Minoru Genda
Minoru Genda | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Allegiance | Imperial Japanese Navy,Japanese Air Self-Defense Force |
| Years of service | 1924–45 (Imperial Navy) 1954–1962 (JASDF) |
| Rank | Captain (Imperial Navy) Major General (JASDF) |
| Commands held | Chief of Staff of JSDAE, Imperial Navy General Staff, Senior Air Officer Zuikaku, Staff officer 1st Air Fleet |
| Battles/wars | World War II, Pearl Harbor Attack Plan |
| Awards | US Legion of Merit degree of Commander (1962) |
Minoru Genda (源田実 Genda Minoru, 16 August 1904–15 August 1989) was a key member of the Japanese military during World War II, and later served in the Japanese House of Councillors for more than 20 years. He was a leading Japanese military aviator during and after World War II. He served in the Imperial Japanese Navy before and during World War II and in the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force after the war, eventually rising to the rank of major general. Genda was the strategist behind the successful December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. For his wartime services, he is considered one of the most successful naval strategists and leaders in the history of the Imperial Japanese Navy. After the war, he was closely involved in the creation of Japan's new "air force," the JASDF, eventually serving as its chief of staff. His military career and nationalist politics made him a hero to Japanese ultranationalists like Shintaro Ishihara and Akio Morita. He was born in Hiroshima, Japan.
Early life
Minoru Genda was the second son of a farmer, born to an ancient family. Two brothers were graduates of Tokyo University, another brother graduated from Chiba Medical College, and his youngest brother entered the Army Academy. Graduating from the First Hiroshima Middle School, Genda entered the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy with the goal of becoming a fighter pilot and graduated in November 1929 at the head of his class.
Imperial Japanese Navy Officer
For the next six years Genda moved rapidly from one operational and staff air assignment to another. He was well-known in the navy and during the 1930s Genda led a division of biplanes around the country, conducting demonstrations and aerobatics. Known as the "Genda's Flying Circus," his team was part of a public relations campaign to promote naval aviation.
Genda was one of the world's first naval officers to realize the potential of massing aircraft carriers to project air power. In the 1930s the aircraft carrier was a new weapons system and untested in war. Most naval strategists and tacticians in the 1930s conceived of single carriers launching raids on enemy targets, or sailing with a fleet to provide air cover against enemy bombers. Genda understood the potential of massed air raids launched from multiple aircraft carriers steaming together.
An air power advocate from the time he attended the Japanese Naval Academy, Genda urged the pre-war Japanese military leaders to stop building battleships (which he believed would be better used as "piers" or scrap iron) and concentrate on aircraft carriers, submarines, and supporting fast cruisers and destroyers. Above all, Genda thought that a high-tech and large naval air fleet would be necessary for survival if Japan was ever to fight a war with the United States or Great Britain and The Netherlands.
Pearl Harbor and World War II
The Pearl Harbor attack plan which was ultimately utilized by Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was essentially the work of Genda, with important contributions by others. Yamamoto had become acquainted with Genda in 1933 when Genda served aboard the carrier Ryujo. Yamamoto initially conceived of a one-way attack on Pearl Harbor from 500 to 600 miles away. In his scheme, returning aircraft would ditch in the ocean off Oahu and the pilots would be picked up by destroyers and submarines. Yamamoto was focused on smashing the U.S. Pacific Fleet and sinking as many battleships as possible. Most Americans and Japanese still believed in early 1941 that battleships were the mightiest weapons of war. The sinking of one, or better yet, a number of these giant vessels would be an appalling blow, akin to a disaster of nature.
Yamamoto met with Genda in early February 1941 and presented his ideas to him for comment. Genda strongly disagreed with a one-way attack. Genda had previously considered an attack on Pearl Harbor in 1934 and he had discussed the possibility then with Takijiro Onishi. Genda emphasized to Yamamoto that "secrecy is the keynote and surprise the all-important factor." Genda felt that the task was "difficult, but not impossible" and began working on the details of the plan. Genda was responsible for much of the training, especially in the new tactics of shallow-water torpedo use, effective use of level-bombing by tactical aircraft, and coordinating several aircraft carriers simultaneously.
The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in a lopsided victory, with 12 American warships sunk and over 180 American aircraft destroyed. The main Japanese fleet suffered no ship losses and only 29 aircraft lost. In the following six months of the Pacific War the Imperial Japanese carrier units ranged across the Pacific and Indian Oceans causing major damage to Allied forces. Later, the Battle of Midway brought this phase of the Pacific War to an end, as four of Japan's six heavy carriers were sunk. The Pacific War ground on for three more years, and by the end it was American carrier task forces that cruised with near-impunity in the Pacific.
Genda served with distinction in Japan's Imperial Navy in World War II and personally participated in many battles. He was a noted naval aviator and fighter pilot with over three thousand flight hours. He organized an elite Japanese air unit (the 343 Kokutai) near the war's end as an alternative to the suicidal Kamikaze units. Genda believed that even late in the war Japanese pilots were capable of fighting experienced American pilots on equal terms if properly trained and supplied with state-of-the-art aircraft. Genda personally felt that the Kawanishi N1K2-J Shiden-Kai (Allied code name, "George") was equal to the American F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair. This unit had some success against American aircraft and fought with distinction.
