to have a POV about this topic is the mere fact that it is more interesting and the implicit consequence is that they are biased.--Pokipsy76 12:14, 6 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

One problem this article must deal with is the reason for so much activity in the alternate theory world. Extensive and very long lived.

Concern - whatsup with hearsay "IIRC" and "BTHOOM" compared to relevant references shown encylopedia'?

This sentence offer one reason for this in a lead paragraph. It is not, and should not be taken to be as this editor has, be understood as pejorative with regard to tany alternative theory. It is, in fact, an alternative theory in itslef, in an odd way. Should be kept as it. 67.86.171.92 13:55, 6 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

It makes no sense to specify in the discussion page the way to take the sentance: we should just use sentances that cannot be taken as pejorative in any way. That sentance is not of this kind.--Pokipsy76 08:16, 7 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Or, implied happenstance versus discernible pattern.

Moreover it's not up to wikipedia to make speculations about what "may have been", it's not enciclopedic, you only have to report fact, sources and relevant *sourced* opinions of people that have a relevance.--Pokipsy76 15:29, 22 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Thank you! Very sucinct and on point for this article and its discussion section.