Genda documented his World War II experiences in a revealing autobiography.
Post-war Activities
Following his service in World War II, Genda's military career came to a halt. The Imperial Navy was officially dissolved in 1945. However, Genda did not face the economic struggles that other former military leaders endured as he was supported in the immediate post-war period by a wealthy businessman.
When Japan began "rearming" in 1950s, Genda rejoined the military, this time in Japan's new "air force," the JASDF, eventually rising to the rank of major general and later the chief of staff. Genda also test flew Lockheed Jet fighters in the United States during this period.
In late 1950s, Genda, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Self Defense Force, was involved in the political turmoil surrounding the acquisition of a successor to the F-86 Sabre then in service with the JASDF. JASDF and the Defense Agency wanted the Grumman F-11 Super Tiger, but heavy lobbying by Lockheed--including downright bribery, through the shadowy underworld figure Yoshio Kodama--of key LDP polticians, including Finance Minister Eisaku Sato and Policy Affairs Research Council Chairman Ichiro Kono, led to adoption of the Lockheed contender, the F-104 instead. Genda functioned as Sato's front man in uniform, openly criticizing the Grumman design and working to steer the selection in favor of the Lockheed aircraft. In August, 1959, Genda became the JASDF chief of staff, with the blessing of Sato, his political patron. In his new capacity, he finalized the adoption of the Lockheed jet over the objections of his subordinates.
After retiring from JASDF in 1962, he ran for was elected to the upper house of Japan's legislature, the House of Councillors, as a member of the Sato Faction within Liberal Democratic Party. He was the first of a number of former SDF men who entered legislative politics under the auspices of the Sato Faction, mostly at the far right end of the Japanese political spectrum. He remained influential in politics for more twenty years, as a leading member of the Defense Division of the Policy Affairs Research Council in LDP, often representing the hardline nationalist position advocating abrogation or curtailment of the Article 9 of the postwar Japanese Constitution and open remilitarization of armed forces. He is particularly well-known for his fierce opposition, along with twelve lesser-known far right LDP Dietmen, against Japan's ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty during the 1974-1976 session of the Diet, on the grounds that Japan may one day need to acquire its own nuclear arsenal.
Genda died on August 15, 1989, exactly 44 years to the day after the Japanese surrender (VJ day) in World War II. He was married and had three children.
Trivia
Genda was an uncredited technical advisor in the making of the film Tora Tora Tora, released in 1970.
Genda was played by actor Cary-Hiroyuki Tagawa in Touchstone Pictures' Pearl Harbor, released in 2001. Actor Robert Ito played the role of Genda in the 1976 film Midway, and actor Tatsuya Mihashi play Genda in the 1970 film "Tora Tora Tora".
Alternative-history writer Harry Turtledove used Genda as the primary Japanese protagonist in his fictional account of an invasion of Oahu following the Pearl Harbor attack in his books Days of Infamy and End of the Beginning.
Quotes
On the Pearl Harbor attack
- "In the event of outbreak of war with the United States, there would be little prospect of our operations succeeding unless, at the very outset, we can deal a crushing blow to the main force of the American Fleet in Hawaiian waters by using the full strength of the 1st and 2nd air Squadrons against it, and thus to preclude the possibility of the American Fleet advancing to take the offensive in the Western Pacific for some time."
- "The main strength of a decisive battle should be air arms, while its auxiliary should be built mostly by submarines. Cruisers and destroyers will be employed as screens of carrier groups, while battleships will be put out of commission and tied up."
- "The basic concept to support this assertion was obviously a flat denial of the hitherto long-cherished concept of a sea battle, a concept which was built on an idea of waging once and for all a decisive gunfire engagement with battleships as the nucleus of strength. Instead, it aimed at launching a fatal series of aerial attacks upon enemy fleets from carrier groups operating a few hundred miles away from the enemy force, while land-based air forces and submarines were to support them."
- "This attack must be a perfect surprise. And the result of this attack must be such that the main force of the American Fleet will not be able to advance to the western Pacific for a period of at least six months."
- "The main target of the attack must be against the American aircraft carriers and land-based planes."
- "We must use the entire carrier strength that we have."
- "An attack by torpedoes will be the best, but when it is not possible due to antisubmarine or antitorpedo obstructions in the deeper waters and near harbors, we must use dive bombers for the attack. In that case, we must change the type of planes on the carriers. Whether the torpedo attacks be in shallow or deep waters, plans for such attacks must be made."
- "This attack will be difficult but not impossible. The success of this attack lies in the success of the initial attack, therefore, the planning of the attack must be done in strict secrecy."
External links
- Sakaida and Takaki, Genda's Blade: Japan's Squadron of Aces: 343 Kokutai book review
- Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans book review
- Green, Michael, Arming Japan text on Google Books.